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Title: Court Sets Ominous Precedent: Informing Jurors of Their Rights Is Now ILLEGAL
Source:
From The Trenches
URL Source: http://fromthetrenchesworldreport.c ... rors-rights-now-illegal/200165
Published: Jun 2, 2017
Author: Justin Gardner
Post Date: 2017-06-03 10:38:54 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 118910
Comments: 422
Big Rapids, MI — As constitutional rights are steadily eroded in the U.S. through the burgeoning police/surveillance state, one case in Michigan provides an example of just how dire the situation has gotten. Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights. Woods was exercising his First Amendment rights and raising awareness about something the courts deliberately fail to tell jurors when beginning a trial – jury nullification, or the right to vote one’s conscience. For this, Woods – a father of eight and former pastor – was charged with jury tampering, after an initial felony charge of obstructing justice was dropped following public outcry. Even with the reduced charge, the case has very troubling implications for free speech rights. The county prosecutor, seemingly furious that a citizen would dare inform the public on jury nullification, said Woods’ pamphlet “is designed to benefit a criminal defendant.” The prosecutor then seemed to contradict himself in a statement, saying, “Once again the pamphlet by itself, fine, people have views on what the law should be, that’s fine. It’s the manner by which this pamphlet was handed out.” Woods, who testified in his own defense, stated under oath that he did not ask anyone walking into the courthouse if they were a juror, remained on the public sidewalk and never blocked any area. He decided to hand out the pamphlets at a Nov. 24, 2015 trial of an Amish man accused of draining a wetland on his property in violation of Dept. of Environment Quality rules. Woods’ pamphlet did not contain anything specific to the case or any Michigan court, according to defense attorney David Kallman. But this innocuous behavior, which should be viewed as a public service, drew the attention of a judge who became “very concerned” when he saw the pamphlets being carried by some of the jury pool. “I THOUGHT THIS WAS GOING TO TRASH MY JURY TRIAL, BASICALLY,” TESTIFIED JUDGE [PETER] JAKLEVIC. “IT JUST DIDN’T SOUND RIGHT.” JACKLEVIC ENDED UP SENDING THAT JURY POOL HOME ON NOV. 24, 2015 WHEN YODER TOOK A PLEA. JAKLEVIC CONTINUED TO TESTIFY THAT HE STEPPED INTO THE HALLWAY WITH MECOSTA COUNTY PROSECUTOR BRIAN THIEDE WHEN DET. ERLANDSON AND A DEPUTY BROUGHT WOOD INTO THE COURTHOUSE THAT DAY. MECOSTA COUNTY DEPUTY JEFF ROBERTS TESTIFIED HE “ASKED WOOD TO COME INSIDE BECAUSE THE JUDGE WANTED TO TALK WITH HIM,” THEN THREATENED TO CALL A CITY COP IF WOOD DID NOT COME INSIDE. WOOD TESTIFIED JUDGE JAKLEVIC NEVER SPOKE TO HIM THAT DAY, OR HIM ANY QUESTIONS, BEFORE ORDERING HIS ARREST. HE TELLS FOX 17 HE HAD CONCERNS HIS CASE WAS TRIED IN MECOSTA COUNTY WHERE ALL OF THIS HAPPENED, INVOLVING SEVERAL COURT OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE JUDGE.” To recap, this judge said “it just didn’t sound right” that people were carrying information pamphlets on their rights as jurors, and he possibly lied on the stand to justify the fact that he had Woods arrested for doing nothing wrong. What’s more, Woods was brought to trial in the same court where all of this transpired and county officials had literally teamed up to violate his rights in the first place. “So our taxpayer dollars are paying their salary, and they were the actors in this case to arrest me, to imprison me, and all that,” said Woods. “I did have a very great concern that they were the ones trying the case, because they work together day in and day out.” Defense attorney Kallman notes that during Woods’ trial, they were prohibited from arguing several points to the jury. “And of course, the First Amendment issues are critical: that we believe our client had the absolute First Amendment right to hand out these brochures right here on this sidewalk,” said Kallman. “That’s part of the problem of where we feel we were handcuffed quite a bit.” When asked how he felt about his First Amendment rights, Woods replied, “Oh, I don’t feel like I have them.” We had briefs about the First Amendment, free speech. It was very clear today, I know the jury doesn’t hear that, but it was very clear that the government did not meet their burden to restrict my free speech on that public sidewalk that day. It was very clear.”
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#63. To: Pinguinite (#61)
Not guilty is a legal term. It does not mean innocent.
Yeah! Like in the 1800's when white juries used nullification to refuse to convict white men of murdering blacks. The good ol' days, right? Screw the rule of law. We average commoners will convict who WE want to convict.
Don't call me an idiot when you're the one who can't comprehend what I'm saying.
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The US Constitution is designed to ensure individual rights unlike the perspective of YOUR AUTHORITARIAN COLLECTIVE RIGHTS BULLSHIT.
Thank you. Will that be on the test?
Yes.
About the only such instructions given to jurors by judges is that it is illegitimate to nullify any law, that the duty of the jury is to judge the defendant on the charges and evidence and only on the legal grounds explained by the judge. I can't say I know of any case where any judge ever explained to a jury that they could nullify the law by exonerating a defendant, even if they were guilty. But there have been many cases where judges tried to intimidate juries or mislead them on this count. It's pretty routine for judges to do this, both state and federal. Nothing makes judges and prosecutors quite as mad as a jury they suspect of nullification. Maybe a little review of the origins of jury nullification is in order: This history, however, is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, but was severely punished by the court. Almost a century later in 1649, in the first known attempt to argue for jury nullification, a jury likewise acquitted John Lilburne for his part in inciting a rebellion against the Cromwell regime. The theoretician and politician Eduard Bernstein wrote of Lilburne's trial: In 1670, a grand jury refused to convict William Penn of unlawful assembly in Bushel's Case. The judge attempted to find the jury in contempt of court; this was ruled inappropriate by the Court of Common Pleas. In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury. Then in 1688, a jury acquitted the Seven Bishops of the Church of England of seditious libel. Juries continued, even in non-criminal cases, to act in defiance of the Crown. In 1763 and 1765, juries awarded £4,000 and £300 to John Wilkes and John Entick respectively, in separate suits for trespass against the Crown's messengers. In both cases, messengers were sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly libelous papers.
Once the jury knows all their facts, they will vote with their conscience. But of course that depends on how the prosecution wants to relay those facts to the jury. If the jury does not have all the facts, because a corrupt prosecution team has opted to withhold pertinent information, then the jury has no options. It becomes a mistrial and possible collusion as well as misapplication of the law. The only option that is left is for this entire mess to be reviewed under standard review by the appellate courts.
Watch this movie. It's an excellent example of how the jury is manipulated by the prosecution and the lawyers involved. It's one of my favorites and explains how the real world works in our courtrooms. And from personal experience I have known of court clerks colluding with opposing counsel teams to have perfectly legitimate cases thrown out by tampering with witnesses and evidence. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runaway_Jury
Eh, it's a movie made from a Grisham novel about a widow suing over her husband dying from smoking. So they made it into an anti-gun movie instead. Usually I prefer documentaries or historical films to novels or based-on-a-real-story type movies.
No it's a movie that reveals tactics that lawyers and prosecution teams apply to obfuscate of matters in law. Jury nullification has become too broadened in applying court procedure that it should be a chapter all in its own on how to deceive and deprive the jury of facts and other tricks used to keep the jury in check all the while the prosecution is playing them all for suckers. Usually I prefer documentaries or historical films to novels or based-on-a-real-story type movies. Then I suggest a reader for you to get keen insight on how courts, judges and lawyers prepare you for the trial process to grooming your client. It's entitled, The First Trial by Steven H. Goldberg
That is why you were mentally incapable of responding to even one post.
They have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals and enter a judgment NOV (non obstante veridictum - notwithstanding the verdict). The problem is that if they do that to override an acquittal, they are very likely (though not absolutely certain) to be overridden on appeal, so they generally don't do it.
They do not have the power to over rule acquittals. That is ridiculous. That would be double jeopardy.
Yeah, but I still hate the movie for it's libtard gun grabber theme, and the dopey notion that it's the manufactures fault if you get harmed by their product. Sue the spoon manufacturer for making Michael Moore a fat slob! /s You're right. This is a civil trial option only. In civil trials judges can overrule a jury finding for the defendant.
But in civil trials there are no convictions or acquittals, only findings for plaintiff or defendant.
Yes it was William Penn not William Tell. I think Tell had a different kind of legal problem related to his marksmanship.
They are not the same. In one case the jury has been corrupted, typically by a bribe of some sort. Said juror agrees to render a not guilty verdict regardless of the evidence and the law. The juror in question commits a criminal offense. A juror practicing jury nullification takes the law from the judge, carefully applies it to the facts, determines the proper verdict, and further determines that rendering a verdict of guilty would result in an injustice. He votes his conscience. No crime is committed. This does not affirm a right. Should the juror state his intent to vote based on nullification, a judge can properly remove him from the jury at ant point before the verdict is rendered, including during deliberations. His conscience prevents him from carrying out the oath he took, but he is not prosecuted criminally.
As nolu chan pointed out, "... juries will acquit defendants who appear sympathetic, who are charged with violating an unpopular law, who the jurors speculate would otherwise be sentenced too severely, or who haven’t been proven guilty under standards for proof the jurors believe are required despite the judge’s instruction otherwise." Jurors will do what jurors do, including when they feel a defendant is guilty according to the letter of the law, but that a verdict of guilty would result in an injustice that they are unable to reconcile with their personal conscience. The judicial result is that shit happens. OJ was acquitted because the prosecutiion failed miserably to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that OJ committed the crime. Much prosecution evidence, and many witnesses, were destroyed on the stand. What happened in the courtroom, and what was reported on the evening news and talk shows, frequently differed greatly.
The Count has a point, albeit presented incompletely. A judge may render a Judgment as a Matter of Law [JMOL], a/k/a/ Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or judgment non obstante veredicto, or JNOV, in a civil case. A judge has the power to set aside a guilty verdict by a jury in a criminal court. The judge's decision to set aside a guilty verdict is appealable. This is in Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For criminal proceedings, see Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure He has no authority to set aside a jury verdict of acquittal in a criminal court which would federally be known as judgment of acquittal. (a) Before Submission to the Jury. After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's evidence, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so. (b) Reserving Decision. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved. (c) After Jury Verdict or Discharge. (1) Time for a Motion. A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later. (2) Ruling on the Motion. If the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal. If the jury has failed to return a verdict, the court may enter a judgment of acquittal. (3) No Prior Motion Required. A defendant is not required to move for a judgment of acquittal before the court submits the case to the jury as a prerequisite for making such a motion after jury discharge. (d) Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial. (1) Motion for a New Trial. If the court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed. The court must specify the reasons for that determination. (2) Finality. The court's order conditionally granting a motion for a new trial does not affect the finality of the judgment of acquittal. (3) Appeal. (A) Grant of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court conditionally grants a motion for a new trial and an appellate court later reverses the judgment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed with the new trial unless the appellate court orders otherwise. (B) Denial of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court conditionally denies a motion for a new trial, an appellee may assert that the denial was erroneous. If the appellate court later reverses the judgment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed as the appellate court directs. Notes (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Pub. L. 99–646, §54(a), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3607; Apr. 29, 1994, eff. Dec. 1, 1994; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.) JMOL, Judgment as a Matter of Law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_notwithstanding_verdict JNOV is the practice in American courts whereby the presiding judge in a civil jury trial may overrule the decision of a jury and reverse or amend their verdict. In literal terms, the judge enters a verdict notwithstanding the jury findings. This intervention, often requested[citation needed] but rarely granted, permits the judge to exercise discretion to avoid extreme and unreasonable jury decisions.[3] A judge is not allowed to enter a JNOV of "guilty" following a jury acquittal in United States criminal cases; such an action would violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be placed in double jeopardy and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. If the judge grants a motion to set aside judgment after the jury convicts, however, this action may be reversed on appeal by the prosecution. A JNOV is appropriate only if the judge determines that no reasonable jury could have reached the given verdict. For example, if a party enters no evidence on an essential element of their case, and the jury still finds in their favor, the court may rule that no reasonable jury would have disregarded the lack of evidence on that key point and reform the judgment. Reversal of a jury's verdict by a judge occurs when the judge believes that there were insufficient facts on which to base the jury's verdict, or that the verdict did not correctly apply the law. This procedure is similar to a situation in which a judge orders a jury to arrive at a particular verdict, called a directed verdict. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is occasionally made when a jury refuses to follow a judge's instruction to arrive at a certain verdict.[4]
Of possible interest: This is a very rare case where a defendant was acquitted in criminal case and later reindicted and convicted for the same crime. It was a bench trial wherein the Chicago gangster bribed the Chicago judge. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/138/302/473725/ Aleman v Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F3d 302 (7th Cir 1998) Harry Aleman, Petitioner-appellant, v. the Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County,criminal Division, Illinois, Honorable Michael P. Toomin,judge Presiding, Honorable Richard Devine, State's Attorneyof Cook County, Illinois, Ernesto Velasco, Executivedirector, Cook County Department of Corrections,respondents-appellees, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998) Argued Dec. 2, 1997. Decided March 6, 1998 Allan A. Ackerman, Chicago, IL, David I. Bruck (argued), Columbia, SC, for Harry Aleman. Rita M. Novak, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, James E. Fitzgerald, John Blakey, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Renee G. Goldfarb (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Criminal Appeals Divison, Chicago, IL, for Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Criminal Division, Michael P. Toomin, Judge, and Ernesto Velasco. James E. Fitzgerald, John Blakey, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Renee G. Goldfarb (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Criminal Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Richard A. Devine. Before WOOD, Jr., COFFEY, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges. FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Harry Aleman successfully bribed a Cook County Circuit Judge to acquit him of a murder charge in a 1977 bench trial. A grand jury returned a second indictment against Aleman on this murder charge in 1993 after evidence of the bribery surfaced. In addition, Aleman was indicted for the first time on a different murder charge. Aleman moved to dismiss both indictments, but the Illinois state courts rejected his arguments. In a lastditch effort to avoid (re)trial, Aleman requested a stay of state court proceedings while a federal district court considered his challenge to the indictments in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case proceeded to trial after the district court denied this petition and motion to stay, and a Cook County jury convicted him of the Logan murder;1 the trial judge thereafter sentenced Aleman to 100-300 years in prison. Aleman appeals the district court's denial of the petition. His conviction will stand, though, because we affirm the district court's denial of Aleman's petition. While walking to work on the morning of September 27, 1972, William Logan was shot and killed by Harry Aleman. Three years later, in October 1975, Aleman also shot and killed Anthony Reitinger, allegedly because Reitinger neglected to pay a "street tax"2 on his bookmaking operation to local organized crime figures. A grand jury indicted Aleman for the Logan murder in December 1976, but he was not charged at this time with the Reitinger murder. After numerous substitutions of counsel and judges, the Logan case proceeded to a bench trial before Cook County Circuit Court Judge Frank Wilson, who acquitted Aleman of the Logan murder in May 1977. Nearly twenty years after the trial, however, two witnesses from the Federal Witness Protection Program were made available to testify that Aleman had murdered both Logan and Reitinger and that he had purchased the Logan acquittal with a $10,000 bribe to Judge Wilson. The first witness, Vincent Rizza, was a former Chicago police officer who ran an illegal bookmaking operation in order to supplement his government salary. Rizza paid a street tax to the local mafia and agreed to report bookmakers who were not making such payments to Aleman; one of the independent bookmakers whom Rizza offered up to Aleman was Anthony Reitinger. This evidence would provide a crucial link between Aleman and Reitinger's unsolved murder. Rizza also supplied corroboration of Aleman's bribe of Judge Wilson in the Logan murder trial. In the early winter of 1977, after Aleman's indictment but before the trial, Aleman told Rizza that the trial was "all taken care of". Aleman said that he requested a bench trial "because the case was all taken care of" and that this way he was not going to jail. Later, when newspaper accounts began to paint a bleak picture of Aleman's chances of gaining an acquittal, he again told Rizza calmly that the case was "taken care of". The second federal government informant was Robert Cooley, a former lawyer steeped in corruption who admitted that he frequently bribed judges, prosecutors, clerks, and sheriffs before entering the Federal Witness Protection Program.3 Cooley was a close friend of Judge Wilson and, at the request of some local organized crime figures, pitched the idea of a "fix" to Wilson. Cooley told Wilson that the case against Aleman was weak, that it could be handled very easily, and that an acquittal would be worth $10,000. Wilson agreed to fix the case if Aleman's counsel, Thomas Maloney, a good friend of Wilson's, would withdraw from the case in order to reduce the appearance of impropriety.4 Cooley thereupon paid Wilson $2,500, and the two men agreed that Wilson would receive the remaining $7,500 after the acquittal. Unbeknownst to Wilson, Cooley had also arranged a $10,000 payment to secure the favorable testimony of an eyewitness to the murder. Cooley then met with Aleman and assured him that an acquittal was guaranteed. The evidence against Aleman, however, was not as flimsy as Cooley had indicated to Judge Wilson. After the second day of trial, Cooley met with Wilson, who was upset at Cooley's misrepresentations and at the prosecutor's allegations that a witness had received $10,000 in exchange for offering false testimony. Amazingly, the issue for Wilson was not whether he would still acquit Aleman, but for how much. Wilson expressed annoyance that a witness was getting the same amount of money as a "full circuit judge"; he said to Cooley that he would "receive all kinds of heat" for the acquittal and requested more bribe money: " [T]hat's all I get is ten thousand dollars? I think I deserve more." Throughout these meetings, the acquittal itself was never in question. Judge Wilson fulfilled his end of the bargain on May 24, 1977, when he acquitted Aleman in a brisk oral ruling and quickly exited the courtroom. Cooley's contacts in organized crime gave him a $3,000 "commission" for his work and an envelope containing $7,500 for Judge Wilson. Cooley and Wilson dined together at a restaurant soon after the trial, and, in the men's room, Cooley slipped Wilson the promised $7,500 envelope. Wilson expressed concern because the press was "all over" him about the seemingly inexplicable acquittal; he complained to Cooley: "That's all I'm going to get? I don't get any more than that?" Wilson then left the restaurant in frustration. In addition to this extraordinary informant testimony, other evidence confirmed the bribery. An F.B.I. agent interviewed Judge Wilson at his retirement home in Arizona in November 1989. The agent informed Wilson that Cooley had become a government informant, that Cooley had secretly taped a recent conversation with Wilson in which the two men discussed the $10,000 Aleman bribe, and that the Government was currently investigating allegations that Wilson accepted a bribe to acquit Aleman. Wilson denied the accusations, but he failed to appear in Chicago for a grand jury subpoena concerning the matter on December 6, 1989. A few months later, Judge Wilson walked into the backyard of his home and shot himself to death. Finally, Monte Katz, a friend of Aleman's in federal prison,5 claimed that Aleman admitted that he murdered William Logan. Katz and Aleman became friends in prison, and, apparently, Aleman often discussed his criminal exploits. Specifically, Aleman told Katz that he "fixed" the Logan trial by paying money to "reach" the judge. Aleman stated that he was not worried about being tried again for the murder because it "was a double jeopardy situation." The Circuit Court noted that the circumstantial evidence of a bribe was also significant. The record revealed "the rather curious spectacle" of Aleman, who originally deemed Judge Wilson to be a prejudiced judge, within the passage of ten weeks, withdrawing his objection and allowing the case to be assigned to Wilson. In addition, Aleman was released from state custody on bond despite facing the state's most serious criminal charge, and the case proceeded to trial in less than five months from the date of his arraignment. The Circuit Court also took pause from the fact that Aleman's attorney, Frank Whalen, set the case for trial within six weeks of filing his appearance and requested no interim continuances to conduct the "adequate preparation one might reasonably anticipate in a case of this magnitude." Based on this body of evidence, in December 1993, the Cook County State's Attorney again charged Aleman for the Logan murder and for the first time charged Aleman with the murder of Reitinger. A grand jury returned indictments on both counts. Aleman claimed to the Circuit Court, as he claims to us on appeal, that the Logan indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that the prejudicial pre-indictment delay on both charges violated his due process rights. After an evidentiary hearing concerning the alleged bribe, the Circuit Court rejected the double jeopardy argument based on the overwhelming factual evidence that Aleman's first trial was a sham. The Court emphasized its certainty that Aleman had bribed Judge Wilson: Although the court earlier observed that the State's burden was to establish the bribery by a preponderance of the evidence, the court also concurs in the State's appraisal that the evidence presented also meets the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Were this a prosecution for the substantive offense of bribery, the court would have little difficulty in concluding that the People had presented a credible and coherent case against the defendant. The evidence clearly establishes the tendering of money to a public officer to influence him in the performance of his duties. (Citations omitted). Based on this factual finding, the Circuit Court held that there was no double jeopardy bar to reprosecuting Aleman for the Logan murder because there was never any jeopardy at the first trial. Furthermore, because crucial witnesses were not available at an earlier time, the court denied Aleman's claims of unconstitutional preindictment delay. These rulings were upheld on appeal. See People v. Aleman, 281 Ill.App.3d 991, 217 Ill.Dec. 526, 667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill.App.), review denied, 168 Ill. 2d 600, 219 Ill.Dec. 567, 671 N.E.2d 734 (1996), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 986, 136 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1997). The district court below also rejected these contentions in Aleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Aleman raises three claims on appeal. First, he takes issue with the Circuit Court's factual findings that he bribed Judge Wilson in the Logan trial. Second, he challenges the effect of those factual findings upon his double jeopardy claim. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969) (holding that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause apply to the states). Finally, he urges us to recognize that the pre-indictment delays of twenty-one and eighteen years in the Logan and Reitinger murders, respectively, violated his due process rights. Our collateral review, however, is quite limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), we can only grant Aleman's petition if one of the Circuit Court's legal rulings was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Aleman's factual challenge can succeed only if he can show by "clear and convincing evidence" that the Circuit Court's findings are erroneous. See id. § 2254(d) (2). He meets neither of these stringent standards. Aleman's challenge to the Circuit Court's factual findings can be dismissed in short order. He rightly points out that the common law has always presumed the neutrality of judges. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (" [T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea."); see also Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the common-law presumption), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1037, 115 S. Ct. 1404, 131 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1995). Aleman seems to think that reciting this principle alone can somehow overcome the great weight of evidence showing that he bribed Judge Wilson. However, we have always recognized that the presumption of a judge's neutrality is a rebuttable one. See Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1373; see also Bracy v. Gramley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1799, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). As in Bracy, the Circuit Court found that the ordinary presumption had been soundly rebutted in this case. Beyond the presumption argument, Aleman argues that the State's witnesses were unreliable based solely on the length of time between the relevant events and the Circuit Court's evidentiary hearing. He relies on dicta from our decision in Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 1996), in which we commented that the petitioner did not show "good cause" for discovery because, in part, there would be a "pall of doubt" over the reliability of any exculpatory witnesses' testimony based on a fourteen-year interval between the events and an evidentiary hearing. Id. The Supreme Court, however, implicitly expressed its disapproval of this statement when overruling the case. See --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). Aleman nevertheless tries to spin gold from this frayed strand. He notes that most of the key players in this story are deceased and, of those that are still living, the events occurred so long ago that their testimony is inherently unreliable. Aleman's position on this point is flawed on many levels. First, the Supreme Court disagreed with our view of Bracy's ability to show good cause based on such testimony. Second, dicta from our Bracy opinion would not have established any sort of general rule that testimony concerning events from over fourteen years ago was presumptively unreliable. Such a rule would have called into question the constitutionality of countless statutes of limitations. Third, and most importantly, any alleged presumption of unreliability would have been rebutted in this case by the Circuit Court's evaluation of the testimony. The Court heard the evidence and concluded that it was reliable "beyond a reasonable doubt". Aleman did not attempt to rebut the State's strong evidence with anything but vacuous and inapposite presumptions. This is a far cry from the "clear and convincing evidence" of factual error that we require before invalidating Circuit Court findings of fact. Aleman's legal challenge presents a unique and interesting question, but it ultimately fares no better than his factual one. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that no one shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Aleman argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause unambiguously bars his reindictment on the Logan murder charge because he faced trial on that murder charge in 1977 and was acquitted by Judge Wilson. In support of his position, he points to a long line of Supreme Court cases reiterating that an acquittal on a charge absolutely bars retrial on that charge. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S. Ct. 824, 829, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978) ("The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.... If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair."); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L. Ed. 300 (1896) ("[I]n this country a verdict of acquittal ... is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense."). Aleman argues that it is irrelevant how he obtained his acquittal and that there is no room for courts to question those circumstances and lift the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 n. 6, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) ("[W]here the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds which are not open to judicial examination."); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S. Ct. 671, 672, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962) (stating that an acquittal triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause even if "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation"). Aleman contends that the Circuit Court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application, of this body of the Supreme Court's interpretations of federal law. The legal conclusion urged by Aleman might not be an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent,6 but the highly deferential standard of collateral review leads us to hold that the contrary interpretation--the one adopted by the Illinois courts in this case--is also not unreasonable. The Illinois courts viewed the authority cited by Aleman as begging the question; the Double Jeopardy Clause may well be absolute when it applies, see Burks, 437 U.S. at 11 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. at 2147 n. 6, but determining if it applies is the real issue in this case. Similarly, the State argues that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause only extend to a defendant who was once before in jeopardy of conviction on a particular criminal charge; the State contends that, by bribing Judge Wilson, Aleman created a situation in which he was never in jeopardy at his first trial. The first trial, therefore, was a sham and the acquittal there rendered has no effect for double jeopardy purposes. Under this theory, the State was free to re-indict him because he has never been in jeopardy of conviction on the Logan murder charge. The Circuit Court concluded that Aleman's first trial was a nullity because he was never truly at risk of conviction. The Supreme Court has emphasized that " [j]eopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with criminal prosecution." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1353-54, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) ("The protections afforded by the [Double Jeopardy] Clause are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy.") (emphasis added); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1064-65, 43 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1975) ("Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.... In particular, it has no significance in this context unless jeopardy has once attached and an accused has been subjected to the risk of conviction."); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331, 90 S. Ct. 1757, 1762, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1970) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict."). Indeed, the Court has stated that preventing the hazards associated with risking conviction is the raison d'etre of the Double Jeopardy Clause: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223-24, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957). Aleman had to endure none of these risks because he "fixed" his case; the Circuit Court found that Aleman was so sanguine about the certainty of his acquittal that he went so far as to tell Vincent Rizza before the trial that jail was "not an option". Aleman may be correct that some risk of conviction still existed after Judge Wilson agreed to fix the case, but it cannot be said that the risk was the sort "traditionally associated" with an impartial criminal justice system.7 See Breed, 421 U.S. at 528, 95 S. Ct. at 1785. It seems only appropriate that a defendant should not be allowed to escape punishment for murder because he bribed the judge. To allow Aleman to profit from his bribery and escape all punishment for the Logan murder would be a perversion of justice, as well as establish an unseemly and dangerous incentive for criminal defendants. The Illinois courts' holdings, therefore, were not contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's rejection of the double jeopardy claims contained in Aleman's petition. [snip]
More shitposting by Deckard. He was doing his deed in front of the courthouse. It matters not that he moved as far as the sidewalk in front of the courthouse. His intent to reach jurors was manifest by this and prior behavior. He was convicted of ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A JURY. http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2015/title-18/part-i/chapter-73/sec.-1504/ 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (2015) §1504. Influencing juror by writing Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE (EXCERPT) Act 328 of 1931 750.120a Willfully attempting to influence juror by intimidation or other improper means; retaliating against person for having performed duties as juror; penalties. Sec. 120a. (1) A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by argument or persuasion, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both. (2) A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by intimidation, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a crime as follows: (a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. (b) If the intimidation is committed in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation is more than 10 years, or the violation is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both. (c) If the intimidation involved committing or attempting to commit a crime or a threat to kill or injure any person or to cause property damage, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not prohibit any deliberating juror from attempting to influence other members of the same jury by any proper means. (4) A person who retaliates, attempts to retaliate, or threatens to retaliate against another person for having performed his or her duties as a juror is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both. As used in this subsection, “retaliate” means any of the following: (a) Committing or attempting to commit a crime against any person. (b) Threatening to kill or injure any person or threatening to cause property damage. (5) This section does not prohibit a person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law including any violation of law arising out of the same transaction as the violation of this section. (6) The court may order a term of imprisonment imposed for violating subsection (2) or (4) to be served consecutively to a term of imprisonment imposed for any other violation of law including any violation of law arising out of the same transaction as the violation of this section. History: Add. 1955, Act 88, Eff. Oct. 14, 1955 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 450, Eff. Mar. 28, 2001 ;-- Am. 2003, Act 280, Imd. Eff. Jan. 8, 2004
Piss off spam-bot. It was a PUBLIC SIDEWALK. All of his article headlines are like that -- the resident was merely "standing on the sidewalk", or "sitting in his car", or "walking down the street". Yeah. Right.
And all along I thought it was because nine African-American jurors in an LA courtroom refused to convict a famous and and admired black man. I believed Marcia Clark when she said she convicted murderers with a fraction of the evidence in this case. The OJ trial was the poster child for jury nullification.
True enough. And good reason why any fully-informed juror should never confirm that was how he voted.
He was convicted of ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A JURY. He was, of his own admission, attempting to influence (educate) jurors with regard to a specific trial that was occurring, potentially both jurors and substitute jurors. Had he merely been handing out brochures without a specific demonstrable (or confessed) intent to influence a particular jury trial, he would have been fine. If, for instance, he made a habit of handing out pamphlets constantly adjacent to the courthouse (but not on its sidewalk), it would be far harder to prosecute him. But he was trying to influence a specific jury and confessed to it as well as having considerable circumstantial evidence that that was his entire intent. So, yes, this could be considered tampering but it is a narrow ruling on the law. People can still hand out FIJA literature, just not to try to influence specific juries to produce a particular trial outcome.
nolu chan, while you present a federal statute that would be most applicable to a set of jurors to remind them of what their official duties are, it is also the courts obligation to inform those same jurors of their rights. Jurors do have rights. They have a right to question the judge and even the prosecution when there is not sufficient evidence for them to make their votes. If this statute is to apply to jurors then it shall also equally apply to the prosecution team because as you noted in the OJ Simpson acquittal case, we all know how corrupt our courts can be. Jurors are expected to abide by those laws as the prosecution and lawyers (including judges). Jurors are also a special people in that they are not officers of the courts but are serving in the capacity of those courts in doing official court business.
He broke the law on a PUBLIC SIDEWALK. That does not change the sentence and it only took 30 minutes for a jury to render a unanimous verdict of guilty. He moved to the sidewalk this time, thinking it made a difference. His clear intent was to hand out his information in that location because he believed he would reach his target of passing jurors or persons called to jury duty. The intent to violate the law, and the actual violation, are present in that location. He could always try standing on a soapbox at Speaker's Corner, not near the entrance of a courthouse. Following your imaginary law earns some poor guy a conviction.
Curiously, I never get this from people who actually watched the court testimony. The prosecution was a mess. The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction. They were so unprepared to go to trial, they diddled about a a few months before presenting evidence that somebody had died. They screwed up the handling of the blood evidence. For the most part, the state case was dead after Barry Scheck got done destroying the LAPD witnesses. The jury took four hours to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal.
As long as his intended target was actual jurors, or persons called for jury duty, he had a problem. His was a failed effort to circumvent the law.
I wish you the best of luck in arguing your jury nullification to a judge. It is for the Court to determine the applicable law. The Court instructs the jury on the applicable law. The jury determines the facts, based on the evidence presented.
They had 10X more than they needed. "For the most part, the state case was dead after Barry Scheck got done destroying the LAPD witnesses." Pffft! All he did was intentionally confuse the jury. He didn't present anything to cause reasonable doubt. "The jury took four hours to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal." That's the time it took to convince the three non-black jurors.
That's true. But can a prosecutor be so certain that he can find a jury who won't nullify a conviction of a FIJA activist? I'm not sure how often it comes up but the prosecutors have to consider this in deciding to bring a case. This guy trying to help the Amish with their whole milk customers did target the jurors of that trial and admitted it. And that is probably the only reason they got a conviction on him.
It is for the Court to determine the applicable law. The Court instructs the jury on the applicable law. The jury determines the facts, based on the evidence presented. Here are the fact. Marbury vs Madison was usurpation. The courts were NEVER given the power they have under the constitution. It is also a fact that the first chief justice of the supreme court. A founding father. Said jurors have a right to judge the law. It is also a fact that you can ignore the judges instructions and render any verdict you want to. When the judge tells you to ignore that evidence. You can also ignore that and nothing the black robe can do about it. We have a corrupt judiciary exercising power they were never given by the constitution. That is why you cannot cite from the constitution the supreme courts authority. You can only cite the authority they gave themselves. That doesn't make it legitimate. It makes it color of law not real law. Color of law is a legal term in blacks law dictionary. You may disagree with me but that is ok.
I'd have to disagree with that. That is nonsense. That is whey everyone knows OJ is guilty. Even you.
I was in law school at the time and watched quite a bit of the trial. I agree with your assessment. The prosecution really did not put on a persuasive case. They spent oceans of time giving a mini- course on DNA evidence that was excessive. And when they demanded that OJ Simpson put on the glove, they blew themselves up. Whether it didn't fit because he scrunched up his fingers, or it didn't fit because he was wearing a latex glove to preserve evidence, the bottom line is that it didn't fit, and OJ got to hold up his hand and say "It doesn't fit." They pulled a stunt, and in doing so they violated one of the key rules of presenting a case: never ask a question to which you don't already know the answer. It was the dramatic high point of their case, when the prosecution stood up and demanded OJ to put on the glove. Everything built up to that, all of the exhausting and overdone lessons on DNA evidence, it was all built up to this staged stunt, wherein OJ would slide on the glove, linking him to everything. It didn't fit. And with that, the wings were off the plane and the case was going down like a lawn dart. Johnny Cochrane understood theater too, repeating over and over in his closing argument the mantra "If it doesn't fit, you must acquit." That's exactly what the jury did. The defense team was very effective. The prosecution was not.
Bullshit only a moron was fooled by OJ opening his hands up and pretending.
Bullshit. You are very gullible.
Comments (104 - 422) not displayed.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest"He's not a criminal if he's found not guilty. Except perhaps in your head."
#64. To: Pinguinite (#58)
"And I see nullification as a way of ensuring that laws passed by a tiny number of representatives meets the approval of the average commoners that have to live under such laws."
#65. To: buckeroo (#56)
You are a complete idiot.
#66. To: misterwhite (#60)
The jury knows he's guilty -- they just don't want to find him guilty. So they find some excuse to vote not guilty.
It so happened that the man whose horse had been stolen had always made it a point to get the best of any person with whom he had any dealings. He had never tried to do anything good for anyone other than himself. Consequently, the man whose horse had been stolen didn’t have a single friend in the entire town. The case was tried and presented to the jury.
The evidence against the accused man was pretty strong. After about thirty minutes of deliberation, the jury returned to the court chambers.
“What is your verdict?” inquired the judge.
There were a few moments of silence and then the chairman spoke. “We find the defendant not guilty if he will return the horse.”
“I cannot accept that verdict. You will have to retire until you reach another verdict,” said the judge. The jury went back into their room to deliberate toward another verdict.
They re-entered the courtroom. They took their place in the jury box and the courtroom grew silent.
“Gentlemen of the jury,” began the judge, “have you reached a verdict?” The chairman of the jury stood up.
“Yes we have, your honor,” he replied. “What is your verdict?” asked the judge.
“We find the defendant not guilty, and he can keep the horse!”
#67. To: misterwhite (#65)
#68. To: buckeroo (#67)
The US Constitution is designed to ensure individual rights unlike the perspective of YOUR AUTHORITARIAN COLLECTIVE RIGHTS BULLSHIT.
#69. To: misterwhite (#68)
#70. To: misterwhite, Pinguinite (#60)
(Edited)
Exactly. In the rare instance where instructions on nullification are given.
There were other key cases in which juries were terribly mistreated by officials, suffering years of imprisonment, etc. So it was a Big Thing at the time and our laws and history still reflect that today.
Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the judge or the Crown. This was achieved either by "packing the jury" or by "writ of attaint". Juries were packed by hand-selecting or by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. This was a common tactic in cases involving treason or sedition. In addition, the writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a "false verdict". If the second jury returned a different verdict, that verdict was imposed and the first jury was imprisoned or fined. His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges represented only 'Norman intruders', whom the jury might here ignore in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as 'damnable, blasphemous heresy'. This view was not shared by the jury, which, after three days' hearing, acquitted Lilburne — who had defended himself as skilfully as any lawyer could have done — to the great horror of the Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations.[19]
In 1653, Lilburne was on trial again and asked the jury to acquit him if it found the death penalty "unconscionably severe" in proportion to the crime he had committed. The jury found Lilburne "Not guilty of any crime worthy of death".[20]
#71. To: misterwhite (#13)
I'll ask again. Once the jury knows ALL their options, how do you think they'll vote?
#72. To: Tooconservative (#29)
(Edited)
It would seem to allow for nullified outcomes by jurors, just no bribing or conspiring of jurors as a "rigged jury". So now I'm no longer sure what the exact legal definition of a rigged jury is.
#73. To: goldilucky (#72)
#74. To: Tooconservative (#73)
(Edited)
Eh, it's a movie made from a Grisham novel about a widow suing over her husband dying from smoking. So they made it into an anti-gun movie instead.
#75. To: misterwhite (#44)
Thank you. This is how I know I've won the argument.
#76. To: Pinguinite (#5)
Judges have the power to vacate jury convictions, but not jury acquittals. Correct me if I'm wrong.
#77. To: Vicomte13 (#76)
They have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals
#78. To: goldilucky, Tooconservative, *Bang List* (#74)
(Edited)
it's a movie that reveals tactics that lawyers and prosecution teams apply to obfuscate of matters in law. Jury nullification has become too broadened in applying court procedure that it should be a chapter all in its own on how to deceive and deprive the jury of facts and other tricks used to keep the jury in check all the while the prosecution is playing them all for suckers.
The D&R terrorists hate us because we're free, to vote second party
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#79. To: A K A Stone (#77)
They do not have the power to over rule acquittals. That is ridiculous. That would be double jeopardy.
#80. To: Vicomte13 (#79)
#81. To: Tooconservative (#70)
#82. To: Tooconservative (#29)
I suppose a nullified jury is not the same as a rigged jury, although I don't really see the difference in the outcome for an individual defendant.
#83. To: misterwhite (#42)
You don't know that. Jurors are not required to fill out a questionairre describing the reasons the voted the way they did.
Was OJ acquitted because the law against murder was unfair?
#84. To: Vicomte13, Pinguinite, A K A Stone (#76)
They [nc- Judges] have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals and enter a judgment NOV (non obstante veridictum - notwithstanding the verdict).
Rule 29. Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, also called judgment non obstante veredicto, or JNOV, is a type of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that is sometimes rendered at the conclusion of a jury trial. In U.S. federal civil court cases, the term has been replaced by the renewed judgment as a matter of law, which emphasizes its relationship to the judgment as a matter of law (formerly called a directed verdict).[1] In U.S. federal criminal cases, the term is "judgment of acquittal".[2]
#85. To: Tooconservative, Pinguinite, misterwhite (#7)
#86. To: Deckard (#0)
Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights.
BIG RAPIDS, Mich. — A jury of six found Keith Wood guilty within 30 minutes Thursday, convicting him of attempting to influence a jury in Mecosta County.
2015 US Code
Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Sections 1 - 6005)
Part I - Crimes (Sections 1 - 2725)
Chapter 73 - Obstruction of Justice (Sections 1501 - 1521)
Sec. 1504 - Influencing juror by writing Section 750.120a
#87. To: nolu chan (#86)
It matters not that he moved as far as the sidewalk in front of the courthouse.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
Those who most loudly denounce Fake News are typically those most aggressively disseminating it.
#88. To: nolu chan (#86)
Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights.
#89. To: nolu chan (#83)
"OJ was acquitted because the prosecutiion failed miserably to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that OJ committed the crime."
#90. To: nolu chan (#82)
This does not affirm a right. Should the juror state his intent to vote based on nullification, a judge can properly remove him from the jury at ant point before the verdict is rendered, including during deliberations. His conscience prevents him from carrying out the oath he took, but he is not prosecuted criminally.
#91. To: nolu chan (#86)
BIG RAPIDS, Mich. — A jury of six found Keith Wood guilty within 30 minutes Thursday, convicting him of attempting to influence a jury in Mecosta County.
#92. To: nolu chan (#86)
§1504. Influencing juror by writing
#93. To: Deckard (#87)
Piss off spam-bot. It was a PUBLIC SIDEWALK.
#94. To: misterwhite (#89)
The OJ trial was the poster child for jury nullification.
#95. To: Tooconservative (#91)
Had he merely been handing out brochures without a specific demonstrable (or confessed) intent to influence a particular jury trial, he would have been fine.
#96. To: goldilucky (#92)
it is also the courts obligation to inform those same jurors of their rights. Jurors do have rights. They have a right to question the judge and even the prosecution when there is not sufficient evidence for them to make their votes.
#97. To: nolu chan (#94)
The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.
#98. To: nolu chan (#95)
As long as his intended target was actual jurors, or persons called for jury duty, he had a problem. His was a failed effort to circumvent the law.
#99. To: nolu chan (#96)
I wish you the best of luck in arguing your jury nullification to a judge.
#100. To: nolu chan (#94)
The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.
#101. To: nolu chan (#94)
#102. To: Vicomte13 (#101)
And when they demanded that OJ Simpson put on the glove, they blew themselves up.
#103. To: Vicomte13 (#101)
It didn't fit.
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