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Title: The American Legion Wants Marijuana Reclassified to Help Treat PTSD
Source:
Reason
URL Source: https://reason.com/blog/2016/09/06/ ... an-legion-wants-marijuana-recl
Published: Sep 6, 2016
Author: Scott Shackford
Post Date: 2016-09-07 07:37:27 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 17965
Comments: 72
These aren't your filthy hippies and stoners looking for an excuse to toke (not that there's anything wrong with that!): The American Legion is calling for the federal government to reclassify marijuana to acknowledge its potential benefits as a medical treatment. As Jacob Sullum previously noted, The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is stubbornly refusing to change the federal classification of marijuana as a drug that has no "accepted medical use" until science proves them wrong. Fortunately they're easing off on the Catch-22 situation that has resulted in this classification making it extremely difficult for researchers to perform the very scientific testing that could determine marijuana's medical value. One of the potential medical values of medical marijuana is as a treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). And in what must certainly at this point make it abundantly clear where the majority of Americans stand on marijuana use, the American Legion has just voted at its national convention to support a resolution calling on Congress to legislatively reclassify cannabis and place it in a category that recognizes its potential value. The resolution, readable here at marijuana.com, highlights a number of important statistics that have helped push the Legion to support it. Across two years, the Department of Veterans Affairs have diagnosed thousands of Afghanistan and Iraq War veterans as having PTSD or Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI). More than 1,300 veterans in fiscal year 2009 were hospitalized for brain injuries. And the resolution notes that systems in the brain can respond to 60 different chemicals found in cannabis. Therefore, the American Legion wants the DEA to license privately-funded medical marijuana and research facilities and to reclassify marijuana away from being lumped in with drugs like cocaine and meth. Tom Angell over at marijuana.com notes that Sue Sisley, a psychiatrist and medical marijuana researcher, has been lobbying the Legion and their local posts to get their support. Sisley is notable for actually getting federal permission to research marijuana as a treatment for PTSD and then getting dumped by the University of Arizona (where she worked) in 2014. What does this mean for a legislative effort to give VA docs permission to actually talk about medical marijuana as a treatment for veterans? As I noted in May, there was an amendment to a military appropriations bill that would end a gag order that prohibits VA doctors from recommending or even discussing medical marijuana treatment with patients, even in states where it had been legalized. The amendment would end the gag order, but wouldn't permit the VA to prescribe or pay for marijuana. The amendment passed the House and Senate, but as Angell notes, after the two sides went through the reconciliation to hammer out any difference, the language completely disappeared. It is no longer part of the Veterans Administration package. Legislators return to session today to hammer out last-minute spending bills to keep the government running (and the Democrats and Republicans are currently in disagreement on how long to extend spending authorizations for the incoming administration). Technically the amendment's language could be restored. 
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DEA, 81 FR 53779-53781, August 12, 2016 State-level public initiatives, including laws and referenda in support of the medical use of marijuana, have generated interest in the medical community and the need for high quality clinical investigation as well as comprehensive safety and effectiveness data. In order to address the need for high quality clinical investigations, the state of California established the Center for Medicinal Cannabis Research (CMCR, www.cmcr.ucsd.edu) in 2000 ''in response to scientific evidence for therapeutic possibilities of cannabis[9] and local legislative initiatives in favor of compassionate use'' (Grant, 2005). State legislation establishing the CMCR called for high quality medical research that would ''enhance understanding of the efficacy and adverse effects of marijuana as a pharmacological agent,'' but stressed the project ''should not be construed as encouraging or sanctioning the social or recreational use of marijuana.'' The CMCR funded many of the published studies on marijuana's potential use for treating multiple sclerosis, neuropathic pain, appetite suppression and cachexia. However, aside from the data produced by CMCR, no state-level medical marijuana laws have produced scientific data on marijuana's safety and effectiveness. FDA approves medical use of a drug following a submission and review of an NDA or BLA. The FDA has not approved any drug product containing marijuana for marketing. Even so, results of small clinical exploratory studies have been published in the current medical literature. Many studies describe human research with marijuana in the United States under FDA-regulated IND applications. However, FDA approval of an NDA is not the only means through which a drug can have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. In general, a drug may have a ''currently accepted medical use'' in treatment in the United States if the drug meets a five-part test. Established case law (Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) upheld the Administrator of DEA's application of the five-part test to determine whether a drug has a ''currently accepted medical use.'' The following describes the five elements that characterize ''currently accepted medical use'' for a drug[10]: i. the drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible ii. there must be adequate safety studies iii. there must be adequate and well- controlled studies proving efficacy iv. the drug must be accepted by qualified experts v. the scientific evidence must be widely available Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.'' Firstly, the chemistry of marijuana, as defined in the petition, is not reproducible in terms of creating a standardized dose. The petition defines marijuana as including all Cannabis cultivated strains. Different marijuana samples derived from various cultivated strains may have very different chemical constituents including delta9-THC and other cannabinoids (Appendino et al., 2011). As a consequence, marijuana products from different strains will have different safety, biological, pharmacological, and toxicological profiles. Thus, when considering all Cannabis strains together, because of the varying chemical constituents, reproducing consistent standardized doses is not possible. Additionally, smoking marijuana currently has not been shown to allow delivery of consistent and reproducible doses. However, if a specific Cannabis strain is grown and processed under strictly controlled conditions, the plant chemistry may be kept consistent enough to produce reproducible and standardized doses. As to the second and third criteria; there are neither adequate safety studies nor adequate and well-controlled studies proving marijuana's efficacy. To support the petitioners' assertion that marijuana has accepted medical use, the petitioners cite the American Medical Association's (AMA) 2009 report entitled ''Use of Cannabis for Medicinal Purposes.'' The petitioners claim the AMA report is evidence the AMA accepts marijuana's safety and efficacy. However, the 2009 AMA report clarifies that the report ''should not be viewed as an endorsement of state-based medical cannabis programs, the legalization of marijuana, or that scientific evidence on the therapeutic use of cannabis meets the same and current standards for a prescription drug product.[11]'' Currently, no published studies conducted with marijuana meet the criteria of an adequate and well-controlled efficacy study. The criteria for an adequate and well-controlled study for purposes of determining the safety and efficacy of a human drug are defined under the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in 21 CFR 314.126. In order to assess this element, FDA conducted a review of clinical studies published and available in the public domain before February, 2013. Studies were identified through a search of PubMed[12] for articles published from inception to February 2013, for randomized controlled trials using marijuana to assess marijuana's efficacy in any therapeutic indication. Additionally, the review included studies identified through a search of bibliographic references in relevant systematic reviews and identified studies presenting original research in any language. Selected studies needed to be placebo-controlled and double-blinded. Additionally, studies needed to encompass administered marijuana plant material. There was no requirement for any specific route of administration, nor any age limits on study subjects. Studies were excluded that used placebo marijuana supplemented by the addition of specific amounts of THC or other cannabinoids. Additionally, studies administering marijuana plant extracts were excluded. The PubMed search yielded a total of 566 abstracts of scientific articles. Of these abstracts, a full-text review was conducted with 85 papers to assess eligibility. Of the studies identified through the search of the references and the 566 abstracts from the PubMed search, only 11 studies met all the criteria for selection (Abrams et al., 2007; Corey-Bloom et al., 2012; Crawford and Merritt, 1979; Ellis et al., 2009; Haney et al., 2005; Haney et al., 2007; Merritt et al., 1980; Tashkin et al., 1974; Ware et al., 2010; Wilsey et al., 2008; Wilsey et al., 2013). These 11 studies were published between 1974 and 2013. Ten of these studies were conducted in the United States and one study was conducted in Canada. The identified studies examine the effects of smoked and vaporized marijuana for the indications of chronic neuropathic pain, spasticity related to Multiple Sclerosis (MS), appetite stimulation in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) patients, glaucoma, and asthma. All studies used adult subjects. The 11 identified studies were individually evaluated to determine if they successfully meet accepted scientific standards. Specifically, they were evaluated on study design including subject selection criteria, sample size, blinding techniques, dosing paradigms, outcome measures, and the statistical analysis of the results. The analysis relied on published studies, thus information available about protocols, procedures, and results were limited to documents published and widely available in the public domain. The review found that all 11 studies that examined effects of inhaled marijuana do not currently prove efficacy of marijuana in any therapeutic indication based on a number of limitations in their study design; however, they may be considered proof of concept studies. Proof of concept studies provide preliminary evidence on a proposed hypothesis involving a drug's effect. For drugs under development, the effect often relates to a short-term clinical outcome being investigated. Proof of concept studies often serve as the link between preclinical studies and dose ranging clinical studies. Thus, proof of concept studies generally are not sufficient to prove efficacy of a drug because they provide only preliminary information about the effects of a drug. In addition to the lack of published adequate and well-controlled efficacy studies proving efficacy, the criteria for adequate safety studies has also not been met. Importantly, in its discussion of the five-part test used to determine whether a drug has a ''currently accepted medical use,'' DEA said, ''No drug can be considered safe in the abstract. Safety has meaning only when judged against the intended use of the drug, its known effectiveness, its known and potential risks, the severity of the illness to be treated, and the availability of alternative remedies'' (57 FR 10504). When determining whether a drug product is safe and effective for any indication, FDA performs an extensive risk-benefit analysis to determine whether the risks posed by the drug product's side effects are outweighed by the drug product's potential benefits for a particular indication. Thus, contrary to the petitioner's assertion that marijuana has accepted safety, in the absence of an accepted therapeutic indication which can be weighed against marijuana's risks, marijuana does not satisfy the element for having adequate safety studies such that experts may conclude that it is safe for treating a specific, recognized disorder. The fourth of the five elements for determining ''currently accepted medical use'' requires that the national community of experts, qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, accepts the safety and effectiveness of the substance for use in treating a specific, recognized disorder. A material conflict of opinion among experts precludes a finding of consensus. Medical practitioners who are not experts in evaluating drugs are not qualified to determine whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective or meets NDA requirements (57 FR 10499-10505). There is no evidence that there is a consensus among qualified experts that marijuana is safe and effective for use in treating a specific, recognized disorder. As discussed above, there are not adequate scientific studies that show marijuana is safe and effective in treating a specific, recognized disorder. In addition, there is no evidence that a consensus of qualified experts have accepted the safety and effectiveness of marijuana for use in treating a specific, recognized disorder. Although medical practitioners are not qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, we also note that the AMA's report, entitled ''Use of Cannabis for Medicinal Purposes,'' does not accept that marijuana currently has accepted medical use. Furthermore, based on the above definition of a ''qualified expert'', who is an individual qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of a drug, state-level medical marijuana laws do not provide evidence of a consensus among qualified experts that marijuana is safe and effective for use in treating a specific, recognized disorder. As to the fifth part of the test, which requires that information concerning the chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, and effectiveness of marijuana to be reported in sufficient detail, the scientific evidence regarding all of these aspects is not available in sufficient detail to allow adequate scientific scrutiny. Specifically, the scientific evidence regarding marijuana's chemistry in terms of a specific Cannabis strain that could produce standardized and reproducible doses is not currently available. Alternately, a drug can be considered to have a ''currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions'' (21 U.S.C. 812(b)(2)(B)), as allowed under the stipulations for a Schedule II drug. Yet, as stated above, currently marijuana does not have any accepted medical use, even under conditions where its use is severely restricted. In conclusion, to date, research on marijuana's medical use has not progressed to the point where marijuana is considered to have a ''currently accepted medical use'' or a ''currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.'' - - - - - - - - - - [9] In this quotation the term cannabis is interchangeable with marijuana. [10] 57 FR I 0499, 10504–06 (March 26, 1992). [11] In this quotation the term cannabis is used interchangeably for marijuana. [12] The following search strategy was used, ‘‘(cannabis OR marijuana) AND (therapeutic use OR therapy) AND (RCT OR randomized controlled trial OR ‘‘systematic review’’ OR clinical trial OR clinical trials) NOT (‘‘marijuana abuse’’[Mesh] OR addictive behavior OR substance related disorders).’’
Which part of "calling on Congress to legislatively reclassify cannabis" did you not understand, nolu spam?
Which part of "reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value," makes sense to you? I know this is really taxing for you, but it seems to be lacking any scientific evidence to justify anything. Moreover, you seem to fail to recognize wordsmithing signifying nothing. RESOLVED, By The American Legion in National Convention assembled in Cincinnati, Ohio, August 30, 31, September 1, 2016, that The American Legion urge the Drug Enforcement Agency to license privately-funded medical marijuana production operations in the United States to enable safe and efficient cannabis drug development research; and, be it finally, RESOLVED, That The American Legion urge Congress to amend legislation to remove Marijuana from schedule I and reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value. DEA, 81 FR 53779-53781, August 12, 2016 Firstly, the chemistry of marijuana, as defined in the petition, is not reproducible in terms of creating a standardized dose. The petition defines marijuana as including all Cannabis cultivated strains. Different marijuana samples derived from various cultivated strains may have very different chemical constituents including delta9-THC and other cannabinoids (Appendino et al., 2011). As a consequence, marijuana products from different strains will have different safety, biological, pharmacological, and toxicological profiles. Thus, when considering all Cannabis strains together, because of the varying chemical constituents, reproducing consistent standardized doses is not possible. Additionally, smoking marijuana currently has not been shown to allow delivery of consistent and reproducible doses. However, if a specific Cannabis strain is grown and processed under strictly controlled conditions, the plant chemistry may be kept consistent enough to produce reproducible and standardized doses. It cannot meet the first test to safely prescribe as medicine. Alternately, a drug can be considered to have a ''currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions'' (21 U.S.C. 812(b)(2)(B)), as allowed under the stipulations for a Schedule II drug. Yet, as stated above, currently marijuana does not have any accepted medical use, even under conditions where its use is severely restricted. In conclusion, to date, research on marijuana's medical use has not progressed to the point where marijuana is considered to have a ''currently accepted medical use'' or a ''currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.'' Marjuana has been determined to not have a "currently accepted medical use," nor a "currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.'' Officially, within the schedule system, what the hell does it mean to "reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value?" Nobody said it does not have potential medical value. It has no currently accepted medical use. A requirement for Schedule V is "The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States." Absent a finding of some "currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," marijuana (or any other substance) is not even assignable to Schedule V, the lowest schedule. There is no schedule category that recognizes a substance with potential medical value. Just about every substance may have potential medical value. That does not connote that it has any currently accepted medical use. - - - - - - - - - -
Are you this stupid, or are you hoping others on LF are? "The five elements" are authoritative because of authority that ultimately derives from Congress and its legislation; when the subject is (urged) Congressional CHANGES to legislation, the CURRENT state of the rules is no longer binding.
Are you this stupid, or are you hoping others on LF are? "The five elements" are authoritative because of authority that ultimately derives from Congress and its legislation; when the subject is (urged) Congressional CHANGES to legislation, the CURRENT state of the rules is no longer binding. I have given up all hope for you. Your brain has apparently been fired on drugs. It is already in a Schedule where it already has been recognized as a substance with potential medical value. It just kind of lacks "currently accepted medical value. DEA, 81 FR 53779-53781, August 12, 2016
I have given up all hope for you. You've answered my question - you are that stupid. Poor stupid nolu spam.
To nolu, (and his buddies here) the government is all powerful and can declare damn near ANYTHING, or any behavior, illegal. - --- This is beyond stupid, -- it is an anti-constitutional theory.
Listening to two stoned dopers who believe they are having a conversation is listening to pure stupid. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of really good shit.
Yup - liberty means it's none of your business nor government's what someone puts in their own body.
"The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens." Legalizing all drugs for all citizens seems to violate that duty. And forcing citizens to care for those who put shit in their own body definitely does.
Legalizing all drugs for all citizens seems to violate that duty. How so? Certainly it's not a duty nor even a legitimate function of government to protect its citizens from themselves ... unless you want your diet and bedtime monitored. Agreed. Including shit like tobacco or a steady diet of fast food.
It's not illegal to consume drugs. But if Congress wishes to regulate the interstate transportation of substances harmful to people, they have that power and that duty.
It's not illegal to consume drugs. But if Congress wishes to regulate the interstate transportation of substances harmful to people, they have that power What they don't have is the authority to regulate intrastate commerce that they can't distinguish from interstate commerce - that turns the Constitutional limitation on its head. Still no evidence for duty since the harm is voluntarily self-inflicted by the user.
Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196-97 (1824): It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is prescribed is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would, be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation; within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies. - - - - - - - - - - Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) http://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1949/1942/1942_59/ Location: Roscoe Filburn's Farm Facts of the Case Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the government to set production quotas for wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment. He claimed that he wanted thewheat for use on his farm, including feed for his poultry and livestock. Fiburn was penalized. He argued that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use. Question Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Wickard, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Agricultural Adjustment Act According to Filburn, the act regulated production and consumption, which are local in character. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is local and not regarded as commerce, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'" - - - - - - - - - - Gonzales v. Raich, sub nom. Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. California is one of at least nine States that authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States” includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. [...] The majority placed heavy reliance on our decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000), as interpreted by recent Circuit precedent, to hold that this separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of federal power. In contrast, the dissenting judge concluded that the CSA, as applied to respondents, was clearly valid under Lopez and Morrison; moreover, he thought it “simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct surrounding the cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this case from the cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn.” 352 F. 3d, at 1235 (opinion of Beam, J.). The obvious importance of the case prompted our grant of certiorari. 542 U. S. 936 (2004). The case is made difficult by respondents’ strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic purposes. The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally. Well-settled law controls our answer. The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. [...] Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress’ commerce power. Brief for Respondents 22, 38. Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority. Rather, respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. [...] Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Perez, 402 U. S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 128–129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 125. We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the “‘total incidence’ ” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U. S., at 154– 155 (“‘[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may do so’” (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259 (1927))). In this vein, we have reiterated that when “ ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” E. g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968); emphasis deleted). [...] In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276–280 (1981); Perez, 402 U. S., at 155– 156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252–253 (1964). Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme. [...] First, the fact that marijuana is used “for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician” cannot itself serve as a distinguishing factor. Id., at 1229. The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses. Moreover, the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes, and in what manner. Indeed, most of the substances classified in the CSA “have a useful and legitimate medical purpose.” 21 U. S. C. § 801(1). Thus, even if respondents are correct that marijuana does have accepted medical uses and thus should be redesignated as a lesser schedule drug, the CSA would still impose controls beyond what is required by California law. The CSA requires manufacturers, physicians, pharmacies, and other handlers of controlled substances to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions mandating registration with the DEA, compliance with specific production quotas, security controls to guard against diversion, recordkeeping and reporting obligations, and prescription requirements. §§ 821–830; 21 CFR § 1301 et seq. (2004). Furthermore, the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544 (1979). Accordingly, the mere fact that marijuana—like virtually every other controlled substance regulated by the CSA—is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the CSA. [...] Second, limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation “in accordance with state law” cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is “ ‘superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’ ” however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 196 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 426 (1925)). See also 392 U. S., at 195–196; Wickard, 317 U. S., at 124 (“ ‘[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress’”).
You should have kept reading: "This power is not only concurrent, but is limited in Congress. It does not extend to the regulation of the internal commerce of any State. This results from the terms used in the grant of power, [22 U.S. 1, 65] 'among the several States.' It results also from the effects of a contrary doctrine, on the whole mass of State power. Internal commerce must be that which is wholly carried on within the limits of a State: as where the commencement, progress, and termination of the voyage, are wholly confined to the territory of the State. This branch of power includes a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers, and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights to carry goods and passengers, by land or water. All such laws must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States, Congress cannot interfere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclusively in the States." Yes, that's the ruling that, after FDR's court-packing threat, turned the Constitutional limitation on its head. Justice Thomas has rightly called it a "rootless and malleable" standard.
"This power is not only concurrent, but is limited in Congress. It does not extend to the regulation of the internal commerce of any State. This results from the terms used in the grant of power, [22 U.S. 1, 65] 'among the several States.' It results also from the effects of a contrary doctrine, on the whole mass of State power. Internal commerce must be that which is wholly carried on within the limits of a State: as where the commencement, progress, and termination of the voyage, are wholly confined to the territory of the State. This branch of power includes a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers, and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights to carry goods and passengers, by land or water. All such laws must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States, Congress cannot interfere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclusively in the States." Yes, that's the ruling that, after FDR's court-packing threat, turned the Constitutional limitation on its head. Justice Thomas has rightly called it a "rootless and malleable" standard. You should read more. In any case, the Supreme Court has spoken. The Court says what the law is. Potheads speak on internet boards. They say any damfool thing -- it is of no legal effect. Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196-97 (1824): It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is prescribed is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would, be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation; within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies. In 1824, the Court made clear that the commerce clause applied to activity that was "in any manner connected with commerce ... among the several states." - - - - - - - - - - In 1942, Wickard clearly stated, "At the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded," and proceeded to state lines of cases had served "to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden. And Wickard also reminded that Gibbons observed of the commerce power that, "nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 119-22 (1942) The Government's concern lest the Act be held to be a regulation of production or consumption, rather than of marketing, is attributable to a few dicta and decisions of this Court which might be understood to lay it down that activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and [p120] "mining" are strictly "local" and, except in special circumstances which are not present here, cannot be regulated under the commerce power because their effects upon interstate commerce are, as matter of law, only "indirect." [n16] Even today, when this power has been held to have great latitude, there is no decision of this Court that such activities may be regulated where no part of the product is intended for interstate commerce or intermingled with the subjects thereof. We believe that a review of the course of decision under the Commerce Clause will make plain, however, that questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as "production" and "indirect" and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce. At the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-195. He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes. Id. at 197. [p121] For nearly a century, however, decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under the Clause, and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce. During this period, there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, and the influence of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states. In discussion and decision, the point of reference, instead of being what was "necessary and proper" to the exercise by Congress of its granted power, was often some concept of sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood. Certain activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and "mining" were occasionally said to be within the province of state governments and beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. [n17] It was not until 1887, with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, [n18] that the interstate commerce power began to exert positive influence in American law and life. This first important federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act [n19] and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others. These statutes ushered in new phases of adjudication, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder. When it first dealt with this new legislation, the Court adhered to its earlier pronouncements, and allowed but [p122] little scope to the power of Congress. United States v. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1. [n20] These earlier pronouncements also played an important part in several.of the five cases in which this Court later held that Acts of Congress under the Commerce Clause were in excess of its power. [n21] Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority were being written, however, other cases called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. Wickard was a return to the power expressed in 1824. - - - - - - - - - - Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) demonstrated that the commerce clause applied to places of public accomodation (diners, hotels that do not move) serving interstate travelers. 1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause as applied to a place of public accommodation serving interstate travelers. Civil Right Cases, 109 U. S. 3, distinguished. Pp. 379 U. S. 249-262. (a) The interstate movement of persons is “commerce” which concerns more than one State. Pp. 379 U. S. 255-256. (b) The protection of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause whether or not the transportation of persons between States is “commercial.” P. 379 U. S. 256. (c) Congress’ action in removing the disruptive effect which it found racial discrimination has on interstate travel is not invalidated because Congress was also legislating against what it considered to be moral wrongs. P. 379 U. S. 257. (d) Congress had power to enact appropriate legislation with regard to a place of public accommodation such as appellant’s motel even if it is assumed to be of a purely “local” character, as Congress’ power over interstate commerce extends to the regulation of local incidents thereof which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. P. 379 U. S. 258. (2) The prohibition in Title II of racial discrimination in public accommodations affecting commerce does not violate the Fifth 379 U. S. 242 Amendment as being a deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law. Pp. 379 U. S. 258-261. (3) Such prohibition does not violate he Thirteenth Amendment as being “involuntary servitude.” P. 379 U. S. 261. 231 F.Supp. 393, affirmed.
You (nolu) should read more. -- (urged CF) Nolu ---In any case, the Supreme Court has spoken. The Court says what the law is. Potheads speak on internet boards. They say any damfool thing -- it is of no legal effect. There you go again: --- posting court opinions that DO NOT MAKE LAW. -- In fact, these opinions are under constitutional dispute. Wannabe lawyers also 'speak on internet boards. They say any damfool thing -- it is of no legal effect.'
When you or your fellow traveling crackpots win the dispute, please let me know. "It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Good law for 213 years and counting, internet crackpots notwithstanding.
#72. To: nolu chan (#71)
There you go again: --- posting court opinions that DO NOT MAKE LAW. -- In fact, these opinions are under constitutional dispute. Trump is about to win, and with any luck, he will appoint constitutionalists to the SCOTUS, - men that will restore our rule of law. And Marshall concluded by reaffirming that SCOTUS was bound by constitutional restraints. just like all other govt departments. In his later years, Marshall's Barron opinion enabled the south to rationalize the civil war. Millions died.-- He is NOT a hero.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestStatus of Research Into the Medical Uses for Marijuana
''The substance's chemistry must be scientifically established to permit it to be reproduced into dosages which can be standardized. The listing of the substance in a current edition of one of the official compendia, as defined by section 201 G) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 321G), is sufficient to meet this requirement.''
''There must be adequate pharmacological and toxicological studies, done by all methods reasonably applicable, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, that the substance is safe for treating a specific, recognized disorder.''
''There must be adequate, well- controlled, well-designed, well-conducted, and well-documented studies, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, on the basis of which it could be fairly and responsibly concluded by such experts that the substance will have the intended effect in treating a specific, recognized disorder.''
''The drug has a New Drug Application (NDA) approved by the Food and Drug Administration, pursuant to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 355. Or, a consensus of the national community of experts, qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, accepts the safety and effectiveness of the substance for use in treating a specific, recognized disorder. A material conflict of opinion among experts precludes a finding of consensus.'' and
''In the absence of NDA approval, information concerning the chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, and effectiveness of the substance must be reported, published, or otherwise widely available, in sufficient detail to permit experts, qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, to fairly and responsibly conclude the substance is safe and effective for use in treating a specific, recognized disorder.''
#31. To: nolu chan (#1)
#38. To: ConservingFreedom (#31)
Which part of "calling on Congress to legislatively reclassify cannabis" did you not understand, nolu spam?
WHEREAS, In April 2016, the Drug Enforcement Agency gave its approval to a study on the effect of medical marijuana on post-traumatic stress disorder, the first randomized, controlled research in the U.S for PTSD that will use the actual plant instead of oils or synthesized cannabis; now, therefore, be it
Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.''
As to the fifth part of the test, which requires that information concerning the chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, and effectiveness of marijuana to be reported in sufficient detail, the scientific evidence regarding all of these aspects is not available in sufficient detail to allow adequate scientific scrutiny. Specifically, the scientific evidence regarding marijuana's chemistry in terms of a specific Cannabis strain that could produce standardized and reproducible doses is not currently available.
#42. To: nolu chan (#38)
Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.''
#43. To: ConservingFreedom (#42)
Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.''
reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value.
The review found that all 11 studies that examined effects of inhaled marijuana do not currently prove efficacy of marijuana in any therapeutic indication based on a number of limitations in their study design; however, they may be considered proof of concept studies. Proof of concept studies provide preliminary evidence on a proposed hypothesis involving a drug's effect. For drugs under development, the effect often relates to a short-term clinical outcome being investigated. Proof of concept studies often serve as the link between preclinical studies and dose ranging clinical studies. Thus, proof of concept studies generally are not sufficient to prove efficacy of a drug because they provide only preliminary information about the effects of a drug.
#44. To: nolu chan (#43)
"Are you this stupid, or are you hoping others on LF are? "The five elements" are authoritative because of authority that ultimately derives from Congress and its legislation; when the subject is (urged) Congressional CHANGES to legislation, the CURRENT state of the rules is no longer binding."
#45. To: ConservingFreedom (#44)
Poor stupid nolu spam. ----- ConservingFreedom
The government decides what may be lawfully prescribed as medicine and what is illegal to cultivate, distribute or possess. --- nolu chan
#48. To: tpaine (#45)
the government is all powerful and can declare damn near ANYTHING, or any behavior, illegal. - --- This is beyond stupid
it is an anti-constitutional theory.
#54. To: nolu chan (#48)
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
#55. To: ConservingFreedom (#54)
#57. To: misterwhite (#55)
"The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens."
And forcing citizens to care for those who put shit in their own body definitely does.
#58. To: ConservingFreedom (#57)
"Certainly it's not a duty nor even a legitimate function of government to protect its citizens from themselves"
#61. To: misterwhite (#58)
"Certainly it's not a duty nor even a legitimate function of government to protect its citizens from themselves"
and that duty.
#64. To: ConservingFreedom, misterwhite (#61)
What they don't have is the authority to regulate intrastate commerce that they can't distinguish from interstate commerce - that turns the Constitutional limitation on its head.
We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?
Wickard v. Filburn
Opinion of the Court
#65. To: nolu chan (#64)
We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?
Wickard v. Filburn
#66. To: ConservingFreedom (#65)
ou should have kept reading:
Wickard v. Filburn
We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?
Appellee says that this is a regulation of production and consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in character, and their effects upon interstate commerce are, at most, "indirect." In answer, the Government argues that the statute regulates neither production nor consumption, but only marketing, and, in the alternative, that, if the Act does go beyond the regulation of marketing, it is sustainable as a "necessary and proper" [n15] implementation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce.
Held:
#69. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#66)
FDR's court-packing threat, turned the Constitutional limitation on its head. Justice Thomas has rightly called it a "rootless and malleable" standard.
#71. To: tpaine (#69)
There you go again: --- posting court opinions that DO NOT MAKE LAW. -- In fact, these opinions are under constitutional dispute.
Replies to Comment # 71. When you or your fellow traveling crackpots win the dispute, please let me know.
"It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Good law for 213 years and counting, internet crackpots notwithstanding...
End Trace Mode for Comment # 71.
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