So hopefully that'll be heard in Richmond, and the General Assembly will modify what's been proposed to make it a little bit more constitutional, but also a little bit more along the wishes of what the people of the Commonwealth really want.

You cannot vote away a Right to keep and bear arms. ANY law restricting the Right is unconstitutional and SHOULD BE MET with any force the citizens protecting their rights choose. Death to Tyrants, not jail.

You cannot vote away a Right to keep and bear arms. ANY law restricting the Right is unconstitutional...

True, as long as you understand what the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (RKBA) consists of.

The 2nd Amendment says "the right ... shall not be infringed."

What that connotes depends on what "the right" was defined as; what is it that cannot be infringed. The U.S. Supreme Court has not accepted the edicts of wacko dingbats on the internet that includes the right to keep any weapon, or that there can be no regulations or restrictions.

The "right to keep and bear arms" existed in the colonies, was brought forth into the states before the union, and was protected by the 2nd Amendment from Federal infringement. The right which existed in the colonies came from the English common law. The Framers saw no need to explain to themselves what that right to keep and bear arms was. It had been in the colonies since before they were born.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765)

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

It has never meant a right to carry any and all weapons for any purpose. It does not mean that today.

http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/07-290.html

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER

Certiorari to The United States Court Of Appeals for the District Of Columbia Circuit

No. 07-290.Argued March 18, 2008--Decided June 26, 2008

District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses; and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess firearms and that the city's total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right.

Held:

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2-53.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2-22.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved. Pp. 22-28.

(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28-30.

(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30-32.

(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion. Pp. 32-47.

(f) None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264-265, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47-54.

2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court's opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54-56.

3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District's total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56-64.

478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
DICK ANTHONY HELLER

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District Of Columbia Circuit

[June 26, 2008]

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.

Nothing uncommon or unusual about an AR-15, the police have one in the trunk, a semi-automatic pistol in the holster and a shotgun in the rack. So the government can regulate fully automatic weapons. They shouldn't be taxing ammunition, reloading tools or disallowing magazine sizes. Anymore than they should be outlawing training or shooting ranges.

Nothing uncommon or unusual about an AR-15, the police have one in the trunk, a semi-automatic pistol in the holster and a shotgun in the rack.

I was relieved to see that Cabela’s sells them all.

https://www.cabelas.com/category/Semiautomatic-Pistols/105529680.uts

https://www.cabelas.com/browse.cmd?categoryId=734095080&CQ_search=shotguns&CQ_zstype=REG

https://www.cabelas.com/browse.cmd?categoryId=734095080&CQ_search=ar-15&CQ_zstype=REG

So the government can regulate fully automatic weapons. They shouldn't be taxing ammunition, reloading tools or disallowing magazine sizes. Anymore than they should be outlawing training or shooting ranges.

What the government should, or should not, do does not define what the government has the power to do. Fact, the government may and does tax food. There is nothing to prevent the government from taxing ammunition. Power is power. The guy who created the Internal Revenue and initated the unapportioned income tax became a national hero carved into Mt. Rushmore.

Nobody has outlawed firearms training or shooting ranges. Some jackasses are pandering to the radical left during an election cycle. Others are pandering to the radical right. Any such bill, if signed into law, would be subject to an immediate restraining order, followed up by being struck down as unconstitutional.

There is sales tax on store sales, adding a special tax on ammo above and beyond that would define an infringement as much as a poll tax would. The same goes for loading tools and equipment. Tax the sales, a special tax is an obvious attempt to make it harder to exercise the RKBA.

There is a tax on practically everything, including food. In many states, prescription drugs are taxed. Income is taxed. Various Nevada locations have taxed sex at brothels, interfering with the right to get laid.

The right to keep and bear arms does not guarantee you may do it tax free.

d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30-32.

Dubious, indeed. Jefferson wanted the include the phrase “No free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms” in the proposed Virginia State constitution in 1776.

It was rejected.

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2-53.

Jesus. How in the hell did they ever come up with that little ditty? I suppose the second amendment's mention of a militia was superfluous.

So simple. The second amendment protects state militias from federal infringement and state constitutions protect the individual right.

United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 ... limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47-54.

US v Miller does NOT say "those in common use for lawful purposes". It reads "of the kind in common use at the time". Period.

But the rest is correct -- the second amendment protects only militia-type weapons.

Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54-56.

Miller said nothing about "prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons". Quite the contrary. Miller said the second amendment ONLY protects militia-type weapons.

If militia-type weapons (eg., machine guns) are banned, how are they ever to become "in common use"?

It has never meant a right to carry any and all weapons for any purpose.

Correct. According to Miller, the weapon had to have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”.

Weapons of war were protected by the second amendment.

Dubious, indeed.

The drafting history is of dubious interpretative worth as it does not express the will of the legislative body

US v Miller does NOT say "those in common use for lawful purposes". It reads "of the kind in common use at the time". Period.

No bother, the English Common Law, from which the right to keep and bear arms was directly derived, contains the content you question.

But the amendment says "the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

What is it that shall not be infringed?

One needs to determine what was intended by the term "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" to determine what shall not be infringed. As stated in 1802 and quoted in Lynch v. Clarke in 1844, "The constitution is unintelligible without reference, to the common law."

By the interpretation of some, one must find the Framers intended to protect, and did protect, a right that did not then exist and had never existed in the colonies, the several states or the United States.

It was the colonial common law right to keep and bear arms that was carried forth into the union.

Lynch v. Clarke, New York Legal Observer, Vol 3, 236, 245 (1844)

In 1795, Judge Wilson, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in delivering his charge to the grand jury, in the Virginia Circuit, went into an elaborate dissertation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts over crimes, and after enumerating such as he deemed cognizable by the circuit court, he continued as follows: "In the foregoing catalogue, murder, man slaughter, robbery, piracy, forgery, perjury, bribery and extortion, are mentioned as crimes and offences; but they are neither defined nor described. For this reason we must refer to some pre-existing law for their definition or description. To what pre-existing law should this reference be made? This is a question of immence importance and extent. It must receive an answer, but I cannot, in this address, assign my reasons for the answer which I am about to give. The reference should be made to the common law. To the common law then let us resort for the definition or description of the crimes and offences which in the laws of the United States have been named, but have not been described or defined. You will in this manner, gentlemen, be furnished with a legal standard, by the judicious application of which you may ascertain with precision the true nature and qualities of such facts and transactions as shall become the objects of your consideration and research." (3 Wilson's Works, 357, 371.) And in the debates on the judiciary in 1802, to which I have before alluded, Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, in an able speech in the House of Representatives, said on this subject, (what was not disputed, so far as facts were concerned,) that "the judges of the United States have held generally that the Constitution of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law. Of the soundness of that opinion I never had a doubt. I should scarcely go too far were I to say, that stript of the common law, there would be neither constitution nor government. The constitution is unintelligible without reference, to the common law. And were we to go into our courts of justice with the mere statutes of the United States, not a step could be taken, not even a contempt could be punished. There would be no form of pleading, no principles of evidence, no rule of property. Without this law the constitution becomes a dead letter. For ten years it has been the doctrine of our courts that the common law was in force." (Debates on the Judiciary, 1802, p. 372. And see 1 Story's Comm. on the Const., 140, 141,; § 157, 158, and note 2; 2 ibid, 262 to 267 ; § 794 to 797 ; Rawle on the Const. 258.)

Quotes from State Constitutions

Connecticut - 1776

Paragraph 1. Be it enacted and declared by the Governor, and Council, and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled, That the ancient Form of Civil Government, contained in the Charter from Charles the Second, King of England, and adopted by the People of this State, shall be and remain the Civil Constitution of this State, under the sole authority of the People thereof, independent of any King or Prince whatever.

- - - - -

Delaware 1776

Art. 25. The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution, and the declaration of rights, &c., agreed to by this convention.

- - - - -

Maryland, 1776

III. That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, used and practised by the courts of law or equity; and also to acts of Assembly, in force on the first of June seventeen hundred and seventy-four, except such as may have since expired, or have been or may be altered by acts of Convention, or this Declaration of Rights—subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State: and the inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property, derived to them, from or under the Charter, granted by his Majesty Charles I. to Cæcilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.

- - - - -

New Jersey, 1776

XXI. That all the laws of this Province, contained in the edition lately published by Mr. Allinson, shall be and remain in full force, until altered by the Legislature of this Colony (such only excepted, as are incompatible with this Charter) and shall be, according as heretofore, regarded in all respects, by all civil officers, and others, the good people of this Province.

XXII. That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.

- - - - -

New York, 1777

XXXV. And this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare that such parts of the common law of England, and of the state law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the same. That such of the said acts, as are temporary, shall expire at the times limited for their duration respectively. That all such parts of the said common law, and all such of the said statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts thereof, as may be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their ministers, or concern the allegiance heretofore yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty, government, or prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of Great Britain and his predecessors, over the colony of New York and its inhabitants, or are repugnant to this constitution, be, and they hereby are, abrogated and rejected. And this convention doth further ordain, that the resolves or resolutions of the congresses of the colony of New York, and of the convention of the State of New York, now in force, and not repugnant to the government established by this constitution, shall be considered as making part of the laws of this State; subject, nevertheless, to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State may, from time to time, make concerning the same.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765)

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

Miller said nothing about "prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons". Quite the contrary. Miller said the second amendment ONLY protects militia-type weapons.

It is about time you get past Miller and the transportation of a sawed off shotgun. Update to Heller and McDonald.

According to Miller

Update to where you can say according to Heller and McDonald.

By the interpretation of some, one must find the Framers intended to protect, and did protect, a right that did not then exist and had never existed in the colonies, the several states or the United States.

Exactly. And that was the right of the states to form militias and to have that right protected from federal infringement.

Update to Heller and McDonald.

That's like saying, "Update to Roe v Wade" or "Update to Kelo".

Heller and McDonald are flawed rulings. They're contrary to all previous rulings by the courts and contrary to the Framer's intent. State constitutions protect the individual right to keep and bear arms -- -- -- which is why gun laws vary from state to state.

Update to where you can say according to Heller and McDonald.

Heller cited Miller so why can't I?

The second amendment protects the right to bear arms.

The second amendment protected the right of "the people" as part of a State militia to keep and bear militia-type weapons from federal infringement.

That's the way it was written and that's the way it was interpreted by the courts for over 200 years.

[misterwhite #27] Heller and McDonald are flawed rulings.

[misterwhite #28] Heller cited Miller so why can't I?

[misterwhite #29] The second amendment protected the right of "the people" as part of a State militia to keep and bear militia-type weapons from federal infringement.

While Miller does not really conflict with Heller, Heller, as the more recent interpretation of the Constitution, strikes down all prior interpretations which conflict with Heller.

Heller applied to the District of Columbia. McDonald extended the application of Heller to the States. They are binding precedent, whether you agree with them or not.

Miller, does not conflict with Heller, as Heller interprets Miller.

You may cite Miller as in agreement with Heller. Any of your misbegotten fanciful interpretations of Miller are non-starters as being in conflict with Heller. Any holding of constitutional interpretation in Miller which actually conflicted with Heller would be struck down by Heller.

To cite Miller to interpret the Constitution in a fashion in conflict with Heller is an act of futility and a waste of time.

The law of the United States, as expressed in Heller:

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined.

District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) at 620-28:

[620]

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organiza­tions, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amend­ment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE STEVENS

[621]

presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by join­ing Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Four­teenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was rele­vant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong. Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment's meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.

JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amend­ment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain mili­tary purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637.

Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled

[622]

shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the ab­sence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Cer­tainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equip­ment or that its use could contribute to the common de­fense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no expla­nation of the content of the right.

This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938,

[623]

No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUS­TICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding "that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occa­sion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early Eng­lish law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms in­cludes the right of the individual to have them for the protec­tion of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by crimi­nals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided

[624]

scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the na­ture of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178-­182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Sec­ond Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case.

We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Fire­arms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller's "ordinary mili­tary equipment" language must be read in tandem with what comes after: "[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense. "In the colonial

[625]

and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by mi­litiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same." State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 (1973)).

Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose an­nounced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra. ²⁵

We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amend­ment.

[...]

[626]

III

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amend­ment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever pur­pose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152-153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohi­bitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489-490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students' Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws impos-

[627]

ing conditions and qualfications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have ex­plained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weap­ons." See 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271-272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383-384 (1824); O'Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the concep­tion of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment's ratiication was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of it between the prefatory clause

[628]

and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

While Miller does not really conflict with Heller,

Miller protected militia-type weapons from federal infringement. Heller ruled that "common use" weapons are protected for self-defense in the home.

Totally different, a perversion of the second amendment, and a ruling which limits second amendment protection.

"They are binding precedent, whether you agree with them or not."

I see. They're binding, but Cruikshank, Presser and Miller are not.

"protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain mili­tary purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637.

Oh? And where is that enumerated power listed in the U.S. Constitution?

"Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen."

Pure speculation. The Miller court ruled on the weapon being transported in interstate commerce and found that the second amendment did not protect it -- no matter who was transporting it.

Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Fire­arms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939.

Might be unconstitutional? The National Fire­arms Act's restrictions on machineguns ARE unconstitutional. And without those restrictions, machine guns WOULD be "in common use" today.

Miller protected militia-type weapons from federal infringement. Heller ruled that "common use" weapons are protected for self-defense in the home.

Anywhere that you project that Miller interpreted the Constitution differently than Heller, Miller is superseded by Heller. Your attempts to invoke Miller are futile and a waste of time.

On any particular point, a more recent holding supersedes any prior holding. If you wish to continue your misinterpretation of Miller you are free to do so. Heller said there was no conflict. If there were a conflict, Heller would supercede Miller or any prior precedent you may choose to drag up or misinterpret.

Might be unconstitutional? The National Fire­arms Act's restrictions on machineguns ARE unconstitutional.

Anywhere that you project that Miller interpreted the Constitution differently than Heller, Miller is superseded by Heller. Your attempts to invoke Miller are futile and a waste of time.

On any particular point, a more recent holding supersedes any prior holding. If you wish to continue your misinterpretation of Miller you are free to do so. Heller said there was no conflict. If there were a conflict, Heller would supercede Miller or any prior precedent you may choose to drag up or misinterpret.

You're wrong like you often are.

If you get confused again just let me know and I will set you straight.

Anywhere that you project that Miller interpreted the Constitution differently than Heller, Miller is superseded by Heller. Your attempts to invoke Miller are futile and a waste of time.

Case law is a waste of time. It isn't in the constitution. Read the constitution and understand it for yourself instead of relying on tyrants. If they get it right give them kudos. If they get it wrong don't pretend and do mental gymnastics to make words mean things they never said.

It must stuck to have to change the meaning of words based on what some judge says.

Nope it is an individual right. The right of the people to keep and bear arms.

Sure, if you ignore the rest of the amendment.

On any particular point, a more recent holding supersedes any prior holding.

Stare decisis be damned!

If there were a conflict, Heller would supercede Miller or any prior precedent you may choose to drag up or misinterpret.

Stare decisis be damned!

Case law is a waste of time. It isn't in the constitution.

The Constitution itself is drafted in the language of the English Common Law and SCOTUS itself has remarked that it is impossible to read and interpret without resort to the English Common Law. Common law itself is the collection of court-made law. If you do not like the common law system, you should experience just one case in the Code System of law, common in Latin Europe.

Case law is the very basis of the Common Law system of law adopted by the Federal government and all thirteen original States. All thirteen states adopted so much of the English Common Law as was not inconsistent with the Federal Consistution. They did so explicitly, either in their State constitution, or in their State statute law. You need not take my word for it. Long ago, I collected the source material for that claim and published it on scribd.

https://www.scribd.com/document/269168881/Common-Law-and-English-Statutes-Adopted-in-American-Founding-Era

Absent stare decisis, we would not have a functioning legal system at all.

Stare decisis be damned!

See #41 and stop being a jerk.

Then you have the balls to say that, well, if there is a conflict with Heller, too bad. Heller is now the new precedent and I must ignore all prior rulings ... because stare decisis.

You want to give this power to the Supreme Court? The power, for example, to define the type of arms protected and have that definition apply nationwide?

Already they've limited the definition to "in common use" for self-defense in the home. Yeah, that's what the second amendment means.

You're so eager to look to the U.S. Supreme Court to protect this right from state laws that you ignore the potential for abuse by some future, liberal-dominated court which now has the power to destroy the real meaning.

Me being a jerk? You lecture me on stare decisis while ignoring Cruikshank, Presser and Miller?

Then you have the balls to say that, well, if there is a conflict with Heller, too bad. Heller is now the new precedent and I must ignore all prior rulings ... because stare decisis.

Yes, that's how it works. When Brown v. Topeka Board of Education struck down Plessey v. Ferguson, neither Plessey nor anything else could be cited as making separate but equal lawful.

Repeating your bullshit endlessly does not polish those turds of thought into pearls of wisdom.

Heller and McDonald superseded all prior interpretations which conflicted with them. Heller states it did not conflict earlier precedents. Heller disagrees with your personal and very fanciful, but wrong, reading of those precedents. Your personal, but wrong, reading of those precedents does not strike down Heller. Deal with it.

Heller does not conflict with earlier precedent. If there were an earlier precedent in conflict, Heller would supersede it.

As for the actual law, can you go out and lawfully purchase a newly manufactured machine gun, or can't you?

As for the actual law, can you go out and lawfully purchase a newly manufactured machine gun, or can't you?

No. Only an existing one at an exorbitant price.

As for the actual law, can you go out and lawfully purchase a newly manufactured machine gun, or can't you?

No. Only an existing one at an exorbitant price.

Has it been that way since before you were born?

Has it been that way since before you were born?

1986 federal legislation called the Firearm Owners Protection Act (specifically the Hughes Amendment) prohibited the possession of “new” machine guns by citizens.

Signed into law 19 March 1986. Which commie was president then?

Passed in the Senate 79-15. The yeas were 49 GOP, 30 Dem. The Nays were 2 GOP, 13 Dem. Not voting 2 GOP, 4 Dem.

Passed in the House (amended) by voice vote.

Agreed to in the Senate by voice vote.

Passed in the House (amended) by voice vote.
Agreed to in the Senate by voice vote.

Yep. Usually how controversial and unconstitutional laws are passed. No individual accountability.

I've practiced both American law (common law) and French Civil Law. The systems get to about the same conclusions, but the pathways are different. That they arrive at the same place is testimony to the bedrock of COMMON SENSE that underlies law. Law is not an exercise in abstract philosophy. It is, in the final analysis, a TOOL of governance, where the rubber meets the road between actual citizens in real disputes with each other and/or with the state.

Nutty notions that some subject matter is, somehow, "above the law" just don't work in a world in which there are REAL disputes, with REAL economic and physical consequences. The reason we developed courts at all - whether Common Law or Civil Law - is precisely because if such places of official adjudication DON'T exist and DON'T have orderly rules and procedures that can be predicted and relied upon, people will resort to "self-help", which is a nice way of saying dueling, blood feud, vendetta, and private war. Civil Law, originally Roman Law, fell into disrepair after the fall of Rome, and with it, the Roman Peace evaporated. Feudal Europe was a pretty bloody and terrible place to live. Common Law grew up in places as a bulwark against the craziness of blood feud.

Granted, Christianity (specifically Catholic Canon Law, which was the only game in town in the 1000s (crazies' assertions to the contrary notwithstanding), very heavily inflected the civil and common law courts, by providing an overarching set of lofty (and often unachieved) standards. Still, courts evolved through experience and common sense.

People having the "God-given right" to carry around unregistered machine guns, set up AA missile batteries in their yards on short final to JFK airport, and keeping a stock of mustard gas and a nuke in their basement, "just in case" cannot be what the Second Amendment means. The Constitution is not a suicide pact!

People having the "God-given right" to carry around unregistered machine guns, set up AA missile batteries ....

People have a "God-given right" to self-defense. Beyond that, it's up to the law.

You accurately portray the legal system as it is, and particularly the system of precedent as it applies under the Common Law.

Oh? The system that says if you don't like precedent you can change it?

Then once you have the new "precedent" you're happy with, that precedent cannot be changed because shut up.

Yep. Usually how controversial and unconstitutional laws are passed. No individual accountability.

Hold 'em accountable. Them and President Ronald Reagan.

Senate Vote #142

1985-07-09

TO PASS S 49

REPUBLICAN - YEA

SD	Yea	Sen. James Abdnor [R, 1981-1986]			
ND	Yea	Sen. Mark Andrews [R, 1981-1986]			
MN	Yea	Sen. Rudolph "Rudy" Boschwitz [R, 1978-1990]	
MS	Yea	Sen. Thad Cochran [R, 1979-2018]		
ME	Yea	Sen. William Cohen [R, 1979-1996]			
NY	Yea	Sen. Alfonse D'Amato [R, 1981-1998]		
MO	Yea	Sen. John Danforth [R, 1976-1994]			
AL	Yea	Sen. Jeremiah Denton Jr. [R, 1981-1986]		
KS	Yea	Sen. Robert Dole [R, 1969-1996]			
NM	Yea	Sen. Pete Domenici [R, 1973-2008]	
MN	Yea	Sen. David Durenberger [R, 1978-1994]		
NC	Yea	Sen. John East [R, 1981-1986]				
WA	Yea	Sen. Daniel Evans [R, 1983-1988]			
UT	Yea	Sen. Edwin "Jake" Garn [R, 1974-1992]		
AZ	Yea	Sen. Barry Goldwater [R, 1969-1986]				
WA	Yea	Sen. Slade Gorton [R, 1981-1986]
TX	Yea	Sen. Phil Gramm [R, 1985-2002]			
IA	Yea	Sen. Charles "Chuck"Grassley [R, 1981-2022]	
UT	Yea	Sen. Orrin Hatch [R, 1977-2018]			
FL	Yea	Sen. Paula Hawkins [R, 1981-1986]			
NV	Yea	Sen. Jacob Hecht [R, 1983-1988]			
PA	Yea	Sen. Henry Heinz III [R, 1977-1991]		
NC	Yea	Sen. Jesse Helms [R, 1973-2002]			
NH	Yea	Sen. Gordon Humphrey [R, 1979-1990]		
KS	Yea	Sen. Nancy Kassebaum [R, 1978-1996]		
WI	Yea	Sen. Robert Kasten Jr. [R, 1981-1992]		
NV	Yea	Sen. Paul Laxalt [R, 1974-1986]			
IN	Yea	Sen. Richard Lugar [R, 1977-2012]			
GA	Yea	Sen. Mack Mattingly [R, 1981-1986]
ID	Yea	Sen. James McClure [R, 1973-1990]	
KY	Yea	Sen. Mitch McConnell [R, 1985-2020]		
AK	Yea	Sen. Frank Murkowski [R, 1981-2002]
OK	Yea	Sen. Don Nickles [R, 1981-2004]
OR	Yea	Sen. Robert Packwood [R, 1969-1995]		
SD	Yea	Sen. Larry Pressler [R, 1979-1996]			
IN	Yea	Sen. James "Dan" Quayle [R, 1981-1989]		
DE	Yea	Sen. William Roth Jr. [R, 1971-2000]
NH	Yea	Sen. Warren Rudman [R, 1980-1992]			
WY	Yea	Sen. Alan Simpson [R, 1979-1996]			
PA	Yea	Sen. Arlen Specter [R, 1981-2010]
VT	Yea	Sen. Robert Stafford [R, 1971-1988]		
AK	Yea	Sen. Ted Stevens [R, 1968-2008]		
ID	Yea	Sen. Steven Symms [R, 1981-1992]			
SC	Yea	Sen. Strom Thurmond [R, 1956-2002]				
VA	Yea	Sen. Paul Trible Jr. [R, 1983-1988]		
VA	Yea	Sen. Paul Trible Jr. [R, 1983-1988]		
WY	Yea	Sen. Malcolm Wallop [R, 1977-1994]			
WY	Yea	Sen. Malcolm Wallop [R, 1977-1994]	
VA	Yea	Sen. John Warner [R, 1979-2008]				
CT	Yea	Sen. Lowell Weicker Jr. [R, 1971-1988]		
CA	Yea	Sen. Pete Wilson [R, 1983-1991]			


DEMOCRAT - YEA

MT	Yea	Sen. Max Baucus [D, 1978-2014]			
DE	Yea	Sen. Joseph Biden Jr. [D, 1973-2009]		
NM	Yea	Sen. Jeff Bingaman [D, 1983-2012]			
WV	Yea	Sen. Robert Byrd [D, 1959-2010]			
TX	Yea	Sen. Lloyd Bentsen Jr. [D, 1971-1993]		
OK	Yea	Sen. David Boren [D, 1979-1994]			
AR	Yea	Sen. Dale Bumpers [D, 1975-1998]			
ND	Yea	Sen. Quentin Burdick [D, 1960-1992]		
FL	Yea	Sen. Lawton Chiles Jr. [D, 1971-1988]		
AZ	Yea	Sen. Dennis DeConcini [D, 1977-1994]		
IL	Yea	Sen. Alan Dixon [D, 1981-1992]			
MO	Yea	Sen. Thomas Eagleton [D, 1968-1986]		
NE	Yea	Sen. James Exon [D, 1979-1996]			
KY	Yea	Sen. Wendell Ford [D, 1974-1998]			
OH	Yea	Sen. John Glenn Jr. [D, 1974-1998]			
TN	Yea	Sen. Albert Gore Jr. [D, 1985-1992]		
IA	Yea	Sen. Thomas "Tom" Harkin [D, 1985-2014]		
AL	Yea	Sen. Howell Heflin [D, 1979-1996]			
SC	Yea	Sen. Ernest "Fritz" Hollings [D, 1966-2004]	
LA	Yea	Sen. John Johnston Jr. [D, 1972-1996]		
VT	Yea	Sen. Patrick Leahy [D, 1975-2022]			
MT	Yea	Sen. John Melcher [D, 1977-1988]			
ME	Yea	Sen. George Mitchell [D, 1980-1994]		
GA	Yea	Sen. Samuel Nunn [D, 1972-1996]			
WI	Yea	Sen. William Proxmire [D, 1957-1988]		
AR	Yea	Sen. David Pryor [D, 1979-1996]			
MI	Yea	Sen. Donald Riegle Jr. [D, 1977-1994]		
WV	Yea	Sen. John "Jay" Rockefeller IV [D.1985-2014] 
TN	Yea	Sen. James Sasser [D, 1977-1994]			
NE	Yea	Sen. Edward Zorinsky [D, 1976-1987]		


REPUBLICAN - NAY

RI	Nay	Sen. John Chafee [R, 1976-1999]			
MD	Nay	Sen. Charles Mathias Jr. [R, 1969-1986]		

DEMOCRAT - NAY

CT	Nay	Sen. Christopher Dodd [D, 1981-2010]		
HI	Nay	Sen. Daniel Inouye [D, 1963-2012]			
MA	Nay	Sen. Edward "Ted" Kennedy [D, 1962-2009]	
MA	Nay	Sen. John Kerry [D, 1985-2013]			
NJ	Nay	Sen. Frank Lautenberg [D, 1982-2000]		
MI	Nay	Sen. Carl Levin [D, 1979-2014]			
MD	Nay	Sen. Paul Sarbanes [D, 1977-2006]			
NY	Nay	Sen. Daniel Moynihan [D, 1977-2000]		
CA	Nay	Sen. Alan Cranston [D, 1969-1992]			
CO	Nay	Sen. Gary Hart [D, 1975-1986]				
HI	Nay	Sen. Spark Matsunaga [D, 1977-1990]		
OH	Nay	Sen. Howard Metzenbaum [D, 1976-1994]		
RI	Nay	Sen. Claiborne Pell [D, 1961-1996]			


REPUBLICAN - NOT VOTING

CO	NV	Sen. William Armstrong [R, 1979-1990]		
CO	NV	Sen. Mark Hatfield [R, 1967-1996]			

DEMOCRAT - NOT VOTING

NJ	NV	Sen. William "Bill" Bradley [D, 1979-1996]	
LA	NV	Sen. Russell Long [D, 1948-1986]			
IL	NV	Sen. Paul Simon [D, 1985-1996]			
MS	NV	Sen. John Stennis [D, 1947-1988]			

People have a "God-given right" to self-defense. Beyond that, it's up to the law.

Do Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus have the same God-given rights recognized by the U.S. justice system?

Do athiests have God-given rights recognized by the U.S. justice system?

What does the U.S. justice system consult to determine which rights are given by God Hisself? Whose God is considered the Giver?

Does it matter whether the judge is a Catholic, Protestant, Jew, Muslim, or athiest?

Or does the U.S. justice system recognize the common law right of self-defense?

People having the "God-given right" to carry around unregistered machine guns, set up AA missile batteries in their yards on short final to JFK airport, and keeping a stock of mustard gas and a nuke in their basement, "just in case" cannot be what the Second Amendment means. The Constitution is not a suicide pact!

While the right to keep and bear arms may not be infringed, the right as brought forth from the English common law into the colonies and into the States, has inherent limitations. These limitations are part of the right, they define the right, they do not infringe upon the right.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765)

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

It has never meant a right to carry any and all weapons for any purpose. It does not mean that today.

Oh? The system that says if you don't like precedent you can change it?

Then once you have the new "precedent" you're happy with, that precedent cannot be changed because shut up.

Yes, precedent can be changed. Were SCOTUS to issue an opinion that abortion was infanticide, and not a constitutionally protected right, Roe could no longer be cited to the effect that abortion is a constitutional right. The more recent precedent would prevail.

A prevailing precedent can be changed by amending the constitution. Opinions in Scott v. Sandford were not judicially overturned, but were overturned by post-war amendments which changed the law. As an historical note, SCOTUS found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, that the lower court also lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and SCOTUS remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Minor v. Happersett in 1875 held unanimously that women did not have a constitutional right to vote for President. Moreover, neither did anyone else, and they still don't. But the 19th Amendment came along and said, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." Women may not be denied the right to vote because of their sex. Where men are allowed to vote, women must be allowed to vote on an equal basis. Minor was correctly decided according to the law then in existence, so the law was changed.

A new abortion precedent could be changed by having the issue revisited by the Court yet again, and changing its interpretation of the Constitution. Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 held that seperate but equal was constitutional. Brown v. Topeka Board of Education in 1954 revisited the issue and held that seperate but equal was inherently unequal and was unconstitutional. One cannot go to court and argue Plessy as precedent to overturn Brown.

What cannot be done is to cite a perceived conflict between Miller (1939)and Heller/McDonald (2008/2010) and claim Miller supersedes the more recent interpretation of the Constitution in Heller/McDonald. The precedent set by Heller/McDonald can be overturned by a subsequent, more recent interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court. Should the Court issue a holding in misterwhite v United States, (2020) saying that the 2nd Amendment protects the right to own a newly manufactured machine gun, you would have a new precedent and could buy all the new machine guns you want.

Until the Constitution is amended, or the Supreme Court revisits the issue, you are out of luck.

Or does the U.S. justice system recognize the common law right of self-defense?

The Declaration of Independence declared that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights , that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness". The right to self- defense is part of the right to life.

Now, if the right to self-defense includes the right to own an AK-47, then we would all have the right to own an AK-47. Correct? Even 12-year-olds? Certainly you wouldn't deny the right to self-defense to a 12-year-old!