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Title: The American Legion Wants Marijuana Reclassified to Help Treat PTSD
Source:
Reason
URL Source: https://reason.com/blog/2016/09/06/ ... an-legion-wants-marijuana-recl
Published: Sep 6, 2016
Author: Scott Shackford
Post Date: 2016-09-07 07:37:27 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 20602
Comments: 72
These aren't your filthy hippies and stoners looking for an excuse to toke (not that there's anything wrong with that!): The American Legion is calling for the federal government to reclassify marijuana to acknowledge its potential benefits as a medical treatment.
As Jacob Sullum previously noted, The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is stubbornly refusing to change the federal classification of marijuana as a drug that has no "accepted medical use" until science proves them wrong. Fortunately they're easing off on the Catch-22 situation that has resulted in this classification making it extremely difficult for researchers to perform the very scientific testing that could determine marijuana's medical value.
One of the potential medical values of medical marijuana is as a treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). And in what must certainly at this point make it abundantly clear where the majority of Americans stand on marijuana use, the American Legion has just voted at its national convention to support a resolution calling on Congress to legislatively reclassify cannabis and place it in a category that recognizes its potential value.
The resolution, readable here at marijuana.com, highlights a number of important statistics that have helped push the Legion to support it. Across two years, the Department of Veterans Affairs have diagnosed thousands of Afghanistan and Iraq War veterans as having PTSD or Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI). More than 1,300 veterans in fiscal year 2009 were hospitalized for brain injuries. And the resolution notes that systems in the brain can respond to 60 different chemicals found in cannabis.
Therefore, the American Legion wants the DEA to license privately-funded medical marijuana and research facilities and to reclassify marijuana away from being lumped in with drugs like cocaine and meth.
Tom Angell over at marijuana.com notes that Sue Sisley, a psychiatrist and medical marijuana researcher, has been lobbying the Legion and their local posts to get their support. Sisley is notable for actually getting federal permission to research marijuana as a treatment for PTSD and then getting dumped by the University of Arizona (where she worked) in 2014.
What does this mean for a legislative effort to give VA docs permission to actually talk about medical marijuana as a treatment for veterans? As I noted in May, there was an amendment to a military appropriations bill that would end a gag order that prohibits VA doctors from recommending or even discussing medical marijuana treatment with patients, even in states where it had been legalized. The amendment would end the gag order, but wouldn't permit the VA to prescribe or pay for marijuana.
The amendment passed the House and Senate, but as Angell notes, after the two sides went through the reconciliation to hammer out any difference, the language completely disappeared. It is no longer part of the Veterans Administration package.
Legislators return to session today to hammer out last-minute spending bills to keep the government running (and the Democrats and Republicans are currently in disagreement on how long to extend spending authorizations for the incoming administration). Technically the amendment's language could be restored. (1 image)
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It is the medical and scientific opinions
ESAD.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
"America is at that awkward stage. It's too late to work within the system, but too early to shoot the bastards."
#29. To: Deckard (#25)
Rant on with your precious opinions, but the fact remains - the DEA is keeping cannabis as a Schedule I drug simply to protect big pharma.
And you just want to be able to go to your proctologist and get a scrip to get your ass high.
Marijuana is a schedule drug by international treaty, and federal law, and fails all five prongs of the test for being authorized as medicine.
#30. To: Deckard (#28)
ESAD.
YMFCSCJSDEKLSOBWBC.
#31. To: nolu chan (#1)
Which part of "calling on Congress to legislatively reclassify cannabis" did you not understand, nolu spam?
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#32. To: Deckard (#28)
Americans for Safe Access, et al., v. Drug Enforcement Administration, No. 11-1265 (D.C. Cir. 22 January 2013) slip op
As noted above, DHHS’ recommendations are binding on the DEA insofar as they rest on scientific and medical determinations. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b).
#33. To: Deckard (#0)
No way, Jose!
Watch Colorado for an example of what ensues when knuckleheads legalize a hallucigenic drug. Scores of brain-addled numbskulls on the road and when they enter another state the police are always looking for Colorado tags on a car driving erratically.
This is a Pandora's Box!
Liberals are a lot like Slinkys, they're good for nothing but they bring a smile to your face as you shove them down the stairs.
#34. To: HomerBohn (#33)
"Since marijuana legalization, highway fatalities in Colorado are at near-historic lows" - www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3280359/posts
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#35. To: Deckard (#8)
Piss up a rope psycho.
Oh, you poor little baby....you should try not to get so upset when facts are presented to you.
Try....try hard.
#36. To: Gatlin (#35)
Facts?
nolu spam posts opinions
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
"America is at that awkward stage. It's too late to work within the system, but too early to shoot the bastards."
#37. To: ConservingFreedom (#34)
Articles posted there aren't to be believed.
Liberals are a lot like Slinkys, they're good for nothing but they bring a smile to your face as you shove them down the stairs.
#38. To: ConservingFreedom (#31)
Which part of "calling on Congress to legislatively reclassify cannabis" did you not understand, nolu spam?
Which part of "reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value," makes sense to you?
I know this is really taxing for you, but it seems to be lacking any scientific evidence to justify anything.
Moreover, you seem to fail to recognize wordsmithing signifying nothing.
WHEREAS, In April 2016, the Drug Enforcement Agency gave its approval to a study on the effect of medical marijuana on post-traumatic stress disorder, the first randomized, controlled research in the U.S for PTSD that will use the actual plant instead of oils or synthesized cannabis; now, therefore, be itRESOLVED, By The American Legion in National Convention assembled in Cincinnati, Ohio, August 30, 31, September 1, 2016, that The American Legion urge the Drug Enforcement Agency to license privately-funded medical marijuana production operations in the United States to enable safe and efficient cannabis drug development research; and, be it finally,
RESOLVED, That The American Legion urge Congress to amend legislation to remove Marijuana from schedule I and reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value.
DEA, 81 FR 53779-53781, August 12, 2016
Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.''Firstly, the chemistry of marijuana, as defined in the petition, is not reproducible in terms of creating a standardized dose. The petition defines marijuana as including all Cannabis cultivated strains. Different marijuana samples derived from various cultivated strains may have very different chemical constituents including delta9-THC and other cannabinoids (Appendino et al., 2011). As a consequence, marijuana products from different strains will have different safety, biological, pharmacological, and toxicological profiles. Thus, when considering all Cannabis strains together, because of the varying chemical constituents, reproducing consistent standardized doses is not possible. Additionally, smoking marijuana currently has not been shown to allow delivery of consistent and reproducible doses. However, if a specific Cannabis strain is grown and processed under strictly controlled conditions, the plant chemistry may be kept consistent enough to produce reproducible and standardized doses.
It cannot meet the first test to safely prescribe as medicine.
As to the fifth part of the test, which requires that information concerning the chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, and effectiveness of marijuana to be reported in sufficient detail, the scientific evidence regarding all of these aspects is not available in sufficient detail to allow adequate scientific scrutiny. Specifically, the scientific evidence regarding marijuana's chemistry in terms of a specific Cannabis strain that could produce standardized and reproducible doses is not currently available.Alternately, a drug can be considered to have a ''currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions'' (21 U.S.C. 812(b)(2)(B)), as allowed under the stipulations for a Schedule II drug. Yet, as stated above, currently marijuana does not have any accepted medical use, even under conditions where its use is severely restricted.
In conclusion, to date, research on marijuana's medical use has not progressed to the point where marijuana is considered to have a ''currently accepted medical use'' or a ''currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.''
Marjuana has been determined to not have a "currently accepted medical use," nor a "currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.''
Officially, within the schedule system, what the hell does it mean to "reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value?"
Nobody said it does not have potential medical value. It has no currently accepted medical use.
A requirement for Schedule V is "The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States."
Absent a finding of some "currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," marijuana (or any other substance) is not even assignable to Schedule V, the lowest schedule.
There is no schedule category that recognizes a substance with potential medical value. Just about every substance may have potential medical value. That does not connote that it has any currently accepted medical use.
- - - - - - - - - -
#39. To: Deckard, nolu chan (#36)
Facts?nolu spam posts opinions
And you post Yellow Journalism half truths and lies.
Chan makes sense....you make yourself look like the idiot that you are.
#40. To: Deckard, Gatlin (#36)
nolu spam posts opinions
Deckard posts recycled bullshit over and over.
#41. To: HomerBohn (#37)
Articles posted there [FR] aren't to be believed.
LOL! Now, now ... I also was banned from FR*, but however goofy JR and the mods are, it's just not the case that fact becomes fiction simply by being posted to FR.
*Details here if you're interested: http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=45337
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#42. To: nolu chan (#38)
Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.''
Are you this stupid, or are you hoping others on LF are? "The five elements" are authoritative because of authority that ultimately derives from Congress and its legislation; when the subject is (urged) Congressional CHANGES to legislation, the CURRENT state of the rules is no longer binding.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#43. To: ConservingFreedom (#42)
Marijuana does not meet any of the five elements necessary for a drug to have a ''currently accepted medical use.''Are you this stupid, or are you hoping others on LF are? "The five elements" are authoritative because of authority that ultimately derives from Congress and its legislation; when the subject is (urged) Congressional CHANGES to legislation, the CURRENT state of the rules is no longer binding.
I have given up all hope for you. Your brain has apparently been fired on drugs.
reclassify it in a category that, at a minimum will recognize cannabis as a drug with potential medical value.
It is already in a Schedule where it already has been recognized as a substance with potential medical value. It just kind of lacks "currently accepted medical value.
DEA, 81 FR 53779-53781, August 12, 2016
The review found that all 11 studies that examined effects of inhaled marijuana do not currently prove efficacy of marijuana in any therapeutic indication based on a number of limitations in their study design; however, they may be considered proof of concept studies. Proof of concept studies provide preliminary evidence on a proposed hypothesis involving a drug's effect. For drugs under development, the effect often relates to a short-term clinical outcome being investigated. Proof of concept studies often serve as the link between preclinical studies and dose ranging clinical studies. Thus, proof of concept studies generally are not sufficient to prove efficacy of a drug because they provide only preliminary information about the effects of a drug.
#44. To: nolu chan (#43)
"Are you this stupid, or are you hoping others on LF are? "The five elements" are authoritative because of authority that ultimately derives from Congress and its legislation; when the subject is (urged) Congressional CHANGES to legislation, the CURRENT state of the rules is no longer binding."I have given up all hope for you.
You've answered my question - you are that stupid.
Poor stupid nolu spam.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#45. To: ConservingFreedom (#44)
Poor stupid nolu spam. ----- ConservingFreedom
The government decides what may be lawfully prescribed as medicine and what is illegal to cultivate, distribute or possess. --- nolu chan
To nolu, (and his buddies here) the government is all powerful and can declare damn near ANYTHING, or any behavior, illegal. - --- This is beyond stupid, -- it is an anti-constitutional theory.
#46. To: Deckard (#0)
I guess the WWII and Korea Vets are all gone.
#47. To: redleghunter, Deckard (#46)
I guess the WWII and Korea Vets are all gone.
Nope - membership is declining because Vietnam vets haven't joined: articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/11/local/me-41612
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#48. To: tpaine (#45)
the government is all powerful and can declare damn near ANYTHING, or any behavior, illegal. - --- This is beyond stupid
Listening to two stoned dopers who believe they are having a conversation is listening to pure stupid.
it is an anti-constitutional theory.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of really good shit.
#49. To: Deckard, Gatlin, ConservingFreedom, redleghunter, tpaine (#36)
Facts?
A friend who is a Vietnam vet, also retired from the California National Guard about 4 years ago.
He has PTSD and has been on prescription psych drugs for about 30 years or more. He called me up a couple of years ago, all jazzed because his VA psychiatrist took him off of all prescription drugs. For the first time in decades he's off of the hated psych meds and drug free, but with California Medical Marijuana as a back up, as needed. He's officially considered cured, and weed helped.
That one story is enough to convince me that MM should be available to all.
Castle(C), Stein(G), Johnson(L)
#50. To: hondo68 (#49)
A friend who is a Vietnam vet, also retired from the California National Guard about 4 years ago.He has PTSD and has been on prescription psych drugs for about 30 years or more. He called me up a couple of years ago, all jazzed because his VA psychiatrist took him off of all prescription drugs. For the first time in decades he's off of the hated psych meds and drug free, but with California Medical Marijuana as a back up, as needed. He's officially considered cured, and weed helped.
That one story is enough to convince me that MM should be available to all.
PTSD: National Center for PTSD
Marijuana Use and PTSD among Veterans
Marijuana use for medical conditions is an issue of growing concern. Some Veterans use marijuana to relieve symptoms of PTSD and several states specifically approve the use of medical marijuana for PTSD. However, controlled studies have not been conducted to evaluate the safety or effectiveness of medical marijuana for PTSD. Thus, there is no evidence at this time that marijuana is an effective treatment for PTSD. In fact, research suggests that marijuana can be harmful to individuals with PTSD.
Epidemiology
Marijuana use has increased over the past decade. In 2013, a study found that 19.8 million people reported using marijuana in the past month, with 8.1 million using almost every day (1). Daily use has increased 60% in the prior decade (1). A number of factors are associated with increased risk of marijuana use, including diagnosis of PTSD (2), social anxiety disorder (3), other substance use, particularly during youth (4), and peer substance use (5).
Cannabis Use Disorder among Veterans Using VA Health Care
There has been no study of marijuana use in the overall Veteran population. What we do know comes from looking at data of Veterans using VA health care, who may not be representative of Veterans overall. When considering the subset of Veterans seen in VA health care with co-occurring PTSD and substance use disorders (SUD), cannabis use disorder has been the most diagnosed SUD since 2009. The percentage of Veterans in VA with PTSD and SUD who were diagnosed with cannabis use disorder increased from 13.0% in fiscal year (FY) 2002 to 22.7% in FY 2014. As of FY 2014, there are more than 40,000 Veterans with PTSD and SUD seen in VA diagnosed with cannabis use disorder (6).
Problems Associated with Marijuana Use
Marijuana use is associated with medical and psychiatric problems. These problems may be caused by using, but they also may reflect the characteristics of the people who use marijuana. Medical problems include chronic bronchitis, abnormal brain development among early adolescent initiators, and impairment in short-term memory, motor coordination and the ability to perform complex psychomotor tasks such as driving. Psychiatric problems include psychosis and impairment in cognitive ability. Quality of life can also be affected through poor life satisfaction, decreased educational attainment, and increased sexual risk-taking behavior (7). Chronic marijuana use also can lead to addiction, with an established and clinically significant withdrawal syndrome (8).
Active Ingredients and Route of Administration
Marijuana contains a variety of components (cannabinoids), most notably delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) the primary psychoactive compound in the marijuana plant. There are a number of other cannabinoids, such as cannabidiol (CBD), cannabinol (CBN), and cannabigerol (CBG). Marijuana can vary in cannabinoid concentration, such as in the ratio of THC to other cannabinoids (CBD in particular). Therefore, the effects of marijuana use (e.g., experience of a high, anxiety, sleep) vary as a function of the concentration of cannabinoids (e.g., THC/CBD). In addition, the potency of cannabinoids can vary. For example, the concentration of THC in the marijuana plant can range in strength from less than 1% to 30% based upon strain and cultivation methods. In general, the potency of THC in the marijuana plant has increased as much as 10- fold over the past 40 years (9,10). Recently, cannabis extract products, such as waxes and oils, have been produced and sold in which the concentration of THC can be as high as 90%. Thus, an individual could unknowingly consume a very high dose of THC in one administration, which increases the risk of an adverse reaction.
Marijuana can be consumed in many different forms (e.g., flower, hash, oil, wax, food products, tinctures). Administration of these forms also can take different routes: inhalation (smoking or vaporizing), ingestion, and topical application. Given the same concentration/ratio of marijuana, smoking or vaporizing marijuana produces similar effects (11); however, ingesting the same dose results in a delayed onset and longer duration of effect (12). Not all marijuana users may be aware of the delayed effect caused by ingestion, which may result in greater consumption and a stronger effect than intended.
Neurobiology
Research has consistently demonstrated that the human endocannabinoid system plays a significant role in PTSD. People with PTSD have greater availability of cannabinoid type 1 (CB1) receptors as compared to trauma-exposed or healthy controls (13,14). As a result, marijuana use by individuals with PTSD may result in short-term reduction of PTSD symptoms. However, data suggest that continued use of marijuana among individuals with PTSD may lead to a number of negative consequences, including marijuana tolerance (via reductions in CB1 receptor density and/or efficiency) and addiction (15). Though recent work has shown that CB1 receptors may return after periods of marijuana abstinence (16), individuals with PTSD may have particular difficulty quitting (17).
Marijuana as a Treatment for PTSD
The belief that marijuana can be used to treat PTSD is limited to anecdotal reports from individuals with PTSD who say that the drug helps with their symptoms. There have been no randomized controlled trials, a necessary "gold standard" for determining efficacy. Administration of oral CBD has been shown to decrease anxiety in those with and without clinical anxiety (18). This work has led to the development and testing of CBD treatments for individuals with social anxiety (19), but not yet among individuals with PTSD. With respect to THC, one open trial of 10 participants with PTSD showed THC was safe and well tolerated and resulted in decreases in hyperarousal symptoms (20).
Treatment for Marijuana Addiction
People with PTSD have particular difficulty stopping their use of marijuana and responding to treatment for marijuana addiction. They have greater craving and withdrawal than those without PTSD (21), and greater likelihood of marijuana use during the six months following a quit attempt (17). However, these individuals can benefit from the many evidence-based treatments for marijuana addiction, including cognitive behavioral therapy, motivational enhancement, and contingency management (22). Thus, providers should still utilize these options to support reduction/abstinence.
Clinical Recommendations
Treatment providers should not ignore marijuana use in their PTSD patients. The VA/DoD PTSD Clinical Practice Guideline (2010) recommends providing evidence-based treatments for the individual disorders concurrently. PTSD providers should offer education about problems associated with long-term marijuana use and make a referral to a substance use disorder (SUD) specialist if they do not feel they have expertise in treating substance use.
Individuals with comorbid PTSD and SUD do not need to wait for a period of abstinence before addressing their PTSD. A growing number of studies demonstrate that that these patients can tolerate trauma-focused treatment and that these treatments do not worsen substance use outcomes. Therefore, providers have a range of options to help improve the lives of patients with the co-occurring disorders. For more information, see PTSD and Substance Use Disorders in Veterans.
References
- SAMHSA. (2014). Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings. (Vol. NSDUH Series H-48, HHS Publication No. (SMA) 13-4795). Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
- Cougle, J.R., Bonn-Miller, M. O., Vujanovic, A. A., Zvolensky, M. J., & Hawkins, K. A. (2011). Posttraumatic stress disorder and cannabis use in a nationally representative sample. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 25, 554-558. doi: 10.1037/a0023076
- Buckner, J.D., Schmidt, N. B., Lang, A. R., Small, J. W., Schluach, R. C., & Lewinsohn, P. M. (2008). Specificity of social anxiety disorder as a risk factor for alcohol and cannabis dependence. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 42, 230-239. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2007.01.002
- Butterworth, P., Slade, T. & Degenhardt, L. (2014). Factors associated with the timing and onset of cannabis use and cannabis use disorder: Results from the 2007 Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being. Drug and Alcohol Review, 33, 555-564. doi: 10.1111/dar.12183
- von Sydow, K., Lieb, R., Pfister, H., Höefler, M., & Wittchen, H. U. (2002). What predicts incident use of cannabis and progression to abuse and dependence? A 4-year prospective examination of risk factors in a community sample of adolescents and young adults. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 68, 49-64.
- Program Evaluation and Resource Center, V.A., 2015.
- Volkow, N. D., Baler, R. D., Compton, W. M., & Weiss, S. R. B. (2014). Adverse health effects of marijuana use. New England Journal of Medicine, 370, 2219-2227. doi: 10.1056/NEJMra1402309
- Budney, A. J., Hughes, J. R., Moore, B. A., & Vandrey, R. (2004). Review of the validity and significance of cannabis withdrawal syndrome. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161, 1967-1977.
- Mehmedic, Z., Chandra, S., Slade, D., Denham, H., Foster, S., Patel, A. S., Ross, S. A., Khan, I. A., & ElSohly, M. A. (2010). Potency trends of ”9-THC and other cannabinoids in confiscated cannabis preparations from 1993 to 2008. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 55, 1209-1217. doi: 10.1111/j.1556-4029.2010.01441.x
- Sevigny, E. L., Pacula, R. L., & Heaton, P. (2014) The effects of medical marijuana laws on potency. International Journal of Drug Policy, 25, 308-319. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.01.003
- Abrams, D. I., Vizoso, H. P., Shade, S. B., Jay, C., Kelly, M. E., & Benowitz, N. L. (2007). Vaporization as a smokeless cannabis delivery system: A pilot study. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 82, 572-578.
- Grotenhermen, F. (2003). Pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of cannabinoids. Clinical Pharmacokinetics, 42, 327-360.
- Neumeister, A., Normandin, M. D., Pietrzak, R. H., Piomelli, D., Zheng, M. Q., Gujarro-Anton, A., Potenza, M. N., Bailey, C. R., Lin, S. F., Najafzaden, S., Ropchan, J., Henry, S., Corsi-Travali, S., Carson, R. E., & Huang, Y. (2013). Elevated brain cannabinoid CB1 receptor availability in post-traumatic stress disorder: A positron emission tomography study. Molecular Psychiatry, 18, 1034-1040. doi: 10.1038/mp.2013.61
- Passie, T., Emrich, H. M., Brandt, S. D., & Halpern, J. H. (2012). Mitigation of post-traumatic stress symptoms by Cannabis resin: A review of the clinical and neurobiological evidence. Drug Testing and Analysis, 4, 649-659. doi: 10.1002/dta.1377
- Kendall, D.A. & Alexander, S.P. H. (2009). Behavioral neurobiology of the endocannabinoid system. Current topics in behavioral neurosciences. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
- Hirvonen, J., Goodwin, R. S., Li, C-T., Terry, G. E., Zoghbi, S. S., Morse, C., Pike, V. W., Volkow, N. D., Huestis, M. A., & Innis, R. B. (2012). Reversible and regionally selective downregulation of brain cannabinoid CB1 receptors in chronic daily cannabis smokers. Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 642-649. doi: 10.1038/mp.2011.82
- Bonn-Miller, M. O., Moos, R. H., Boden, M. T., Long, W. R., Kimerling, R., & Trafton, J. A. (in press). The impact of posttraumatic stress disorder on cannabis quit success. The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse.
- Crippa, J. A., Zuardi, A. W., Martìn-Santos, R., Bhattacharyya, S., Atakan, Z., McGuire, P., & Fusar-Poli, P. (2009). Cannabis and anxiety: a critical review of the evidence. Human Psychopharmacology, 24, 515-523. doi: 10.1002/hup.1048
- Bergamaschi, M. M., Queiroz, R. H. C., Hortes, M., Chagas, N., de Oliveira, C. G., De Martinis, B. S., Kapczinski, F., Quevedo, J., Roesler, R., Schröder, N., Nardi, A. E., Martín-Santos, R., Hallak, J. E. C., Zuardi, A. W., & Crippa, J. A. S. (2011). Cannabidiol reduces the anxiety induced by simulated public speaking in treatment-naïve social phobia patients. Neuropsychopharmacology, 36, 1219-1226. doi: 10.1038/npp.2011.6
- Roitman, P., Mechoulam, R., Cooper-Kazaz, R., & Shalev, A. (2014). Preliminary, open-label, pilot study of add-on oral ”9- tetrahydrocannabinol in chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. Clinical Drug Investigation, 34, 587-591. doi: 10.1007/s40261-014-0212-3
- Boden, M. T., Babson, K. A., Vujanovic, A. A., Short, N. A., & Bonn- Miller, M. (2013). Posttraumatic stress disorder and cannabis use characteristics among military Veterans with cannabis dependence. The American Journal on Addictions, 22, 277-284. doi: 10.1111/j.1521- 0391.2012.12018.x
- Roffman, R. A. & Stephens, R. S. (2006). Cannabis dependence: its nature, consequences, and treatment. International research monographs in the addictions. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/c o-occurring/marijuana_use_ptsd_veterans.asp.
#51. To: Deckard (#4)
Nothing the government says about anything is true.
You know that and I know that and soon a lot of other people are going to find this out.
I do not go to church every time the doors are opened, but I love Jesus Christ. I am only human and fail Him daily. I believe Jesus is the Son of God, was born of a virgin, was crucified on a cross, died for my sins and rose from the dead and that He loves us dearly, and is faithful to forgive us of our sins. But He says that if you deny me in front of your friends I will deny you in front of my Father. Can I get an Amen!
#52. To: redleghunter, y'all (#46)
I guess the WWII and Korea Vets are all gone.
Not quite. -- Technically speaking, I'm a Korean war vet, as I joined on Jan 31st, 1955.
Never saw Korea though, served two years in Munich, 56/58.
#53. To: nolu chan, and his progressive prohibitionist buddies (#48)
To nolu, (and his buddies here) believe the government is all powerful and can declare damn near ANYTHING, or any behavior, illegal. - --- This is beyond stupid, -- it is an anti-constitutional theory.
Listening to two stoned dopers who believe they are having a conversation is listening to pure stupid.
Never smoked much POT. -- Booze is my drug of choice, mainly single malts, red wine, and wheat beers.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness, -- free from prohibitionists who are afraid that someone, somewhere, is living large.
#54. To: nolu chan (#48)
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
Yup - liberty means it's none of your business nor government's what someone puts in their own body.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#55. To: ConservingFreedom (#54)
"The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens."
Legalizing all drugs for all citizens seems to violate that duty. And forcing citizens to care for those who put shit in their own body definitely does.
#56. To: misterwhite, hypocritical prohibitionist (#55)
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness, -- protected from prohibitionists who are afraid that someone, somewhere, is living free.
Misterwhite ---- "The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens." --- Legalizing all drugs for all citizens seems to violate that duty.
Only to prohibitionists is there a 'government duty' to criminalize certain substances. -- Dangerous materials can be reasonably regulated without unconstitutional bans.
And forcing citizens to care for those who put shit in their own body definitely does.
We agree on forcing citizens to care, yet you're FOR forcing citizens with prohibitions on drugs, guns, moral issues, etc.
Whatta hypocrite.
#57. To: misterwhite (#55)
"The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens."Legalizing all drugs for all citizens seems to violate that duty.
How so? Certainly it's not a duty nor even a legitimate function of government to protect its citizens from themselves ... unless you want your diet and bedtime monitored.
And forcing citizens to care for those who put shit in their own body definitely does.
Agreed. Including shit like tobacco or a steady diet of fast food.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#58. To: ConservingFreedom (#57)
"Certainly it's not a duty nor even a legitimate function of government to protect its citizens from themselves"
It's not illegal to consume drugs. But if Congress wishes to regulate the interstate transportation of substances harmful to people, they have that power and that duty.
#59. To: Deckard (#36)
Well, I guess this means that the American Legion is now officially on the Shit List of the Canary Klan.
The Legion should be prepared for raids, tanks crashing through the walls, and Swat Teams storming in, with summary executions on the spot.
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Those who beat their swords into plowshares will plow for those who don't
Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.
if you look around, we have gone so far down the the rat hole, the almighty is going to have to apologize to Sodom and Gomorrah, if we don't have a judgement come down on us.
President Obama is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people. --Clint Eastwood
"I am concerned for the security of our great nation; not so much because of any threat from without, but because of the insidious forces working from within." -- General Douglas MacArthur
#60. To: misterwhite, prohibitionist, and proud of it. (#58)
Misterwhite ---- "The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its citizens." --- Legalizing all drugs for all citizens seems to violate that duty.
Only to prohibitionists is there a 'government duty' to criminalize certain substances. -- Dangerous materials can be reasonably regulated without unconstitutional bans.
It's not illegal to consume drugs. But if Congress wishes to regulate the interstate transportation of substances harmful to people, they have that power and that duty.
Congress has SEIZED that power, unconstitutionally. --- And it has turned us into a,nation of scofflaws, -- as all prohibitions do. -- Millions of citizens disregard our stupid 'laws' on guns, drugs, etc. -- And we all pay the price to hold them in jails.
#61. To: misterwhite (#58)
"Certainly it's not a duty nor even a legitimate function of government to protect its citizens from themselves"It's not illegal to consume drugs. But if Congress wishes to regulate the interstate transportation of substances harmful to people, they have that power
What they don't have is the authority to regulate intrastate commerce that they can't distinguish from interstate commerce - that turns the Constitutional limitation on its head.
and that duty.
Still no evidence for duty since the harm is voluntarily self-inflicted by the user.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#62. To: ConservingFreedom (#61)
"What they don't have is the authority to regulate intrastate commerce that they can't distinguish from interstate commerce - that turns the Constitutional limitation on its head."
The U.S. Supreme Court says they do. Are you saying the FAA doesn't have the power to regulate intrastate flights?
"Still no evidence for duty since the harm is voluntarily self-inflicted by the user."
If only that were true. But it's not.
#63. To: misterwhite (#62)
The U.S. Supreme Court says they do.
LOL! They also say abortion and gay sex are Constitutionally protected rights.
Are you saying the FAA doesn't have the power to regulate intrastate flights?
Yes.
"Still no evidence for duty since the harm is voluntarily self-inflicted by the user."
If only that were true. But it's not.
What harm of drugs is not voluntarily self-inflicted by the user?
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#64. To: ConservingFreedom, misterwhite (#61)
What they don't have is the authority to regulate intrastate commerce that they can't distinguish from interstate commerce - that turns the Constitutional limitation on its head.
Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196-97 (1824):
We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is prescribed is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would, be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation; within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.
- - - - - - - - - -
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1949/1942/1942_59/
Wickard v. FilburnLocation: Roscoe Filburn's Farm
Facts of the Case
Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the government to set production quotas for wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment. He claimed that he wanted thewheat for use on his farm, including feed for his poultry and livestock. Fiburn was penalized. He argued that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use.
Question
Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature?
Conclusion
Decision: 8 votes for Wickard, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Agricultural Adjustment Act
According to Filburn, the act regulated production and consumption, which are local in character. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is local and not regarded as commerce, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"
- - - - - - - - - -
Gonzales v. Raich, sub nom. Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
Opinion of the CourtJustice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. California is one of at least nine States that authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States” includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.
[...]
The majority placed heavy reliance on our decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000), as interpreted by recent Circuit precedent, to hold that this separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of federal power. In contrast, the dissenting judge concluded that the CSA, as applied to respondents, was clearly valid under Lopez and Morrison; moreover, he thought it “simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct surrounding the cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this case from the cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn.” 352 F. 3d, at 1235 (opinion of Beam, J.).
The obvious importance of the case prompted our grant of certiorari. 542 U. S. 936 (2004). The case is made difficult by respondents’ strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic purposes. The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally. Well-settled law controls our answer. The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
[...]
Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress’ commerce power. Brief for Respondents 22, 38. Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority. Rather, respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.
[...]
Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Perez, 402 U. S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 128–129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 125. We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the “‘total incidence’ ” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U. S., at 154– 155 (“‘[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may do so’” (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259 (1927))). In this vein, we have reiterated that when “ ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” E. g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968); emphasis deleted).
[...]
In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276–280 (1981); Perez, 402 U. S., at 155– 156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252–253 (1964). Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.
[...]
First, the fact that marijuana is used “for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician” cannot itself serve as a distinguishing factor. Id., at 1229. The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses. Moreover, the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes, and in what manner. Indeed, most of the substances classified in the CSA “have a useful and legitimate medical purpose.” 21 U. S. C. § 801(1). Thus, even if respondents are correct that marijuana does have accepted medical uses and thus should be redesignated as a lesser schedule drug, the CSA would still impose controls beyond what is required by California law. The CSA requires manufacturers, physicians, pharmacies, and other handlers of controlled substances to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions mandating registration with the DEA, compliance with specific production quotas, security controls to guard against diversion, recordkeeping and reporting obligations, and prescription requirements. §§ 821–830; 21 CFR § 1301 et seq. (2004). Furthermore, the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544 (1979). Accordingly, the mere fact that marijuana—like virtually every other controlled substance regulated by the CSA—is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the CSA.
[...]
Second, limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation “in accordance with state law” cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is “ ‘superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’ ” however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 196 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 426 (1925)). See also 392 U. S., at 195–196; Wickard, 317 U. S., at 124 (“ ‘[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress’”).
#65. To: nolu chan (#64)
We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?
You should have kept reading:
"This power is not only concurrent, but is limited in Congress. It does not extend to the regulation of the internal commerce of any State. This results from the terms used in the grant of power, [22 U.S. 1, 65] 'among the several States.' It results also from the effects of a contrary doctrine, on the whole mass of State power. Internal commerce must be that which is wholly carried on within the limits of a State: as where the commencement, progress, and termination of the voyage, are wholly confined to the territory of the State. This branch of power includes a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers, and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights to carry goods and passengers, by land or water. All such laws must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States, Congress cannot interfere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclusively in the States."
Wickard v. Filburn
Yes, that's the ruling that, after FDR's court-packing threat, turned the Constitutional limitation on its head. Justice Thomas has rightly called it a "rootless and malleable" standard.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them.
#66. To: ConservingFreedom (#65)
ou should have kept reading:"This power is not only concurrent, but is limited in Congress. It does not extend to the regulation of the internal commerce of any State. This results from the terms used in the grant of power, [22 U.S. 1, 65] 'among the several States.' It results also from the effects of a contrary doctrine, on the whole mass of State power. Internal commerce must be that which is wholly carried on within the limits of a State: as where the commencement, progress, and termination of the voyage, are wholly confined to the territory of the State. This branch of power includes a vast range of State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, licenses to retailers, and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights to carry goods and passengers, by land or water. All such laws must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce with other States, Congress cannot interfere, as its power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, which resides exclusively in the States."
Wickard v. FilburnYes, that's the ruling that, after FDR's court-packing threat, turned the Constitutional limitation on its head. Justice Thomas has rightly called it a "rootless and malleable" standard.
You should read more.
In any case, the Supreme Court has spoken. The Court says what the law is. Potheads speak on internet boards. They say any damfool thing -- it is of no legal effect.
Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196-97 (1824):
We are now arrived at the inquiry — What is this power?It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is prescribed is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would, be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation; within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.
In 1824, the Court made clear that the commerce clause applied to activity that was "in any manner connected with commerce ... among the several states."
- - - - - - - - - -
In 1942, Wickard clearly stated, "At the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded," and proceeded to state lines of cases had served "to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden. And Wickard also reminded that Gibbons observed of the commerce power that, "nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes."
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 119-22 (1942)
Appellee says that this is a regulation of production and consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in character, and their effects upon interstate commerce are, at most, "indirect." In answer, the Government argues that the statute regulates neither production nor consumption, but only marketing, and, in the alternative, that, if the Act does go beyond the regulation of marketing, it is sustainable as a "necessary and proper" [n15] implementation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce.The Government's concern lest the Act be held to be a regulation of production or consumption, rather than of marketing, is attributable to a few dicta and decisions of this Court which might be understood to lay it down that activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and [p120] "mining" are strictly "local" and, except in special circumstances which are not present here, cannot be regulated under the commerce power because their effects upon interstate commerce are, as matter of law, only "indirect." [n16] Even today, when this power has been held to have great latitude, there is no decision of this Court that such activities may be regulated where no part of the product is intended for interstate commerce or intermingled with the subjects thereof. We believe that a review of the course of decision under the Commerce Clause will make plain, however, that questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as "production" and "indirect" and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce.
At the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-195. He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes. Id. at 197. [p121]
For nearly a century, however, decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under the Clause, and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce. During this period, there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, and the influence of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states. In discussion and decision, the point of reference, instead of being what was "necessary and proper" to the exercise by Congress of its granted power, was often some concept of sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood. Certain activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and "mining" were occasionally said to be within the province of state governments and beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. [n17]
It was not until 1887, with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, [n18] that the interstate commerce power began to exert positive influence in American law and life. This first important federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act [n19] and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others. These statutes ushered in new phases of adjudication, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder.
When it first dealt with this new legislation, the Court adhered to its earlier pronouncements, and allowed but [p122] little scope to the power of Congress. United States v. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1. [n20] These earlier pronouncements also played an important part in several.of the five cases in which this Court later held that Acts of Congress under the Commerce Clause were in excess of its power. [n21]
Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority were being written, however, other cases called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.
Wickard was a return to the power expressed in 1824.
- - - - - - - - - -
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) demonstrated that the commerce clause applied to places of public accomodation (diners, hotels that do not move) serving interstate travelers.
Held:1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause as applied to a place of public accommodation serving interstate travelers. Civil Right Cases, 109 U. S. 3, distinguished. Pp. 379 U. S. 249-262. (a) The interstate movement of persons is “commerce” which concerns more than one State. Pp. 379 U. S. 255-256.
(b) The protection of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause whether or not the transportation of persons between States is “commercial.” P. 379 U. S. 256.
(c) Congress’ action in removing the disruptive effect which it found racial discrimination has on interstate travel is not invalidated because Congress was also legislating against what it considered to be moral wrongs. P. 379 U. S. 257.
(d) Congress had power to enact appropriate legislation with regard to a place of public accommodation such as appellant’s motel even if it is assumed to be of a purely “local” character, as Congress’ power over interstate commerce extends to the regulation of local incidents thereof which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. P. 379 U. S. 258.
(2) The prohibition in Title II of racial discrimination in public accommodations affecting commerce does not violate the Fifth
379 U. S. 242
Amendment as being a deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law. Pp. 379 U. S. 258-261.
(3) Such prohibition does not violate he Thirteenth Amendment as being “involuntary servitude.” P. 379 U. S. 261.
231 F.Supp. 393, affirmed.
#67. To: nolu chan (#66)
In any case, the Supreme Court has spoken. The Court says what the law is.
The Supreme Court has also ruled that abortion and same-sex marriage are legal.
As much as cultists like you would like to believe it to be true, SCOTUS is not God.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
"America is at that awkward stage. It's too late to work within the system, but too early to shoot the bastards."
#68. To: Deckard, nolu chan (#67)
In any case, the Supreme Court has spoken. The Court says what the law is.The Supreme Court has also ruled that abortion and same-sex marriage are legal.
As much as cultists like you would like to believe it to be true, SCOTUS is not God.
Conversely, God is not SCOTUS.
While there is biblical precedence for going against man’s law to keep the laws of God, if you break man's law (commit a crime), you may go Jail and if you break God's law (commit a sin) you may go to Hell.
How you respond when SCOTUS says what the law is and that contradicts God’s law is strictly up to you. Realizing of course that just because God lets you off when you break his law it does not mean that you will escape man's punishment.
You must suffer the consequences for breaking man’s laws.
.
.
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