Title: ‘Where we at?’: SWAT Gets Lost, Throws Grenade Into Innocent Elderly Man’s Home as He Watches TV Source:
Free Thought Project URL Source:https://thefreethoughtproject.com/l ... eam-raids-elderly-man-grenade/ Published:Sep 12, 2020 Author:Matt Agorist Post Date:2020-09-12 19:26:52 by Deckard Keywords:None Views:4028 Comments:33
Henry County, GA — The Free Thought Project has reported on countless cases of police officers, SWAT teams, and other law enforcement agencies going to the wrong address, kicking in doors and terrorizing entirely innocent people. This is a common trend in American policing. However, the following case out of Georgia shows a level of incompetence that rivals many of our most egregious cases.
“Something went off like a bomb in my house,” Onree Norris, 81, recalls from the night incompetent cops raided his home, throwing a flashbang grenade inside after getting lost. As the explosion blew out windows and lit up the inside of his house like a fireball, deputies with the Henry County Sheriff’s Office Special Response Team smashed down his door with a battering ram.
“Sheriff’s office, search warrant!” a deputy is heard yelling. But the search warrant was not for Norris’ home. A scathing report from 11 Alive details the utterly shocking incompetence and excessive force used to terrorize this innocent man.
Before making their way to the wrong home, deputies are recorded on their body cameras, clueless as to where they are.
“Where’s the house?,” a deputy is heard on camera asking, with no response. “Where we at? Where we at?,” he asks again, without any answer.
Another deputy asks, “where’s the f***ing house?,” as the unit continues past the actual house on their way to Norris’ house.
Instead of confirming the correct house, they simply chose Norris’ house, threw in a grenade and went right on in. Had they taken just ten seconds to read the description of the home, they would have known they were at the wrong home.
As 11 Alive reports, “the warrant described an off-white house with a black roof. Norris’ house is yellow with a gray roof. The houses even had separate driveways, addresses, and mailboxes.”
But deputies didn’t care, they just wanted to smash things and kidnap those damn “dope heads.”
When the SWAT team entered Norris’ home, Norris was temporarily kidnapped and his things smashed.
“Got to the hallway, they was all over me,” Norris said. “Grabbed my arm, twisted behind my back, and handcuffed me.”
Norris was 79 years old at the time and presented a threat to absolutely no one.
“That just like scared me to death. I’d already had heart trouble, I had heart surgery,” Norris said.
Norris is heard on the body camera video telling the deputies who just flash banged his home as he watched TV that he has heart trouble. But they couldn’t have cared less.
Eventually, police realized they were in the wrong house and so they began turning off their body cameras in a likely attempt to cover up their dangerous ignorance. Norris says that’s when a deputy told him that they will uncuff him and leave, so long as he signs this piece of paper they placed in front of him.
“So I signed my name on there,” Norris said. “I didn’t get a chance to read it.”
After police eventually left, they walked to the correct house and the heavily militarized SWAT team, equipped with M4 rifles and grenades confiscated a small amount of drugs. The term “overkill” doesn’t even begin to describe the situation and speaks to the utterly anserine and violent nature of the war on drugs.
According to 11 Alive, Norris’ grandson, Wantez Robinson, called 911 and requested an ambulance to check out his grandfather after the raid.
For two years, Norris has been fighting unsuccessfully to sue the cops involved. Thanks to qualified immunity, the officers involved remain protected.
“A pizza delivery man could have delivered a pizza to the correct address,” Norris’ attorney Darryl Scott said of the police incompetence.
“You’re able to come and kick someone’s house down, let flash grenades go, and you’re at the wrong house, and you’re not held accountable for it?,” Robinson questioned. “Someone has to be held accountable for this. You should not be able to just go into someone’s house because you feel like it,” he added.
A few days after the raid, deputies came back and fixed the door but lawyers for the SWAT team have fought vigorously for two years against any other form of compensation.
Norris’ granddaughter, LaCristy Johnson, minced no words when saying, “the government has given officers a blank check to go out in the community and break the law. They feel like they have the right to do that with no consequence.” And, unfortunately, she is right.
Based on how he was treated and the utter lack of concern given to his case, Norris says he has no confidence that these raids on the wrong homes will ever come to an end.
“They’re just gonna keep on doing it,” he said. “They probably go into somebody’s wrong house, somebody’s gonna get hurt.”
This case arises out of the execution of a search warrant at the wrong address.
Plaintiff Onree Norris, whose home was mistakenly raided, sued Defendants Jermaine Hicks, David Cody, David Lemacks, Jerome Moore, and Steven Parrish for violating his Fourth Amendment rights.
Defendants now move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
Start by trying to overcome, "Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims."
Next, attempt to overcome Plaintiff's failure to name Team Leader Kendig as a defendant.
If you overcome the untimely attempt to add Team Leader Kendig, then overcome "Even if Plaintiff had shown good cause, the Court would deny his motion to amend as futile because, for many of the same reasons explained below, Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified imunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."
Then you can apply yourself to Doc #80, CLERK'S JUDGMENT in favor of defedants against Plaintiff Norris for costs." And Doc #88 "Costs taxed in amouhnt of $1833.36 against plaintiffs."
It is a shame that everything in the bullshit article about this 2018 case is contradicted by the actual court opinion.
Norris v Hicks, Doc 79 Order Granting Summary Judgment (16 Mar 2020) by nolu chan on Scribd
It is the Opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, issued by Michael L. Brown, United States District Judge.
It is just a coincidence that yet another court opinion says that Deckard and his bullshit source of Matt Agorist are full of shit. Again. On this shit case from 2018, decided in March 2020.
You just can't deal with what the court had to say.
Qualified immunity: Police off the hook for no-knock raid on wrong house
You be their lawyer and help them collect.
Start by trying to overcome, "Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims."
Next, attempt to overcome Plaintiff's failure to name Team Leader Kendig as a defendant.
If you overcome the untimely attempt to add Team Leader Kendig, then overcome "Even if Plaintiff had shown good cause, the Court would deny his motion to amend as futile because, for many of the same reasons explained below, Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified immunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."
Then you can apply yourself to Doc #80, CLERK'S JUDGMENT in favor of defendants against Plaintiff Norris for costs." And Doc #88 "Costs taxed in amouhnt of $1833.36 against plaintiffs."
It is a shame that everything in the bullshit article about this 2018 case is contradicted by the actual court opinion. When bullshit is taken to court, it loses.
[The Court:] "Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified immunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."
[Deckard] You'd give the prick a medal.
Whine all you want, but Agent Kendig was NEVER a defendant in the case because of the Plaintiff's legal fuck up.
OPINION of the Court:
At 12:
On April 1, 2019, about two months after discovery closed and almost a year into the case, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint by adding Agent Kendig as a defendant. (Dkt. 50.)
At 12:
II. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Plaintiff moves to add Agent Kendig as a defendant. Plaintiff's motion is untimely.
On July 30, 2018, the Court's Scheduling Order (Dkt. 14) approved the parties' Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan (Dkt. 11), which states: “Amendments to the pleadings submitted LATER THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS after [July 27, 2018] will not be accepted for filing, unless otherwise permitted by law.” (Dkt. 11 at 8.) The Scheduling Order also incorporates the Local Rules, which state that, subject to inapplicable exceptions, “all . . . motions must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS after [July 27, 2018] unless the filing party has obtained prior permission of the Court to file later.” LR 7.1(A)(2), NDGa.; (see Dkts. 11 at 7 - 8; 14). Plaintiff filed his motion to amend on April 1, 2019, more than seven months after the Scheduling Order's deadline. See Goolsby v. Gain Techs., Inc., 362 F. App'x 123, 127, 131 (11th Cir. 2010) (scheduling order approved the parties' joint preliminary report and discovery plan, and thereby incorporated the amendment deadline listed in that filing). “[W]hen a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party's delay may be excused.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998). Rule 16 provides that the scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), which “precludes modification unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension,” Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418. “This means that the likelihood of obtaining permission to amend diminishes drastically after the court enters a scheduling order with deadlines for amendments that have expired.” Kozyrev v. Ponomarenko, 2020 WL 977635, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020).
Plaintiff was not diligent here. His motion to amend comes almost a year into the case, more than seven months after the Scheduling Order's deadline, almost two months after the close of discovery, and one day before the (extended) deadline for filing summary judgment motions. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly found that delays of this length preclude amendment. See Pugh v. Kobelco Const. Mach. Am., LLC, 413 F. App'x 134, 136 (11th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to amend filed “more than three months after the expiration of the deadline for amending pleadings”); Goolsby, 362 F. App'x at 128, 131 (denying motion to amend filed “nearly two months after the parties' deadline for amending the pleadings”); S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009) (denying motion to amend filed five months after scheduling order's deadline and “a few weeks” after fact discovery closed); see also Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a motion for leave to amend following the close of discovery, past the deadline for amendments and past the deadline for filing dispositive motions.”).
Plaintiff claims “[t]he extent of Mr. Kendig's involvement in the raid was unknown pre-discovery.” (Dkt. 50 at 6.) That may be, but Plaintiff during discovery obtained significant information about Agent Kendig's involvement and still waited months to seek an amendment. For example, on November 20, 2018 — more than four months before filing the motion to amend — Plaintiff elicited the following testimony from Defendant Cody at his deposition:
Q. And then you said that there were team members within the Henry SR Team who had control over certain other aspects. Is that - A. They are the team -- they are the -- or he, for this one, is a team leader. They go in the house. He controls what's going on in the house. He controls the movement to the house. I delegate that authority to our team leader. Q. Who is that with this particular warrant execution? A. Sergeant Kendig. Q. Would that be Eric Kendig? A. Yes. Q. What specific responsibility did you delegate to Sergeant Kendig with respect to the execution of the warrant at 305 English Road? A. He's the team leader, the entry team leader. Q. The entry team leader. So, just in layman's terms, what does that mean? A. Means he controls the movement of people going to the house. He controls who goes into the house. I let him -he makes up his own list of people that are -- he is going to the house with. So -- Q. Okay. And he would have created a list in this particular case? A. Right.
(Dkt. 71 at 21:9-22:11.) This testimony put Plaintiff on notice of Agent Kendig's central role in the raid. Defendant Cody also offered testimony about Agent Kendig's position in the Response Team's tactical formation during the raid. (Id. at 36:14-18.) And, on January 10, 2019, Plaintiff elicited further testimony about Agent Kendig from Defendant Moore. (Dkt. 73 at 9:4-16.) Plaintiff even deposed Agent Kendig on January 24, 2019, but still waited more than two months before moving to add him as a defendant. (Dkt. 51-1.) This is not diligence. See S. Grouts, 575 F.3d at 1242 (“Southern Grouts lacked diligence, at the very least, because it waited until August 5, 2008 to file a motion to amend its complaint with information that it had known over a month before.”).
Because Plaintiff's “proposed amendment was based on facts that were, or should have been, within his own knowledge” well before he moved to amend in April 2019, he has not shown good cause to modify the Scheduling Order and his motion to amend is denied as untimely. Pugh, 413 F. App'x at 136.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Also, you ignore the facts of the case:
OPINION of the Court:
At 3:
In September 2017, Defendants Moore and Parrish tried to conduct surveillance at 305 English Road but were immediately chased away by three or four people standing in front of the property. (Dkts. 59-5 at 4-5; 70 at 6:14-7:11.) Men at the property got in a car and followed Defendants Moore and Parrish at high speed, “pretty much” bumper-to- bumper, for about ten miles. (Dkts. 59-5 at 4-5; 70 at 6:1-13; 73 at 15:1816:7.) Based on his view of the property during the surveillance attempt, Defendant Parrish believed the home at 305 English Road looked “habitable” and “typical to the other houses in the area.” (Dkt. 70 at 8:612.)
At 5:
Given the “violence threat” involved in visiting 305 English Road, the Task Force obtained the assistance of the Response Team to execute the search warrant. (Dkts. 55-87; 59-217; 73 at 7:18-22.) No one from the Response Team had previously been to 305 English Road. (See Dkt. 69 at 53:3-13; 71 at 10:11-13.) The Response Team usually conducts drive-by surveillance of a target property before executing a warrant but was unable to do so here because of the risk of getting spotted and attacked by Watkins and his associates. (Dkts. 51-1 at 14:10-20, 26:1-6; 69 at 53:3-13.)
At 7:
It appears Defendant Cody was the only Response Team agent who reviewed the warrant. (Dkts. 62 at 3, 10-11; 71 at 13:2-18.) He made sure it was signed, confirmed it authorized a no-knock entry, and confirmed that the address in the warrant matched the address identified in the PowerPoint presentation. (Dkt. 71 at 13:713, 16:2-17:6.) But he did not read the warrant “word for word all the way through,” and there is no evidence he read the warrant's description of the house at 305 English Road. (Id. at 15:19-16:15.) Because the Response Team relies on the Task Force to describe the target property and to take them there, Defendant Cody typically does not review the warrant's property description before completing a raid. (Id.; see Dkt. 52 at 42:3-7 (Task Force responsible for “ensuring that the officers who were going to serve the warrant on a target location know where that location is”).)
Defendant Hicks explained during the meeting that the Task Force was responsible for securing the grounds around the target residence and vehicles in the yard. (Dkts. 55-1 at 11; 59-224.) The Response Team was responsible for entering and securing the house. (Dkts. 55-1 at 11; 59-222.) Lieutenant Marlowe led the Task Force while Defendant Cody led the Response Team. (Dkts. 55-1 at 11; 69 at 28:14-22.) Although Defendant Cody exercised “overall tactical control,” he delegated authority to Response Team Agent Eric Kendig to lead the team's execution of his tactical plan. (Dkts. 51-1 at 19:17-21:9; 55-1 at 11; 71 at 20:13-21:16.) This meant Defendant Cody would oversee the operation from outside the target residence while Agent Kendig led the team's entry into the house. (Id.)
- - - - - - - - - -
At 34:
As explained above, Defendant Cody took several steps to identify the target residence. His team executed the warrant under dangerous and dynamic circumstances, and as it was starting to get dark. They had never visited or seen the house before (through no fault of their own), which was unusual. The Task Force was responsible for describing the house but incorrectly said it was an occupied residence. By the time the Response Team realized 305 English Road did not match this description, there was a need to act quickly. Defendant Cody reasonably relied on his team, including Agent Kendig to whom he delegated authority to lead entry into the home. Plaintiff's house was next to, and not dissimilar from, 305 English Road. And, unlike 305 English Road, Plaintiff's house actually looked like an occupied residence, which is what the team were told to look for. Given these facts, the Court cannot say Defendant Cody's conduct was unconstitutional — under “general principle[s] of law” — “as a matter of obvious clarity.” Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1014-15.
Defendant Cody is entitled to qualified immunity — and therefore summary judgment — because Plaintiff has not shown that he violated clearly established law. The remaining Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff concedes they are protected by qualified immunity. The Court therefore grants Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
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Furthermore, your imaginary law does not apply, and you choose to ignore the actual law.
Section 50-21-23. Limited waiver of sovereign immunity
(a) The state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; provided, however, that the state's sovereign immunity is waived subject to all exceptions and limitations set forth in this article. The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.
(b) The state waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided in this article and only with respect to actions brought in the courts of the State of Georgia. The state does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States.
Code 1981, § 50-21-23, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1.
1. To any claim filed in any Courts operated by the United States or any State Government other than Georgia.
2. This policy does not apply to losses resulting from conduct on the part of State officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.
3. This policy provides no coverage with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States against the State government entities insured herein.
4. No award for damages under this policy shall include punitive or exemplary damages or interest prior to judgment.
5. Nothing in this policy shall impose or create any obligation upon other insurance funds to the State.
6. No claim or judgment against the State under this policy shall be payable except from the State Tort Claims Trust Fund or from any policies of insurance or contracts of indemnity provided under the Fund and which provide coverage for the claim being paid.
7. Nothing in this policy shall be construed to authorize any execution or levy against any State property or funds. Execution or levy against State property or funds is expressly prohibited
8. No claim for past due wages or other types of fringe benefits are covered under this policy in claims brought by State employees and former State employees for damages arising out of a work related occurrence.
9. Nothing in this policy shall be construed to authorize the waiver of the Workers’ Compensation exclusive remedy when State employees are injured on the job.
10. The first $500 of each property damage claim, involving property of others in the care, custody or control of a state agency or authority. However, DOAS may pay any part or the entire loss amount to effect settlement of the claim or “suit” and, upon notification of the action taken, the state agency or authority shall promptly reimburse DOAS for such part of the first $500 as had been paid by DOAS.
PART VI – IMMUNITIES
1. An act or omission by a State officer or employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute, regulation, rule, or ordinance, whether or not such statute, regulation, rule, or ordinance is valid.
2. The exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a State officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.
3. The assessment or collection of any tax or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer.
4. Legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutorial action or inaction.
5. Administrative action or inaction of a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial nature.
6. Civil disturbance, riot, insurrection, or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the method of providing, law enforcement, police, or fire protection.
7. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights.
8. Inspection powers or functions, including failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property other than property owned by the State to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law, regulation, code, or ordinance or contains a hazard to health or safety.
9. Licensing powers or functions, including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.
10. The plan or design for construction of or improvement to highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public works where such plan or design is prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design.
11. Financing regulatory activities, including, but not limited to, examinations, inspections, audits, or other financial oversight activities.
12. Activities of the Georgia National Guard when engaged in state or federal training or duty, but this exception does not apply to vehicular accidents; or
13. Any failure or malfunction occurring before December 31, 2005, which is caused directly or indirectly by the failure of computer software or any device containing a computer processor to accurately or properly recognize, calculate, display, sort, or otherwise process dates or times, if the failure or malfunction causing the loss was unforeseeable or if the failure or malfunction causing the loss was foreseeable but the plan or design or both for identifying and preventing the failure or malfunction was prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted computer and information system design standards in effect at the time of the preparation of the plan or design.
