Deckard, where are you? Stand tall and be counted. Hiding in a corner, squatting in your own puddle of warm piss is no way to go through life. I await your legal theory of how the taxpayers are liable. In the meantime, while you hide in silence...

With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.

Anderson v. Creighton et al, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) qualified immunity

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-1520. Argued February 23, 1987—Decided June 25, 1987

Petitioner, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, participated with other law enforcement officers in a warrantless search of respondents’ home. The search was conducted because petitioner believed that one Dixon, who was suspected of a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there, but he was not. Respondents filed a state-court action against petitioner, asserting a claim for damages under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner removed the suit to Federal District Court and then filed a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that the Fourth Amendment claim was barred by his qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Before any discovery occurred, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the search was lawful. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search’s lawfulness could not be determined on summary judgment, because factual disputes precluded deciding as a matter of law that the search was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The court also held that petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, since the right he allegedly violated—the right of persons to be protected from warrantless searches of their homes unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances—was clearly established.

Held:

1. Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he can establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment even though it actually did not. Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time the action was taken. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800. In order to conclude that the right which the official allegedly violated is “clearly established,” the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. The Court of Appeals—which apparently considered only the fact that the right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances was clearly established—erred by refusing to consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which petitioner was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances. The relevant question here is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed petitioner’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Petitioner’s subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant. Pp. 638-641.

2. There is no merit to respondents’ argument that it is inappropriate to give officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment—and thus necessarily to have unreasonably searched or seized—the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action. Such argument is foreclosed by the fact that this Court has previously extended qualified immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Also without merit is respondents’ suggestion that Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, be overruled by holding that qualified immunity may never be extended to officials who conduct unlawful warrantless searches. Nor is there any merit to respondents’ contention that no immunity should be provided to police officers who conduct unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search of fugitives. Pp. 642-646.

766 F. 2d 1269, vacated and remanded.

Nice diatribe Perry Mason. You on Company time right now or are you off duty?

Is that your legal theory? Go back to squatting in your puddle of warm piss.

Is that your legal theory?

Objection your Honor. The record will show that Mr. Deckard espoused no so-called "legal theory", He merely compared nolu spam's....er I mean chan....

Ahem...as I was saying, your Honor - Mr. chan has impressed us all with his nose-to-the grindstone efforts, relentlessly scouring through reams of cases that may help him in the admirable yet so sadly and strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative) task he has been performing and will continue to faithfully perform.

The comparison to Perry Mason, the fictional TV lawyer is valid

***

Golly gee, I tell you what. Danged if I don't sound just like one of them fancy lawyer-type people.

And I never even went to law school.

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Key word generally. Not always.

The state, faced with the expected testimony of child-protection experts and a social worker’s troubling case notes, has reached a $4.97 million settlement with the father of Athena Angeles, the 3-year-old Windham girl who was beaten to death in 2011 by her mother’s live-in boyfriend despite her bearing the black eyes and bruises of previous abuse and the warning calls of the staff at her pre-school.

The Department of Children and Families, one of the targets of the father’s $20 million wrongful death and malpractice claim, had never removed Athena or her younger sister from the home or interviewed the mother’s boyfriend in the weeks before Athena’s death. The case had repercussions across the state because Athena had been taken to Windham Hospital only hours before her death with head injuries from abuse, but was released after treatment without a mandated report to authorities. She would return to the hospital a short time later, but would not survive her fresh injuries.

https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-athena-angeles-child-abuse-dcf-20190104-rb6ibk7thnaf7o24dg35n2apwq-story.html

There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.

In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.

States pay out all the time.

strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative)

See? It's just so easy to sprinkle that term in almost any sentence. Try to work schadenfreude in there as well. Or go for the brass ring by mixing and matching these words at random. Try to fit Sisyphean schadenfreude into a sentence.

Pretty soon you too can sound like the hoity-toity instead of the hoi polloi. LOL

Due to the state's indemnification law, courts may assign liability to parties not named in the original lawsuit. Or so it seems. I can't find anything that indicates that Connecticut's legislature has subsequently changed that law so it does seem that it is still in effect. Unless nolu can prove that avenue of liability has otherwise been closed off. Certainly, AKA has an argument to make here since a court did impose liability on a party (the town) which was not originally named as a plaintiff in the case. And a federal court could do the same, using Connecticut's own indemnification laws and precedents like this case to justify such a decision.

courts may assign liability to parties

Spreading liability (aka passing blame for personal responsibilities) IS A LIBERAL TRAIT.

I’d be cautious about how far you would support such a slippery slope... even if it is a police officer you would like to hem-up.

IMHO, when someone is able to walk to a vehicle, unlock it, sit in it, start it.... and drive it any kind of distance, and they willingly drank alcohol, there is only ONE person 100% responsible.

I’d be cautious about how far you would support such a slippery slope... even if it is a police officer you would like to hem-up.

I am not supporting it at all. I don't live in Connecticut and have no opportunities to change the unique laws of Connecticut. I am simply demonstrating a case where Connecticut law and Connecticut courts and a Connecticut jury did assign liability to a party not named in the lawsuit (the town) when an off-duty cop let a drinking buddy drive and kill himself and a few others.

The jury said, at least in part, that the town was responsible because the job description for town police was that they were considered on-duty 24 hours a day and therefore they were always acting under the city's civil liability, even if the city is not named in a lawsuit.

Unless the laws of Connecticut are changed, it seems to me that in another case where Connecticut state police are being sued, another jury and another court might decide that the state is responsible for their actions.

So do you know whether CT state police are considered legally on-duty 24 hours a day or not? If they are, then how can the state be shielded from liability for any action of state cops as long as it happens on Connecticut soil? There may not be federal laws that can apply to this (as nolu says) but a federal court can and will impose liability if the federal court believes that the state courts are misapplying state laws or are acting corruptly in trying to let responsible agencies off the hook for their liability regarding the conduct of their employees.

Federal courts are not utterly powerless in such cases even if federal laws do not apply directly.

IMHO, when someone is able to walk to a vehicle, unlock it, sit in it, start it.... and drive it any kind of distance, and they willingly drank alcohol, there is only ONE person 100% responsible.

Well, you'd better move to Connecticut and inform the jurors and the voters and the courts of that fact. Have fun with that.

So do you know whether CT state police are considered legally on-duty 24 hours a day or not?

There is case law that state they can make arrests, off duty, provided they have the PC to make that arrest, and if they get hurt making that arrest, they are covered by work insurance.

However, they aren’t paid off duty... so I would think they don’t have to act.

There is case law that state they can make arrests, off duty, provided they have the PC to make that arrest, and if they get hurt making that arrest, they are covered by work insurance.

However, they aren’t paid off duty... so I would think they don’t have to act.

And yet, in the CT case I cited, the jury did hold the town liable.

INDEMNIFICATION In the event that an officer is sued, the law provides that the municipality must indemnify the officer for damage or injury, not wanton or willful, caused in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment (CGS § 7-465). The statute allows officers “excused from official duty” to be indemnified as long as they are engaged in “the immediate and actual performance of a public duty imposed by law” at the time of the injury (CGS § 7-465). Apparently, in the Seymour case, the jury concluded that the indemnification statute required the town to assume liability for its police officer. According to Frank Szilagyi, attorney for the defendants, because town regulations stated that police officers were on duty 24 hours a day, the town was obliged to indemnify off-duty officers even if they were not engaged in a “public duty imposed by law” as required by the statute. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY Under Connecticut's comparative negligence statute, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court, apportions responsibility for negligence among the parties in the lawsuit (CGS § 52-572h(f)). The fact that the plaintiff's negligence may have been a proximate cause of the damage does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from receiving compensation (CGS § 52-572h(b)). But if the plaintiff is found more than 50% responsible for the damage, then he cannot be compensated (CGS § 52-572h(b)). The procedural history of this case led to a complicated apportionment of liability between the parties. The case began as four lawsuits, on behalf of the each occupant of the car involved in the crash, including the driver. The passengers each individually sued the town of Seymour, the driver, and the owner of the bar that served the alcohol. The driver sued the town and the bar. Before trial, these individual suits were consolidated. Yet the jury did not read a collective verdict at the end of the trial, but found different levels of liability among the parties. In the lawsuit where the plaintiff was the car driver, the jury divided responsibility equally between the driver and the town. Yet in the other three lawsuits, the jury found the driver 53% responsible, the town 35%, and the bar that served the alcohol 12%. Douglas Mahoney, attorney for the plaintiffs, said that the inconsistency can be explained by settlements between the parties before the jury reached a verdict. In this case, the car driver's family settled with the bar before the verdict, leaving the jury to apportion liability between only two parties, the driver and the town, rather than three parties. Attorney Szilagyi also said that the bar's withdrawal from the driver's lawsuit caused confusion among the jurors and may have led them to reach the dual verdict.

And yet, in the CT case I cited, the jury did hold the town liable.

Where does your local court pick it’s jury pool from? The same liberally indoctrinated people that watch MSM, get college indoctrinated degrees... and watch indoctrinated Hollyweird on TV.

Pretty soon, we’ll be able to sue a taxi driver for going off duty 5 minutes before a drunk leaves the bar. Of course he could have prevented it.

Pretty soon, we’ll be able to sue a taxi driver for going off duty 5 minutes before a drunk leaves the bar. Of course he could have prevented it.

Well, maybe.

I wonder what the liability is if a veteran police officer poisons a neighbor's cat with a fish poisoned with antifreeze, a piece of bait intended to harm a domestic animal. What would the police officer's employer's liability be? Know of any cases like that?

I know a lot of states have laws to protect domestic animals, even crappy ones like rats and hamsters and ferrets, from being killed even if the laws would otherwise allow it if they were not someone's pet.

You may be able to kill feral cats in all 50 states. But a cat or dog or other pet is pretty hard to consider feral, especially if they have a home base and lack hunting skills to feed themselves which is true of a lot of pets, some of whom may kill prey, like a cat killing a mouse, but won't eat it.

You may be able to kill feral cats in all 50 states. But a cat or dog or other pet is pretty hard to consider feral, especially if they have a home base and lack hunting skills to feed themselves which is true of a lot of pets, some of whom may kill prey, like a cat killing a mouse, but won't eat it.

If it’s roaming free... it’s feral.

do·mes·ti·cate (dY-ms′t--k
t′)

tr.v. do·mes·ti·cat·ed, do·mes·ti·cat·ing, do·mes·ti·cates

1. To cause to feel comfortable at home; make domestic.

Wild animals roam. Domestic pets belong on your property or IN your home.

Do you let your cat shit on your neighbors, too? Be honest.

Cats, well, I don't like the little dead-looking spots they cause for a month when they take a big pee on your lawn. But their turds aren't big enough to make a mess out of the mower. So I wouldn't throw a antifreeze-poisoned fish out on the lawn to kill a trespassing cat to keep it from peeing or pooping on my lawn, you know, like some cops would.

We do have a roaming cat problem in the neighborhood though. Including mama cats who keep crapping out litters of kittens. They were down to two kittens, then one disappeared. Last week, I went out to walk and noticed the last kitten, barely able to navigate on its own, was crying and mewling more than a block away in the alley. I think its mama lost track of it and it wandered off. It's probably dead by now if some softie idiot didn't take it in so they could brag to their friends about "rescuing" that poor kitten, blah-blah-blah. So we're back to a couple of mama cats, waiting to get knocked up and have kittens in the spring, of which only one or two will survive to reproduce. But they don't make a big mess or pee on stuff too much. I suppose they do pose a hazard to other cats and the old bat and her granddaughter who feed the cats (sometimes) and let them live under her porch might catch toxoplasmosis from them but that is their business if they want to catch brain diseases from semi-feral cats. It's a free country and people can have all the cat-based brain diseases they want.

We do have a roaming cat problem in the neighborhood though.

You wanna know how that’s caused? lol. Two things.

1) Lazy cat owners like A K A Flip Flop, who are too fucking lazy and cheap to buy cat litter, and clean a fucking litter box. So they love on the cat for an hour a day and allow it to shit on their neighbors for 23.... that’s called love. Then they EXPECT ME TO VALUE THEIR CAT, LIKE THEY DO.

YOUR CAT is no different than a deer to me. You expect too much.

2) Sheep that allow it, and call animal control... and nothing is done.

For the record, I’ve not killed a single kitty, besides a few unfortunate ones that kamikaze ran under my moving vehicle... and I don’t even know if they died. I just can testify that when I looked in the rear view mirror, the vermin was still flopping around like a fish out of water.

I don't allow them to perch on the front step or back porch for their little mewling outbursts or their cat orgies. That's what the hose is for. They seem to understand quickly that they aren't welcome when you douse them with cold water.

I know it isn't as much fun as antifreeze but I make do with what I have on hand.

I'm not mean enough just to kill them wantonly.

And that’s what I know about A K A Flip Flop. He can threaten to “kick my ass” all he wants, but he ain’t built for the job.

That's what the hose is for. They seem to understand quickly that they aren't welcome when you douse them with cold water.

I know it isn't as much fun as antifreeze but I make do with what I have on hand.

You should study small felines. They don’t learn... but their behaviors can be modified by removing reproductive organs, front claws... or even their blood pressure. Trying to teach a cat not to return and victimize your property is like trying to convince A K A Flip Flop that he’s a lazy pet owning asshole neighbor.

There are things they hate enough that they remember if you have done something to them, like a sudden bucket of water on them. Or a shop vac starting up very near them.

#81. To: nolu chan, Tooconservative (#80)

Is that your legal theory?

Objection your Honor. The record will show that Mr. Deckard espoused no so-called "legal theory", He merely compared nolu spam's....er I mean chan....

Ahem...as I was saying, your Honor - Mr. chan has impressed us all with his nose-to-the grindstone efforts, relentlessly scouring through reams of cases that may help him in the admirable yet so sadly and strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative) task he has been performing and will continue to faithfully perform.

The record will show that I requested Deckard's legal theory at #74 and #76, and he has yet to respond to either. Instead, as is his custom, he chose to irrelevantly respond to #78 which quotes a case on qualified immunity.

Accepting your latest mealy mouthed excuse, you deny saying anything about anything, and have no legal theory about how to defend the Matt Agorist screaming headline that the tax payer will pay. As you deny all knowledge, your non-opinion opinion is worthless, as usual, and you a relegated back to your corner to squat in your own warm piss.

Attempts to posit a viable legal theory so far are acts of futility, as addressed below.

[government officials performing discretionary functions] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Key word generally. Not always.

I have added the context back in for you.

Do you allege the officers in Picard were merely performing discretionary functions? If not, your cited matter is irrelevant.

In any case, that is a disscussion of the application of qualified immunity.

Do you find qualified immunity applies to the officers? If so, any associated charge is dismissed on summary judgment and nobody pays.

Do you find the officers do not qualify for qualified immunity? Why not?

If you find the officers' acts or omissions were wanton, reckless or malicious, and thereby voided their claim to qualified immunity, the Court will assess any damages against the officers as individuals. Under what law do you hold that Connecticut is liable to pay the officers, who acted within the discharge of their duties, for damages assessed for acts which were wanton, reckless or malicious?

So far, you have made zero progress.

There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.

In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.

States pay out all the time.

Yes there is a DIFFERENT case in Connecticut. It is so different that it is in STATE court and not in FEDERAL COURT. Cases may be brought in State court if the state permits them. When an individual brings a case in Federal court, the State may not be named as a defendant. The Federal government cannot award damages against a State.

This whole case is irrelevant.

When an individual brings a case in Federal court, the State may not be named as a defendant. The Federal government cannot award damages against a State.

This whole case is irrelevant.

Au contraire. The Supremes on a number of occasions have explicitly upheld the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Which punches big holes in all your posts about how federal courts can never ever do such things to state governments (or sovereign municipalities). Not only can the courts throw away any restraints on state sovereignty, the courts have ruled that Congress is empowered to do exactly the same thing. So Congress and federal courts all can (and have) violated your alleged state sovereignty immunity ideas.

Just because it doesn't happen often doesn't mean that it never happens. We don't have a solar eclipse every day but that does not mean there is no such thing as a solar eclipse.

I think you owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

This mystical case must adddress the State immunity problem posed by Edelman which states that, "A suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability payable from public funds in the state treasury is foreclosed by the Amendment if the State does not consent to suit." Suits in State court do not adddress the question. State laws about the liability of (non-sovereign) cities, towns, villages, or municipal entities are not relevant.

Or you are looking for a State law where the State volunteers to reimburse the officers where the officers' acts or omissions were wanton, reckless or malicious.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974)

At 1 (Syllabus)

Held: The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution bars that portion of the District Court's decree that ordered retroactive payment of benefits. Pp. 415 U. S. 658-678.

(a) A suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability payable from public funds in the state treasury is foreclosed by the Amendment if the State does not consent to suit. Pp. 415 U. S. 662-663.

At 675-677:

But it has not heretofore

415 U. S. 676

been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that

415 U. S. 677

section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.

You owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0172.htm

[excerpts]

SUMMARY

In December 2005, a Waterbury Superior Court jury found an off-duty Seymour police detective negligent for failing to prevent an intoxicated driver who was drinking at a bar with him from driving. That driver veered off the road after leaving the bar, killing himself and two passengers and seriously injuring another passenger. The jury awarded more than $1 million each to the families of the deceased men, and $2 million to the crash survivor.

Although the police officer was found negligent, the court found the town responsible for paying damages because of the state's indemnification law. This law requires municipalities to assume liability for any injuries caused by an employee in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment that are not the result of wanton or willful conduct.

Please note that this is for State ligitation involving a town, and the indemnity law cited here contains various conditions to liability.

Picard is a Federal case in Federal court where the State is NOT a named defendant. And in all the discussion and attempted defense of the screaming headline of Matt Agorist, not one mumbling word has been uttered about the applicable law and its coverage. Nobody has yet identified said law pertaining to STATE officers and employees.

[Tooconservative #102] I think you owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

[Tooconservative #105] Don't try to obfuscate or change the subject by throwing lots of irrelevant text at us.

You owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.

I am sorry, but you, sir, owe everyone an apology for wasting their time and misleading them.

Your case at the Justia link does not support your fantastic conclusions.

Your quote in your pretty shaded box does NOT come from the opinion of the Court. That Congress can abrogate state sovereignty in connection to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment provides no evidence whatsoever that it did, in fact, abrogate state sovereignty in the case of Picard.

In your selected irrelevant case, "Current and retired male employees of the state of Connecticut sued the state in federal court...." In the Picard case, state employees were sued in their individual capacity. by a non-state employee. In Picard, no government entity is even named as a defendant.

Fitzgerald states its threshhold "of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman."

Held:

1. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a backpay award to petitioners in No. 75-251, since that Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate

Page 427 U. S. 446

legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. Congress, in determining what legislation is appropriate for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, may, as it has done in Title VII, provide for suits against States that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. The "threshold fact of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman, supra, is thus present here. Pp. 427 U. S. 451-456.

Fitzgerald is an entirely different context than Picard.

First, I note that the case you refer to as Fitzgerald v. Bitzer abbreviates the actual caption which shows it is against a government entity, the State Employees' Retirement Pension.

Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al., 427 US 445 (1976)

Abbreviating the state entity out of the caption does not change the fact that the named defendent in the caption is a government entity. It is quite clear at the official source., as shown below.

Justia contains a disclaimer: "Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources."

https://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep427/usrep427445/usrep427445.pdf

https://www.scribd.com/document/428891929/Fitzpatrick-et-al-v-Bitzer-Chairman-State-Employees-Retirement-Commission-et-al-427-US-445-1976-State-Liability

Fitzpatrick does not carve out any exception to Edelman's application to Picard.

Fitzpatrick at 447:

Opinion of the Court

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court

In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter such an award against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the effect of our decision in Edelman was to foreclose Congress’ power. We granted certiorari to resolve this important constitutional ques­tion. 423 U. S. 1031 (1975). We reverse.

Do you seriously allege that Picard is about the State of Connecticut having subjected Picard to employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?

Do you seriously allege that Picard was an employee of the State of Connecticut?

At 451:

We concluded that none of the statutes relied upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization by Congress to join a State as defend­ant. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the case, it could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant. The provisions of the Social Security Act relied upon by plaintiffs were held by their terms not to “authorize suit against anyone,” 415 U. S., at 674, and they, too, were incapable of supplying the predicate for a claim of waiver on the part of the State.

All parties in the instant litigation agree with the Court of Appeals that the suit for retroactive benefits by the petitioners is in fact indistinguishable from that sought to be maintained in Edelman, since what is sought here is a damages award payable to a private party from the state treasury.

In Fitzpatrick et al v Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al, 427 US 445 (1976) alleged state liability is self-evident in that a government entity is named as the sole defendant. Ditto for Edelman.

In Picard, it is obvious that no government is named as a defendant, and all defendants are sued in ther individual capacity.

You have found an exception the the 11th Amendment requirement when employees of a state sue their own state for a violation of Federal employment discrimination law, with the government having acted in its official capacity.

In Picard you have employees who may have acted outside the scope of their employment, having been wanton, reckless or malicious.

In the Picard case, as a matter of legal fact which you attempt to ignore, no legal governmental entity is a defendant. The government is not represented and does not appear in court.

If the employee defendants in Picard are to be reimbursed for any damages assessed against them, they must obtain that from the State. Instead of you you ass pickers busying yourselves with irrelevant bullshit, try the applicable state law which has seemingly eluded you.

Conn - Indemnification of state officers and employees

https://codes.findlaw.com/ct/title-5-state-employees/ct-gen-st-sect-5-141d.html

Connecticut General Statutes

Title 5. State Employees § 5-141d.

Indemnification of state officers and employees. Duties of Attorney General. Legal fees and costs. Enforcement action. Exceptions

(a) The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee, as defined in section 4-141 , and any member of the Public Defender Services Commission from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.

(b) The state, through the Attorney General, shall provide for the defense of any such state officer, employee or member in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act, omission or deprivation which occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the officer, employee or member was acting in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, except that the state shall not be required to provide for such a defense whenever the Attorney General, based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, determines that it would be inappropriate to do so and he so notifies the officer, employee or member in writing.

(c) Legal fees and costs incurred as a result of the retention by any such officer, employee or member of an attorney to defend his interests in any such civil action or proceeding shall be borne by the state only in those cases where (1) the Attorney General has stated in writing to the officer, employee or member, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that the state will not provide an attorney to defend the interests of the officer, employee or member, and (2) the officer, employee or member is thereafter found to have acted in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, and not to have acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. Such legal fees and costs incurred by such officer, employee or member shall be paid to such officer, employee or member only after the final disposition of the suit, claim or demand and only in such amounts as shall be determined by the Attorney General to be reasonable. In determining whether such amounts are reasonable, the Attorney General may consider whether it was appropriate for a group of officers, employees or members to be represented by the same counsel.

(d) Such officer, employee or member may bring an action in the Superior Court against the state to enforce the provisions of this section.

(e) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any such officer, employee or member to the extent he has a right to indemnification under any other section of the general statutes.

That doesn't sound like an apology.

I do not apologize for your error.

It doesn't sound much like an apology.

I do not apologize for your fuckup in misinterpreting the legal effect of Fitzpatrick v . Bitzer. As SCOTUS puts it, you can stop tilting at windmills. Google can only do so much. It can help you find something. Apparently, it did not help you understand it. I will let SCOTUS help with that.

SCOTUS IN Quern eviscerates Tooconservative interpretation of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer

Quern, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

At 332:

1. Neither Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, the legislative history cited in that decision, nor this Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases subsequent to Edelman cast any doubt on Edelman’s holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amend­ment immunity of the States.

At 337:

In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment. 415 U. S., at 663; see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. De­partment of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). We rejected the notion that simply because the lower court’s grant of retro­active benefits had been styled “equitable restitution” it was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. But we also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667-668; see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974).

At 338:

And just as petitioner insists on tilting at windmills by attacking the District Court’s decision, respondent suggests that our decision in Edelman has been eviscerated by later decisions such as Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Brief for Respondent 55 n. 37. See also Aldridge v. Turlington, No. TCA-78-830 (ND Fla., Nov. 17, 1978); but see Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Col­lege, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). As we have noted above, we held in Edelman that in “a [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action ... a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroac­tive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.” 415 U. S., at 677. We disagree with respondent’s sugges­tion. This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edel­man and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.

While the separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney, supra debated the continuing soundness of Edelman after our decision in Monell, any doubt on that score was largely dispelled by Alabama v. Pugh, supra, decided just 10 days after Hutto. In Pugh the Court held, over three dissents, that the State of Alabama could not be joined as a defendant without violating the Eleventh Amendment, even though the complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the claim was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similar to that made in Hutto. The Court said:

“There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).” 438 U. S., at 782.

The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authoriza­tion,’ ” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.

Just in case anyone missed it, Picard v. Torneo is most assuredly a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Your apology does not sound very sincere.

Your excuse for your royal fuckup does not sound very sincere. But when ya got nothing, that's the shit a shitweasel has to do.

SCOTUS IN Quern eviscerates Tooconservative interpretation of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer

Quern, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

At 332:

1. Neither Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, the legislative history cited in that decision, nor this Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases subsequent to Edelman cast any doubt on Edelman’s holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amend­ment immunity of the States.

At 337:

In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment. 415 U. S., at 663; see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. De­partment of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). We rejected the notion that simply because the lower court’s grant of retro­active benefits had been styled “equitable restitution” it was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. But we also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667-668; see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974).

At 338:

And just as petitioner insists on tilting at windmills by attacking the District Court’s decision, respondent suggests that our decision in Edelman has been eviscerated by later decisions such as Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Brief for Respondent 55 n. 37. See also Aldridge v. Turlington, No. TCA-78-830 (ND Fla., Nov. 17, 1978); but see Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Col­lege, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). As we have noted above, we held in Edelman that in “a [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action ... a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroac­tive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.” 415 U. S., at 677. We disagree with respondent’s sugges­tion. This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edel­man and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.

While the separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney, supra debated the continuing soundness of Edelman after our decision in Monell, any doubt on that score was largely dispelled by Alabama v. Pugh, supra, decided just 10 days after Hutto. In Pugh the Court held, over three dissents, that the State of Alabama could not be joined as a defendant without violating the Eleventh Amendment, even though the complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the claim was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similar to that made in Hutto. The Court said:

“There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).” 438 U. S., at 782.

The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authoriza­tion,’ ” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.

Just in case anyone missed it, Picard v. Torneo is most assuredly a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I'm pretty sure your apology is insincere.

I am absolutely certain that your desperate atttempt to defend your hero, Matt Agorist, by quoting from the irrelevant case of Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al., 427 US 445 (1976) is an abject failure.

It is off-topic, it is against a governmental entity as a named defendant, and SCOTUS has described a prior attempt to misinterpret that, and other cases, to undermine Edelman as titling at windmills.

Carry on, Don Quixote, with your tilt at windmills.

Whenever you and Deckard decide to stop hiding in your communal sore loser corner, squatting in a puddle of your own warm piss, the state law will still be here.

Conn - Indemnification of state officers and employees

https://codes.findlaw.com/ct/title-5-state-employees/ct-gen-st-sect-5-141d.html

Connecticut General Statutes

Title 5. State Employees § 5-141d.

Indemnification of state officers and employees. Duties of Attorney General. Legal fees and costs. Enforcement action. Exceptions

(a) The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee, as defined in section 4-141 , and any member of the Public Defender Services Commission from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.

(b) The state, through the Attorney General, shall provide for the defense of any such state officer, employee or member in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act, omission or deprivation which occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the officer, employee or member was acting in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, except that the state shall not be required to provide for such a defense whenever the Attorney General, based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, determines that it would be inappropriate to do so and he so notifies the officer, employee or member in writing.

(c) Legal fees and costs incurred as a result of the retention by any such officer, employee or member of an attorney to defend his interests in any such civil action or proceeding shall be borne by the state only in those cases where (1) the Attorney General has stated in writing to the officer, employee or member, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that the state will not provide an attorney to defend the interests of the officer, employee or member, and (2) the officer, employee or member is thereafter found to have acted in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, and not to have acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. Such legal fees and costs incurred by such officer, employee or member shall be paid to such officer, employee or member only after the final disposition of the suit, claim or demand and only in such amounts as shall be determined by the Attorney General to be reasonable. In determining whether such amounts are reasonable, the Attorney General may consider whether it was appropriate for a group of officers, employees or members to be represented by the same counsel.

(d) Such officer, employee or member may bring an action in the Superior Court against the state to enforce the provisions of this section.

(e) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any such officer, employee or member to the extent he has a right to indemnification under any other section of the general statutes.

I accept your apology.

ADMISSION ACCEPTED

An individual may not sue a state government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While you have attempted a smokescreen with cases that relate to cities, towns, villlages, or local government units, none are applicable to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in Picard, the only case which is the subject at hand.

I accept your many times repeated abject admission that you have no expressible legal theory whatsoever with which you can attempt to defend the false but screaming headline of your hero Matt Agorist, regarding the Picard case, that the taxpayer will pay.

All you have been able to do is make up irrelevant nonsense like Russiagate, and make a lot of noise like a typical socialist propagandist. Of course, substance is missing.

Your misbegotten reliance upon Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman, State Employees' Retirement Commission et al. is noted. Forty years ago, such reliance by others was summarily rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Quern v. Jordan.

It must be clearly noted that you have made no arguable attempt to justify the claim of your hero Matt Agorist regarding Picard.

Your Fitzpatrick case was asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Picard was asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which stems from a post civil war act.

Fitzpatrick had to do with a government employee suing his state government for employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Picard did not involve a state employee suing anyone for anything.

Fitzpatrick was filed against a local government unit which is not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Picard is solely filed against three employees in their individual capacity, and against no government entity whatsoever.

The Fitzpatrick argument was explicitly overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979, insofar as supporting an overruling of the Eleventh Amendment state immunity established in Edelman.

The Supreme Court did not suggest such argument was questionable, it explicitly cited Fitzpatrick v Bitzer and explicitly rejected the attack on Eleventh Amendment immunity established in Edelman. There is no governmental defendant in Picard because Edelman clearly prohibits one from being there.

Explicit language of a congressional amendment made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local government entities. There is no such similar statutory language applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Quern, Director, Department of Public Act of Ilinois v Jordan 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

At 332:

In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment.

At 340:

The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authoriza­tion,’” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.

For those with learning disabilities, I point out the obvious that Fitzpatrick is not against a named state defendant, i.e., one of the sovereign states. Indeed, it should be obvious, even to flat earther's, that Bitzer is not the name of a previously unknown sovereign state. Rather, the suit is against the State Employees Retirement Commission, and one named Bitzer was its Chairman. It is a seperate entity which manages a pension fund, not the state treasury.

Also at 340:

The decision in Pugh was handed down nearly one month after Monell and 10 days after Hutto, where separate opinions debated this precise point. If, after Monell and Hutto, this Court harbored any doubts about the continued validity of Edelman's conclusion that § 1983 does not constitute a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, it is inconceivable that the Court would have taken the extraordinary action of summarily reversing a lower court on the basis of Edelman.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that so much time and energy has been wasted, and no legal theory has been ut forth to show how the sovereign state of Connecticut is liable officers who either have qualified immunity, or whose acts or omissions are found to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that so much time and energy has been wasted

Not at all. It's unfortunate that you have those feelings.

It's unfortunate that you have those feelings.

REGRETTABLY, I CANNOT TAKE CREDIT FOR YOUR FUCKUPS

If anything is true, it is that one man does not take credit for another man's fuckup. Those things are personal, and even where there is enough fucking up to go around, I sincerely feel that it is not the place of others to glom on to the glory of the fucker up.

For example, at #102, you raise the case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (te centerpiece of your endzone celebration) which acknowledges it is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, the article, not part of any court opinion, notes that "the Fourteent Amendment provides a Congressional grant of authority for the federal court system to award money damages to private individuals who have been subjected to employment discrimination by a state government." Alas, you fucked up and did a spectacular celebration before you realized you dropped the ball on the field of play and it was picked u and retured for a touchdown while you continued your mindless celebration.

Of course, fuckup #1 was to rely on an article about a court opinion, without bothering to read the official court opinion itself.

Fuckup #2 was to to bother to compare the facts of Fitzpatrick to the facts of either Edelman or Picard.

Fuckup #3 was to not check the judicial history of Fitzpatrick to see if your interpretation of its effect was subsequently upheld or rejected. What you did would be like quoting Plessey v. Ferguson to defend school segregation, or, heaven forbid, quoting Scott v. Sanford for the proposition that freed slaves could never become citizens.

Had you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick, you would have noticed that the named defendant was not the sovereign state of Bitzer, but the State Employees' Retirement Commission, of which a gentlemen named Bitzer was Chairman.

You might even have noticed, at page 2 of Fitzpatrick, the given rationale that "Congress, in determining what legislation is appropriate for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, may, as it has done in Title VII, provide for suits against States that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. The "threshold fact of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman supra, is thus present here.

Picard relied on Edelman. Edelman as precedent for Eleventh Amendment immunity was not disturbed by Fitzpatrick. No § 1983 case was disturbed by Fitzpatrick which is a Section VII case whose exception is dependent upon a congressional exception not applicable to Edelman, Picard, or any other § 1983 case. Fitzpatrick pertains to a Section VII case only. That you did not discover this is a testament to your superficial legal research, and reliance upon unofficial sources.

Notably, had you not fucked up and ignored subsequent cases, you would have found Quern (1979) which stated at 338, "In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amend­ment."

And Quern stated at 338, "This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edel­man and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.

Nope, it just ain't right for one man to take credit for another man's fuckups. The record is clear that these are you fuckups, and yours alone. You own them and all the flat earth awards that may arise from them. Taking credit for your fuckups just ain't right and I ain't gonna do it.

As a show of my sincerity, I hereby nominate you as flat earth fuckup of the month. The credit is entirely yours.

Had you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick...

Um, yeah. First I would have to care. Which I don't.

Had you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick...

Um, yeah. First I would have to care. Which I don't.

Of course, I do not care if you bothered to read the official court opinion in Fitzpatrick, the cornerstone of your fucked up argument. It was obvious from your end zone celebration that you mistook your fumble for a touchdown. However, as it was merely you showing your ass, and making a fool of yourself, and everybody has a right to make a fool of himself, I did not take it personally. But being an upstanding guy, I did not desire to take credit for your fuck up.

It takes a certain sort of skill to fuck up on that level and gloat about it. It takes real persistence to make believe such a fuckup is a success and to continue gloating, even though there is a thread full of evidence it was but a fuckup of epic proportions. Such an effort, on behalf of an epic fuckup, deserves adequate recognition.

I therefore nominated you for flat earth fuckup of the month.

I therefore nominated you for flat earth fuckup of the month.

I post more anti-Flattard stuff than anyone here.

It's so ridiculous to say otherwise that it isn't even worth demanding that you apologize.

I will, therefore, be satisfied at your earlier abject and tearful apology.

I post more anti-Flattard stuff than anyone here.

And you deserve credit to the fullest for playing your major part in bringing the flat earth discussion to the forefront and making it the leading topic of discussion at LF, challenged only by good drugs, bad cops and tall tales about Jim Ficken's tall grass.

I did not mean for your monumental fuckup on the Picard case to in any way slight your contributions to the flat earth discussion, and helping that enthralling topic surge to the top of the charts.

Just so you do not feel slighted, and to make amends, in addition to your prior nomination for flat earth fuckup of the month, I hereby nominate you as top flat earth contributor of the month.

Just as you need know nothing to participate on the legal discussion of Picard, you need know nothing to participate on the discussion of how to weigh heavy objects in space. You just use an Elon Muck space scale.

Just as you need know nothing to participate on the legal discussion of Picard, you need know nothing to participate on the discussion of how to weigh heavy objects in space. You just use an Elon Muck space scale.

I don't recall suggesting that anyone try to weigh Musk's car in space. I looked back when you said this before. I don't think anything I said could be construed as a suggestion to weigh Musk's car in space, even if it was located in an orbit where we could go weigh it. But it doesn't get that close to an Earth orbit.

Can you cite the remark that I made which made you believe that I was suggesting that we could weigh Musk's car in space?

If not, you should apologize. Again.

I don't recall suggesting that anyone try to weigh Musk's car in space. I looked back when you said this before. I don't think anything I said could be construed as a suggestion to weigh Musk's car in space, even if it was located in an orbit where we could go weigh it. But it doesn't get that close to an Earth orbit.

I note that you do not recall reading the court document you lectured about either.

Can you cite the remark that I made which made you believe that I was suggesting that we could weigh Musk's car in space?

Why, sure I can. I will get right on that while you and Deckard finish up on explaining your legal theory on how the government must pay in the case of Picard v. Torneo, Jacoki and and Barone.

If you think your unconscious stream of bullshit offered any coherent legal theory, you really should apologize for trying to bullshit your way through.

While you are at it, you can apologize for throwing a smoke bomb for Deckard to hide behind. Perhaps you want a third award for teamwork.

Why, sure I can. I will get right on that while you and Deckard finish up on explaining your legal theory on how the government must pay in the case of Picard v. Torneo, Jacoki and and Barone.

I leave all of the legal theory to Deckard.

You just seemed so happy to keep copy/pasting your little legal boilerplate that I couldn't bear the idea of disappointing you.

I leave all of the legal theory to Deckard.

I acknowledge your abject admission of not having so much as a legal theory to support your bluster.