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Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document
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Published: Jun 28, 2016
Author: Mike Lee
Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine
Keywords: None
Views: 22364
Comments: 124
Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com
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#85. To: poor demented yukon (#84)
The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Two days later, a coalition of delegates came together to strike the Clause from the draft of the Constitution, and succeeded in doing so by a vote of 7–4. 2 Farrand's Records at 210–11 (Aug. 7, 1787); id. at 214 (Aug. 8, 1787). The Clause's opponents saw it as a needless landmine, one that could seriously weaken the new national government by investing too much power in what they viewed as the less independent, less expert, and less responsible of the two chambers of Congress, while generating pointless gridlock and mortally weakening the Senate. See, e.g., id. at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787) (summarizing objections of Pinkney, Mercer, and Madison, the last of whom “was for striking it out: considering it as of no advantage to the large States as fettering the Govt. and as a source of injurious altercations between the two Houses”); id. at 274–80 (Aug. 13, 1787) (summarizing additional objections of Wilson, Morris, Madison, Carrol, Rutledge, and McHenry to a similar version of the Origination Clause five days later). The education will continue with the Court going back and reciting the history of the Origination Clause from the Constitutional Convention..
The ignorance of poor demented nolu does not end just because he is an asshole. It will never end.
The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Two days later, a coalition of delegates came together to strike the Clause from the draft of the Constitution, and succeeded in doing so by a vote of 7–4. 2 Farrand's Records at 210–11 (Aug. 7, 1787); id. at 214 (Aug. 8, 1787). The Clause's opponents saw it as a needless landmine, one that could seriously weaken the new national government by investing too much power in what they viewed as the less independent, less expert, and less responsible of the two chambers of Congress, while generating pointless gridlock and mortally weakening the Senate. See, e.g., id. at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787) (summarizing objections of Pinkney, Mercer, and Madison, the last of whom “was for striking it out: considering it as of no advantage to the large States as fettering the Govt. and as a source of injurious altercations between the two Houses”); id. at 274–80 (Aug. 13, 1787) (summarizing additional objections of Wilson, Morris, Madison, Carrol, Rutledge, and McHenry to a similar version of the Origination Clause five days later). The Origination Clause's proponents, in an effort to resuscitate it, suggested circumscribed language that they hoped would reinstate its core. On August 11, Edmund Randolph successfully moved to have the Clause reconsidered: [Randolph] signified that he should propose instead of the original Section, a clause specifying that the bills in question should be for the purpose of Revenue, in order to repel ye. objection agst. the extent of the words “ raising money, ” which might happen incidentally, and that the Senate should not so amend or alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in order to obviate the inconveniences urged agst. a restriction of the Senate to a simple affirmative or negative. Id. at 263 (Aug. 11, 1787). That motion for reconsideration passed by a vote of 9–1. Id. Randolph's amended Origination Clause read: [A]ll bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the same, shall originate in the House of representatives; and shall not be so altered or amended by the Senate, as to encrease or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode of raising or the objects of [its] appropriation. Id. at 266 (Aug. 13, 1787). Speaking in favor of the revised Origination Clause, George Mason explained that “[b]y specifying purposes of revenue, it obviated the objection that the Section extended to all bills under which money might incidentally arise.” Id. at 273 (Aug. 13, 1787) (emphasis in original). Elbridge Gerry, probably the most ardent supporter of a stronger Origination Clause, expressed displeasure with Randolph's narrowing and indicated it conceded too much. In the debate over the new, narrower Origination Clause, Gerry cautioned: “[A]cceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating Money bills.” Id. at 275. After substantial debate, the Convention rejected Randolph's amended language by a vote of 7–4. Id. at 266 (recording votes taken Aug. 13, 1787). The education will continue with the Court going back and reciting the history of the Origination Clause from the Constitutional Convention..
The ignorance of poor demented nolu does not end just because he is an asshole. It will never end, unless he smarts up, and admits he is NOT an constitutional lawyer. He's just another opinionated progressive.
The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Madison explained that he thought Randolph's amendments to the Clause did little to repair it. See id. at 276–77 (Aug. 13, 1787). Randolph's suggested purposive language, he argued, would not prevent “contention & faction,” and it could create “difficulties and disputes between the two houses.” Id. at 276 (Aug. 13, 1787). Even if limiting purposive language were inserted, the House could still insist that Senate-originated trade bills were actually disguised bills for raising revenue. See id. Randolph's purposive language would not prevent the two Houses from clashing over which bills were subject to the Clause. See id. In Madison's view, the purposive language was not enough of an improvement. See id. at 276–77. The dissent leans on Madison's remarks, but concludes they express views opposite to those Madison held. See Dissent at 1055–56. The dissent sees in Madison's words a ringing rejection of a purposive Origination Clause, not just by Madison, but the whole Convention. Two flaws in that account are especially pertinent. First, Madison opposed Randolph's purposive language not because he favored a broader Clause (as the dissent implies) but because he opposed the Clause entirely, and thought the purposive language did not meaningfully narrow it. The dissent's error is in thinking that Madison was against the language when in fact he was against the Clause, and thought the language too limited a fix to persuade him to support it. See Dissent at 1055–56 & nn. 3–4. The education will continue with the Court going back and reciting the history of the Origination Clause from the Constitutional Convention.
The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Following the rejection of Randolph's proposal on August 13, Caleb Strong moved on August 15 to introduce language substantially similar to Randolph's, except that it also authorized the Senate to amend House-originated bills passed “for the purposes of revenue.” Id. at 294, 297. The revised language of the Origination Clause read: Each House shall possess the right of originating all Bills except Bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue or for appropriating the same and for fixing the salaries of the Officers of Government which shall originate in the House of representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other cases. Id. at 294. The Convention postponed consideration of the motion to amend the relevant Section by a vote of 6–5. Id. On August 21 it again deferred consideration of the Amendment. Id. at 357–58. On August 31, those parts of the draft Constitution that had been postponed were referred to a committee called the Committee of Eleven, composed of a Convention member from each state. See id. at 473, 481 (Aug. 31, 1787) (listing Committee members and purpose of the Committee). On September 5, the Committee reported out a version of the Origination Clause almost identical to the modern Clause. It included the important requirement that “all Bills for raising Revenue” would originate in the House of Representatives, along with language permitting the Senate to amend such bills. Id. at 505 (Sept. 5, 1787). The convention finalized the Clause three days later by slightly amending the language governing the Senate's amendment authority. Id. at 552 (Sept. 8, 1787). The Convention settled on that language by a vote of 9–2, id., and signed the Constitution nine days later, on September 17, 1787. The education will continue with the Court going back and reciting the history of the Origination Clause from the Constitutional Convention..
The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole. To continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of the yukon/tpaine in the ass idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare — the PPACA, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. All hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure yukon/tpaine will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. His education continues with the D.C. Circuit Court sitting en banc in deciding whether to grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc. The dissent misses that substitution of the Constitution's “for raising revenue” language for its “for raising money for the purposes of revenue” language occurred in a context making clear that it was a stylistic change, not a substantive one. The Committee of Eleven that proposed much of the Constitution's final text primarily regarded the question before it as whether to include the Clause at all. See Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 668–71 (1937). Ultimately, the Committee chose to include the Origination Clause in exchange for investing the Senate with the power to choose the President when a majority of the electors were not united for any candidate. Id. at 669 (explaining that “to conciliate those who would be inclined to oppose such an increase of power in the Senate” the Committee adopted “the suggestion which Caleb Strong had made as to revenue bills”). The slight change from Caleb Strong's proposed wording brooked no recorded comment whatsoever when placed before the Convention, see 2 Farrand's Records at 508–10 (Sept. 5, 1787), and the Convention specifically adopted the Clause's “for raising Revenue” language by a vote of 9–2. Id. at 545, 552 (Sept. 8, 1787). One would hardly expect such a united and amicable outcome if the scope of the Clause remained an issue. The foregoing is powerful evidence that the Committee of Eleven did not quietly broaden the Origination Clause's scope in early September. The best reading of the history is that the Convention finalized the scope of the Clause in mid-August (when it debated the Clause's purposive language) and delegated to the Committee of Eleven the more limited question whether or not to include it in the Constitution at all. See Warren, supra at 668–71. The Convention rejected the Senate-empowering half of the Committee's compromise and placed in the House of Representatives the power to choose the President when a majority of the electors were not united for any candidate. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; 2 Farrand's Records at 519, 527, 531 (Sept. 6, 1787); 1 George Ticknor Curtis, Constitutional History of the United States 457 (1889). The education will continue with the Court going back and reciting the history of the Origination Clause from the Constitutional Convention..
Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. No, not to your satisfaction, oh great Chan. Yes, we all agree with the great Chan on that specific point. Now, can you explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific, oh great Chan. Amaze us with your impeccable logic, and more of your incredible ability to go on, and on, and on about this issue that no one gives a shit about...
what's is Donald on kicked bags via the the that plastic Make love ps nolu good pss the looks hi ... crash to If you ... don't use exclamation points --- you should't be typeing ! Commas - semicolons - question marks are for girlie boys !
looks hi ... crash to If you ... don't use exclamation points --- you should't be typeing ! Commas - semicolons - question marks are for girlie boys !
Yeah, Mike Lee, on his page 77: "For more than a century and a half after the founding of our nation, The First Amendment was not interpreted as requiring the government to be completely neutral between religion and atheism. ... Currency said "In God We Trust." There's an authoritative, trustworthy source. "E Pluribus Unum" was unofficially considered the national motto until 1956 when "In God We Trust" was adopted. "In God We Trust" was first authorized on coinage in 1864. Legislation in 1955 made it mandatory on coins and paper currency. In 1956 it became the national motto. Do you have a source that matters? Nobody gives a crap what Lee may have written. The Federal court decided en banc, in Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) regarding the Obamacare Act that "the mandate in Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause." While ruling on that basis, it also found that the PPACA originated in the House and would not have violated the Origination Clause had it applied. The dissent disagreed with the reasoning of the majority. The dissent would have "rule[d] for the Government on the ground that the Affordable Care Act originated in the House and thereby complied with the Origination Clause." The Court was unanimous that the Affordable Care Act originated in the House. To complete the Opinion of the Court, Because the Supreme Court has instructed us how to decide Origination Clause questions, this case presents no occasion for a comprehensive historical inquiry. But even the modest look we take here demonstrates that the gloss given by the dissent is wide of the mark. E. In addition to evidence from the framing and ratification, early constitutional history confirms that the Origination Clause's expected application was through a purpose-based test. St. George Tucker, writing in 1803 in the first major treatise on American law, argued that the Origination Clause should be read in light of English practice and therefore sweepingly construed to prevent the Senate from raising revenue through even “indirect modes of taxation” such as “debasing the value of the coin.” St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 261 (1803). Tucker, however, was forced to acknowledge, in a lengthy footnote, that the practice of the first Congresses had already shown that those bodies thought the Origination Clause was quite narrow, and that laws that raised revenue, even “to a very considerable amount,” did not implicate the Origination Clause unless “revenue was intended to be drawn to the government by these laws.” Id. at 261 n. § (1803). Justice Joseph Story, writing in 1833 in his own Commentaries on the Constitution, commented on Tucker's treatment of the Origination Clause, explaining that “[a] learned commentator[, Tucker,] supposes, that every bill, which indirectly or consequentially may raise revenue, is, within the sense of the constitution, a revenue bill.” 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 877, at 343 (1833). Justice Story went on to explain that “the practical construction of the constitution has been against his opinion,” id., and that “the history of the origin of the power, already suggested, abundantly proves, that it has been confined to bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue,” id. Justice Story's views form the basis of controlling precedent in this court and in the Supreme Court. In deciding the first appeal of Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebeker, this court quoted extensively from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution. The opinion noted Story's recognition that there were two views of the Origination Clause: a view that “supposes that every bill which indirectly or consequentially may raise revenue is, within the sense of the Constitution, a revenue bill,” and the superior view that “it has been confined to bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue.” 3 App.D.C. 190, 201 (1894) (quoting 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880); see also United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875) (citing Justice Story's views approvingly). The Supreme Court concluded, as we did then and must again here, that the latter view was correct. 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (adopting Justice Story's views); see also Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674 (treating Justice Story's views as having been adopted by the Supreme Court in Nebeker). Justice Story's comments on Tucker have been quoted in Supreme Court opinions on the Origination Clause, often as grounds for holding that the law at issue does not come within the scope of the Clause. See Munoz–Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674 . Early congressional practice, recognized by two of America's most influential early constitutional scholars and endorsed by one of them (Story), strongly suggests that the original expected application of the Origination Clause was purposive. Most importantly, in our view, that is the approach that was adopted and has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. * * * For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. In adhering to Supreme Court precedent adopting a purposive interpretation, the panel opinion honors the balance of power between the two Houses of Congress as envisioned by the Framers, thereby safeguarding individual liberty. There is no basis for the dissent's accusation to the contrary. See Dissent at 1059–60. The court has correctly voted to deny rehearing en banc. And so the Obamacare mandate was held not to come within the scope of the Origination Clause and unanimously found to have originated in the House. All hope was not lost as plaintiff petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court. http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011916zor_l5gm.pdf U.S. Supreme Court ORDERS, 19 Jan 2016 SISSEL, MATT V. DEPT. OF H&HS, ET AL. The motion of Daniel G. Anderson, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae out of time is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. And after the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert, all hope was lost.
Oh bullshit. Another day and another fight.
Yes, we all agree with the great Chan, and Mike Lee on that specific point. Now, can you explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific, oh great Chan. Amaze us with your impeccable logic, and more of your incredible ability to go on, and on, and on about this issue that no one gives a shit about... Only the great Chan imagines he's fighting, Bucky. No one else here has a clue what his problem is.
Another millenium, another unsuccesful fight. The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights.
The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights. Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp 2d 159 (Dist. Ct., D.C 2013) IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [...] It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. [...] First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” [...] For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914) "I am also satisfied that the section inquestion is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient. Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill."
Amaze us with your impeccable logic, and more of your incredible ability to go on, and on, and on about this issue that no one gives a shit about... Only the great Chan imagines he's fighting, Bucky. No one else here has a clue what his problem is.. If your 'invite' includes another several hundred demented posts by you, ---- no thanks.
It ACA still has nothing to do with the Origination Clause. You and buckeroo the two idiots who have been arguing that it does. http://www2.libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=46857&Disp=35#C35 [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. http://www2.libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=46857&Disp=39#C39 A bill which has been promulgated by the Legislative Branch as a House Resolution is beyond the power of the Judicial Branch to declare as anything other than a House Resolution, originated in the House. The precedent is well over a century old and continues to be controlling. The Affordable Care Act was H.R. 3590. Only Dumb and Dumber could think that anything promulgated in a HOUSE Resolution could violate the origination clause of the Constitution. And, of course, the Origination Clause only pertains to Acts whose primary purpose is to raise revenue. As the Court stated in Sissel, "In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914) "I am also satisfied that the section inquestion is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient. Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill." The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights. Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp 2d 159 (Dist. Ct., D.C 2013) IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [...] It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. [...] First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” [...] For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement Second, this report describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating revenue measures is the House’s prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most frequently. The House’s primary method for enforcement is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action on the disputed Senate measure, or referring it to committee. [...] Article I, Section 7, provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills, but there have been occasions on which either the House or Senate has debated the question of how expansively the Senate’s amending authority should be interpreted. [...] In the House, James A. Garfield, stated that [...] As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue bills be germane, the constitutional provision allowing the Senate to “propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills” opens the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible alternatives.35 In this way, the Senate may “originate” specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures. Chief Justice Edward White, writing the majority opinion in Rainey v. United States stated that Similarly, in 1968, the House refused to hold that a Senate amendment to add a general surtax on income to a House-originated bill concerning excise tax rates was a violation of the Origination Clause. ... The court’s understanding of the Origination Clause is therefore based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose. These principles are illustrated in two often cited cases. In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, the Supreme Court held that an act to establish a national currency backed by United States bonds, that also imposed a fee on banks based on the average amount of notes in circulation, did not violate the clause because it was not a revenue bill. In this case, the Court ruled that the primary purpose of the bill was to establish a national currency, and the fee on banks was incidental to that purpose. In Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bill to impose a tax on property in the District of Columbia to raise money for the express purpose of providing railroad terminal facilities was not a bill to raise revenue because the money raised was for a specific purpose, rather than to meet the general expenses or obligations of the government. A more recent ruling based on these principles appeared in United States v. Munoz-Flores. In this case, the law being challenged required federal courts to impose a monetary “special assessment” on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, to be used for some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime. In the opinion of the Court, the fact that this requirement would create new income for the federal government was not alone sufficient for the measure to be considered a revenue bill. The Court held that the case “falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. ... The House The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate has been printed on blue paper. This process is provided for under House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1), which states: ... CONCLUSION ... The system of government formulated by the framers of the Constitution in 1787 incorporated an intricate balancing of authorities and prerogatives, between the federal and state governments, among the branches of the federal government, and within the legislative branch, between the House and Senate. On the issue of taxation, the framers sought to mirror British practice by requiring that “All Bills for raising Revenue” originate in the popularly elected House, but balanced this by allowing the Senate the right to amend such bills. Left ambiguous was a precise definition about which measures would comprise revenue bills, and how far the Senate’s right to amend them extended. Over the course of more than two centuries of experience, the meaning of the Origination Clause has been honed by congressional and judicial precedents. Today, the clause applies unambiguously only to those bills that have as their primary purpose raising funds for the general operation of the federal government. However, it remains for the House, Senate, and federal courts to employ this understanding to enforce the application of the clause. The primary method for ensuring the enforcement of the Origination Clause has historically been blue-slip resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives. This remains true today, although other avenues of enforcement, from simple House inaction on Senate-originated bills to review by the Supreme Court, also play significant roles. Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives As generally understood, this clause carries two kinds of prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a non-revenue measure. However, the Senate may generally amend a House-originated revenue measure as it sees fit. The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.”1 Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. The House takes this action by adopting a resolution stating that a Senate bill (or Senate amendment(s) to a non-revenue House bill) “in the opinion of this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bill [or such bill with the Senate amendment(s) thereto] be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.” It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate is printed on blue paper. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rainey v United States, 23 US 310 (1914) Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 951 F Supp 2d 159 (Dist Ct, DC 2013) Obamacare and the Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS 13-5202, 760 F 3d 1 (DC Cir 2014) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 799 F3d 1035 (DC Cir 2015) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution (2011) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, Blue-Slipping - Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives (2015) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Can you explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific, oh great Chan. --- And be aware that no one really gives a shit. You're wrong, as usual, about me 'arguing that it does'. --- I don't care, -- and the only reason I'm responding to you at this point, -- is to see you making a fool of yourself spamming the forum. -- Please, continue with your demented, lengthy, cut and paste essays, that no one reads...
I guess YOUR INTERPRETATION of the US SUPREME COURT's INTERPRETATION of the US Constitution is proof positive that the US Supreme Court's decisons of and about their selective jurisprudence reigns supreme in the USA. Just so you know, I have to yawn, pal.
[tpaine #102] the only reason I'm responding to you at this point, -- is to see you making a fool of yourself spamming the forum. If you say so. Perhaps you could provide a synopsis of your #63 and the like. I'll provide a copy below so you do not have to search for it. Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game.
A bill which has been promulgated by the Legislative Branch as a House Resolution is beyond the power of the Judicial Branch to declare as anything other than a House Resolution, originated in the House. The precedent is well over a century old and continues to be controlling. The Affordable Care Act was H.R. 3590. Only Dumb and Dumber could think that anything promulgated in a HOUSE Resolution could violate the origination clause of the Constitution. And, of course, the Origination Clause only pertains to Acts whose primary purpose is to raise revenue. As the Court stated in Sissel, "In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914) "I am also satisfied that the section inquestion is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient. Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill." The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights. Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp 2d 159 (Dist. Ct., D.C 2013) IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [...] It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. [...] First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” [...] For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement Second, this report describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating revenue measures is the House’s prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most frequently. The House’s primary method for enforcement is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action on the disputed Senate measure, or referring it to committee. [...] Article I, Section 7, provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills, but there have been occasions on which either the House or Senate has debated the question of how expansively the Senate’s amending authority should be interpreted. [...] In the House, James A. Garfield, stated that [...] As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue bills be germane, the constitutional provision allowing the Senate to “propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills” opens the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible alternatives.35 In this way, the Senate may “originate” specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures. Chief Justice Edward White, writing the majority opinion in Rainey v. United States stated that Similarly, in 1968, the House refused to hold that a Senate amendment to add a general surtax on income to a House-originated bill concerning excise tax rates was a violation of the Origination Clause. ... The court’s understanding of the Origination Clause is therefore based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose. These principles are illustrated in two often cited cases. In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, the Supreme Court held that an act to establish a national currency backed by United States bonds, that also imposed a fee on banks based on the average amount of notes in circulation, did not violate the clause because it was not a revenue bill. In this case, the Court ruled that the primary purpose of the bill was to establish a national currency, and the fee on banks was incidental to that purpose. In Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bill to impose a tax on property in the District of Columbia to raise money for the express purpose of providing railroad terminal facilities was not a bill to raise revenue because the money raised was for a specific purpose, rather than to meet the general expenses or obligations of the government. A more recent ruling based on these principles appeared in United States v. Munoz-Flores. In this case, the law being challenged required federal courts to impose a monetary “special assessment” on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, to be used for some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime. In the opinion of the Court, the fact that this requirement would create new income for the federal government was not alone sufficient for the measure to be considered a revenue bill. The Court held that the case “falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. ... The House The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate has been printed on blue paper. This process is provided for under House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1), which states: ... CONCLUSION ... The system of government formulated by the framers of the Constitution in 1787 incorporated an intricate balancing of authorities and prerogatives, between the federal and state governments, among the branches of the federal government, and within the legislative branch, between the House and Senate. On the issue of taxation, the framers sought to mirror British practice by requiring that “All Bills for raising Revenue” originate in the popularly elected House, but balanced this by allowing the Senate the right to amend such bills. Left ambiguous was a precise definition about which measures would comprise revenue bills, and how far the Senate’s right to amend them extended. Over the course of more than two centuries of experience, the meaning of the Origination Clause has been honed by congressional and judicial precedents. Today, the clause applies unambiguously only to those bills that have as their primary purpose raising funds for the general operation of the federal government. However, it remains for the House, Senate, and federal courts to employ this understanding to enforce the application of the clause. The primary method for ensuring the enforcement of the Origination Clause has historically been blue-slip resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives. This remains true today, although other avenues of enforcement, from simple House inaction on Senate-originated bills to review by the Supreme Court, also play significant roles. Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives As generally understood, this clause carries two kinds of prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a non-revenue measure. However, the Senate may generally amend a House-originated revenue measure as it sees fit. The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.”1 Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. The House takes this action by adopting a resolution stating that a Senate bill (or Senate amendment(s) to a non-revenue House bill) “in the opinion of this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bill [or such bill with the Senate amendment(s) thereto] be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.” It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate is printed on blue paper. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rainey v United States, 23 US 310 (1914) Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 951 F Supp 2d 159 (Dist Ct, DC 2013) Obamacare and the Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS 13-5202, 760 F 3d 1 (DC Cir 2014) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 799 F3d 1035 (DC Cir 2015) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution (2011) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, Blue-Slipping - Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives (2015) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ho hum. More of the same crap from poor Chan...
[tpaine #102] the only reason I'm responding to you at this point, -- is to see you making a fool of yourself spamming the forum. If you say so. Perhaps you could provide a synopsis of your #65 which is very much like your #63 I'll provide a copy below so you do not have to search for it. [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Does the 2nd Amendment apply to African Americans? Dallas police shooting: 'Black Power group' claims responsibility No Charges for Clinton Proves Two Tier Legal System, Global Crash is Certain Is Hillary Morally Unfit to Be President? 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CANADA, U.S. AND MEXICO LEADERS PLOT NORTH AMERICAN UNION Judge Jeanine Pirro on Hannity - Comey Has ' Destroyed Reputation ' of FBI - 7/5/16 Collapse of Empires is Upon Us So Hillary Clinton is not going to be prosecuted... Groundbreaking Study Shows Cannabis Can Counter Alzheimer’s Disease Cops Force Student to be a Snitch — Found Him With a Bullet in His Head and Rocks in His Backpack 4 Celebrated Freedoms That Now Require Permission or Privilege to Enjoy A fair warning Veteran beaten ... after saying --- he was voting for Trump FBI Rewrites Federal Law to Let Hillary Off the Hook Colorado teens are using less marijuana since legalization FBI recommends no charges against Clinton in email probe FBI Director James Comey to Give Press Conference on Unspecified Subject This Morning Charges Dropped Against Mom Who Whipped Her Kids’ Butts for Stealing from Their Neighbor’s House Police Across America Celebrate Freedom This 4th Of July With Forced Blood Draw Checkpoints Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 283 Comments: 64 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-23) not displayed. . . . #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #59] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-07 20:32:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #61. To: nolu chan (#60) I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 2:39:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #62. To: tpaine (#61) [tpaine #61] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #61] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. To remind you of the last lesson: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. Having given you sufficient time time to recover from that flat statement of the D.C. Circuit Court, that the "contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause," I now continue from the Opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the Origination Clause and The PPACA, aka Obamacare. Resuming the lesson at 770 F.3d 7, IV. The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Sissel contends that "the shared responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue" and that it "originated in the Senate, not the House" in violation of the Origination Clause. Appellant's Br. 20. He states in his complaint that "[i]n September, 2009, the House [of Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the 'Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,'" to "'amend[] the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces and certain other Federal employees.'" Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges this bill "had nothing to do with health insurance reform," and yet "[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to 'amend' the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement and associated payment), and renaming the bill the 'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.'" Id. The "substitute legislation," he alleges, was "a revenue-raising tax bill," id., and the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause "[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the House," id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the Supreme Court's accepted meaning of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it originated in the House or the Senate. In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court has held from the early days of this Nation that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897) (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880). The Court has adhered to this "strict" interpretation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875). Necessarily, this court has followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under this "strict" interpretation, [760 F.3d 8] the Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674, and a "special assessment" levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims' fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964. In each case, consistent with its "strict" interpretation of the phrase "Bills for raising Revenue," the Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether "a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the [Origination] [C]lause." 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The Court observed that "[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question." Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the Court noted that " [a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that [the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants] creates is ... `incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," which was to provide money for a crime victims' fund. 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at "levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense," it does not fall within the limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court precedent necessarily leads to the conclusion that Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's repeated focus on the statutory provision's "object," Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and "primary purpose," Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, makes clear, contrary to Sissel's position, that the purpose of a bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580, not to raise revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The Supreme Court explained: "Although the [Section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Id. at 2596 (emphasis added); see id. at 2596-97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), that the "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue." See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary, "the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties." Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 — if people do not [760 F.3d 9] "sign up" for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act's primary aim to induce participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of the Act would mean less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody "two exceptions" to the general "presumpt[ion]" that "[a]ll taxes" are subject to the Clause. Appellant's Br. 14; Reply Br. 6-7. He maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither funds a particular governmental program, as was true in Munoz- Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98, 110 S.Ct. 1964, nor enforces compliance with a statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433, 26 S.Ct. 674. Yet even assuming Sissel is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the Affordable Care Act's mandate does not fall squarely within the fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. There's more, but that can wait for the next lesson from the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 15:04:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #63. To: nolu chan (#62) Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016- 07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 16:30:43 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Edit #64. To: tpaine (#63) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4- inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), resuming at 9: Sissel's interpretation of the taxing power also fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of Congress's taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600, Sissel contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to the Origination Clause because it "serves no constitutional purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress's taxing power." Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising revenue. In fact, "the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes[] than revenue." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950), the Supreme Court stated: It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. Id. at 44, 71 S.Ct. 108 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953), where the Court upheld "a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers," id. at 23, 73 S.Ct. 510, notwithstanding the argument that "the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize ... illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure," id. at 28, 73 S.Ct. 510, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because not all of Congress's exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at raising revenue, and a measure is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nebeker and Millard confirm this point: Not all "taxes" are "Bills for raising Revenue." See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. [760 F.3d 10] Sissel's attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court's "tax" cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge on the existence (or absence) of another source of constitutional authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on circulating notes in Nebeker was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, it was enacted "in furtherance of Congress's Article I power to coin money." Reply Br. 6; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal government's enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may well be "Bills for raising Revenue." The mere existence of another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely, a measure that would not be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" does not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example, Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in Millard was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Reply Br. 7; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that Congress's authority over the District of Columbia affected the Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and the absence of another constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to Congress's taxing power does not compel the conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That's tough. The D.C. Circuit Court, specifically on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause, stated that, "this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." It's ok if you have another sad and throw another tiny fisted tantrum. But all hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 17:00:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com
A bill which has been promulgated by the Legislative Branch as a House Resolution is beyond the power of the Judicial Branch to declare as anything other than a House Resolution, originated in the House. The precedent is well over a century old and continues to be controlling. The Affordable Care Act was H.R. 3590. Only Dumb and Dumber could think that anything promulgated in a HOUSE Resolution could violate the origination clause of the Constitution. And, of course, the Origination Clause only pertains to Acts whose primary purpose is to raise revenue. As the Court stated in Sissel, "In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914) "I am also satisfied that the section inquestion is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient. Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill." The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights. Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp 2d 159 (Dist. Ct., D.C 2013) IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [...] It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. [...] First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” [...] For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement Second, this report describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating revenue measures is the House’s prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most frequently. The House’s primary method for enforcement is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action on the disputed Senate measure, or referring it to committee. [...] Article I, Section 7, provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills, but there have been occasions on which either the House or Senate has debated the question of how expansively the Senate’s amending authority should be interpreted. [...] In the House, James A. Garfield, stated that [...] As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue bills be germane, the constitutional provision allowing the Senate to “propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills” opens the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible alternatives.35 In this way, the Senate may “originate” specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures. Chief Justice Edward White, writing the majority opinion in Rainey v. United States stated that Similarly, in 1968, the House refused to hold that a Senate amendment to add a general surtax on income to a House-originated bill concerning excise tax rates was a violation of the Origination Clause. ... The court’s understanding of the Origination Clause is therefore based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose. These principles are illustrated in two often cited cases. In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, the Supreme Court held that an act to establish a national currency backed by United States bonds, that also imposed a fee on banks based on the average amount of notes in circulation, did not violate the clause because it was not a revenue bill. In this case, the Court ruled that the primary purpose of the bill was to establish a national currency, and the fee on banks was incidental to that purpose. In Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bill to impose a tax on property in the District of Columbia to raise money for the express purpose of providing railroad terminal facilities was not a bill to raise revenue because the money raised was for a specific purpose, rather than to meet the general expenses or obligations of the government. A more recent ruling based on these principles appeared in United States v. Munoz-Flores. In this case, the law being challenged required federal courts to impose a monetary “special assessment” on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, to be used for some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime. In the opinion of the Court, the fact that this requirement would create new income for the federal government was not alone sufficient for the measure to be considered a revenue bill. The Court held that the case “falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. ... The House The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate has been printed on blue paper. This process is provided for under House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1), which states: ... CONCLUSION ... The system of government formulated by the framers of the Constitution in 1787 incorporated an intricate balancing of authorities and prerogatives, between the federal and state governments, among the branches of the federal government, and within the legislative branch, between the House and Senate. On the issue of taxation, the framers sought to mirror British practice by requiring that “All Bills for raising Revenue” originate in the popularly elected House, but balanced this by allowing the Senate the right to amend such bills. Left ambiguous was a precise definition about which measures would comprise revenue bills, and how far the Senate’s right to amend them extended. Over the course of more than two centuries of experience, the meaning of the Origination Clause has been honed by congressional and judicial precedents. Today, the clause applies unambiguously only to those bills that have as their primary purpose raising funds for the general operation of the federal government. However, it remains for the House, Senate, and federal courts to employ this understanding to enforce the application of the clause. The primary method for ensuring the enforcement of the Origination Clause has historically been blue-slip resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives. This remains true today, although other avenues of enforcement, from simple House inaction on Senate-originated bills to review by the Supreme Court, also play significant roles. Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives As generally understood, this clause carries two kinds of prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a non-revenue measure. However, the Senate may generally amend a House-originated revenue measure as it sees fit. The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.”1 Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. The House takes this action by adopting a resolution stating that a Senate bill (or Senate amendment(s) to a non-revenue House bill) “in the opinion of this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bill [or such bill with the Senate amendment(s) thereto] be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.” It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate is printed on blue paper. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rainey v United States, 23 US 310 (1914) Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 951 F Supp 2d 159 (Dist Ct, DC 2013) Obamacare and the Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS 13-5202, 760 F 3d 1 (DC Cir 2014) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 799 F3d 1035 (DC Cir 2015) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution (2011) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, Blue-Slipping - Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives (2015) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A bill which has been promulgated by the Legislative Branch as a House Resolution is beyond the power of the Judicial Branch to declare as anything other than a House Resolution, originated in the House. The precedent is well over a century old and continues to be controlling. The Affordable Care Act was H.R. 3590. Only Dumb and Dumber could think that anything promulgated in a HOUSE Resolution could violate the origination clause of the Constitution. And, of course, the Origination Clause only pertains to Acts whose primary purpose is to raise revenue. As the Court stated in Sissel, "In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914) "I am also satisfied that the section inquestion is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient. Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill." The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights. Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp 2d 159 (Dist. Ct., D.C 2013) IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [...] It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. [...] First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” [...] For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement Second, this report describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating revenue measures is the House’s prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most frequently. The House’s primary method for enforcement is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action on the disputed Senate measure, or referring it to committee. [...] Article I, Section 7, provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills, but there have been occasions on which either the House or Senate has debated the question of how expansively the Senate’s amending authority should be interpreted. [...] In the House, James A. Garfield, stated that [...] As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue bills be germane, the constitutional provision allowing the Senate to “propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills” opens the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible alternatives.35 In this way, the Senate may “originate” specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures. Chief Justice Edward White, writing the majority opinion in Rainey v. United States stated that Similarly, in 1968, the House refused to hold that a Senate amendment to add a general surtax on income to a House-originated bill concerning excise tax rates was a violation of the Origination Clause. ... The court’s understanding of the Origination Clause is therefore based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose. These principles are illustrated in two often cited cases. In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, the Supreme Court held that an act to establish a national currency backed by United States bonds, that also imposed a fee on banks based on the average amount of notes in circulation, did not violate the clause because it was not a revenue bill. In this case, the Court ruled that the primary purpose of the bill was to establish a national currency, and the fee on banks was incidental to that purpose. In Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bill to impose a tax on property in the District of Columbia to raise money for the express purpose of providing railroad terminal facilities was not a bill to raise revenue because the money raised was for a specific purpose, rather than to meet the general expenses or obligations of the government. A more recent ruling based on these principles appeared in United States v. Munoz-Flores. In this case, the law being challenged required federal courts to impose a monetary “special assessment” on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, to be used for some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime. In the opinion of the Court, the fact that this requirement would create new income for the federal government was not alone sufficient for the measure to be considered a revenue bill. The Court held that the case “falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. ... The House The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate has been printed on blue paper. This process is provided for under House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1), which states: ... CONCLUSION ... The system of government formulated by the framers of the Constitution in 1787 incorporated an intricate balancing of authorities and prerogatives, between the federal and state governments, among the branches of the federal government, and within the legislative branch, between the House and Senate. On the issue of taxation, the framers sought to mirror British practice by requiring that “All Bills for raising Revenue” originate in the popularly elected House, but balanced this by allowing the Senate the right to amend such bills. Left ambiguous was a precise definition about which measures would comprise revenue bills, and how far the Senate’s right to amend them extended. Over the course of more than two centuries of experience, the meaning of the Origination Clause has been honed by congressional and judicial precedents. Today, the clause applies unambiguously only to those bills that have as their primary purpose raising funds for the general operation of the federal government. However, it remains for the House, Senate, and federal courts to employ this understanding to enforce the application of the clause. The primary method for ensuring the enforcement of the Origination Clause has historically been blue-slip resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives. This remains true today, although other avenues of enforcement, from simple House inaction on Senate-originated bills to review by the Supreme Court, also play significant roles. Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives As generally understood, this clause carries two kinds of prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a non-revenue measure. However, the Senate may generally amend a House-originated revenue measure as it sees fit. The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.”1 Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. The House takes this action by adopting a resolution stating that a Senate bill (or Senate amendment(s) to a non-revenue House bill) “in the opinion of this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bill [or such bill with the Senate amendment(s) thereto] be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.” It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate is printed on blue paper. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rainey v United States, 23 US 310 (1914) Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 951 F Supp 2d 159 (Dist Ct, DC 2013) Obamacare and the Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS 13-5202, 760 F 3d 1 (DC Cir 2014) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 799 F3d 1035 (DC Cir 2015) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution (2011) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, Blue-Slipping - Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives (2015) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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[tpaine #111] Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.co Your link does not work. Call real loud for your mommy. [tpaine #102] the only reason I'm responding to you at this point, -- is to see you making a fool of yourself spamming the forum. If you say so. Perhaps you could provide a synopsis of your #65 which is very much like your #63. I'll provide a copy below so you do not have to search for it. [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Does the 2nd Amendment apply to African Americans? Dallas police shooting: 'Black Power group' claims responsibility No Charges for Clinton Proves Two Tier Legal System, Global Crash is Certain Is Hillary Morally Unfit to Be President? 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CANADA, U.S. AND MEXICO LEADERS PLOT NORTH AMERICAN UNION Judge Jeanine Pirro on Hannity - Comey Has ' Destroyed Reputation ' of FBI - 7/5/16 Collapse of Empires is Upon Us So Hillary Clinton is not going to be prosecuted... Groundbreaking Study Shows Cannabis Can Counter Alzheimer’s Disease Cops Force Student to be a Snitch — Found Him With a Bullet in His Head and Rocks in His Backpack 4 Celebrated Freedoms That Now Require Permission or Privilege to Enjoy A fair warning Veteran beaten ... after saying --- he was voting for Trump FBI Rewrites Federal Law to Let Hillary Off the Hook Colorado teens are using less marijuana since legalization FBI recommends no charges against Clinton in email probe FBI Director James Comey to Give Press Conference on Unspecified Subject This Morning Charges Dropped Against Mom Who Whipped Her Kids’ Butts for Stealing from Their Neighbor’s House Police Across America Celebrate Freedom This 4th Of July With Forced Blood Draw Checkpoints Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 283 Comments: 64 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-23) not displayed. . . . #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #59] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-07 20:32:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #61. To: nolu chan (#60) I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 2:39:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #62. To: tpaine (#61) [tpaine #61] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #61] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. To remind you of the last lesson: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. Having given you sufficient time time to recover from that flat statement of the D.C. Circuit Court, that the "contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause," I now continue from the Opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the Origination Clause and The PPACA, aka Obamacare. Resuming the lesson at 770 F.3d 7, IV. The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Sissel contends that "the shared responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue" and that it "originated in the Senate, not the House" in violation of the Origination Clause. Appellant's Br. 20. He states in his complaint that "[i]n September, 2009, the House [of Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the 'Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,'" to "'amend[] the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces and certain other Federal employees.'" Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges this bill "had nothing to do with health insurance reform," and yet "[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to 'amend' the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement and associated payment), and renaming the bill the 'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.'" Id. The "substitute legislation," he alleges, was "a revenue-raising tax bill," id., and the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause "[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the House," id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the Supreme Court's accepted meaning of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it originated in the House or the Senate. In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court has held from the early days of this Nation that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897) (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880). The Court has adhered to this "strict" interpretation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875). Necessarily, this court has followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under this "strict" interpretation, [760 F.3d 8] the Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674, and a "special assessment" levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims' fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964. In each case, consistent with its "strict" interpretation of the phrase "Bills for raising Revenue," the Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether "a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the [Origination] [C]lause." 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The Court observed that "[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question." Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the Court noted that " [a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that [the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants] creates is ... `incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," which was to provide money for a crime victims' fund. 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at "levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense," it does not fall within the limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court precedent necessarily leads to the conclusion that Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's repeated focus on the statutory provision's "object," Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and "primary purpose," Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, makes clear, contrary to Sissel's position, that the purpose of a bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580, not to raise revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The Supreme Court explained: "Although the [Section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Id. at 2596 (emphasis added); see id. at 2596-97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), that the "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue." See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary, "the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties." Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 — if people do not [760 F.3d 9] "sign up" for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act's primary aim to induce participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of the Act would mean less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody "two exceptions" to the general "presumpt[ion]" that "[a]ll taxes" are subject to the Clause. Appellant's Br. 14; Reply Br. 6-7. He maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither funds a particular governmental program, as was true in Munoz- Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98, 110 S.Ct. 1964, nor enforces compliance with a statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433, 26 S.Ct. 674. Yet even assuming Sissel is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the Affordable Care Act's mandate does not fall squarely within the fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. There's more, but that can wait for the next lesson from the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 15:04:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #63. To: nolu chan (#62) Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016- 07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 16:30:43 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Edit #64. To: tpaine (#63) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4- inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), resuming at 9: Sissel's interpretation of the taxing power also fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of Congress's taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600, Sissel contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to the Origination Clause because it "serves no constitutional purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress's taxing power." Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising revenue. In fact, "the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes[] than revenue." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950), the Supreme Court stated: It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. Id. at 44, 71 S.Ct. 108 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953), where the Court upheld "a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers," id. at 23, 73 S.Ct. 510, notwithstanding the argument that "the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize ... illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure," id. at 28, 73 S.Ct. 510, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because not all of Congress's exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at raising revenue, and a measure is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nebeker and Millard confirm this point: Not all "taxes" are "Bills for raising Revenue." See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. [760 F.3d 10] Sissel's attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court's "tax" cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge on the existence (or absence) of another source of constitutional authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on circulating notes in Nebeker was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, it was enacted "in furtherance of Congress's Article I power to coin money." Reply Br. 6; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal government's enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may well be "Bills for raising Revenue." The mere existence of another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely, a measure that would not be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" does not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example, Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in Millard was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Reply Br. 7; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that Congress's authority over the District of Columbia affected the Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and the absence of another constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to Congress's taxing power does not compel the conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That's tough. The D.C. Circuit Court, specifically on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause, stated that, "this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." It's ok if you have another sad and throw another tiny fisted tantrum. But all hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 17:00:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com
We seem to be reaching the limits of this forums reload capabilities. --- Is anyone else having trouble refreshing Nolu Chan's spam ? If you are, who gives a shit? -- Certainty not me...
Sergei Kanaryova If you are, who gives a shit? -- Certainty not me... Call real loud for your mommy. My posts have been precisely on point about Obamacare and the Origination Clause of the Constitution, except when quoting tpaine SPAM. It has to be a bitch seeing your SPAM quoted back to you. I am experiencing no difficulty. You may desire to replace your 8086 rig, or your dialup modem. But as you say, nobody is reading it and you don't give a shit. You just need your mommyu to get you out of the shit you got yourself into. [tpaine #102] the only reason I'm responding to you at this point, -- is to see you making a fool of yourself spamming the forum. AN EXAMPLE OF tpaine SPAM: #65 which is very much like your #63 [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Does the 2nd Amendment apply to African Americans? Dallas police shooting: 'Black Power group' claims responsibility No Charges for Clinton Proves Two Tier Legal System, Global Crash is Certain Is Hillary Morally Unfit to Be President? Amid protests, DA says La. police shooting may be "authorized killing" EXCLUSIVE: Security camera recording of Alton Sterling's shooting by two white cops was seized 'illegally' by police - who now face demands to return 'best evidence' of death Terrifying moment brave cop's bullet bounces off armored vest of Dallas gunman - who then shoots the officer in the back before executing him at point-blank range with assault rifle All lives matter, police lives matter, words of hate matter 11 Dallas Officers Shot, 3 Dead in Shooting as Protest Ended The Department of Political Justice Rep. 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CANADA, U.S. AND MEXICO LEADERS PLOT NORTH AMERICAN UNION Judge Jeanine Pirro on Hannity - Comey Has ' Destroyed Reputation ' of FBI - 7/5/16 Collapse of Empires is Upon Us So Hillary Clinton is not going to be prosecuted... Groundbreaking Study Shows Cannabis Can Counter Alzheimer’s Disease Cops Force Student to be a Snitch — Found Him With a Bullet in His Head and Rocks in His Backpack 4 Celebrated Freedoms That Now Require Permission or Privilege to Enjoy A fair warning Veteran beaten ... after saying --- he was voting for Trump FBI Rewrites Federal Law to Let Hillary Off the Hook Colorado teens are using less marijuana since legalization FBI recommends no charges against Clinton in email probe FBI Director James Comey to Give Press Conference on Unspecified Subject This Morning Charges Dropped Against Mom Who Whipped Her Kids’ Butts for Stealing from Their Neighbor’s House Police Across America Celebrate Freedom This 4th Of July With Forced Blood Draw Checkpoints Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 283 Comments: 64 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-23) not displayed. . . . #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #59] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-07 20:32:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #61. To: nolu chan (#60) I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 2:39:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #62. To: tpaine (#61) [tpaine #61] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #61] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. To remind you of the last lesson: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. Having given you sufficient time time to recover from that flat statement of the D.C. Circuit Court, that the "contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause," I now continue from the Opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the Origination Clause and The PPACA, aka Obamacare. Resuming the lesson at 770 F.3d 7, IV. The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Sissel contends that "the shared responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue" and that it "originated in the Senate, not the House" in violation of the Origination Clause. Appellant's Br. 20. He states in his complaint that "[i]n September, 2009, the House [of Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the 'Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,'" to "'amend[] the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces and certain other Federal employees.'" Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges this bill "had nothing to do with health insurance reform," and yet "[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to 'amend' the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement and associated payment), and renaming the bill the 'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.'" Id. The "substitute legislation," he alleges, was "a revenue-raising tax bill," id., and the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause "[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the House," id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the Supreme Court's accepted meaning of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it originated in the House or the Senate. In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court has held from the early days of this Nation that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897) (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880). The Court has adhered to this "strict" interpretation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875). Necessarily, this court has followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under this "strict" interpretation, [760 F.3d 8] the Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674, and a "special assessment" levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims' fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964. In each case, consistent with its "strict" interpretation of the phrase "Bills for raising Revenue," the Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether "a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the [Origination] [C]lause." 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The Court observed that "[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question." Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the Court noted that " [a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that [the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants] creates is ... `incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," which was to provide money for a crime victims' fund. 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at "levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense," it does not fall within the limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court precedent necessarily leads to the conclusion that Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's repeated focus on the statutory provision's "object," Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and "primary purpose," Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, makes clear, contrary to Sissel's position, that the purpose of a bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580, not to raise revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The Supreme Court explained: "Although the [Section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Id. at 2596 (emphasis added); see id. at 2596-97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), that the "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue." See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary, "the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties." Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 — if people do not [760 F.3d 9] "sign up" for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act's primary aim to induce participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of the Act would mean less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody "two exceptions" to the general "presumpt[ion]" that "[a]ll taxes" are subject to the Clause. Appellant's Br. 14; Reply Br. 6-7. He maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither funds a particular governmental program, as was true in Munoz- Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98, 110 S.Ct. 1964, nor enforces compliance with a statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433, 26 S.Ct. 674. Yet even assuming Sissel is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the Affordable Care Act's mandate does not fall squarely within the fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. There's more, but that can wait for the next lesson from the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 15:04:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #63. To: nolu chan (#62) Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016- 07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 16:30:43 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Edit #64. To: tpaine (#63) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4- inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), resuming at 9: Sissel's interpretation of the taxing power also fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of Congress's taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600, Sissel contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to the Origination Clause because it "serves no constitutional purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress's taxing power." Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising revenue. In fact, "the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes[] than revenue." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950), the Supreme Court stated: It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. Id. at 44, 71 S.Ct. 108 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953), where the Court upheld "a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers," id. at 23, 73 S.Ct. 510, notwithstanding the argument that "the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize ... illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure," id. at 28, 73 S.Ct. 510, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because not all of Congress's exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at raising revenue, and a measure is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nebeker and Millard confirm this point: Not all "taxes" are "Bills for raising Revenue." See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. [760 F.3d 10] Sissel's attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court's "tax" cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge on the existence (or absence) of another source of constitutional authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on circulating notes in Nebeker was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, it was enacted "in furtherance of Congress's Article I power to coin money." Reply Br. 6; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal government's enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may well be "Bills for raising Revenue." The mere existence of another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely, a measure that would not be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" does not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example, Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in Millard was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Reply Br. 7; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that Congress's authority over the District of Columbia affected the Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and the absence of another constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to Congress's taxing power does not compel the conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That's tough. The D.C. Circuit Court, specifically on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause, stated that, "this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." It's ok if you have another sad and throw another tiny fisted tantrum. But all hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 17:00:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com
Poor form and lousy delivery. Please find a method to improve your presentations.
Red Diaper Doper Baby post. To: nolu chan Poor form and lousy delivery. Please find a method to improve your presentations. cgi-lib.pl: Request to receive too much data: 1636043 bytes The above message is what I get when I attempt to rely to Chan's spam. I doubt that Chan is concerned with his - "Poor form and lousy delivery." He seems obsessed with proving that his opinions MUST NOT BE CHALLENGED, poor soul.. I think he needs rest.
Nolu may have fallen off the deep end. Who can we find to provide some deep counseling? yukon?
You neither challenge nor respond with substance to the opinions of the courts. A bill which has been promulgated by the Legislative Branch as a House Resolution is beyond the power of the Judicial Branch to declare as anything other than a House Resolution, originated in the House. The precedent is well over a century old and continues to be controlling. The Affordable Care Act was H.R. 3590. Only Dumb and Dumber could think that anything promulgated in a HOUSE Resolution could violate the origination clause of the Constitution. And, of course, the Origination Clause only pertains to Acts whose primary purpose is to raise revenue. As the Court stated in Sissel, "In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914) "I am also satisfied that the section inquestion is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient. Having become an enrolled and duly authenticated Act of Congress, it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill." The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights. Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp 2d 159 (Dist. Ct., D.C 2013) IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Sissel v. DHHS, 799 F.3d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [...] It bears repeating that, in all of our history, the Supreme Court has not once found a law in violation of the Origination Clause. [...] First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. First, the dissent would reach the same conclusion that the Court did on a different basis. It reasons that H.R. 3590, the legislative vehicle that became the Affordable Care Act, was a revenue-raising bill that originated in the House. Dissent at 1050, 1060–63 & n. 6. To get there, it rests on Rainey v. United States for the proposition that, as long as a Senate amendment is “an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House[,][t]hat is sufficient” for it to comply with the Origination Clause. 232 U.S. 310, 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, 58 L.Ed. 617 (1914). Rainey, the dissent tells us, “is squarely on point and has never been overruled.” [...] For these reasons, the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc presents no basis for the en banc court to revisit the holding that Sissel's challenge to the mandate in section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act does not come within the scope of the Origination Clause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement Second, this report describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating revenue measures is the House’s prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most frequently. The House’s primary method for enforcement is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action on the disputed Senate measure, or referring it to committee. [...] Article I, Section 7, provides that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills, but there have been occasions on which either the House or Senate has debated the question of how expansively the Senate’s amending authority should be interpreted. [...] In the House, James A. Garfield, stated that [...] As currently understood, because the Senate has no rule requiring that amendments to revenue bills be germane, the constitutional provision allowing the Senate to “propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills” opens the door to Senate action on a wide range of possible alternatives.35 In this way, the Senate may “originate” specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures. Chief Justice Edward White, writing the majority opinion in Rainey v. United States stated that Similarly, in 1968, the House refused to hold that a Senate amendment to add a general surtax on income to a House-originated bill concerning excise tax rates was a violation of the Origination Clause. ... The court’s understanding of the Origination Clause is therefore based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose. These principles are illustrated in two often cited cases. In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, the Supreme Court held that an act to establish a national currency backed by United States bonds, that also imposed a fee on banks based on the average amount of notes in circulation, did not violate the clause because it was not a revenue bill. In this case, the Court ruled that the primary purpose of the bill was to establish a national currency, and the fee on banks was incidental to that purpose. In Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bill to impose a tax on property in the District of Columbia to raise money for the express purpose of providing railroad terminal facilities was not a bill to raise revenue because the money raised was for a specific purpose, rather than to meet the general expenses or obligations of the government. A more recent ruling based on these principles appeared in United States v. Munoz-Flores. In this case, the law being challenged required federal courts to impose a monetary “special assessment” on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor, to be used for some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime. In the opinion of the Court, the fact that this requirement would create new income for the federal government was not alone sufficient for the measure to be considered a revenue bill. The Court held that the case “falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. ... The House The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.” Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate has been printed on blue paper. This process is provided for under House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1), which states: ... CONCLUSION ... The system of government formulated by the framers of the Constitution in 1787 incorporated an intricate balancing of authorities and prerogatives, between the federal and state governments, among the branches of the federal government, and within the legislative branch, between the House and Senate. On the issue of taxation, the framers sought to mirror British practice by requiring that “All Bills for raising Revenue” originate in the popularly elected House, but balanced this by allowing the Senate the right to amend such bills. Left ambiguous was a precise definition about which measures would comprise revenue bills, and how far the Senate’s right to amend them extended. Over the course of more than two centuries of experience, the meaning of the Origination Clause has been honed by congressional and judicial precedents. Today, the clause applies unambiguously only to those bills that have as their primary purpose raising funds for the general operation of the federal government. However, it remains for the House, Senate, and federal courts to employ this understanding to enforce the application of the clause. The primary method for ensuring the enforcement of the Origination Clause has historically been blue-slip resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives. This remains true today, although other avenues of enforcement, from simple House inaction on Senate-originated bills to review by the Supreme Court, also play significant roles. Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives As generally understood, this clause carries two kinds of prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a non-revenue measure. However, the Senate may generally amend a House-originated revenue measure as it sees fit. The House’s primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as “blue-slipping.”1 Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. The House takes this action by adopting a resolution stating that a Senate bill (or Senate amendment(s) to a non-revenue House bill) “in the opinion of this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States and is an infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bill [or such bill with the Senate amendment(s) thereto] be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.” It is called blue-slipping because historically the resolution returning the offending bill to the Senate is printed on blue paper. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rainey v United States, 23 US 310 (1914) Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 951 F Supp 2d 159 (Dist Ct, DC 2013) Obamacare and the Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS 13-5202, 760 F 3d 1 (DC Cir 2014) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sissel v DHHS, 799 F3d 1035 (DC Cir 2015) Obamacare and Origination Clause - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution (2011) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CRS Report - Saturno, Blue-Slipping - Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives (2015) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I hate to step on your toes, but you are being redundant. Are you insane?
No. You idiots who say the Obamacare Act, a HOUSE Resolution not for the PURPOSE of raising revenue, violated the Originated Clause, are in denial or insane. Give your sane review of tpaine's comment: [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Does the 2nd Amendment apply to African Americans? Dallas police shooting: 'Black Power group' claims responsibility No Charges for Clinton Proves Two Tier Legal System, Global Crash is Certain Is Hillary Morally Unfit to Be President? 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CANADA, U.S. AND MEXICO LEADERS PLOT NORTH AMERICAN UNION Judge Jeanine Pirro on Hannity - Comey Has ' Destroyed Reputation ' of FBI - 7/5/16 Collapse of Empires is Upon Us So Hillary Clinton is not going to be prosecuted... Groundbreaking Study Shows Cannabis Can Counter Alzheimer’s Disease Cops Force Student to be a Snitch — Found Him With a Bullet in His Head and Rocks in His Backpack 4 Celebrated Freedoms That Now Require Permission or Privilege to Enjoy A fair warning Veteran beaten ... after saying --- he was voting for Trump FBI Rewrites Federal Law to Let Hillary Off the Hook Colorado teens are using less marijuana since legalization FBI recommends no charges against Clinton in email probe FBI Director James Comey to Give Press Conference on Unspecified Subject This Morning Charges Dropped Against Mom Who Whipped Her Kids’ Butts for Stealing from Their Neighbor’s House Police Across America Celebrate Freedom This 4th Of July With Forced Blood Draw Checkpoints Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 283 Comments: 64 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-23) not displayed. . . . #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #59] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-07 20:32:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #61. To: nolu chan (#60) I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 2:39:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #62. To: tpaine (#61) [tpaine #61] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. I am glad that you "not new" position now is identical to my position as stated. Regardless of how you got there, you are to be praised for accepting the same learned position as myself. [tpaine #61] Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. To remind you of the last lesson: United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. Having given you sufficient time time to recover from that flat statement of the D.C. Circuit Court, that the "contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause," I now continue from the Opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the Origination Clause and The PPACA, aka Obamacare. Resuming the lesson at 770 F.3d 7, IV. The Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Sissel contends that "the shared responsibility payment is a bill for raising revenue" and that it "originated in the Senate, not the House" in violation of the Origination Clause. Appellant's Br. 20. He states in his complaint that "[i]n September, 2009, the House [of Representatives] passed H.R. 3590, entitled the 'Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,'" to "'amend[] the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify [the] first-time homebuyers credit in the case of members of the Armed Forces and certain other Federal employees.'" Compl. ¶ 40. He alleges this bill "had nothing to do with health insurance reform," and yet "[i]n November of [2009], the Senate purported to 'amend' the House bill by gutting its contents, replacing them with health-insurance reforms (including the purchase requirement and associated payment), and renaming the bill the 'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.'" Id. The "substitute legislation," he alleges, was "a revenue-raising tax bill," id., and the enactment of the Act violated the Origination Clause "[b]ecause the tax originated in the Senate, and not in the House," id. ¶ 41. Because we conclude that the shared responsibility payment in Section 5000A is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the Supreme Court's accepted meaning of that phrase, and thus was not subject to the Origination Clause, this court has no occasion to determine whether it originated in the House or the Senate. In interpreting the Origination Clause, the Supreme Court has held from the early days of this Nation that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897) (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880). The Court has adhered to this "strict" interpretation. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875). Necessarily, this court has followed suit. See Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1090 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under this "strict" interpretation, [760 F.3d 8] the Supreme Court has upheld as not subject to the Origination Clause a tax on circulating bank notes, see Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, a tax to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, see Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674, and a "special assessment" levied on federal criminal offenders for a victims' fund, see Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 401, 110 S.Ct. 1964. In each case, consistent with its "strict" interpretation of the phrase "Bills for raising Revenue," the Court's analysis focused on the purpose of the challenged measure: Because the revenue raised was merely incidental to the main object or aim of the challenged measure, the requirements of the Origination Clause were held not to apply. In Nebeker, for example, the issue was whether "a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation[] was a revenue bill within the [Origination] [C]lause." 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The Court observed that "[t]he main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question." Id. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Millard, involving the use of property taxes to fund railway construction in the District of Columbia, the Court reasoned that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." 202 U.S. at 437, 26 S.Ct. 674 (emphasis added). And in Munoz-Flores, the Court noted that " [a]ny revenue for the general Treasury that [the provision imposing a special assessment on defendants] creates is ... `incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," which was to provide money for a crime victims' fund. 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964 (emphasis added; alterations omitted). In each instance, the Court underscored that unless a bill is aimed at "levy[ing] taxes in the strict sense," it does not fall within the limited scope of the Origination Clause. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 1964; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. 674; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766. The purposive approach embodied in Supreme Court precedent necessarily leads to the conclusion that Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" under the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's repeated focus on the statutory provision's "object," Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766, and "primary purpose," Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964, makes clear, contrary to Sissel's position, that the purpose of a bill is critical to the Origination Clause inquiry. And after the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, it is beyond dispute that the paramount aim of the Affordable Care Act is "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580, not to raise revenue by means of the shared responsibility payment. The Supreme Court explained: "Although the [Section 5000A] payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage." Id. at 2596 (emphasis added); see id. at 2596-97. This court noted in Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012), that the "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue." See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (congressional findings). To the contrary, "the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties." Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Section 5000A shared responsibility payment may ultimately generate substantial revenues — potentially $4 billion in annual income for the government by 2017, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 — if people do not [760 F.3d 9] "sign up" for coverage, but those revenues are a byproduct of the Affordable Care Act's primary aim to induce participation in health insurance plans. Successful operation of the Act would mean less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. Sissel contends, however, that the Supreme Court cases rejecting Origination Clause challenges merely embody "two exceptions" to the general "presumpt[ion]" that "[a]ll taxes" are subject to the Clause. Appellant's Br. 14; Reply Br. 6-7. He maintains that the Affordable Care Act does not fall within either exception because the Section 5000A payment neither funds a particular governmental program, as was true in Munoz- Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98, 110 S.Ct. 1964, nor enforces compliance with a statute passed under some other (non-taxing) constitutional power, as in Millard, 202 U.S. at 433, 26 S.Ct. 674. Yet even assuming Sissel is correct that the precedent can be classified in one or both of his categories, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that a statute must be so classifiable to avoid the requirements of the Origination Clause. All Sissel has demonstrated is that the Affordable Care Act's mandate does not fall squarely within the fact patterns of prior unsuccessful Origination Clause challenges, not that his challenge should succeed. There's more, but that can wait for the next lesson from the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 15:04:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #63. To: nolu chan (#62) Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016- 07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game. tpaine posted on 2016-07-08 16:30:43 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Edit #64. To: tpaine (#63) Your "response" is noted. I shall print it out, cut it into 4- inch squares, put it in the little reading room, and see if any of your intelligence rubs off on me. Now to continue your education about the Origination Clause of the Constitution in correction of your idiocy about its application to the passage of Obamacare, H.R. 3590, 111th Congress, 03/23/2010 became Public Law No. 111-148. Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014), resuming at 9: Sissel's interpretation of the taxing power also fails to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. In emphasizing that in NFIB the Court upheld Section 5000A solely as an exercise of Congress's taxing power, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2600, Sissel contends that the Section 5000A tax is presumptively subject to the Origination Clause because it "serves no constitutional purpose other than to raise revenue pursuant to Congress's taxing power." Reply Br. 7. This implicitly assumes that all exercises of the taxing power are necessarily aimed at raising revenue. In fact, "the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes[] than revenue." 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 962, p. 434 (1833), cited in NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. In United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108, 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950), the Supreme Court stated: It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the taxing power] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. Id. at 44, 71 S.Ct. 108 (emphasis added; citations omitted). That view was reiterated in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953), where the Court upheld "a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers," id. at 23, 73 S.Ct. 510, notwithstanding the argument that "the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize ... illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure," id. at 28, 73 S.Ct. 510, abrogated on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Because not all of Congress's exercises of the taxing power are primarily aimed at raising revenue, and a measure is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" only if its primary purpose is to raise general revenues, some exercises of the taxing power are not subject to the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court's decisions in Nebeker and Millard confirm this point: Not all "taxes" are "Bills for raising Revenue." See Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. [760 F.3d 10] Sissel's attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court's "tax" cases confirm that the Origination Clause inquiry does not hinge on the existence (or absence) of another source of constitutional authority. For instance, Sissel contends that the tax on circulating notes in Nebeker was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, it was enacted "in furtherance of Congress's Article I power to coin money." Reply Br. 6; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. But many taxes are imposed to raise revenue in furtherance of the federal government's enumerated powers, and some of those taxes may well be "Bills for raising Revenue." The mere existence of another source of Congressional power, then, cannot be what insulates a measure from the Origination Clause. Conversely, a measure that would not be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" does not become one simply because Congress lacks an independent basis (apart from the taxing power) to enact it. For example, Sissel contends that the tax to finance railroad projects in Millard was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" because, among other things, Congress possessed exclusive constitutional jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Reply Br. 7; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Yet nothing in Millard hints that Congress's authority over the District of Columbia affected the Origination Clause inquiry in that case. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37, 26 S.Ct. 674. In sum, under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of another constitutional power does not suggest that a provision is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and the absence of another constitutional power does not, in itself, suggest that it is. Because the existence of another power is not necessary (or sufficient) to exempt a bill from the Origination Clause, the mere fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to Congress's taxing power does not compel the conclusion that the entire Affordable Care Act is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause. Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. That's tough. The D.C. Circuit Court, specifically on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause, stated that, "this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause." It's ok if you have another sad and throw another tiny fisted tantrum. But all hope was not lost. Sissel appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehearing en banc. The eleven judge panel wrote at significantly greater length. I'm sure you will enjoy what they had to say directly on point about the Obamacare bill and the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-08 17:00:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest [Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register] Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com
You spammed the thread again, with a pile of shit. Is this all you are capable of performing?
You better believe it, the poor man is deranged.
Whatever do you mean? A pile of shit? It was a direct replica of one of tpaine's brilliant posts. Yes, you may have another. Status: Logged In; Check Pings U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Source: [None] URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 28, 2016 Author: Mike Lee Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine Keywords: None Views: 278 Comments: 62 Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com Post Comment Private Reply Bookmark Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Comments (1-21) not displayed. . . . #22. To: tpaine (#17) Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? CZ82 posted on 2016-06-28 20:30:34 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22) Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love. Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:00:29 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #24. To: tpaine (#0) The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:08:22 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #25. To: buckeroo (#24) The US government is corrupt. Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is... tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:15:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #26. To: tpaine (#25) It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:19:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #27. To: buckeroo (#26) Relax. Trump will save us all. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:21:21 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #28. To: tpaine (#27) If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 21:28:03 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #29. To: buckeroo (#28) Relax. Trump will save us all. If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 21:41:49 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #30. To: tpaine (#29) no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out! buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 22:07:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #31. To: buckeroo (#30) you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out See if you can find a sense of humor. tpaine posted on 2016-06-28 23:10:52 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #32. To: buckeroo (#26) (Edited) but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-28 23:31:12 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #33. To: GrandIsland (#32) This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ... buckeroo posted on 2016-06-28 23:47:02 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #34. To: buckeroo (#33) Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. GrandIsland posted on 2016-06-29 7:26:00 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24) [Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 12:20:20 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #36. To: Willie Green (#1) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be. If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." ConservingFreedom posted on 2016-06-29 14:08:42 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35) buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended. tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 14:27:01 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37) Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt? nolu chan posted on 2016-06-29 15:21:07 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? tpaine posted on 2016-06-29 15:37:47 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #40. To: tpaine (#39) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 15:42:05 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #41. To: nolu chan (#40) (Edited) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. tpaine posted on 2016-06-30 17:05:17 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #42. To: tpaine (#41) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. U.S. Supreme Court Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. nolu chan posted on 2016-06-30 20:59:46 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #43. To: nolu chan (#42) Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 12:24:54 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #44. To: tpaine (#43) All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 13:47:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44) You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full -- You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-01 16:30:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #46. To: tpaine (#45) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, III Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-01 22:12:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #47. To: nolu chan (#46) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 15:10:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #48. To: tpaine (#47) [tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. 202 U.S. 434 This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 15:45:59 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #49. To: nolu chan (#48) You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself. tpaine posted on 2016-07-02 16:10:27 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #50. To: tpaine (#49) [tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. [tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion. Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 19:54:04 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #51. To: nolu chan (#50) I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. buckeroo posted on 2016-07-02 20:06:32 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51) [buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin. I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy- year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives." nolu chan posted on 2016-07-02 23:28:08 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #53. To: nolu chan (#52) Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 11:09:14 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #54. To: tpaine (#53) [tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. [tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. 2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut- and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call _vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00395 A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R H.R. 3590 Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40) Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872, S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964 Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF] Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148 nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 12:02:24 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #55. To: nolu chan (#54) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 12:25:36 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #56. To: tpaine (#55) [tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. [tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. [tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). IV. CONCLUSION In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 14:33:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #57. To: nolu chan (#56) Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 16:08:06 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #58. To: tpaine (#57) [tpaine #57] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution [nolu chan #56] Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. [tpaine #57] You're repeating my position.... I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Specific education about the Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590 began with Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) in the D.C. District Court which found your blather about the origination clause failed to state a cause of action and dismissed the case on a pre-trial motion. Your education continues with the appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, Sissel v. DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non- exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Matt Sissel, who is an artist and small-business [760 F.3d 3] owner who serves from time to time on active duty with the National Guard, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that the mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. We affirm, because his contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2598, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) ("NFIB"), and his contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting that Clause. I'm sure that gives you a sad. I'm sure you want some time to recover before I tax you further with the reasoning of the Court. Next, your lesson continues with Sisson at the D.C. Circuit Court. nolu chan posted on 2016-07-03 23:22:51 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #59. To: nolu chan (#58) In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. --- This debate on the issue continues. You're repeating my position, imagining you're refuting it? You are one weird obsessive, nolu.. -- Try relaxing, and accepting the fact that court opinions do not change our Constitution. I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? tpaine posted on 2016-07-03 23:57:23 ET Reply Trace Private Reply #60. To: tpaine (#59) [nolu chan #58] I am glad to hear that your new position is that court opinions apply to everyone in all 52 jurisdictions when the Court interprets the Constitution. [tpaine #59] I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed is that YOU have now decided to I have no 'new position'. -- The only thing that is changed bbbis that YOU have now decided to lie about my position.. Feel proud? Very proud, grasshopper. Carry on, hopperchan. As you see two can play yourself game.
The Constitutional Convention's critical compromises concerning the language and scope of the Origination Clause occurred in its closing weeks, between mid-August and early September 1787. As of mid-August, proponents of the initial, broader version of the Origination Clause were on the defensive. On August 6, the Committee of Detail—of which Edmund Randolph, a strong supporter of the Origination Clause, was a prominent member—put forward its draft proposal for the Constitution. That draft included the language: “All bills for raising or appropriating money ... shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate.” Id. at 178 (Aug. 6, 1787); see also William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2012) (describing circumstances surrounding the Committee of Detail's draft).
#86. To: Asshole (#85)
The education of yukon/tpaine does not end just because he is an asshole.
#87. To: yupaine (#86)
The Constitutional Convention's critical compromises concerning the language and scope of the Origination Clause occurred in its closing weeks, between mid-August and early September 1787. As of mid-August, proponents of the initial, broader version of the Origination Clause were on the defensive. On August 6, the Committee of Detail—of which Edmund Randolph, a strong supporter of the Origination Clause, was a prominent member—put forward its draft proposal for the Constitution. That draft included the language: “All bills for raising or appropriating money ... shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate.” Id. at 178 (Aug. 6, 1787); see also William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2012) (describing circumstances surrounding the Committee of Detail's draft).
#88. To: Return of the ASS (#87)
#89. To: yupaine (#88)
James Madison also spoke in that exchange. Madison was against the inclusion of an Origination Clause. He had said only five days earlier, with respect to a prior, broader version that he “was for striking it out.” Id. at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787).
#90. To: yupaine (#88)
Second, the dissent overlooks that, whatever Madison thought, supporters of the Clause—those that most wanted it in the Constitution—thought that a purpose-based limitation was a compromise on which all sides could agree. The dissent pins its argument that the Convention rejected the purposive Origination Clause on two sentences by Madison. The dissent overlooks entirely that Madison thought a non-purposive Clause would be equally unworkable, 2 Farrand's Records at 276–77 (Aug. 13, 1787); id. at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787), that discussion of the Origination Clause did not begin or end with Madison's remarks, and that when its supporters regrouped and reintroduced the Clause thereafter, they left the purposive language intact.
#91. To: yupaine (#88)
The final language of the Clause employs a word (“for”) that is widely recognized as a synonym for the words “for the purposes of”—the very language the proponents of the narrowed substitute Clause had suggested. See id. at 263 (Aug. 11, 1787) (Randolph's proposed language: “All bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue”); id. at 294 (Aug. 15, 1787) (Strong's proposed language: “Bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue”). That evidence suggests that the Supreme Court's purposive reading of the Origination Clause is the reading the Framers intended.
#92. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#35)
Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific!
The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives.
#93. To: tpaine (#92)
(Edited)
really
funny
Trump
a
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fraud
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up
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obomba
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than
an
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has
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hunter
again
boris
chan
frames
sells
them
too
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that
he
is
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me
#94. To: All (#93)
like
a
... rail
road
... jack
me
#95. To: tpaine (#92)
[tpaine #92] Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare.
What of the dissent's reliance on statements by Elbridge Gerry and James Madison praising a seemingly broader Origination Clause? The version Gerry championed is not in the Constitution. Gerry criticized the Constitution for rejecting his vision of the Origination Clause, and he cited that rejection as a reason why he refused to sign the Constitution and advocated against its ratification. See Letter of Elbridge Gerry to the Vice President of the Convention of Massachusetts (Jan. 21, 1788), reprinted in 3 Farrand's Records at 265. Madison extolled the Origination Clause in Federalist 58, not because it gave the House power over all taxes, but because, in his opinion, it vested the House with exclusive power to originate appropriations bills. See The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that the House's power would derive from its “power over the purse”). Neither “revenue” nor “tax” is mentioned in Federalist 58. Id. at 356–61. And at the Convention itself, Madison appeared vocally to oppose the Clause. See 2 Farrand's Records at 224 (Aug. 8, 1787); id. at 276–77 (Aug. 13, 1787).
15-543
#96. To: nolu chan, tpaine (#95)
And after the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert, all hope was lost.
#97. To: buckeroo, and the great Chan, fighting? (#96)
The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. -- Chan
Chan, --- After the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert, all hope was lost.
Oh bullshit. Another day and another fight. --- buckeroo
#98. To: buckeroo (#96)
Oh bullshit. Another day and another fight.
#99. To: tpaine (#97)
The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause.
Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause.
The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose.
Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the ourt saying:
#100. To: nolu chan (#99)
buckeroo (#96) --- Oh bullshit. Another day and another fight.
Chan, -- another millenium, another unsuccesful fight. The supreme court has never upheld any challenge to a Federal law based on the origination clause. Ya never know, year 227 may be the charm. This case is dead. You are invited to bring another case overwhelming the court with your brilliant insights.
#101. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#100)
Now, can you explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific, oh great Chan.
#35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24)
[tpaine #39] "Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: --
Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin.
Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the court saying:
The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause.
Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause.
The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Section Research Manager
March 15, 2011 The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination Clause matters, adopting a definition of revenue bills that is based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose.
I do not deny their [the Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that their thousand pages must be on the subject matter of our bill.
the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient .... it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.
A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution [emphasis added], shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. Any Member of the House may offer such a resolution, but normally it is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee who would do so.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 26, 2015 Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known generally as the Origination Clause because it requires that
[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
#102. To: nolu chan (#101)
It ACA still has nothing to do with the Origination Clause. --- You and buckeroo the two who have been arguing that it does.
#103. To: nolu chan, tpaine (#101)
#104. To: tpaine (#102)
#63. To: nolu chan (#62)
#105. To: tpaine (#102)
Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the court saying:
The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause.
Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause.
The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Section Research Manager
March 15, 2011 The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination Clause matters, adopting a definition of revenue bills that is based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose.
I do not deny their [the Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that their thousand pages must be on the subject matter of our bill.
the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient .... it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.
A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution [emphasis added], shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. Any Member of the House may offer such a resolution, but normally it is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee who would do so.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 26, 2015 Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known generally as the Origination Clause because it requires that
[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
#106. To: nolu chan, continues to spam this thread. Dementia? (#105)
#107. To: tpaine (#106)
#65. To: nolu chan (#64)
#108. To: tpaine (#106)
Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the court saying:
The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause.
Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause.
The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Section Research Manager
March 15, 2011 The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination Clause matters, adopting a definition of revenue bills that is based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose.
I do not deny their [the Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that their thousand pages must be on the subject matter of our bill.
the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient .... it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.
A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution [emphasis added], shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. Any Member of the House may offer such a resolution, but normally it is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee who would do so.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 26, 2015 Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known generally as the Origination Clause because it requires that
[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
#109. To: nolu chan, Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com (#107)
Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com
#110. To: tpaine (#109)
Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the court saying:
The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause.
Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause.
The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Section Research Manager
March 15, 2011 The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination Clause matters, adopting a definition of revenue bills that is based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose.
I do not deny their [the Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that their thousand pages must be on the subject matter of our bill.
the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient .... it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.
A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution [emphasis added], shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. Any Member of the House may offer such a resolution, but normally it is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee who would do so.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 26, 2015 Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known generally as the Origination Clause because it requires that
[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
#111. To: nolu chan, Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com tpaine (#110)
#112. To: tpaine (#111)
#65. To: nolu chan (#64)
#113. To: nolu chan, Please report web page problems, questions and comments to webmaster@libertysflame.com, , Y'ALL (#112)
#114. To: tpaine, Sergei Kanaryova (#113)
[tpaine #113] We seem to be reaching the limits of this forums reload capabilities. --- Is anyone else having trouble refreshing Nolu Chan's spam ?
#65. To: nolu chan (#64)
#115. To: nolu chan (#114)
#116. To: nolu chan, Red Diaper Doper Baby (#114)
SPAM ! ! !
Castle(C), Stein(G), Johnson(L)
#117. To: buckeroo (#115)
#118. To: hondo68, nolu chan (#116)
#119. To: tpaine (#117)
He seems obsessed with proving that his opinions MUST NOT BE CHALLENGED, poor soul..
Without intimating that there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity, and upon the assumption for the sake of the argument that such power may be invoked, again we think the court below disposed of the contention upon a ground entirely satisfactory which we adopt and approve, the court saying:
The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause.
Where, as here, the Supreme Court has concluded that a provision's revenue-raising function is incidental to its primary purpose, see NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596, the Origination Clause does not apply. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the shared responsibility payment may in fact generate substantial revenues. In light of the Supreme Court's historical commitment to a narrow construction of the Origination Clause, this court can only hold that the challenged measure — whose primary purpose "plainly" was not to raise revenue, id. at 2596 — falls outside the scope of the Clause.
The panel opinion rests, as it must, on binding Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never found an Origination Clause violation. And in three separate cases spanning more than a century, it held that the variable controlling whether a statutory provision falls within the ambit of the Origination Clause is whether raising revenue for the general Treasury is that provision's primary purpose.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Section Research Manager
March 15, 2011 The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination Clause matters, adopting a definition of revenue bills that is based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose.
I do not deny their [the Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that their thousand pages must be on the subject matter of our bill.
the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient .... it is not for this Court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.
A resolution reported as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered from the floor by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader as a question of the privileges of the House, or offered as privileged under clause 1, section 7, article I of the Constitution [emphasis added], shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn. Any Member of the House may offer such a resolution, but normally it is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee who would do so.
Congressional Research Service
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
June 26, 2015 Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known generally as the Origination Clause because it requires that
[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
#120. To: nolu chan (#119)
#121. To: buckeroo (#120)
I hate to step on your toes, but you are being redundant. Are you insane?
#65. To: nolu chan (#64)
#122. To: nolu chan (#121)
#123. To: buckeroo, , nolu chan You spammed the thread again, with a pile of shit. Is this all you are capable of performing? (#122)
: nolu chan You spammed the thread again, with a pile of shit. Is this all you are capable of performing?
#124. To: buckeroo (#122)
You spammed the thread again, with a pile of shit. Is this all you are capable of performing?
#63. To: nolu chan (#62)
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