There has been no trial or judgment which has determined that the taxpayers are in any sort of way “to be held liable.”

Nice job deflecting again Partsons.

Apparently it's OK with you that cops can violate the rights of an innocent citizen and then conspire to make up a bunch of bullshit charges in attempt to frame the guy.

The corruption starts as an unidentified trooper begins to search for anything that these gentlemen may have done to make up charges against them. However, they were clean. At this point, Trooper first class Barone chimes in describing how they now have to charge these men with something to justify their harassment and subsequent detainment.

“Want me to punch a number on this? Gotta cover our ass,” explains the trooper as they begin conspiring.

“Let’s give him something,” says an unidentified trooper, pondering the ways they can lie about this innocent man.

“What are they going to do? Are they going to do anything?” says Sergeant Jacobi, noting that they are entirely innocent.

“It’s legal to do it,” he continues, describing how the actions of the two activists are completely legal, before going on to make up charges on them.

“I think we do simple trespass, we do reckless use of the highway and creating a public disturbance,” Jacobi says as he makes up these false charges against innocent people. “All three are tickets.”

Once they figure out the false charges to raise, the officers then brainstorm a story of lies to back them up.

“And then we claim that, um, in backup, we had multiple, um,” the unidentified trooper stutters as he makes up his fake story. “Um, they (the non-existent complainants) didn’t want to stay and give us a statement, so we took our own course of action.”

The corrupt cops had then solved their fake case, lied about a cover story, and were set to charge an innocent man with three crimes — all in a day’s work.

Of course the taxpayers will be forced to shell out beaucoup bucks to settle the lawsuit.

Did you watch the video or do you just support police abuse of power?

[Matt Agorist] Now, because the system failed to hold the officers accountable, the case is now a civil matter and the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut.

[Gatlin #1] There has been no trial or judgment which has determined that the taxpayers are in any sort of way “to be held liable.”

- - - - - - - - - -

[A K A Stone #3] I watched a few seconds of the video and the cop is already lying that it is illegal to take his picture. Why didn't you express outrage at that lie.

Gatlin pointed out the bullshit element of the article. There has been no trial, nobody has been ordered to stand trial, and there will likely be no trial.

[Matt Agorist] Now, because the system failed to hold the officers accountable, the case is now a civil matter and the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut. The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

Where is the missing citation to the lawsuit?

[Matt Agorist] Taxpayers to Be Held Liable After Cops Steal Man’s Phone, Film Themselves Conspiring to Frame Him

If the taxpayers are to be held liable, why have "the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial"? That makes no sense whatever, Pure Agorist.

[Matt Agorist] On September 11, 2015, journalist and police accountability activist, Michael Picard was illegally detained

[Matt Agorist] As TFTP reported at the time,

WATCH: Cops Steal Man’s Phone, Accidentally Record Themselves Conspiring to Falsely Charge Him

Matt Agorist September 20, 2016

The Free Thought Project spoke to the ACLU who put out a press release:

In a complaint filed today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut (ACLU-CT) contends that three state police troopers illegally retaliated against a protester by searching and detaining him, confiscating his camera, and charging him with fabricated criminal infractions. On behalf of Connecticut resident Michael Picard, the ACLU-CT alleges that John Barone, Patrick Torneo, and John Jacobi, all employed by the state police division of Connecticut’s Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, violated Picard’s First Amendment rights to free speech and information and Fourth Amendment right against warrantless seizure of his property.

https://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=59243&Disp=10#C10

#10. To: All (#9) (Edited)

I just noticed this is another article by the liar Matt Argorist.

No more articles from that freak.

If you post more I will delete them. Then if you continue I will delete everything from free thought project. Then I will just delete you.

I don't like liars.

Thanks for your cooperation.

A K A Stone posted on 2019-06-23 7:07:11 ET

Taxpayers to Be Held Liable …

I ask:

Has there been a trial or judgment which determined that the taxpayers are in any sort of way “to be held liable” and will have to pay out any money?

"to be" refers to the likely outcome, based on past experiences of this type.

I just noticed this is another article by the liar Matt Argorist.

No more articles from that freak.

If you post more I will delete them

Stone later retracted that edict.

Try to keep up short-bus rider.

I watched a few seconds of the video and the cop is already lying that it is illegal to take his picture. Why didn't you express outrage at that lie. The cop should already be fired and imprisoned.

Courts routinely allow cops to lie to the public. Not just in criminal interrogations but pretty much all the time.

This journalist is just lucky that the police were not "frightened" and had to shoot him full of holes. Because the police being "frightened" is their free ticket to exoneration for almost anything. It's the fraidy-cop legal defense and juries fall for it more often than not.

"Blam, blam, blam! That chihuahua frightened me when it was sitting on the lap of that elderly person sleeping in a wheelchair so I had to shoot them both. Did I mention I was very frightened?"

We really should just fire any cop that tries to use a fraidy-cop defense. It's most often a confession of complete incompetence as a cop as a public safety officer. When helpless people and harmless dogs end up dead regularly on your beat, the cops are more of a menace to public safety than anything else, perhaps even more than the local criminal element who don't go shooting up the wrong house or the invalids in wheelchairs or the quiet little dogs in their kennel. It's generally a shameful defense.

"Well I came home after a shift enforcing the laws and I was busy sexting and flirting with my partner and I climbed an extra set of stairs in my building and walked into the just-ajar door of what I thought was my apartment. Pushing the door open, I saw a man eating ice cream on an unfamiliar sofa and I suddenly became Very Very Frightened so...blam-blam-blam...now let me off the hook so I can go back to shooting up citizens on duty, not just in my own home or my scary ice-cream gobbling neighbor's home."

It's a ridiculous defense. Laughable even were it not for the unfortunate victim who lost his life.

Stone later retracted that edict.

Try to keep up short-bus rider.

Provide a link or a quote asswipe.

I am sure he will find the link for you.

Nope. He's too lazy.

I see it. It was on 4 Sep and I was not around from 8/25 to 9/18. It was not addressed to me so I was not pinged to it.

https://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=59860&Disp=13#C13

#13. To: Deckard (#12)

Post Matt. Don't flood us with Matt though please.

A K A Stone posted on 2019-09-04 8:25:38 ET

the case is now a civil matter and the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit

Nobody has been ordered to stand trial. A trial has not yet been scheduled.

Here are the last four docket entries:

09/18/2019 94 ORDER: The parties are instructed to file a joint report within 15 days of this order the following information: Trial availability dates; estimated length of trial; and whether the parties would consent to magistrate jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 9/18/19.(Imbriani, Susan) (Entered: 09/18/2019)

09/18/2019 95 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Robert M. Spector for settlement conference. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 9/18/19.(Imbriani, Susan) (Entered: 09/18/2019)

09/19/2019 96 NOTICE OF E-FILED CALENDAR: THIS IS THE ONLY NOTICE COUNSEL/THE PARTIES WILL RECEIVE. ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE MUST PRESENT PHOTO IDENTIFICATION. A telephonic pre-settlement conference is set for 10/1/2019 at 02:00 PM before Judge Robert M. Spector. A date for the settlement conference will be set during the telephone call. As the Court requires parties or their representatives with settlement authority to attend the settlement conference, counsel should obtain dates of unavailability from their clients over the next 90 days and have their own calendars available to aid in the scheduling. During the telephone call, counsel should be prepared to discuss what information needs to be exchanged and anything else that needs to be accomplished prior to the settlement conference for the discussions to be productive. Please use the following dial-in for this call: (877) 873-8017; Access Code: 7040261. (Mallon, Kathleen) (Entered: 09/19/2019)

09/23/2019 97 MOTION for Reconsideration by John Barone, John Jacobi, Patrick Torneo. (Motherway, Carmel) (Entered: 09/23/2019)

Suit was filed 15 Sep 2016.

Named defendants on the Docket Report are Patrick Torneo, John Jacobi, and John Barone.

Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 USC 1331.

https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2016/title-28/part-iv/chapter-85/sec.-1331/

28 USC 1331

§1331. Federal question

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Some counts have already been tossed on Summary Judgment. Folks can stop making believe these are still before the court.

COMPLAINT at 11-12 recites the Counts and Prayer for Relief:

Count 1: Violation of Mr. Picard’s First Amendment Right to Receive and Memorialize Information

87. By interfering with Mr. Picard’s ability to use his camera and smartphone, the defendants violated Mr. Picard’s First Amendment right to receive and memorialize information.

Count 2: Violation of Mr. Picard’s Fourth Amendment Right Against Warrantless Seizure of his Property

88. By seizing Mr. Picard’s camera and detaining it without it without a search warrant or any reasonable suspicion that the camera contained evidence of a crime or was itself contraband, the defendants violated Mr. Picard’s Fourth Amendment right against warrantless seizure of his possessions.

Count 3: Retaliation Against Mr. Picard for His Expression

89. By detaining, searching, confiscating his belongings, and charging Mr. Picard with fabricated criminal infractions, the defendants violated Mr. Picard’s First Amendment right to document and protest government activity.

Request for Relief

90. Therefore, Mr. Picard is entitled to have this Court:

(a) enter judgment in his favor on all counts;

(b) award him damages, and punitive damages, for the defendants’ violations of his rights;

(c) order the defendants to reimburse him his reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees in conformance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

(d) order all other relief as the Court deems appropriate.

91. Mr. Picard claims a trial by jury on all disputes so eligible.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

09/16/2019 92 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT denying 74 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 76 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 84 Motion to Preclude. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 9/16/19. (Imbriani, Susan) (Entered: 09/16/2019)

Doc 92 at 9-16:

Count One

Plaintiff maintains that defendants violated his First Amendment rights to gather information when Barone slapped his video camera to the ground as he approached plaintiff; and when Barone later took the video camera away for the duration of the encounter. Plaintiff argues that the law protects his ability to photograph or videograph what any passing pedestrian or motorist could observe with their senses.

Plaintiff relies on Supreme Court precedent establishing the right to gather information as protected by the First Amendment. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-5, 568 (1969). However, the Supreme Court has also established that even in a public forum, “the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Neither the Supreme Court nor Second Circuit precedent has squarely established that an individual who is the subject of police activity has the right to record police performing their official duties.

See McKenzie v. City of New York, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019). However, circuits that have addressed whether there is a right to record police activity “have concluded that the First Amendment protects the right to record police officers performing their duties in a public space, subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.” Gerskovich v. Iocco, 2017 WL 323645, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (“The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that the First Amendment protects the right to record police activity.”); Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The circuits that have recognized the right have indicated that such right may not be applicable in certain situations such as “in particularly dangerous situations, if the recording interferes with the police activity, if it is surreptitious, if it is done by the subject of the police activity, or if the police activity is part of an undercover investigation.” McKenzie, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7.

The Court will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count one on the basis of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability to the extent that their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine protects public officials from the risk of potentially ruinous monetary liability that would deter qualified people from public service, and it safeguards the public interest in having government employees act with independence and without fear of consequences. Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F. 2d 889, 895 (2d Cir. 1988).

A party is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity if the court finds that the rights of the plaintiff were not clearly established or that no reasonable jury could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant to believe that he was not clearly violating an established federal right. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1996).

In the first stage of the qualified immunity analysis, the court must consider whether the facts, taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, could show a constitutional violation. Cowan v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 761 (2d Cir. 2003). If so, the court must determine whether the right in question was clearly established at the time the violation occurred. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

In determining whether a right is clearly established, the court considers whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2002). To determine whether a particular right was clearly established at the time defendants acted, the court should consider:

(1) whether the right in question was defined with “reasonable specificity”;

(2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and (3) whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful. Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1991). “When neither the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized a right, the law of our sister circuits and the holdings of district courts cannot act to render that right clearly established within the Second Circuit.” Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006).

Thus, a qualified immunity defense is established where: "(a) the defendant's action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law." Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998). The doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes that "reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. However, qualified immunity applies if the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable. Id. Qualified immunity does not apply if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have taken the actions of the alleged violation. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. Summary judgment is appropriate when a trier of fact would find that reasonable officers could disagree. Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1995).

Some district courts have held that in the context of a journalist, who is not subject to the police activity, the First Amendment right to record police activity in public is clearly established. See Stolarik v. City of New York, 2017 WL 4712423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017); Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380. However, the instant plaintiff was not a journalist or even a bystander; he was a subject of defendants' investigation and performance of their official duties. Accordingly, plaintiff's right to record police activity or to record a police officer engaged in his official duties was not “clearly established” within this Circuit at the time of September 11, 2015, so that a reasonable defendant officer would have understood from existing law that his conduct was unlawful. See Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McKenzie, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7; Rivera v. Foley, 2015 WL 1296258, at *9 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015) (qualified immunity granted on basis that right to record police officers engaged in ongoing investigation was not clearly established as matter of constitutional law). ²

Summary judgment will enter in favor of defendants on this claim.

² Connecticut General Statutes § 52-571j(b) provides: “An employer of a peace officer who interferes with any person taking a photographic or digital still or video image of such peace officer or another peace officer acting in the performance of such peace officer's duties shall be liable to such person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.” However, this statute, which was not effective until October 1, 2015, does not create a clearly established First Amendment right to record police in performance of official duties.

Doc 92 at 18-19:

Count Three

In count three, plaintiff alleges that defendants charged him with the infractions to retaliate against his protected activities of protesting and/or recording police activity. Defendants argue that summary judgment must enter on plaintiff's retaliation claims because the defendants acted with probable cause; no evidence indicates that defendants' actions were motivated or substantially caused by plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights; and defendants' actions did not chill plaintiff's First Amendment rights. They also assert that his claim of retaliation based on his recording of their activity must fail because it implicates no First Amendment right.

To state his First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a right protected by the First Amendment; (2) defendants' actions were motivated or substantially caused by plaintiff's exercise of that right; and (3) defendants' actions effectively chilled the exercise of his First Amendment. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir. 2001). “Chilled speech is not necessary if plaintiff can establish that he suffered some other concrete harm.” Dorsett v. County of Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013).

As to plaintiff's claim of retaliation based on his First Amendment right to record the defendants in their official duties, the Court will grant summary judgment on basis of qualified immunity due to the lack of a clearly established First Amendment right to record police activity as articulated relevant to count one.

Doc 92 at 27:

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [doc. 74] is DENIED; defendants' motion for summary judgment [doc. 76] is GRANTED as to count one and as to the First Amendment retaliation claim based on his asserted First Amendment right to record police activity in count three; defendants' motion for summary judgment is otherwise DENIED as to count two and three. The motion to preclude [doc. 84] is found to be MOOT.

Dated this 16th day of September, 2019 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

https://www.scribd.com/document/427998961/Picard-v-Torneo-Dcct-3-16-Cv-1564-Wwe-09-Sep-2019-Doc-92-Memorandum-on-Decision-on-Cross-Motions-for-Summary-Judgment

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Nobody has been ordered to stand trial. A trial has not yet been scheduled.

I think there should be a trial. Deckard should be put on trial for posting Matt Agorist articles here at LibertysFlame.

AKA can be the judge. nolu can be the prosecutor. Deckard can represent himself in court (pro se!). misterwhite can be the Jury Foreman. And I can be a Fully-Informed Juror.

It would be the Trial Of The Century.

And this article began with a humongous LIE used as a attention grabber in the headline.

He posted a likely scenario as a headline. Of course it's OK when you post one of your libertarian-bashing posts with obvious lies or opinions as headlines isn't it Gatlin.?

In fact here's one you authored: Libertarians on Liberty’s Post suppress dissent – Sad.

Stone: "Post Matt. Don't flood us with Matt though please. "

One or two articles does not constitute a flood.

I never – NEVER – “disrespected ANY citizens” and I NEVER made ANY “excuses for the cops.”

HAHAHAHA!!!

All – ALL – I ever did was to point out that Matt Agorist LIED in the article.

Don’t waste your time with Stone. No matter how bad Dicktard, Hondope or Fred’s Ass Hurtz treats Stone, calls him vile names on his own forum, Stone always lets them back on to post.

Here is FACT. Stone could tell Dicktard not to post something, and we fucking both know, Dicktard with do what ever the fuck he wants. We also know Stone will never permanently ban a PAULTARD... so think about it. If Stone won’t permanently ban Dicktard, and Dicktard won’t follow Stones directives... THEN STONE HAS TO FLIP FLOP.

It is what it is.

One example:

I'm sick of your lies asshole.

Deckard posted on 2019-08-15 8:43:51 ET

It is what it is.

I know that you are absolutely correct.

So sad - So VERY SAD ...

I didn’t see where Stone said Matt Agorist lies were permitted after he had said: ”I don't like liars.”

I didn’t see where Stone said that the title was a lie. In fact, he made some rather positive comments agreeing with the article itself.

Stop trying to be the forum nanny Parsons.

You don't agree with the title?

Your whining is duly noted.

Show where I ever did either … “disrespected ANY citizens”

Every libertarian-bashing screed you post for example.

I NEVER made ANY “excuses for the cops"

Every thread where a cop abuses innocent citizens - you and FireIsland worship cops.

Stop with your DEFLECTION ...

I answered your questions boot-licker.

Will you admit they were lies?

Stop with your DEFLECTION ...

You've been deflecting the entire thread.

35 posts in and you have yet to address the egregious behavior of the lying cops.

Will you admit they were lies?

Pointing out the LIES in the article on this thread

Oh, now the entire article is a lie?

Please point out the lies here:

The corruption starts as an unidentified trooper begins to search for anything that these gentlemen may have done to make up charges against them. However, they were clean. At this point, Trooper first class Barone chimes in describing how they now have to charge these men with something to justify their harassment and subsequent detainment.

“Want me to punch a number on this? Gotta cover our ass,” explains the trooper as they begin conspiring.

“Let’s give him something,” says an unidentified trooper, pondering the ways they can lie about this innocent man.

“What are they going to do? Are they going to do anything?” says Sergeant Jacobi, noting that they are entirely innocent.

“It’s legal to do it,” he continues, describing how the actions of the two activists are completely legal, before going on to make up charges on them.

“I think we do simple trespass, we do reckless use of the highway and creating a public disturbance,” Jacobi says as he makes up these false charges against innocent people. “All three are tickets.”

Once they figure out the false charges to raise, the officers then brainstorm a story of lies to back them up.

“And then we claim that, um, in backup, we had multiple, um,” the unidentified trooper stutters as he makes up his fake story. “Um, they (the non-existent complainants) didn’t want to stay and give us a statement, so we took our own course of action.”

The corrupt cops had then solved their fake case, lied about a cover story, and were set to charge an innocent man with three crimes — all in a day’s work.

Nice tactic troll - nitpicking about a title while ignoring the numerous ACTUAL lies made up by these cops.

The SECOND LIE from Matt Agorist:

… the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut.

State troopers to stand civil trial for taking protester’s camera, filing charges against him at West Hartford checkpoint (Hartford Courant)

Deckard did just that. Dckard posted an article by Matt Agorist while Stone had restricted him from posting any article byMatt Agorist.

Stone later rescinded that edict - try to keep up assclowns.

You posted the article BEFORE stone rescinded that edict.

Uh, no I didn't. I'm not going to jump through hoops for you and look it up, but Stone rescinded his ban at least a week ago.

But I suppose since you've lied at least once, might as well keep' em coming.

Still ignoring where I smacked down one of your false assertions?

State troopers to stand civil trial for taking protester’s camera, filing charges against him at West Hartford checkpoint (Hartford Courant)

State troopers to stand civil trial for taking protester’s camera, filing charges against him at West Hartford checkpoint (Hartford Courant)

That is a newspaper report.

See the court actual documents.

Show me the date and case number.

That is a newspaper report.

Yeah, it is. Here are the DOCKET REPORT and the COMPLAINT.

DOCKET REPORT Picard v Torneo, DCCT 3-16-Cv-1564-WWE Retrieved 29 Sep 2019

https://www.scribd.com/document/428027798/DOCKET-REPORT-Picard-v-Torneo-DCCT-3-16-Cv-1564-WWE-Retrieved-29-Sep-2019

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Picard v Torneo, DCCT 3-16-cv-1564-WWE (15 Sep 2016) Doc 1, COMPLAINT

https://www.scribd.com/document/428028071/Picard-v-Torneo-Dcct-3-16-Cv-1564-Wwe-15-Sep-2016-Doc-1-Complaint

You are a good Person who has my respect.

Hand Salute,
Gatlin

[Matt Agorist] State-owned roadways and right of ways are public property. The trooper’s assertion that it is illegal to film on his ‘state property’ was entirely false and in violation of Connecticut Bill No. 245, which “protects the right of an individual to photograph or video record peace officers in the performance of their duties.”

That should be Connecticut Senate Bill 245 of 2012, and after it is passed it is an Act, and then it is a law. Mere technicalities.

However, with his usual flair (entirely false), Matt Agorist flubs the dub again. The law in question is not some grossly generalized thing with no exceptions. The law is not so general and has exceptions. Moreover, the Court has already dismissed the associated Count on summary judgment on the grounds that Matt Agorist is full of crap. The Court did not really say that, it was just my inner Agorist coming out. The Court did say, 13 days before the onslaught of Matt Agorist bullshit:

Some district courts have held that in the context of a journalist, who is not subject to the police activity, the First Amendment right to record police activity in public is clearly established. See Stolarik v. City of New York, 2017 WL 4712423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017); Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380. However, the instant plaintiff was not a journalist or even a bystander; he was a subject of defendants’ investigation and performance of their official duties. Accordingly, plaintiff’s right to record police activity or to record a police officer engaged in his official duties was not “clearly established” within this Circuit at the time of September 11, 2015, so that a reasonable defendant officer would have understood from existing law that his conduct was unlawful. See Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McKenzie, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7; Rivera v. Foley, 2015 WL 1296258, at *9 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015) (qualified immunity granted on basis that right to record police officers engaged in ongoing investigation was not clearly established as matter of constitutional law). Summary judgment will enter in favor of defendants on this claim.

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/TOB/S/2012SB-00245-R00-SB.htm

General Assembly

Raised Bill No. 245

February Session, 2012

LCO No. 1357

*01357_______JUD*

Referred to Committee on Judiciary

Introduced by:

(JUD)

AN ACT CONCERNING THE RECORDING OF POLICE ACTIVITY BY THE PUBLIC.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2012) (a) For the purposes of this section, "peace officer" has the meaning provided in section 53a-3 of the general statutes.

(b) A peace officer who interferes with any person taking a photographic or digital still or video image of such peace officer or another peace officer acting in the performance of such peace officer's duties shall, subject to sections 5-141d, 7-465 and 29-8a of the general statutes, be liable to such person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.

(c) A peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.

This act shall take effect as follows and shall amend the following sections:

Section 1
October 1, 2012

New section

Statement of Purpose:

To protect the right of an individual to photograph or video record peace officers in the performance of their duties.

I deal with lies on a first come basis …

No you don't. You didn't mention one lie the cops told. Not one.

How about doing that now. Instead of whining about an accurate title, yes the taxpayers will pay for the asshole liar cops on the video.

Are you capable of addressing the substance of the article or are you to obsessed with Deckard and proving libertarians aren't your equal?

And why Stone changed his mind to once again permit these “flavored news story atrocities” to appear on his web site – only Stone knows.

Free speech and open dialog. Back to my original position on the home page.

and they are promoting a self-interest agenda.

Everyone has their own agenda. Your agenda is to trash libetarians. Now I don't agree with libertarians on moral issues either. But they aren't wrong on everything that is for sure.

c) A peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.

Judges are corrupt and this is bullshit just like Roberts and Obamacare.

The cops said on tape that they had to cover their asses. So they made up stuff after the fact.

The cops should be fired and imprisoned and would be if we had honest judges and prosecutors.

[nolu chan #55 quoting Connecticut state law] c) A peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.

Judges are corrupt and this is bullshit just like Roberts and Obamacare.

The cops said on tape that they had to cover their asses. So they made up stuff after the fact.

The cops should be fired and imprisoned and would be if we had honest judges and prosecutors.

The quote is not from a judge or a court. It is a direct linked quote of a law of the State of Connecticut.

You may call it bullshit, but it undoubtedly the actual law, as opposed to imaginary bullshit law. Real law trumps imaginary bullshit law.

Identifying information as provided at my #55:

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/TOB/S/2012SB-00245-R00-SB.htm

General Assembly

Raised Bill No. 245

February Session, 2012

LCO No. 1357

*01357_______JUD*

General Assembly

Raised Bill No. 245

February Session, 2012

LCO No. 1357

*01357_______JUD*

the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut. The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

Is it inferred that the Court will require the taxpayer to pay? That would be false.

As I have noted, no governmental entity is a named defendant in Picard v. Torneo, et al.

Why is no element of government named as defendant?

When you get done with that, the next question is:

How could there be a judgment of liability against the taxpayer where no element of government is a party to the lawsuit?

Just for the record, my agenda is to trash misstatement of law or facts. With Matt Agorist and a few others, such misstatements are in wild abundance.

Strangely enough, after I spend all my time disproving what is in the cop-hating article – I am consequently labeled either a “cop-sucker” or a “boot-licker” when all I have done is to challenge opinions and conclusions.

Get used to it. I does not look like it will change.

And I an thoroughly enjoying doing it ...

[Matt Agorist] The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

Picard, Doc 92 at 13-14, the Court stated:

Some district courts have held that in the context of a journalist, who is not subject to the police activity, the First Amendment right to record police activity in public is clearly established. See Stolarik v. City of New York, 2017 WL 4712423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017); Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380. However, the instant plaintiff was not a journalist or even a bystander; he was a subject of defendants' investigation and performance of their official duties. Accordingly, plaintiff's right to record police activity or to record a police officer engaged in his official duties was not “clearly established” within this Circuit at the time of September 11, 2015, so that a reasonable defendant officer would have understood from existing law that his conduct was unlawful. See Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McKenzie, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7; Rivera v. Foley, 2015 WL 1296258, at *9 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015) (qualified immunity granted on basis that right to record police officers engaged in ongoing investigation was not clearly established as matter of constitutional law)."

Summary judgment will enter in favor of defendants on this claim.

And the Court ruled at 27:

defendants' motion for summary judgment [doc. 76] is GRANTED as to count one and as to the First Amendment retaliation claim based on his asserted First Amendment right to record police activity

Do try to keep up old chap. You do not want to be relegated to the short bus again.

[Matt Agorist] The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

One must wonder why the taxpayer will pay if no governmental entity is a party to this lawsuit.

The COMPLAINT at 2, paragraphs 10-13, identifies the Defendants:

10. Defendant John Barone was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of trooper first class.

11. Defendant Patrick Torneo was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of master sergeant.

12. Defendant John Jacobi was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of sergeant.

13. At all times relevant to this action, the defendants were on duty for their employer, and were wearing Connecticut State Police uniforms, badges, and pistols.

No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.

Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?

If you have no legal theory, you may have to start riding the short bus again.

short bus

I loath any reminders of the movie with that title. They would consider that a success that I've been so offended for so long. It's about as bad as those Lars Von Trier movies.

[nolu chan #74] No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.

[nolu chan #74] Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?

Regarding a legal theory, it appears the legal theory is *c*r*i*c*k*e*t*s*.

https://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=60173&Disp=7#C7

[A K A Stone] The free thought project article in question contained no lies. The tax payers will pay.

Why? What is your legal theory? Do you expect the court to order the taxpayers to pay?

Perhaps a U.S. Supreme Court opinion will help rouse y'all from your stupor.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974)

At 675-677:

But it has not heretofore

415 U. S. 676

been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that

415 U. S. 677

section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.

Just asking, trying to clarify what y'all are saying. Do you expect judgment for the plaintiff and against the government?

With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800 (24 Jun 1982) [footnotes omitted]

At 801:

Henceforth, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pp. 815-819.

At 815-19:

B

Qualified or “good faith” immunity is an affirmative de­fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). Decisions of this Court have established that the “good faith” defense has both an “objec­tive” and a “subjective” aspect. The objective element in­volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975). The subjective component refers to “permissible intentions.” Ibid. Characteristically the Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum­stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of­ficial “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio­late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury . . . .” Ibid, (emphasis added).

The subjective element of the good-faith defense fre­quently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that dis­puted questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on mo­tions for summary judgment. And an official’s subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.

In the context of Butz’ attempted balancing of competing values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litiga­tion of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service. There are special costs to “subjective” inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary functions. In contrast with the thought processes accompanying “minis­terial” tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s ex­periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de­cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back­ground in which there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there­fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional col­leagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.

Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing dis­cretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S., at 322.

Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum­mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro­priately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity ques­tion is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circum­stances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.

By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that fo­cuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. Where an official could be expected to know that cer­tain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers in­jury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken “with inde­pendence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967).

Deckard, where are you? Stand tall and be counted. Hiding in a corner, squatting in your own puddle of warm piss is no way to go through life. I await your legal theory of how the taxpayers are liable. In the meantime, while you hide in silence...

With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.

Anderson v. Creighton et al, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) qualified immunity

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-1520. Argued February 23, 1987—Decided June 25, 1987

Petitioner, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, participated with other law enforcement officers in a warrantless search of respondents’ home. The search was conducted because petitioner believed that one Dixon, who was suspected of a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there, but he was not. Respondents filed a state-court action against petitioner, asserting a claim for damages under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner removed the suit to Federal District Court and then filed a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that the Fourth Amendment claim was barred by his qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Before any discovery occurred, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the search was lawful. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search’s lawfulness could not be determined on summary judgment, because factual disputes precluded deciding as a matter of law that the search was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The court also held that petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, since the right he allegedly violated—the right of persons to be protected from warrantless searches of their homes unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances—was clearly established.

Held:

1. Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he can establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment even though it actually did not. Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time the action was taken. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800. In order to conclude that the right which the official allegedly violated is “clearly established,” the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. The Court of Appeals—which apparently considered only the fact that the right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances was clearly established—erred by refusing to consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which petitioner was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances. The relevant question here is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed petitioner’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Petitioner’s subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant. Pp. 638-641.

2. There is no merit to respondents’ argument that it is inappropriate to give officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment—and thus necessarily to have unreasonably searched or seized—the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action. Such argument is foreclosed by the fact that this Court has previously extended qualified immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Also without merit is respondents’ suggestion that Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, be overruled by holding that qualified immunity may never be extended to officials who conduct unlawful warrantless searches. Nor is there any merit to respondents’ contention that no immunity should be provided to police officers who conduct unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search of fugitives. Pp. 642-646.

766 F. 2d 1269, vacated and remanded.

Nice diatribe Perry Mason. You on Company time right now or are you off duty?

Is that your legal theory? Go back to squatting in your puddle of warm piss.

Is that your legal theory?

Objection your Honor. The record will show that Mr. Deckard espoused no so-called "legal theory", He merely compared nolu spam's....er I mean chan....

Ahem...as I was saying, your Honor - Mr. chan has impressed us all with his nose-to-the grindstone efforts, relentlessly scouring through reams of cases that may help him in the admirable yet so sadly and strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative) task he has been performing and will continue to faithfully perform.

The comparison to Perry Mason, the fictional TV lawyer is valid

***

Golly gee, I tell you what. Danged if I don't sound just like one of them fancy lawyer-type people.

And I never even went to law school.

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Key word generally. Not always.

The state, faced with the expected testimony of child-protection experts and a social worker’s troubling case notes, has reached a $4.97 million settlement with the father of Athena Angeles, the 3-year-old Windham girl who was beaten to death in 2011 by her mother’s live-in boyfriend despite her bearing the black eyes and bruises of previous abuse and the warning calls of the staff at her pre-school.

The Department of Children and Families, one of the targets of the father’s $20 million wrongful death and malpractice claim, had never removed Athena or her younger sister from the home or interviewed the mother’s boyfriend in the weeks before Athena’s death. The case had repercussions across the state because Athena had been taken to Windham Hospital only hours before her death with head injuries from abuse, but was released after treatment without a mandated report to authorities. She would return to the hospital a short time later, but would not survive her fresh injuries.

https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-athena-angeles-child-abuse-dcf-20190104-rb6ibk7thnaf7o24dg35n2apwq-story.html

There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.

In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.

States pay out all the time.

strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative)

See? It's just so easy to sprinkle that term in almost any sentence. Try to work schadenfreude in there as well. Or go for the brass ring by mixing and matching these words at random. Try to fit Sisyphean schadenfreude into a sentence.

Pretty soon you too can sound like the hoity-toity instead of the hoi polloi. LOL

Due to the state's indemnification law, courts may assign liability to parties not named in the original lawsuit. Or so it seems. I can't find anything that indicates that Connecticut's legislature has subsequently changed that law so it does seem that it is still in effect. Unless nolu can prove that avenue of liability has otherwise been closed off. Certainly, AKA has an argument to make here since a court did impose liability on a party (the town) which was not originally named as a plaintiff in the case. And a federal court could do the same, using Connecticut's own indemnification laws and precedents like this case to justify such a decision.

courts may assign liability to parties

Spreading liability (aka passing blame for personal responsibilities) IS A LIBERAL TRAIT.

I’d be cautious about how far you would support such a slippery slope... even if it is a police officer you would like to hem-up.

IMHO, when someone is able to walk to a vehicle, unlock it, sit in it, start it.... and drive it any kind of distance, and they willingly drank alcohol, there is only ONE person 100% responsible.

I’d be cautious about how far you would support such a slippery slope... even if it is a police officer you would like to hem-up.

I am not supporting it at all. I don't live in Connecticut and have no opportunities to change the unique laws of Connecticut. I am simply demonstrating a case where Connecticut law and Connecticut courts and a Connecticut jury did assign liability to a party not named in the lawsuit (the town) when an off-duty cop let a drinking buddy drive and kill himself and a few others.

The jury said, at least in part, that the town was responsible because the job description for town police was that they were considered on-duty 24 hours a day and therefore they were always acting under the city's civil liability, even if the city is not named in a lawsuit.

Unless the laws of Connecticut are changed, it seems to me that in another case where Connecticut state police are being sued, another jury and another court might decide that the state is responsible for their actions.

So do you know whether CT state police are considered legally on-duty 24 hours a day or not? If they are, then how can the state be shielded from liability for any action of state cops as long as it happens on Connecticut soil? There may not be federal laws that can apply to this (as nolu says) but a federal court can and will impose liability if the federal court believes that the state courts are misapplying state laws or are acting corruptly in trying to let responsible agencies off the hook for their liability regarding the conduct of their employees.

Federal courts are not utterly powerless in such cases even if federal laws do not apply directly.

IMHO, when someone is able to walk to a vehicle, unlock it, sit in it, start it.... and drive it any kind of distance, and they willingly drank alcohol, there is only ONE person 100% responsible.

Well, you'd better move to Connecticut and inform the jurors and the voters and the courts of that fact. Have fun with that.

So do you know whether CT state police are considered legally on-duty 24 hours a day or not?

There is case law that state they can make arrests, off duty, provided they have the PC to make that arrest, and if they get hurt making that arrest, they are covered by work insurance.

However, they aren’t paid off duty... so I would think they don’t have to act.

There is case law that state they can make arrests, off duty, provided they have the PC to make that arrest, and if they get hurt making that arrest, they are covered by work insurance.

However, they aren’t paid off duty... so I would think they don’t have to act.

And yet, in the CT case I cited, the jury did hold the town liable.

INDEMNIFICATION In the event that an officer is sued, the law provides that the municipality must indemnify the officer for damage or injury, not wanton or willful, caused in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment (CGS § 7-465). The statute allows officers “excused from official duty” to be indemnified as long as they are engaged in “the immediate and actual performance of a public duty imposed by law” at the time of the injury (CGS § 7-465). Apparently, in the Seymour case, the jury concluded that the indemnification statute required the town to assume liability for its police officer. According to Frank Szilagyi, attorney for the defendants, because town regulations stated that police officers were on duty 24 hours a day, the town was obliged to indemnify off-duty officers even if they were not engaged in a “public duty imposed by law” as required by the statute. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY Under Connecticut's comparative negligence statute, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court, apportions responsibility for negligence among the parties in the lawsuit (CGS § 52-572h(f)). The fact that the plaintiff's negligence may have been a proximate cause of the damage does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from receiving compensation (CGS § 52-572h(b)). But if the plaintiff is found more than 50% responsible for the damage, then he cannot be compensated (CGS § 52-572h(b)). The procedural history of this case led to a complicated apportionment of liability between the parties. The case began as four lawsuits, on behalf of the each occupant of the car involved in the crash, including the driver. The passengers each individually sued the town of Seymour, the driver, and the owner of the bar that served the alcohol. The driver sued the town and the bar. Before trial, these individual suits were consolidated. Yet the jury did not read a collective verdict at the end of the trial, but found different levels of liability among the parties. In the lawsuit where the plaintiff was the car driver, the jury divided responsibility equally between the driver and the town. Yet in the other three lawsuits, the jury found the driver 53% responsible, the town 35%, and the bar that served the alcohol 12%. Douglas Mahoney, attorney for the plaintiffs, said that the inconsistency can be explained by settlements between the parties before the jury reached a verdict. In this case, the car driver's family settled with the bar before the verdict, leaving the jury to apportion liability between only two parties, the driver and the town, rather than three parties. Attorney Szilagyi also said that the bar's withdrawal from the driver's lawsuit caused confusion among the jurors and may have led them to reach the dual verdict.

And yet, in the CT case I cited, the jury did hold the town liable.

Where does your local court pick it’s jury pool from? The same liberally indoctrinated people that watch MSM, get college indoctrinated degrees... and watch indoctrinated Hollyweird on TV.

Pretty soon, we’ll be able to sue a taxi driver for going off duty 5 minutes before a drunk leaves the bar. Of course he could have prevented it.

Pretty soon, we’ll be able to sue a taxi driver for going off duty 5 minutes before a drunk leaves the bar. Of course he could have prevented it.

Well, maybe.

I wonder what the liability is if a veteran police officer poisons a neighbor's cat with a fish poisoned with antifreeze, a piece of bait intended to harm a domestic animal. What would the police officer's employer's liability be? Know of any cases like that?

I know a lot of states have laws to protect domestic animals, even crappy ones like rats and hamsters and ferrets, from being killed even if the laws would otherwise allow it if they were not someone's pet.

You may be able to kill feral cats in all 50 states. But a cat or dog or other pet is pretty hard to consider feral, especially if they have a home base and lack hunting skills to feed themselves which is true of a lot of pets, some of whom may kill prey, like a cat killing a mouse, but won't eat it.

You may be able to kill feral cats in all 50 states. But a cat or dog or other pet is pretty hard to consider feral, especially if they have a home base and lack hunting skills to feed themselves which is true of a lot of pets, some of whom may kill prey, like a cat killing a mouse, but won't eat it.

If it’s roaming free... it’s feral.

do·mes·ti·cate (dY-ms′t--k
t′)

tr.v. do·mes·ti·cat·ed, do·mes·ti·cat·ing, do·mes·ti·cates

1. To cause to feel comfortable at home; make domestic.

Wild animals roam. Domestic pets belong on your property or IN your home.

Do you let your cat shit on your neighbors, too? Be honest.

Cats, well, I don't like the little dead-looking spots they cause for a month when they take a big pee on your lawn. But their turds aren't big enough to make a mess out of the mower. So I wouldn't throw a antifreeze-poisoned fish out on the lawn to kill a trespassing cat to keep it from peeing or pooping on my lawn, you know, like some cops would.

We do have a roaming cat problem in the neighborhood though. Including mama cats who keep crapping out litters of kittens. They were down to two kittens, then one disappeared. Last week, I went out to walk and noticed the last kitten, barely able to navigate on its own, was crying and mewling more than a block away in the alley. I think its mama lost track of it and it wandered off. It's probably dead by now if some softie idiot didn't take it in so they could brag to their friends about "rescuing" that poor kitten, blah-blah-blah. So we're back to a couple of mama cats, waiting to get knocked up and have kittens in the spring, of which only one or two will survive to reproduce. But they don't make a big mess or pee on stuff too much. I suppose they do pose a hazard to other cats and the old bat and her granddaughter who feed the cats (sometimes) and let them live under her porch might catch toxoplasmosis from them but that is their business if they want to catch brain diseases from semi-feral cats. It's a free country and people can have all the cat-based brain diseases they want.

We do have a roaming cat problem in the neighborhood though.

You wanna know how that’s caused? lol. Two things.

1) Lazy cat owners like A K A Flip Flop, who are too fucking lazy and cheap to buy cat litter, and clean a fucking litter box. So they love on the cat for an hour a day and allow it to shit on their neighbors for 23.... that’s called love. Then they EXPECT ME TO VALUE THEIR CAT, LIKE THEY DO.

YOUR CAT is no different than a deer to me. You expect too much.

2) Sheep that allow it, and call animal control... and nothing is done.

For the record, I’ve not killed a single kitty, besides a few unfortunate ones that kamikaze ran under my moving vehicle... and I don’t even know if they died. I just can testify that when I looked in the rear view mirror, the vermin was still flopping around like a fish out of water.

I don't allow them to perch on the front step or back porch for their little mewling outbursts or their cat orgies. That's what the hose is for. They seem to understand quickly that they aren't welcome when you douse them with cold water.

I know it isn't as much fun as antifreeze but I make do with what I have on hand.

I'm not mean enough just to kill them wantonly.

And that’s what I know about A K A Flip Flop. He can threaten to “kick my ass” all he wants, but he ain’t built for the job.

That's what the hose is for. They seem to understand quickly that they aren't welcome when you douse them with cold water.

I know it isn't as much fun as antifreeze but I make do with what I have on hand.

You should study small felines. They don’t learn... but their behaviors can be modified by removing reproductive organs, front claws... or even their blood pressure. Trying to teach a cat not to return and victimize your property is like trying to convince A K A Flip Flop that he’s a lazy pet owning asshole neighbor.

There are things they hate enough that they remember if you have done something to them, like a sudden bucket of water on them. Or a shop vac starting up very near them.

#81. To: nolu chan, Tooconservative (#80)

Is that your legal theory?

Objection your Honor. The record will show that Mr. Deckard espoused no so-called "legal theory", He merely compared nolu spam's....er I mean chan....

Ahem...as I was saying, your Honor - Mr. chan has impressed us all with his nose-to-the grindstone efforts, relentlessly scouring through reams of cases that may help him in the admirable yet so sadly and strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative) task he has been performing and will continue to faithfully perform.

The record will show that I requested Deckard's legal theory at #74 and #76, and he has yet to respond to either. Instead, as is his custom, he chose to irrelevantly respond to #78 which quotes a case on qualified immunity.

Accepting your latest mealy mouthed excuse, you deny saying anything about anything, and have no legal theory about how to defend the Matt Agorist screaming headline that the tax payer will pay. As you deny all knowledge, your non-opinion opinion is worthless, as usual, and you a relegated back to your corner to squat in your own warm piss.

Attempts to posit a viable legal theory so far are acts of futility, as addressed below.

[government officials performing discretionary functions] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Key word generally. Not always.

I have added the context back in for you.

Do you allege the officers in Picard were merely performing discretionary functions? If not, your cited matter is irrelevant.

In any case, that is a disscussion of the application of qualified immunity.

Do you find qualified immunity applies to the officers? If so, any associated charge is dismissed on summary judgment and nobody pays.

Do you find the officers do not qualify for qualified immunity? Why not?

If you find the officers' acts or omissions were wanton, reckless or malicious, and thereby voided their claim to qualified immunity, the Court will assess any damages against the officers as individuals. Under what law do you hold that Connecticut is liable to pay the officers, who acted within the discharge of their duties, for damages assessed for acts which were wanton, reckless or malicious?

So far, you have made zero progress.

There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.

In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.

States pay out all the time.

Yes there is a DIFFERENT case in Connecticut. It is so different that it is in STATE court and not in FEDERAL COURT. Cases may be brought in State court if the state permits them. When an individual brings a case in Federal court, the State may not be named as a defendant. The Federal government cannot award damages against a State.

This whole case is irrelevant.

When an individual brings a case in Federal court, the State may not be named as a defendant. The Federal government cannot award damages against a State.

This whole case is irrelevant.

Au contraire. The Supremes on a number of occasions have explicitly upheld the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Which punches big holes in all your posts about how federal courts can never ever do such things to state governments (or sovereign municipalities). Not only can the courts throw away any restraints on state sovereignty, the courts have ruled that Congress is empowered to do exactly the same thing. So Congress and federal courts all can (and have) violated your alleged state sovereignty immunity ideas.

Just because it doesn't happen often doesn't mean that it never happens. We don't have a solar eclipse every day but that does not mean there is no such thing as a solar eclipse.

I think you owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

This mystical case must adddress the State immunity problem posed by Edelman which states that, "A suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability payable from public funds in the state treasury is foreclosed by the Amendment if the State does not consent to suit." Suits in State court do not adddress the question. State laws about the liability of (non-sovereign) cities, towns, villages, or municipal entities are not relevant.

Or you are looking for a State law where the State volunteers to reimburse the officers where the officers' acts or omissions were wanton, reckless or malicious.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974)

At 1 (Syllabus)

Held: The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution bars that portion of the District Court's decree that ordered retroactive payment of benefits. Pp. 415 U. S. 658-678.

(a) A suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability payable from public funds in the state treasury is foreclosed by the Amendment if the State does not consent to suit. Pp. 415 U. S. 662-663.

At 675-677:

But it has not heretofore

415 U. S. 676

been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that

415 U. S. 677

section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.

You owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0172.htm

[excerpts]

SUMMARY

In December 2005, a Waterbury Superior Court jury found an off-duty Seymour police detective negligent for failing to prevent an intoxicated driver who was drinking at a bar with him from driving. That driver veered off the road after leaving the bar, killing himself and two passengers and seriously injuring another passenger. The jury awarded more than $1 million each to the families of the deceased men, and $2 million to the crash survivor.

Although the police officer was found negligent, the court found the town responsible for paying damages because of the state's indemnification law. This law requires municipalities to assume liability for any injuries caused by an employee in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment that are not the result of wanton or willful conduct.

Please note that this is for State ligitation involving a town, and the indemnity law cited here contains various conditions to liability.

Picard is a Federal case in Federal court where the State is NOT a named defendant. And in all the discussion and attempted defense of the screaming headline of Matt Agorist, not one mumbling word has been uttered about the applicable law and its coverage. Nobody has yet identified said law pertaining to STATE officers and employees.

[Tooconservative #102] I think you owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

[Tooconservative #105] Don't try to obfuscate or change the subject by throwing lots of irrelevant text at us.

You owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

I am sorry, but you, sir, owe everyone an apology for wasting their time and misleading them.

Your case at the Justia link does not support your fantastic conclusions.

Your quote in your pretty shaded box does NOT come from the opinion of the Court. That Congress can abrogate state sovereignty in connection to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment provides no evidence whatsoever that it did, in fact, abrogate state sovereignty in the case of Picard.

In your selected irrelevant case, "Current and retired male employees of the state of Connecticut sued the state in federal court...." In the Picard case, state employees were sued in their individual capacity. by a non-state employee. In Picard, no government entity is even named as a defendant.

Fitzgerald states its threshhold "of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman."

Held:

1. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a backpay award to petitioners in No. 75-251, since that Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate

Page 427 U. S. 446

legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. Congress, in determining what legislation is appropriate for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, may, as it has done in Title VII, provide for suits against States that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. The "threshold fact of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman, supra, is thus present here. Pp. 427 U. S. 451-456.

Fitzgerald is an entirely different context than Picard.

First, I note that the case you refer to as Fitzgerald v. Bitzer abbreviates the actual caption which shows it is against a government entity, the State Employees' Retirement Pension.

Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al., 427 US 445 (1976)

Abbreviating the state entity out of the caption does not change the fact that the named defendent in the caption is a government entity. It is quite clear at the official source., as shown below.

Justia contains a disclaimer: "Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources."

https://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep427/usrep427445/usrep427445.pdf

https://www.scribd.com/document/428891929/Fitzpatrick-et-al-v-Bitzer-Chairman-State-Employees-Retirement-Commission-et-al-427-US-445-1976-State-Liability

Fitzpatrick does not carve out any exception to Edelman's application to Picard.

Fitzpatrick at 447:

Opinion of the Court

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court

In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter such an award against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the effect of our decision in Edelman was to foreclose Congress’ power. We granted certiorari to resolve this important constitutional ques­tion. 423 U. S. 1031 (1975). We reverse.

Do you seriously allege that Picard is about the State of Connecticut having subjected Picard to employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?

Do you seriously allege that Picard was an employee of the State of Connecticut?

At 451:

We concluded that none of the statutes relied upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization by Congress to join a State as defend­ant. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the case, it could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant. The provisions of the Social Security Act relied upon by plaintiffs were held by their terms not to “authorize suit against anyone,” 415 U. S., at 674, and they, too, were incapable of supplying the predicate for a claim of waiver on the part of the State.

All parties in the instant litigation agree with the Court of Appeals that the suit for retroactive benefits by the petitioners is in fact indistinguishable from that sought to be maintained in Edelman, since what is sought here is a damages award payable to a private party from the state treasury.

In Fitzpatrick et al v Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al, 427 US 445 (1976) alleged state liability is self-evident in that a government entity is named as the sole defendant. Ditto for Edelman.

In Picard, it is obvious that no government is named as a defendant, and all defendants are sued in ther individual capacity.

You have found an exception the the 11th Amendment requirement when employees of a state sue their own state for a violation of Federal employment discrimination law, with the government having acted in its official capacity.

In Picard you have employees who may have acted outside the scope of their employment, having been wanton, reckless or malicious.

In the Picard case, as a matter of legal fact which you attempt to ignore, no legal governmental entity is a defendant. The government is not represented and does not appear in court.

If the employee defendants in Picard are to be reimbursed for any damages assessed against them, they must obtain that from the State. Instead of you you ass pickers busying yourselves with irrelevant bullshit, try the applicable state law which has seemingly eluded you.

Conn - Indemnification of state officers and employees

https://codes.findlaw.com/ct/title-5-state-employees/ct-gen-st-sect-5-141d.html

Connecticut General Statutes

Title 5. State Employees § 5-141d.

Indemnification of state officers and employees. Duties of Attorney General. Legal fees and costs. Enforcement action. Exceptions

(a) The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee, as defined in section 4-141 , and any member of the Public Defender Services Commission from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.

(b) The state, through the Attorney General, shall provide for the defense of any such state officer, employee or member in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act, omission or deprivation which occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the officer, employee or member was acting in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, except that the state shall not be required to provide for such a defense whenever the Attorney General, based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, determines that it would be inappropriate to do so and he so notifies the officer, employee or member in writing.

(c) Legal fees and costs incurred as a result of the retention by any such officer, employee or member of an attorney to defend his interests in any such civil action or proceeding shall be borne by the state only in those cases where (1) the Attorney General has stated in writing to the officer, employee or member, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that the state will not provide an attorney to defend the interests of the officer, employee or member, and (2) the officer, employee or member is thereafter found to have acted in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, and not to have acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. Such legal fees and costs incurred by such officer, employee or member shall be paid to such officer, employee or member only after the final disposition of the suit, claim or demand and only in such amounts as shall be determined by the Attorney General to be reasonable. In determining whether such amounts are reasonable, the Attorney General may consider whether it was appropriate for a group of officers, employees or members to be represented by the same counsel.

(d) Such officer, employee or member may bring an action in the Superior Court against the state to enforce the provisions of this section.

(e) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any such officer, employee or member to the extent he has a right to indemnification under any other section of the general statutes.

That doesn't sound like an apology.

I do not apologize for your error.

It doesn't sound much like an apology.

I do not apologize for your fuckup in misinterpreting the legal effect of Fitzpatrick v . Bitzer. As SCOTUS puts it, you can stop tilting at windmills. Google can only do so much. It can help you find something. Apparently, it did not help you understand it. I will let SCOTUS help with that.

SCOTUS IN Quern eviscerates Tooconservative interpretation of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer

Quern, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

At 332:

1. Neither Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, the legislative history cited in that decision, nor this Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases subsequent to Edelman cast any doubt on Edelman’s holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amend­ment immunity of the States.

At 337:

In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment. 415 U. S., at 663; see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. De­partment of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). We rejected the notion that simply because the lower court’s grant of retro­active benefits had been styled “equitable restitution” it was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. But we also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667-668; see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974).

At 338:

And just as petitioner insists on tilting at windmills by attacking the District Court’s decision, respondent suggests that our decision in Edelman has been eviscerated by later decisions such as Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Brief for Respondent 55 n. 37. See also Aldridge v. Turlington, No. TCA-78-830 (ND Fla., Nov. 17, 1978); but see Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Col­lege, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). As we have noted above, we held in Edelman that in “a [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action ... a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroac­tive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.” 415 U. S., at 677. We disagree with respondent’s sugges­tion. This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edel­man and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.

While the separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney, supra debated the continuing soundness of Edelman after our decision in Monell, any doubt on that score was largely dispelled by Alabama v. Pugh, supra, decided just 10 days after Hutto. In Pugh the Court held, over three dissents, that the State of Alabama could not be joined as a defendant without violating the Eleventh Amendment, even though the complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the claim was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similar to that made in Hutto. The Court said:

“There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).” 438 U. S., at 782.

The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authoriza­tion,’ ” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.

Just in case anyone missed it, Picard v. Torneo is most assuredly a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Your apology does not sound very sincere.

Your excuse for your royal fuckup does not sound very sincere. But when ya got nothing, that's the shit a shitweasel has to do.

SCOTUS IN Quern eviscerates Tooconservative interpretation of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer

Quern, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

At 332:

1. Neither Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, the legislative history cited in that decision, nor this Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases subsequent to Edelman cast any doubt on Edelman’s holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amend­ment immunity of the States.

At 337:

In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment. 415 U. S., at 663; see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. De­partment of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). We rejected the notion that simply because the lower court’s grant of retro­active benefits had been styled “equitable restitution” it was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. But we also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667-668; see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974).

At 338:

And just as petitioner insists on tilting at windmills by attacking the District Court’s decision, respondent suggests that our decision in Edelman has been eviscerated by later decisions such as Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Brief for Respondent 55 n. 37. See also Aldridge v. Turlington, No. TCA-78-830 (ND Fla., Nov. 17, 1978); but see Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Col­lege, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). As we have noted above, we held in Edelman that in “a [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action ... a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroac­tive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.” 415 U. S., at 677. We disagree with respondent’s sugges­tion. This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edel­man and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.

While the separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney, supra debated the continuing soundness of Edelman after our decision in Monell, any doubt on that score was largely dispelled by Alabama v. Pugh, supra, decided just 10 days after Hutto. In Pugh the Court held, over three dissents, that the State of Alabama could not be joined as a defendant without violating the Eleventh Amendment, even though the complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the claim was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similar to that made in Hutto. The Court said:

“There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).” 438 U. S., at 782.

The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authoriza­tion,’ ” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.

Just in case anyone missed it, Picard v. Torneo is most assuredly a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I'm pretty sure your apology is insincere.

I am absolutely certain that your desperate atttempt to defend your hero, Matt Agorist, by quoting from the irrelevant case of Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al., 427 US 445 (1976) is an abject failure.

It is off-topic, it is against a governmental entity as a named defendant, and SCOTUS has described a prior attempt to misinterpret that, and other cases, to undermine Edelman as titling at windmills.

Carry on, Don Quixote, with your tilt at windmills.

Whenever you and Deckard decide to stop hiding in your communal sore loser corner, squatting in a puddle of your own warm piss, the state law will still be here.

Conn - Indemnification of state officers and employees

https://codes.findlaw.com/ct/title-5-state-employees/ct-gen-st-sect-5-141d.html

Connecticut General Statutes

Title 5. State Employees § 5-141d.

Indemnification of state officers and employees. Duties of Attorney General. Legal fees and costs. Enforcement action. Exceptions

(a) The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee, as defined in section 4-141 , and any member of the Public Defender Services Commission from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.

(b) The state, through the Attorney General, shall provide for the defense of any such state officer, employee or member in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act, omission or deprivation which occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the officer, employee or member was acting in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, except that the state shall not be required to provide for such a defense whenever the Attorney General, based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, determines that it would be inappropriate to do so and he so notifies the officer, employee or member in writing.

(c) Legal fees and costs incurred as a result of the retention by any such officer, employee or member of an attorney to defend his interests in any such civil action or proceeding shall be borne by the state only in those cases where (1) the Attorney General has stated in writing to the officer, employee or member, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that the state will not provide an attorney to defend the interests of the officer, employee or member, and (2) the officer, employee or member is thereafter found to have acted in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, and not to have acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. Such legal fees and costs incurred by such officer, employee or member shall be paid to such officer, employee or member only after the final disposition of the suit, claim or demand and only in such amounts as shall be determined by the Attorney General to be reasonable. In determining whether such amounts are reasonable, the Attorney General may consider whether it was appropriate for a group of officers, employees or members to be represented by the same counsel.

(d) Such officer, employee or member may bring an action in the Superior Court against the state to enforce the provisions of this section.

(e) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any such officer, employee or member to the extent he has a right to indemnification under any other section of the general statutes.

I accept your apology.

ADMISSION ACCEPTED

An individual may not sue a state government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While you have attempted a smokescreen with cases that relate to cities, towns, villlages, or local government units, none are applicable to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in Picard, the only case which is the subject at hand.

I accept your many times repeated abject admission that you have no expressible legal theory whatsoever with which you can attempt to defend the false but screaming headline of your hero Matt Agorist, regarding the Picard case, that the taxpayer will pay.

All you have been able to do is make up irrelevant nonsense like Russiagate, and make a lot of noise like a typical socialist propagandist. Of course, substance is missing.

Your misbegotten reliance upon Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman, State Employees' Retirement Commission et al. is noted. Forty years ago, such reliance by others was summarily rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Quern v. Jordan.

It must be clearly noted that you have made no arguable attempt to justify the claim of your hero Matt Agorist regarding Picard.

Your Fitzpatrick case was asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Picard was asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which stems from a post civil war act.

Fitzpatrick had to do with a government employee suing his state government for employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Picard did not involve a state employee suing anyone for anything.

Fitzpatrick was filed against a local government unit which is not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Picard is solely filed against three employees in their individual capacity, and against no government entity whatsoever.

The Fitzpatrick argument was explicitly overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979, insofar as supporting an overruling of the Eleventh Amendment state immunity established in Edelman.

The Supreme Court did not suggest such argument was questionable, it explicitly cited Fitzpatrick v Bitzer and explicitly rejected the attack on Eleventh Amendment immunity established in Edelman. There is no governmental defendant in Picard because Edelman clearly prohibits one from being there.

Explicit language of a congressional amendment made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local government entities. There is no such similar statutory language applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Quern, Director, Department of Public Act of Ilinois v Jordan 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

At 332:

In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment.

At 340:

The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authoriza­tion,’” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.

For those with learning disabilities, I point out the obvious that Fitzpatrick is not against a named state defendant, i.e., one of the sovereign states. Indeed, it should be obvious, even to flat earther's, that Bitzer is not the name of a previously unknown sovereign state. Rather, the suit is against the State Employees Retirement Commission, and one named Bitzer was its Chairman. It is a seperate entity which manages a pension fund, not the state treasury.

Also at 340:

The decision in Pugh was handed down nearly one month after Monell and 10 days after Hutto, where separate opinions debated this precise point. If, after Monell and Hutto, this Court harbored any doubts about the continued validity of Edelman's conclusion that § 1983 does not constitute a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, it is inconceivable that the Court would have taken the extraordinary action of summarily reversing a lower court on the basis of Edelman.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that so much time and energy has been wasted, and no legal theory has been ut forth to show how the sovereign state of Connecticut is liable officers who either have qualified immunity, or whose acts or omissions are found to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that so much time and energy has been wasted

Not at all. It's unfortunate that you have those feelings.

It's unfortunate that you have those feelings.

REGRETTABLY, I CANNOT TAKE CREDIT FOR YOUR FUCKUPS

If anything is true, it is that one man does not take credit for another man's fuckup. Those things are personal, and even where there is enough fucking up to go around, I sincerely feel that it is not the place of others to glom on to the glory of the fucker up.

For example, at #102, you raise the case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (te centerpiece of your endzone celebration) which acknowledges it is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, the article, not part of any court opinion, notes that "the Fourteent Amendment provides a Congressional grant of authority for the federal court system to award money damages to private individuals who have been subjected to employment discrimination by a state government." Alas, you fucked up and did a spectacular celebration before you realized you dropped the ball on the field of play and it was picked u and retured for a touchdown while you continued your mindless celebration.

Of course, fuckup #1 was to rely on an article about a court opinion, without bothering to read the official court opinion itself.

Fuckup #2 was to to bother to compare the facts of Fitzpatrick to the facts of either Edelman or Picard.

Fuckup #3 was to not check the judicial history of Fitzpatrick to see if your interpretation of its effect was subsequently upheld or rejected. What you did would be like quoting Plessey v. Ferguson to defend school segregation, or, heaven forbid, quoting Scott v. Sanford for the proposition that freed slaves could never become citizens.

Had you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick, you would have noticed that the named defendant was not the sovereign state of Bitzer, but the State Employees' Retirement Commission, of which a gentlemen named Bitzer was Chairman.

You might even have noticed, at page 2 of Fitzpatrick, the given rationale that "Congress, in determining what legislation is appropriate for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, may, as it has done in Title VII, provide for suits against States that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. The "threshold fact of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman supra, is thus present here.

Picard relied on Edelman. Edelman as precedent for Eleventh Amendment immunity was not disturbed by Fitzpatrick. No § 1983 case was disturbed by Fitzpatrick which is a Section VII case whose exception is dependent upon a congressional exception not applicable to Edelman, Picard, or any other § 1983 case. Fitzpatrick pertains to a Section VII case only. That you did not discover this is a testament to your superficial legal research, and reliance upon unofficial sources.

Notably, had you not fucked up and ignored subsequent cases, you would have found Quern (1979) which stated at 338, "In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment."

And Quern stated at 338, "This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edel­man and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.

Nope, it just ain't right for one man to take credit for another man's fuckups. The record is clear that these are you fuckups, and yours alone. You own them and all the flat earth awards that may arise from them. Taking credit for your fuckups just ain't right and I ain't gonna do it.

As a show of my sincerity, I hereby nominate you as flat earth fuckup of the month. The credit is entirely yours.

Had you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick...

Um, yeah. First I would have to care. Which I don't.

Had you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick...

Um, yeah. First I would have to care. Which I don't.

Of course, I do not care if you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick, the cornerstone of your fucked up argument. It was obvious from your end zone celebration that you mistook your fumble for a touchdown. However, as it was merely you showing your ass, and making a fool of yourself, and everybody has a right to make a fool of himself, I did not take it personally. But being an upstanding guy, I did not desire to take credit for your fuck up.

It takes a certain sort of skill to fuck up on that level and gloat about it. It takes real persistence to make believe such a fuckup is a success and to continue gloating, even though there is a thread full of evidence it was but a fuckup of epic proportions. Such an effort, on behalf of an epic fuckup, deserves adequate recognition.

I therefore nominated you for flat earth fuckup of the month.

I therefore nominated you for flat earth fuckup of the month.

I post more anti-Flattard stuff than anyone here.

It's so ridiculous to say otherwise that it isn't even worth demanding that you apologize.

I will, therefore, be satisfied at your earlier abject and tearful apology.

I post more anti-Flattard stuff than anyone here.

And you deserve credit to the fullest for playing your major part in bringing the flat earth discussion to the forefront and making it the leading topic of discussion at LF, challenged only by good drugs, bad cops and tall tales about Jim Ficken's tall grass.

I did not mean for your monumental fuckup on the Picard case to in any way slight your contributions to the flat earth discussion, and helping that enthralling topic surge to the top of the charts.

Just so you do not feel slighted, and to make amends, in addition to your prior nomination for flat earth fuckup of the month, I hereby nominate you as top flat earth contributor of the month.

Just as you need know nothing to participate on the legal discussion of Picard, you need know nothing to participate on the discussion of how to weigh heavy objects in space. You just use an Elon Muck space scale.

Just as you need know nothing to participate on the legal discussion of Picard, you need know nothing to participate on the discussion of how to weigh heavy objects in space. You just use an Elon Muck space scale.

I don't recall suggesting that anyone try to weigh Musk's car in space. I looked back when you said this before. I don't think anything I said could be construed as a suggestion to weigh Musk's car in space, even if it was located in an orbit where we could go weigh it. But it doesn't get that close to an Earth orbit.

Can you cite the remark that I made which made you believe that I was suggesting that we could weigh Musk's car in space?

If not, you should apologize. Again.

I don't recall suggesting that anyone try to weigh Musk's car in space. I looked back when you said this before. I don't think anything I said could be construed as a suggestion to weigh Musk's car in space, even if it was located in an orbit where we could go weigh it. But it doesn't get that close to an Earth orbit.

I note that you do not recall reading the court document you lectured about either.

Can you cite the remark that I made which made you believe that I was suggesting that we could weigh Musk's car in space?

Why, sure I can. I will get right on that while you and Deckard finish up on explaining your legal theory on how the government must pay in the case of Picard v. Torneo, Jacoki and and Barone.

If you think your unconscious stream of bullshit offered any coherent legal theory, you really should apologize for trying to bullshit your way through.

While you are at it, you can apologize for throwing a smoke bomb for Deckard to hide behind. Perhaps you want a third award for teamwork.

Why, sure I can. I will get right on that while you and Deckard finish up on explaining your legal theory on how the government must pay in the case of Picard v. Torneo, Jacoki and and Barone.

I leave all of the legal theory to Deckard.

You just seemed so happy to keep copy/pasting your little legal boilerplate that I couldn't bear the idea of disappointing you.

I leave all of the legal theory to Deckard.

I acknowledge your abject admission of not having so much as a legal theory to support your bluster.

I leave all of the legal theory to Deckard.

I acknowledge your abject admission of not having so much as a legal theory to support your bluster.

Liberty's Flame is a discussion forum, not a courtroom so cool it with the shyster vibe, ya dig man? You know amigo, we all appreciate the hours of tireless work that you do for the site, especially all those reams of past court cases you so diligently post. Must be how you acquired the fitting moniker: nolu spam.

Just wondering Lt. Caffee - how much do you bilk....oops, I meant bill

At what rate do you bill your bosses for the time you spend here amusing us?

Liberty's Flame is a discussion forum, not a courtroom so cool it with the shyster vibe, ya dig man?

I understand why you prefer the lies of the liar Matt Agorist to actual court opinions and documents. I also understand why you cannot offer any rational legal argument to support the lies of your favorite liar Matt Agorist.
BT
AR

I acknowledge your abject admission of not having so much as a legal theory to support your bluster.

Was I that abject? I thought I was more indifferent. You're the one that's all passionate about it. I don't think Stone, Deckard, me (and Matt Agorist) combined care as much as you do about whatever it is you're carrying on about.