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Status: Not Logged In; Sign In U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 22387 Comments: 124 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment   Private Reply   Ignore Thread   Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-43) not displayed.       .       .       . #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-01   13:47:36 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-01   16:30:36 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-01   22:12:06 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-02   15:10:32 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-02   15:45:59 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-02   16:10:27 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-02   19:54:04 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo  posted on  2016-07-02   20:06:32 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy-year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-02   23:28:08 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-03   11:09:14 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut-and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-03   12:02:24 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-03   12:25:36 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-03   14:33:51 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-03   16:08:06 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non-exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-03   23:22:51 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-03   23:57:23 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #59] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-07   20:32:01 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #61. To: nolu chan (#60) I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-08   2:39:08 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #62. To: tpaine (#61) [tpaine #61] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #61] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. To remind you of the last lesson: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non-exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. Having given you sufficient time time to recover from that flat statement of the D.C. Circuit Court, that the "contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause," I now continue from the Opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the Origination Clause and The PPACA, aka Obamacare. Resuming the lesson at 770 F.3d 7, IV. The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Sissel contends that "the shared responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue" and that it "originated in the Senate, not the House" in violation of the Origination Clause. Appellant's Br. 20. He states in his complaint that "[i]n September, 2009, the House [of Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the 'Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,'" to "'amend[] the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces and certain other Federal employees.'" Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges this bill "had nothing to do with health insurance reform," and yet "[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to 'amend' the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement and associated payment), and renaming the bill the 'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.'" Id. The "substitute legislation," he alleges, was "a revenue-raising tax bill," id., and the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause "[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the House," id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the Supreme Court's accepted meaning of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it originated in the House or the Senate. In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court has held from the early days of this Nation that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897) (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880). The Court has adhered to this "strict" interpretation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875). Necessarily, this court has followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under this "strict" interpretation, [760 F.3d 8] the Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674, and a "special assessment" levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims' fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964. In each case, consistent with its "strict" interpretation of the phrase "Bills for raising Revenue," the Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether "a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the [Origination] [C]lause." 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The Court observed that "[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question." Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the Court noted that "[a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that [the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants] creates is ... `incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," which was to provide money for a crime victims' fund. 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at "levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense," it does not fall within the limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court precedent necessarily leads to the conclusion that Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's repeated focus on the statutory provision's "object," Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and "primary purpose," Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, makes clear, contrary to Sissel's position, that the purpose of a bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580, not to raise revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The Supreme Court explained: "Although the [Section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Id. at 2596 (emphasis added); see id. at 2596-97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), that the "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue." See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary, "the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties." Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 — if people do not [760 F.3d 9] "sign up" for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act's primary aim to induce participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of the Act would mean less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody "two exceptions" to the general "presumpt[ion]" that "[a]ll taxes" are subject to the Clause. Appellant's Br. 14; Reply Br. 6-7. He maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither funds a particular governmental program, as was true in Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98, 110 S.Ct. 1964, nor enforces compliance with a statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433, 26 S.Ct. 674. Yet even assuming Sissel is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the Affordable Care Act's mandate does not fall squarely within the fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. There's more, but that can wait for the next lesson from the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-08   15:04:29 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #63. To: nolu chan (#62) Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-08   16:30:43 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #64. To: tpaine (#63) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4-inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), resuming at 9: Sissel's interpretation of the taxing power also fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of Congress's taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600, Sissel contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to the Origination Clause because it "serves no constitutional purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress's taxing power." Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising revenue. In fact, "the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes[] than revenue." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950), the Supreme Court stated: It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. Id. at 44, 71 S.Ct. 108 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953), where the Court upheld "a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers," id. at 23, 73 S.Ct. 510, notwithstanding the argument that "the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize ... illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure," id. at 28, 73 S.Ct. 510, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because not all of Congress's exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at raising revenue, and a measure is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nebeker and Millard confirm this point: Not all "taxes" are "Bills for raising Revenue." See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. [760 F.3d 10] Sissel's attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court's "tax" cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge on the existence (or absence) of another source of constitutional authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on circulating notes in Nebeker was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, it was enacted "in furtherance of Congress's Article I power to coin money." Reply Br. 6; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal government's enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may well be "Bills for raising Revenue." The mere existence of another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely, a measure that would not be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" does not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example, Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in Millard was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Reply Br. 7; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that Congress's authority over the District of Columbia affected the Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and the absence of another constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to Congress's taxing power does not compel the conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That's tough. The D.C. Circuit Court, specifically on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause, stated that, "this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." It's ok if you have another sad and throw another tiny fisted tantrum. But all hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-08   17:00:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #65. To: nolu chan (#64) [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Does the 2nd Amendment apply to African Americans? Dallas police shooting: 'Black Power group' claims responsibility No Charges for Clinton Proves Two Tier Legal System, Global Crash is Certain Is Hillary Morally Unfit to Be President? Amid protests, DA says La. police shooting may be "authorized killing" EXCLUSIVE: Security camera recording of Alton Sterling's shooting by two white cops was seized 'illegally' by police - who now face demands to return 'best evidence' of death Terrifying moment brave cop's bullet bounces off armored vest of Dallas gunman - who then shoots the officer in the back before executing him at point-blank range with assault rifle All lives matter, police lives matter, words of hate matter 11 Dallas Officers Shot, 3 Dead in Shooting as Protest Ended The Department of Political Justice Rep. 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CANADA, U.S. AND MEXICO LEADERS PLOT NORTH AMERICAN UNION Judge Jeanine Pirro on Hannity - Comey Has ' Destroyed Reputation ' of FBI - 7/5/16 Collapse of Empires is Upon Us So Hillary Clinton is not going to be prosecuted... Groundbreaking Study Shows Cannabis Can Counter Alzheimer’s Disease Cops Force Student to be a Snitch — Found Him With a Bullet in His Head and Rocks in His Backpack 4 Celebrated Freedoms That Now Require Permission or Privilege to Enjoy A fair warning Veteran beaten ... after saying --- he was voting for Trump FBI Rewrites Federal Law to Let Hillary Off the Hook Colorado teens are using less marijuana since legalization FBI recommends no charges against Clinton in email probe FBI Director James Comey to Give Press Conference on Unspecified Subject This Morning Charges Dropped Against Mom Who Whipped Her Kids’ Butts for Stealing from Their Neighbor’s House Police Across America Celebrate Freedom This 4th Of July With Forced Blood Draw Checkpoints Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 283 Comments: 64 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-23) not displayed. . . . #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #59] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-07 20:32:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #61. To: nolu chan (#60) I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 2:39:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #62. To: tpaine (#61) [tpaine #61] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #61] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. To remind you of the last lesson: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. Having given you sufficient time time to recover from that flat statement of the D.C. Circuit Court, that the "contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause," I now continue from the Opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the Origination Clause and The PPACA, aka Obamacare. Resuming the lesson at 770 F.3d 7, IV. The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Sissel contends that "the shared responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue" and that it "originated in the Senate, not the House" in violation of the Origination Clause. Appellant's Br. 20. He states in his complaint that "[i]n September, 2009, the House [of Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the 'Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,'" to "'amend[] the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces and certain other Federal employees.'" Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges this bill "had nothing to do with health insurance reform," and yet "[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to 'amend' the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement and associated payment), and renaming the bill the 'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.'" Id. The "substitute legislation," he alleges, was "a revenue-raising tax bill," id., and the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause "[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the House," id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the Supreme Court's accepted meaning of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it originated in the House or the Senate. In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court has held from the early days of this Nation that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897) (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880). The Court has adhered to this "strict" interpretation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875). Necessarily, this court has followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under this "strict" interpretation, [760 F.3d 8] the Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674, and a "special assessment" levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims' fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964. In each case, consistent with its "strict" interpretation of the phrase "Bills for raising Revenue," the Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether "a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the [Origination] [C]lause." 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The Court observed that "[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question." Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the Court noted that " [a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that [the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants] creates is ... `incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," which was to provide money for a crime victims' fund. 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at "levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense," it does not fall within the limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court precedent necessarily leads to the conclusion that Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's repeated focus on the statutory provision's "object," Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and "primary purpose," Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, makes clear, contrary to Sissel's position, that the purpose of a bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580, not to raise revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The Supreme Court explained: "Although the [Section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Id. at 2596 (emphasis added); see id. at 2596-97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), that the "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue." See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary, "the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties." Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 — if people do not [760 F.3d 9] "sign up" for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act's primary aim to induce participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of the Act would mean less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody "two exceptions" to the general "presumpt[ion]" that "[a]ll taxes" are subject to the Clause. Appellant's Br. 14; Reply Br. 6-7. He maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither funds a particular governmental program, as was true in Munoz- Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98, 110 S.Ct. 1964, nor enforces compliance with a statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433, 26 S.Ct. 674. Yet even assuming Sissel is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the Affordable Care Act's mandate does not fall squarely within the fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. There's more, but that can wait for the next lesson from the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 15:04:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #63. To: nolu chan (#62) Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016- 07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 16:30:43 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Edit #64. To: tpaine (#63) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4- inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), resuming at 9: Sissel's interpretation of the taxing power also fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of Congress's taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600, Sissel contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to the Origination Clause because it "serves no constitutional purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress's taxing power." Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising revenue. In fact, "the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes[] than revenue." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950), the Supreme Court stated: It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. Id. at 44, 71 S.Ct. 108 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953), where the Court upheld "a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers," id. at 23, 73 S.Ct. 510, notwithstanding the argument that "the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize ... illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure," id. at 28, 73 S.Ct. 510, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because not all of Congress's exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at raising revenue, and a measure is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nebeker and Millard confirm this point: Not all "taxes" are "Bills for raising Revenue." See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. [760 F.3d 10] Sissel's attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court's "tax" cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge on the existence (or absence) of another source of constitutional authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on circulating notes in Nebeker was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, it was enacted "in furtherance of Congress's Article I power to coin money." Reply Br. 6; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal government's enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may well be "Bills for raising Revenue." The mere existence of another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely, a measure that would not be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" does not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example, Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in Millard was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Reply Br. 7; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that Congress's authority over the District of Columbia affected the Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and the absence of another constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to Congress's taxing power does not compel the conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That's tough. The D.C. Circuit Court, specifically on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause, stated that, "this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." It's ok if you have another sad and throw another tiny fisted tantrum. But all hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 17:00:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com tpaine  posted on  2016-07-08   17:03:35 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #66. To: tpaine (#65) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4-inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. Your education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F. 3d 1035, (D.C. Cir. 2015) Sissel v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:10–cv–01263). Theodore Hadzi–Antich, Paul James Beard, II, Timothy Mason Sandefur, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, for Appellant. Alisa B. Klein, Mark B. Stern, Beth S. Brinkmann, DoJ Appellate Counsel, Stuart F. Delery, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald C. Machen, Jr., Esquire, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Appellees. Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge; HENDERSON, ROGERS, TATEL, BROWN, GRIFFITH, KAVANAUGH, SRINIVASAN, MILLETT, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges. On Petition for Rehearing En Banc ORDER Appellant's petition for rehearing en banc, the response thereto, and the briefs of amici curiae in support of appellant were circulated to the full court, and a vote was requested. Thereafter a majority of the judges of the court in regular, active service did not vote in favor of the petition. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the petition be denied. A statement by Circuit Judges ROGERS, PILLARD, and WILKINS, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, is attached. A statement by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH, with whom Circuit Judges HENDERSON, BROWN, and GRIFFITH join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, is attached. ROGERS, PILLARD, AND WILKINS, Circuit Judges, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc: A majority of the court has voted to deny the petition for en banc rehearing of this case. A dissenting statement, however, charges the original panel opinion with undermining individual liberty by upsetting the balance of power between the two Houses of Congress. See Dissent at 1064–65. Our opinion does no such thing. Our examination of the Origination Clause's text and history, as well as congressional practice and Supreme Court precedent related to the Clause, persuaded us that the clearest and narrowest ground on which to resolve Sissel's challenge to the payment required under section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, was to rely on the Supreme Court's established purposive approach. The Court recognized in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2596, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), that, “[a]lthough the [section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue [if people do not ‘sign up’], it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage,” acknowledging that the purpose of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and its tax penalty was to spur conduct, not to raise revenue for the general operations of government. [...] Rather predictably, when the tpaine nonsense was considered at great length by the Court sitting en banc, they affirmed the prior decisions finding that the meritless nonsense failed to state a legal cause of action. Their lengthy explanation, directly on point about the Obamacare bill, and why the misbegotten argument regarding the Origination Clause fails miserably on a pre-trial motion, is sure to be educational. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-10   20:00:07 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #67. To: nolu chan (#66) You keep posting your same tired opinions, over and over, Opinions do not change our Constitution. -- And you are quite mad to insist they do. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-10   20:53:50 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #68. To: tpaine (#67) Opinions do not change our Constitution. Excellent point. Nevertheless, the USSC opinions shape law everywhere; their opinions are frequently bad for the country. buckeroo  posted on  2016-07-10   21:01:01 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #69. To: buckeroo, and the canary clan, Y'ALL (#68) Opinions do not change our Constitution. Excellent point. ---- Nevertheless, the USSC opinions shape law everywhere; their opinions are frequently bad for the country. Indeed they are. Some of them are tearing this country apart, and fools like Nolu Chan and the canary clan don't give a shit. Amazing myopia. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-10   21:10:23 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #70. To: tpaine (#67) [tpaine #67] You keep posting your same tired opinions, over and over, No repeat here. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. Your education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. I. The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And, in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose. See United States v. Munoz–Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); see also Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436 –37, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906). The panel opinion rests on the purposive reading adopted and applied by the Supreme Court in these three cases. A. Munoz–Flores, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the Origination Clause, restated that “a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a Bill for raising Revenue within the meaning of the Origination Clause.” 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The dissent quotes that language, but then adds a new and different test by which a statute could escape the requirements of the Origination Clause only if it raises funds “designated for use in a specific program,” and does not “raise revenues paid into the general treasury and available for general governmental use[ ].” Dissent at 1057. The Court in Munoz–Flores, however, described and followed Nebeker's holding that “a bill creating a discrete governmental program and providing sources for its financial support is not a revenue bill simply because it creates revenue.” 495 U.S. at 400, 110 S.Ct. 1964 . The Court could have been talking about the ACA. The dissent nonetheless argues that this court should convene en banc to announce that the holdings in Munoz–Flores, Millard, and Nebeker are narrower than the purposive test expressly employed by the Supreme Court. Those cases, the dissent contends, establish only a very limited exception to the Origination Clause for taxes designated exclusively for use by a specific program or service. Dissent at 1057–59. That argument relies on a faulty premise. The cases considered by the Supreme Court involved revenue-generating measures that supported identified government programs or services but that were not designated by law for exclusive use by the particular program or service, and in any event none of them was resolved on the grounds proposed by the dissent. [...] It must be difficult. The D.C. Circuit sitting en banc says your nonsense is a load a crap that fails to state a case. And they do so precisely on point about the Obamacare bill and your bullcrap about the Origination Clause, page after page after page in excuisite detail. Your education shall continue with more from the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-11   13:28:00 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #71. To: nolu chan (#70) You keep posting your same tired opinions, over and over, Opinions do not change our Constitution. -- And you are quite mad to insist they do. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-11   14:30:09 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #72. To: tpaine (#71) [tpaine #71] You keep posting your same tired opinions, over and over, No repeat here. No need, you poor child. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. Your education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. I. The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And, in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose. See United States v. Munoz–Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); see also Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436 –37, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906). The panel opinion rests on the purposive reading adopted and applied by the Supreme Court in these three cases. A. Munoz–Flores, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the Origination Clause, restated that “a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a Bill for raising Revenue within the meaning of the Origination Clause.” 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The dissent quotes that language, but then adds a new and different test by which a statute could escape the requirements of the Origination Clause only if it raises funds “designated for use in a specific program,” and does not “raise revenues paid into the general treasury and available for general governmental use[ ].” Dissent at 1057. The Court in Munoz–Flores, however, described and followed Nebeker's holding that “a bill creating a discrete governmental program and providing sources for its financial support is not a revenue bill simply because it creates revenue.” 495 U.S. at 400, 110 S.Ct. 1964 . The Court could have been talking about the ACA. The dissent nonetheless argues that this court should convene en banc to announce that the holdings in Munoz–Flores, Millard, and Nebeker are narrower than the purposive test expressly employed by the Supreme Court. Those cases, the dissent contends, establish only a very limited exception to the Origination Clause for taxes designated exclusively for use by a specific program or service. Dissent at 1057–59. That argument relies on a faulty premise. The cases considered by the Supreme Court involved revenue-generating measures that supported identified government programs or services but that were not designated by law for exclusive use by the particular program or service, and in any event none of them was resolved on the grounds proposed by the dissent. [...] It must be difficult. The D.C. Circuit sitting en banc says your nonsense is a load a crap that fails to state a case. And they do so precisely on point about the Obamacare bill and your bullcrap about the Origination Clause, page after page after page in excuisite detail. Your education shall continue with more from the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-12   15:34:32 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #73. To: tpaine (#71) [tpaine #71] You keep posting your same tired opinions, over and over, No repeat here. No need, you poor child. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. Your education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Nebeker involved three bank taxes in Section 41 of the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 111 (1864), that allegedly originated in the Senate. Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202–03, 17 S.Ct. 766. The taxes, due every six months, required that each bank pay a half percent tax on the “average amount of its notes in circulation,” a quarter percent tax on the “average amount of its deposits,” and a quarter percent tax on the “average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds.” Id. at 199, 17 S.Ct. 766 (quoting 13 Stat. at 111). The principal purpose of the National Bank Act was “to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds,” id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and the Act provided that the expenses of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency would be paid from the taxes in the Act, see id. at 199–200, 17 S.Ct. 766. But it is not the case, as the dissent asserts, that “all of the funds raised were designated by law to be used to pay the costs of printing and distributing currency.” Dissent at 1058. The Act at issue in Nebeker placed no restriction on how funds raised in excess of those needed for maintaining the currency would be spent. The taxes at issue in Nebeker were to be paid “to the treasurer of the United States” “in lieu of all existing taxes.” 167 U.S. at 198–99, 17 S.Ct. 766 (quoting 13 Stat. at 111). The statute directed that the “expenses of the [currency] bureau” were to be paid from the money raised. Id. But, other than that requirement, the Act placed no limitation on the use of any excess funds. Id. As things turned out, there was a great deal of excess. The Secretary of the Treasury's most recent annual report at the time the Supreme Court decided Nebeker reflected that $1.763 million had been collected in the first half of that year through the tax on national banks. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Year 1896, at XIX (GPO 1897). The Secretary recommended that the tax be cut in half. Id. at XXXIII. The Comptroller of the Currency's own contemporaneous annual report explained that this was because the tax collected funds “beyond any possible need of the Government.” Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency to the Second Session of the Fifty–Fourth Congress, at 105 (GPO 1896). When the new Federal Reserve System displaced national bank notes in 1914, and the Comptroller ultimately accounted for the life of the circulation tax, he reckoned that $126 million had been collected from the circulation tax alone while the expenses of the Currency Bureau had been only $15 million. 1 Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency to the Third Session of the Sixty–Third Congress, at 55 (GPO 1915). The circulation tax raised billions in today's dollars. One could say—borrowing words used by today's dissent—that the Bank Act “raise[d] revenue. Lots of revenue.” Dissent at 1049. The Supreme Court nonetheless held in Nebeker that the taxes did not implicate the Origination Clause because they were “in the furtherance of [the] object” of the Act: “providing a national currency.” Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 . The Court said it was conclusive that: [t]he main purpose that congress had in view [in enacting the National Bank Act] was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act, or by any of its provisions, to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). The taxes in Nebeker had the effect of raising substantial general revenues, but that was not the purpose—the “great object”—of the law, and so the Origination Clause was not implicated. See, e.g., 1 Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States § 251, p. 566 (1910) (“[I]n [Nebeker] the court, in effect, held that a bill, the primary purpose of which is not the raising of revenue, is not a measure that must originate in the House, even though, incidentally, a revenue will be derived by the United States from its execution.”). It must be difficult. The D.C. Circuit sitting en banc says your nonsense is a load a crap that fails to state a case. And they do so precisely on point about the Obamacare bill and your bullcrap about the Origination Clause, page after page after page in exquisite detail. Your education shall continue with more from the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-13   12:48:36 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #74. To: nolu chan (#73) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-14   18:08:41 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #75. To: tpaine (#71) [tpaine #71] You keep posting your same tired opinions, over and over, No repeat here. No need, you poor child. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. Your education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Similarly, in Millard, the Supreme Court held that three laws relating to railroad improvements and expansion in the District of Columbia did not implicate the Origination Clause. 202 U.S. at 434–35, 26 S.Ct. 674. One of the laws at issue provided, in relevant part, that the costs of making the improvements the Act contemplated would be paid “[f]ifty per centum ... by the United States and the remaining fifty per centum ... by the District of Columbia, which last-mentioned fifty per centum shall be levied and assessed upon the taxable property and privileges in said District other than the property of the United States and of the District of Columbia.” 31 Stat. 767, 771, 773–74 (1901). The other two statutes also provided that “half” of the costs of various sorts of improvements would “be paid out of the revenues of the District of Columbia,” 31 Stat. 774, 779 (1901), or “by the District of Columbia,” 32 Stat. 909, 918 (1903). The case is frequently described as imposing “a tax on property in the District of Columbia.” Dissent at 1058. As the statutory language appears to show, however, the three laws challenged in Millard did not in themselves specify or levy taxes. The Millard v. Roberts court of appeals thought the appellant charged the Senate with unconstitutionally originating an appropriations bill. 25 App.D.C. 221, 223–24 (1905), aff'd,202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906). It disposed of the case on the ground that sustaining a challenge to “a bill plainly for another purpose, and which only incidentally carries an appropriation with it in order to give it effect” would mean that “possibly one half or three fourths of the legislation of Congress would be null and void.” Id. The Supreme Court in Millard took a different tack, calling the bill a tax but summarily rejecting the appellant's claim. The Court held that whether the challenged bill anticipated future taxes or somehow levied taxes did not matter, because “[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act.” 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 . The taxes were instrumental to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose—railroad improvements. The Court thus thought the challenge easily dismissed: “In answer to the [Origination Clause] contention the case of [Nebeker] need only be cited.” Id. Millard's brevity offers an important clue in unpacking the Supreme Court's adherence to a purposive approach to the Origination Clause. The Court thought the issue so clear-cut in Millard that it dismissed the case on purpose grounds rather than on the ground that the statute simply did not impose any taxes (but at most described future taxes). Were designation truly the test of the Origination Clause's scope, Millard would have been a far more difficult case. Millard might or might not have involved designation; it might or might not have reviewed a bill levying new taxes. The Court in Millard did not dismiss the case because the bill under review imposed no tax, nor because the taxes were in any way explicitly designated, but because the taxes were “but means to the purposes provided by the act.” 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 . Under that analysis, the ACA readily survives Sissel's Origination Clause challenge. The D.C. Circuit sitting en banc says your nonsense is a load a crap that fails to state a case. And they do so precisely on point about the Obamacare bill and your bullcrap about the Origination Clause, page after page after page in exquisite detail. Your education shall continue with more from the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-15   0:25:57 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #76. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. (#75) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-17   12:37:58 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #77. To: tpaine (#76) (Edited) Poor sad yukon/tpaine in the ass, trapped like the rat that he is, has nothing better do than create and to address his pathetic non-responsive posts to very long non-existent handles which will not show up in any ping list. For examples of this psychosis, see: #76. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. (#75) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-17   12:37:58 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - #24. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. (#23) Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-17   12:40:29 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - #34. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. (#33) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-17   12:42:09 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - #163. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. (#162) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-17   12:43:42 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - #125. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spam. (#124) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-17   12:45:40 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This is merely his psychotic attempt to evade reqponsibility for his truly stupid and untenable assertion that the Bill of Rights has applied to the states since its adoption in 1791. He cannot admit he is full of shit, despite the unending parade of Federal court opinions which hold, specifically on point, that yukon/tpaine in the ass is full of shit. For yet another example see, Waterfall Homeowners Ass'n v. Viega, Inc., 2:11-cv-01498-RCJ-GWF (D. Nev. Jul 09, 2012) Until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.). The Declaration of Rights that comprises Article I of the Nevada Constitution, which was adopted in 1864, was included in order to impose certain restrictions on the State of Nevada that were already imposed against the federal government under the Bill of Rights, and the Nevada Supreme Court has not interpreted the protections of the Declaration of Rights to exceed the scope of their federal counterparts. Michael W. Bowers, The Sagebrush State 43-44 (3rd ed., Univ. Nev. Press 2006); Michael W. Bowers, The Nevada State Constitution 24 (1993). nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-26   12:29:52 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #78. To: tpaine (#76) The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. B. The purpose of the ACA was to overhaul the national healthcare system, not to raise revenue. It provided for a “shared responsibility payment,” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, to support the law's programmatic goals by encouraging people to purchase insurance and by helping to fund the overall program. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2585 (describing the mechanics of the shared responsibility payment as the solution to cost-shifting problems in the national health insurance market). The ACA enacted that mandate as part of three key reforms in the national health insurance market. The Act (1) bars insurers from denying coverage to any person because of a preexisting condition (a reform called “guaranteed issue”) and prohibits charging people with preexisting conditions higher premiums than those without (a reform called “community rating”), (2) enacts market-expanding reforms to ensure large enough risk pools through a “coverage mandate” to prevent health insurance premiums from skyrocketing, and (3) provides refundable tax credits to individuals in order to make insurance more affordable. See King v. Burwell, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2486–87, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). The centerpiece of the market-expanding reforms is a requirement that individuals purchase insurance, supported in part by the tax subsidies where needed. See id. A mandate that people lacking insurance pay to the government a “shared responsibility payment” is designed to encourage individuals to buy coverage. As the Supreme Court emphasized in its recent King v. Burwell opinion interpreting a key provision of the ACA, that law's “three key reforms” are “closely intertwined.” Id. at 2487. The Court explained that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan” and Congress's legislative plan in passing the ACA was to “improve health insurance markets” by making coverage more accessible and affordable. Id. at 2496. King reinforces the Supreme Court's holding in NFIB, and the panel's conclusion in this case, that the individual mandate is part of a package of reforms Congress deemed essential to the ACA's main purposes of “expand[ing] coverage in the individual health insurance market” and “ensur[ing] that anyone who wanted to buy health insurance could do so.” Id. at 2485. The dissent objects that the shared responsibility payment will raise too much money for it to count as just a piece of a larger, more comprehensive whole. The dissent forefronts the size of the numbers involved, highlighting one early Congressional Budget Office estimate of the billions of dollars the ACA would raise over ten years. Dissent at 1049, 1052–53. It is unclear what those numbers could add to the claim that the ACA raises revenue; they are gross figures, not net of the costs of providing the health insurance coverage and health care for which the ACA was enacted. Any time Congress enacts an ambitious, nationwide reform that includes a mechanism to pay for itself, the numbers will be large. But program size does not establish a revenue-raising purpose or effect. The purpose of the ACA is to give back what it generates, in the form of broader, more effective, and fairer health coverage, not to raise revenue for general governmental obligations. The dissent suggests that it “makes little sense” for the panel to conclude that the Origination Clause “magically” does not apply to the ACA even though, had the ACA been two bills, a tax bill and a spending bill, the Origination Clause would have applied to the tax bill. Dissent at 1054. The same criticism could have been leveled against the bills at issue in Munoz–Flores, Millard, and Nebeker. The dissent does not contend that the purpose of the ACA or its shared responsibility payment was to raise revenue. Id. The dissent nonetheless points out that there are taxes in the ACA other than the shared responsibility payment. Id. But only the shared responsibility payment was alleged as the basis for the Origination Clause claim in this case. In any event, the dissent's examples of Senate-originated laws that should implicate the Origination Clause all involve Senate bills with tax provisions that are unrelated to the purposes of the bill or have revenue-raising as the Senate's sole purpose. Id. at 1053–54, 1058–59. The dissent mentions, for example, that the Senate might attempt to attach a gas tax to a major national security bill, id. at 1053–54, or raise income taxes to offset the costs of fighting a war, id. at 1058–59. The panel opinion does not, and need not, opine on how the Origination Clause might apply to a bill containing revenue-raising provisions unrelated to its non-revenue objectives. Rehearing is not appropriate on an issue that no party raised, briefed or argued to the panel, the panel did not consider, and that was not even advanced in the losing party's petition for rehearing. See King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Bork, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). The dissent does not contend, nor are we aware of any credible suggestion, that the purpose of the ACA, including its revenue provisions, was other than to reform the nation's market for health care, including by encouraging individuals to purchase health insurance and by supplying subsidies to make those purchases affordable. Sissel has not identified any provision in the ACA that he asserts is unrelated to its overarching purpose. This is not a case in which the Senate originated an omnibus bill packed with revenue provisions bearing no apparent relationship to any other aspect of the bill. Whatever novel questions such a bill would raise, they are far afield from this case, which is easily decided under the Supreme Court's precedents. The dissent skillfully strives to square its view of the Origination Clause with the Supreme Court's precedents. Its basic position is that “any provision” of a law that raises revenue for general governmental purposes comes within the Origination Clause. Id. at 1060 n. 5. It quickly acknowledges that rule is too broad. Acts to sell public lands, trade bills, and laws that fix the price of stamps, among many others, have always fallen outside the Clause. So have several types of laws that actually levy taxes. To align its rule with precedent, the dissent defines an exception to the general rule: laws creating distinct governmental programs fall outside the Clause, but only if they designate the money they raise for a separate fund to pay their costs. Id. at 1057–59. The dissent sees that even that rule still sweeps too wide. The Supreme Court has held at least twice that laws that paid into the general Treasury fell outside the Clause. To make it work, the dissent locates another exception: Laws that do not raise “substantial” revenue for the Treasury are also not subject to the Clause. Id. at 1058–60. Those rules and their exceptions do not reflect the law. The dissent insists that it must matter to the Constitution whether a bill expressly designates its revenues for use by a particular government program. No case has ever said that it must. The Court has instead cautioned that “[w]hat bills belong to that class [of bills for raising revenue] is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.” Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 . The dissent yearns for just such a general statement. But there is no need for one in this case. It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. The Court has said Origination Clause challenges are justiciable, and the panel's opinion stayed in the lane in which the Court has authorized judicial review. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-26   12:33:21 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #79. To: tpaine (#76) The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. II. In deciding this case, the panel saw no need to go further than application of the relevant Supreme Court precedent. Our court exercises its en banc power sparingly; its exercise of that power to change the reasoning in correctly decided cases is rarer still. We think the dissent, in arguing for rehearing now, seeks to revisit Origination Clause doctrine in ways squarely foreclosed by that precedent and unsupported by the Constitution's history and text. Even setting aside that these are not open issues, we see problems with the dissent's treatment of several of them, which we address in turn. A. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” Dissent at 1063. If there was no reason to doubt that approach, we agree that it could be a ready, additional way to decide this case, either in the first instance or as an alternative holding. But we decided against relying on it, in large part because the holding of Munoz–Flores—the Supreme Court's most recent examination of the issue—was based on a different analysis. The Court chose its approach over an alternative developed in Justice Scalia's passionate concurrence in the judgment, which would have decided that case as the dissent proposes to approach this one. See 495 U.S. at 391–92 & n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1964; id. at 408, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Quite simply, Munoz–Flores insisted on basing the holding upon the purpose of the bill rather than the chamber where the bill began, and because the Court's latest analysis of the Origination Clause is instructive (if not binding), we believe the proper course is to follow that example. We ultimately decided not to address the scope of the Senate's power to amend House-originated Bills because Munoz–Flores and the Supreme Court's other cases delineating the scope of the Origination Clause provided a clear path to the proper resolution of Sissel's contention. Next the Court delves into the history of the Origination Clause, quoting founders and framers from the constitutional debates. Exciting and educational stuff indeed! nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-27   14:18:04 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #80. To: Obsessive compulsive nolu chan, cannot stop spamming (#79) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? tpaine  posted on  2016-07-27   18:00:48 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #81. To: tpaine (#80) The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. II. In deciding this case, the panel saw no need to go further than application of the relevant Supreme Court precedent. Our court exercises its en banc power sparingly; its exercise of that power to change the reasoning in correctly decided cases is rarer still. We think the dissent, in arguing for rehearing now, seeks to revisit Origination Clause doctrine in ways squarely foreclosed by that precedent and unsupported by the Constitution's history and text. Even setting aside that these are not open issues, we see problems with the dissent's treatment of several of them, which we address in turn. A. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” Dissent at 1063. If there was no reason to doubt that approach, we agree that it could be a ready, additional way to decide this case, either in the first instance or as an alternative holding. But we decided against relying on it, in large part because the holding of Munoz–Flores—the Supreme Court's most recent examination of the issue—was based on a different analysis. The Court chose its approach over an alternative developed in Justice Scalia's passionate concurrence in the judgment, which would have decided that case as the dissent proposes to approach this one. See 495 U.S. at 391–92 & n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1964; id. at 408, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Quite simply, Munoz–Flores insisted on basing the holding upon the purpose of the bill rather than the chamber where the bill began, and because the Court's latest analysis of the Origination Clause is instructive (if not binding), we believe the proper course is to follow that example. We ultimately decided not to address the scope of the Senate's power to amend House-originated Bills because Munoz–Flores and the Supreme Court's other cases delineating the scope of the Origination Clause provided a clear path to the proper resolution of Sissel's contention. Next the Court delves into the history of the Origination Clause, quoting founders and framers from the constitutional debates. Exciting and educational stuff indeed! nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-28   0:09:57 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #82. To: nolu chan, now obsessed with calling me YUKON? --- How stupid can he get? (#81) Poor sad nolu, obsessed with trying to prove that SCOTUS opinions change our Constitution. Why does he WANT to give that power to the supreme court? Because that's what socialists do? The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. I agree that Yukon was an asshole, but only a truly demented asshole would imagine that I'm Yukon. Get professional help nolu, -- Yukon was killed on his last big game hunt by a rabid chipmunk. tpaine  posted on  2016-07-28   3:26:03 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply   #83. To: tpaine (#82) The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. C. The dissent points out that the House has “blue-slipp[ed]” revenue-raising bills with regulatory purposes. Id. at 1056. But the House has interpreted the Origination Clause far more broadly than even the dissent believes is appropriate. The practice of the House supports neither the panel nor the dissent—its method differs from both. The House of Representatives has charted its own path. That is its prerogative. It does little to clarify the question now before us. The House has cited the Origination Clause in returning to the Senate bills that appropriate funds, see 3 Lewis Deschler, Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives ch. 13, §§ 20.2, 20.4 (1994), ban certain imports, see 138 Cong. Rec. 3377 (Feb. 25, 1992); 145 Cong. Rec. H5677–80 (July 15, 1999), adjust import quotas, see Deschler's Precedents ch. 13, § 15.4, and that reduce revenue by granting tax exemptions, see id., §§ 15.3, 18.5. Recently, the House blue-slipped a Senate bill that would have repealed a fee whose proceeds, like those in Munoz-Flores and Nebeker, were designated to pay for a particular nuclear waste disposal program and were deposited into the general fund of the Treasury only after they exceeded the cost of the program. See 144 Cong. Rec. H878–79 (Mar. 5, 1998). The House thus has considered the Clause to apply well beyond the lines drawn by the Supreme Court, the panel in this case, and the dissent. The House may well continue to do so, and it retains the means by which to enforce its own interpretation of the Clause. But, as a result, its practice does not provide support for the dissent's designation approach. D. The dissent claims that the Origination Clause “reflects a deliberate choice made by the Framers at Philadelphia.” Dissent at 1055. It cites the views of two individual Framers and declares they “might as well have been speaking about the Affordable Care Act.” Id. The Constitution certainly reflects deliberate choices, but it is not at all clear that the dissent has correctly analyzed the choices reflected in the Origination Clause. The historical evidence best supports the Supreme Court's purposive interpretation. What began as a requirement that “all money bills of every kind shall originate in the House of Delegates & shall not be altered by the Senate” eventually evolved into the relatively limited prohibition on Senate origination of bills for raising revenue that we have today. See Thomas L. Jipping, TEFRA and the Origination Clause: Taking the Oath Seriously, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 633, 661–62 & n. 146 (1986). The scope of the Origination Clause “underwent a narrowing of focus from concerning ‘all money bills' to ‘bills for raising revenue’ through the course of the [constitutional] convention.” Id. at 662. The narrowing was consequential: “Successive versions of the clause show that the specific powers contained in its original version were given up only when it was clear that success of the convention required it.” Id. at 661. There is weighty evidence the Clause's use of the phrase “for raising revenue” was meant to establish a purposive standard. On two occasions near the end of the Constitutional Convention, supporters of the Clause proposed language that expressly limited its reach to bills enacted for the purposes of raising revenue. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 294–97, 266–80 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (hereinafter Farrand's Records ). Opponents of the Clause expressed no opposition to its narrowing, but focused their criticisms on the absence of a Senate amendment power and the Clause's prohibition on Senate appropriations. See, e.g., id. at 224, 274–80. That history suggests that the Origination Clause's “All Bills for raising Revenue” language was meant to condense the purposive language put forward by the Clause's proponents near the close of the Convention—“for the purposes of revenue”—but not to change its meaning. The education will continue with the Court going back and reciting the history of the Origination Clause from the Constitutional Convention.. nolu chan  posted on  2016-07-29   3:22:34 ET  Reply   Trace   Private Reply         .       .       . Comments (84 - 124) not displayed. Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest

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