You better be careful, they may try to torch your house for posting this.

Watch your 6 !!!

Deck, wonder how long it will be before the " Crew " show up to defend that POS, to tell us how much a Hero he is, and that the community owes so much to him.

Not much of a canary crew around these parts lately ever since GrandIsland and Gatlin went on the lam. After watching white and nolu sham defending a cop who murdered a woman in her home, nothing those two say or post would surprise me in the least.

You better be careful, they may try to torch your house for posting this.

Shhh...don't give them any ideas.

I have wondered if nolu sham and gatlin are not one and the same.

I don't think so. nolu wants to be perceived as some sort of whiz-bang lawyer - more likely he is a first year law student who obviously does not have a real job so he posts his "opinions" to make people think he is some kind of legal whiz.

Gatlin's style of posting is different.

Unless they really are the same person and is suffering from schizophrenia.

" Gatlin's style of posting is different. "

Maybe, but they both are often quite verbose, with endless pages of BS.

They both have very high opinions of themselves.

Call one sarge, the other mini me. LOL

nolu wants to be perceived as some sort of whiz-bang lawyer - more likely he is a first year law student

Nolu does some good legal work. I can't recall the last time he was wrong on the law itself.

Of course, he has very strong political opinions on things, and when he gets angry, or motivated, on a cause he becomes a strong legal advocate for his way of looking at it.

When presented is a sound LEGAL argument to the contrary, he doesn't deny the law itself, or attempt to make up law that isn't there. (Lots of people do that.) He does what a good lawyer does and advocates for his cause.

Example: that woman shot in her house. He found the training procedures - the regulations by which the cops are taught. And he has a point too: if the jury is persuaded to hold him to that standard, which is not an unreasonable thing to expect, that cop may very well be acquitted.

Screaming at Nolu for that fact doesn't change the fact, and it doesn't hurt Nolu's feelings because he knows that, structurally, he's right.

Of course he's not going to engage on the matter of jury nullification - the truth that ultimately the jury has the power to judge both the facts AND the law (even though many judges hate that latter power). He's not going to fight about that, because he knows that's true.

I think he is quite good at what he does.

Nolu does some good legal work. I can't recall the last time he was wrong on the law itself.

Of course, he has very strong political opinions on things, and when he gets angry, or motivated, on a cause he becomes a strong legal advocate for his way of looking at it.

One can technically be correct as the law may be applied -- but it doesn't always make it right or fair. The best attorneys seem to have the ability to take either side and manipulate the semantics (or cite a subverted case law) to win their respective case -- and damn the original intent.

I support the right of advocacy or of opining passionately or in anger at this forum -- whomever it is -- whether nolu, GI, or Gilligan; Just as long as spamming isn't abused, chronic ignorance isn't the rule rather than exception, and support of one's own opinion or case is given.

The best attorneys seem to have the ability to take either side and manipulate the semantics (or cite a subverted case law) to win their respective case -- and damn the original intent.

Yes, damn the original intent, because the idea that "original intent" should govern how the law is read and applied is merely the political opinion of ONE SET of constituents, who want it that way because then they can win their causes more easily, without having to struggle hard like everybody else.

But that's not the way the game is played, and that's not the way people are going to be. There is real power, and wealth, and control, at stake in law, and so therefore OF COURSE nobody is going to simply concede the field of battle to one side because they claim "original intent".

"Original intent", to the extent that can be determined and agreed upon at all (WHOSE "original" intent?), is just one way of looking at things. That it gets one party to a case the answer he wants is great for him, but on its own there is no inherent power in original intent - there is merely the argument of the fellow who wants to use it that it's best, because it gives him the outcome he desires.

The opponent will, of course, point to other sources of authority, such as recent interpretation, the evolution of society and economics, righting wrongs, etc.

The winner is the one who convinces the trier of law and of fact that to agree with him.

Yes, damn the original intent, because the idea that "original intent" should govern how the law is read and applied is merely the political opinion of ONE SET of constituents, who want it that way because then they can win their causes more easily, without having to struggle hard like everybody else.

"Original intent", to the extent that can be determined and agreed upon at all (WHOSE "original" intent?), is just one way of looking at things....

Well, the Original Intent was the progenitor of Constitutional Law, based on consensus and common sense during a day when law would NEVER have based equality, fairness and justice solely on sexual considerations and a social justice agenda. It would have rightly been sneered at.

Facts are facts, and truth, truth -- whether 200 years ago or 2000 years ago.

Replacing THAT broken, stodgy, rigid Original Intent with what has today become a "new set" of court opinion today has rigged the law and justice. This is provable. Moreover, the amorphous "Living Constitution" and Court we find ourselves parsing law points today has helped create our current upside down world of chaos and anarchy, dividing Americans into slivers and bits.

Hasn't it indeed been this flexible anti-OI ilk, whose demented courts have created the insanity called, "same-sex Marriage"? Have un-equally applied and created select laws enforced FOR/AGAINST select demographics (Hate Laws/Speech/AA, Quotas, Black & Gay Privileged)? Courts and LE that selectively and un-equal protection/enforcement (Antifa vs Conservatives)? And selectively, unfairly, and unequally applied the law in politically targeting conservative businesses (Bakeries/Florists/Chick-Fi-A)? This while The bending over backwards on speech and laws that un-equally support "Gay/LBGTQ"/SJW EVERYTHING? Etc??

There is real power, and wealth, and control, at stake in law, and so therefore OF COURSE nobody is going to simply concede the field of battle to one side because they claim "original intent".

No kidding.

But the truth is, yes -- one side HAS surrendered the high ground, the fair ground, the EQUAL ground with respect to law and its application. The debate is now with respect to WHO surrendered OI as a basis of law, and why. Some say the Elites have evolved to such a position of power that they eventually and currently control BOTH sides of the Courts, thus the ultimate direction. (Once people don't respect the Law they deem unfair, they defy it, ergo chaos/anarchy. ARE we seeing this nowadays?)

The opponent will, of course, point to other sources of authority, such as recent interpretation, the evolution of society and economics, righting wrongs, etc.

The winner is the one who convinces the trier of law and of fact that to agree with him.

Are you really convinced the Courts have NOT been hijacked by subversive elements?

Truth does NOT "evolve." Lies do.

Acceptance of Lies to rectify past wrongs is not "justice"; It is travesty. How dare the (female-heavy) Courts apply what are reparations. How dare they apply "revenge" justice upon men and Whitey.

The decidedly ideological-based socialist, fascist, situational, anti-sovereignty bent that now defines American courts now as well as European courts will not turn out well.

The "Winner": Nobody but the Elites.

The "Losers": Everybody else.

nolu wants to be perceived as some sort of whiz-bang lawyer - more likely he is a first year law student who obviously does not have a real job so he posts his "opinions" to make people think he is some kind of legal whiz.

I'm a little old to be a 1L.

I have never claimed to be a lawyer.

I obviously do not have a real job, or any job. I used to have a real job. I retired over ten years ago.

I do not post my opinions to make people think anything. I post the opinions of legal authorities and courts to counter the bullshit posted by the anarcho-libertarian hive around here.

With effort, and ability, anyone could use the Google and find the online legal information that I post. You call that sort of stuff B.S. or spam. Others refer to such things a court opinions or legal opinions.

I prefer legal opinions from sources that evidence knowledge of the law. You prefer legal opinions from legally challenged, highly biased sources who say what you want to hear.

Maybe, but they both are often quite verbose, with endless pages of BS.

Being short, concise and wrong, accompanied by a page of tag lines is no accomplishment.

Accompanying my claims with the legal authority that supports them does seem to chafe the anarcho-libertarian hive that believes their every brain fart is the actual law.

Of course he's not going to engage on the matter of jury nullification - the truth that ultimately the jury has the power to judge both the facts AND the law (even though many judges hate that latter power). He's not going to fight about that, because he knows that's true.

I have addressed the issue of jury nullification numerous times on this site. I have done it enough times that I only need to drag out the script to do it again. It seemed pointless as I am sure you already know the issue, and the local anarcho-libertarian hive will not listen.

See my post of 2019-09-24.

The legal issue before the court in People v. Brandt 2019 CO 80 (23 Sep 2019) was free speech, not jury nullification. No act of jury nullification was involved; only advocacy.

Of course, there is no such "right" to jury nullification. Should any juror admit that he or she believes in jury nullification, the judge has a duty to excuse or remove them for cause. With some restrictions pertaining to where and when, the right to free speech protects the distribution of legal bullshit. The alleged "right" of jury nullification is legal bullshit.

In a Charge of the Court, or jury instruction, the jury is typically instructed as in the following actual instruction from a Texas case:

You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to the testimony, but you are bound to receive the law from the Court which is herein given to you and be governed by that law.

Anarcho-libertarians chafe at such an instruction.

A juror has the power (not the right) to violate his or her oath and not face liability. A juror has the power (not the right) to retire to the jury room and ignore the Court's explicit written instructions to the jury and not face liability. The juror may face dismissal from the jury.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/116/606/611938/

U.S. v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997)

Before: LUMBARD, Mc LAUGHLIN and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge.

We consider here the propriety of the district court's dismissal of a juror allegedly engaged in "nullification"—the intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presiding judge—during the course of deliberations. We address, in turn, (1) whether such alleged misconduct constitutes "just cause" for dismissal of a deliberating juror under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 23(b)"),1 so that a jury of only eleven persons may continue to deliberate and return a verdict, and (2) what evidentiary standard must be met to support a dismissal on this ground.

The appellants are two sets of defendants convicted of violations of federal narcotics laws after two separate trials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief Judge ). We have decided the appeals of defendants convicted at the first of these trials in a summary order of this date. We write here to consider only the appeals of Grady Thomas, Ramse Thomas, Jason Thomas, Tracey Thomas, and Loray Thomas, all of whom were convicted in the second trial. On appeal, they argue, chiefly, that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of one of the jurors pursuant to Rule 23(b) during the course of jury deliberations. The court based its decision to remove the juror, in large part, on a finding that the juror was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law—in effect, that the juror intended to acquit the defendants regardless of the evidence of their guilt.

We consider below whether a juror's intent to convict or acquit regardless of the evidence constitutes a basis for the juror's removal during the course of deliberations under Rule 23(b). We also consider what constitutes sufficient evidence of that intent in light of the limitations on a presiding judge's authority to investigate allegations of nullification required by the need to safeguard the secrecy of jury deliberations. We conclude, inter alia, that—as an obvious violation of a juror's oath and duty—a refusal to apply the law as set forth by the court constitutes grounds for dismissal under Rule 23(b). We also conclude that the importance of safeguarding the secrecy of the jury deliberation room, coupled with the need to protect against the dismissal of a juror based on his doubts about the guilt of a criminal defendant, require that a juror be dismissed for a refusal to apply the law as instructed only where the record is clear beyond doubt that the juror is not, in fact, simply unpersuaded by the prosecution's case. We hold that the district court erred in dismissing a juror, based largely on its finding that the juror was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law, where the record evidence raised the possibility that the juror's view on the merits of the case was motivated by doubts about the defendants' guilt, rather than by an intent to nullify the law. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the district court and remand for a new trial.

[...]

The district court dismissed Juror No. 5 pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 23(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that where "the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." We review the district court's exercise of this authority for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1092, 115 S.Ct. 756, 130 L.Ed.2d 655 (1995); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1187 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990). 24

To determine whether the court erred in dismissing Juror No. 5, we must first decide whether the district court's primary basis for the dismissal—the juror's intention to disregard the applicable criminal laws—constitutes "just cause" for his removal under Rule 23(b). In holding that a presiding judge has a duty to dismiss a juror who purposefully disregards the court's instructions on the law, we briefly review the factors that courts have traditionally considered to be "just cause" for dismissal pursuant to Rule 23(b), and discuss the dangers inherent in so-called "nullification." Having concluded that a deliberating juror's intent to nullify constitutes "just cause" for dismissal, we next consider whether the district court in this case had a sufficient evidentiary basis for concluding that Juror No. 5 was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law.

[...]

Essentially, the judge found that Juror No. 5 intended to engage in a form of "nullification," a practice whereby a juror votes in purposeful disregard of the evidence, defying the court's instructions on the law.

We take this occasion to restate some basic principles regarding the character of our jury system. Nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court—in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to "render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 225 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis supplied).8 We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent. Accordingly, we conclude that a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less subject to dismissal than is a juror who disregards the court's instructions due to an event or relationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.

We are mindful that the term "nullification" can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors may nullify, for example, because of the identity of a party, a disapprobation of the particular prosecution at issue, or a more general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws. We recognize, too, that nullification may at times manifest itself as a form of civil disobedience that some may regard as tolerable. The case of John Peter Zenger, the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal acquitted of criminal libel in 1735, and the nineteenth-century acquittals in prosecutions under the fugitive slave laws, are perhaps our country's most renowned examples of "benevolent" nullification. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J.); see also SHANNON C, STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 52-55 (1990) (describing Zenger trial). We are also aware of the long and complicated history of juries acting as judges of the law as well as the evidence, see, e.g., John D. Gordan III, Juries as Judges of the Law: The American Experience, 108 LAW Q. REV. 272 (1992); Mark De Wolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939), and of the theoretical underpinnings of this practice in the United States, in which legal decisions by juries were sometimes regarded as an expression of faithfulness to the law (regardless of the authority of institutions or officeholders), rather than defiance of the law or "nullification."More generally, the very institution of trial by jury in a criminal case, as Judge Learned Hand observed, "introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions." U.S. ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). This is so because, as Judge Hand explained, "[t]he individual can forfeit his liberty—to say nothing of his life—only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they came.... [S]ince if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove...." Id. at 775-76.

As courts have long recognized, several features of our jury trial system act to protect the jury's power to acquit, regardless of the evidence, when the prosecution's case meets with the jury's "moral[ ] disapprov[al]." Since the emergence of the general verdict in criminal cases and the famous opinion in Bushell's Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P.1670), freeing a member of the jury arrested for voting to acquit William Penn against the weight of the evidence, nullifying jurors have been protected from being called to account for their verdicts. Moreover, and in addition to the courts' duty to safeguard the secrecy of the jury deliberation room (discussed in greater detail below), the several rules protecting the unassailability of jury verdicts of acquittal—even where these verdicts are inconsistent with other verdicts rendered by the same jury in the same case, United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.) (recognizing link between upholding inconsistent verdicts and protecting juries' power of lenity), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 242, 19 L.Ed.2d 262 (1967)—serve to "permit[ ] juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2007, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But as the quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Standefer indicates, in language originally employed by Judge Learned Hand, the power of juries to "nullify" or exercise a power of lenity is just that—a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent.

One can technically be correct as the law may be applied -- but it doesn't always make it right or fair.

We have courts of law. The law is not always right or fair. Consider who the people elect to write the laws. The Court is charged with following the law.

[Liberator] The best attorneys seem to have the ability to take either side and manipulate the semantics (or cite a subverted case law) to win their respective case -- and damn the original intent.

[Vicomte13] Yes, damn the original intent, because the idea that "original intent" should govern how the law is read and applied is merely the political opinion of ONE SET of constituents, who want it that way because then they can win their causes more easily, without having to struggle hard like everybody else.

The Court is to look at the meaning of the words adopted, as that meaning existed at the time. Regarding the Constitution, reference is made to the English common law for terms taken therefrom.

The anarcho-libertarian hive does not want to hear it.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570, 576-77 (2008)

II

We turn first to the meaning of the Second Amendment.

A

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824). Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)

In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].

the power of juries to "nullify" or exercise a power of lenity is just that—a power; it is by no means a right

Learned Hand was the greatest American judge to never sit on the Supreme Court.

Generally, for reasons of judicial economy (and because the majority of the court agrees more or less with the old precedent), the Supremes like to "stare decisis et not quieta movetur" - to stand by the decided and not disturb that which is quietly settled.

Except when they don't like it. Then they'll overturn those precedents at will (Brown v. Board of Education) or blow them up with dynamite because they can (the gay marriage decision!)

We have courts of law. The law is not always right or fair. Consider who the people elect to write the laws. The Court is charged with following the law.

“There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”

- Robert H. Jackson, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (concurring)

Accompanying my claims with the legal authority that supports them

Which legal authority supports a SWAT team member and his schoolteacher wife producing child porn?

I bet you support the guy because he's a cop, and as you have shown repeatedly in the past, you are one of those submissive boot-lickers who believe that cops can do no wrong.

Which legal authority supports a SWAT team member and his schoolteacher wife producing child porn?

Deckard, Deckard on the Law.

I bet you support the guy because he's a cop

I bet you support him because he didn't knock the dick out of your mouth.

you are one of those submissive boot-lickers who believe that cops can do no wrong.

You forget that I was the one who argued that murder was an appropriate charge against Amber Guyger, pointing out the Texas definitions of murder and consent, and rebutting the claim that diminished capacity was a recognized defense in that state. You were your usual clueless self.