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Title: Florida Woman Found Not Guilty of Marijuana Cultivation (Jury Nullification)
Source:
Marijuana.com
URL Source: http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/ ... ilty-of-marijuana-cultivation/
Published: Sep 17, 2016
Author: Monterey Bud
Post Date: 2016-09-17 21:06:32 by Hondo68
Keywords: Not Guilty, legal, Maine to Florida
Views: 9872
Comments: 53
Bridget Kirouac, a medical marijuana patient who relocated from Maine to Florida, and who suffers from debilitating bone spurs, was found not guilty of cultivating medical marijuana in her Martin County home. BREAKING: Bridget Kirouac found NOT GUILTY of cultivation and possession of cannabis. More tonight on @WPTVpic.twitter.com/KTNuuRqXd7 — Jason Hackett (@JHackettWPTV) September 16, 2016 Informing the sympathetic jury, “I’m not a criminal, I’m a patient,” Kirouac told the attentive courtroom. “All I’m trying to do is survive.” Kirouac used marijuana Kirouac explained to the courtroom that she was an MMJ patient in the state of Maine with a valid recommendation for medical marijuana before relocating to the Sunshine State for its warmer climate. She held back tears while explaining her struggle with pain. “When you get to that point, and you tried as many of the options that are available to you as I have…dying becomes a very attractive prospect,” she said. The prosecution focused on the fact that medical marijuana was not legal at the time of her offense. They were ultimately handed a historical defeat with the jury’s not guilty verdict for Bridget Kirouac. Poster Comment: A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal. THE END 
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 53.
#3. To: hondo68 (#0)
Hallelujah!! This was the second medical marijuana case that Michael Minardi has won in Florida. The first was the case of Jesse Teplicki. If you are ever charged with marijuana possession in Florida, be sure to cite the binding precedent of Florida v. Bridget Kirouac, opinion of the jury. That judge is a spoilsport.
You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others. Not just this thread either - it's pretty much the same on any post you make about medical marijuana users. Let's get one thing straight - the government does not own our bodies and as such has no business telling anyone what they may or may not use to medicate themselves.
Not just this thread either - it's pretty much the same on any post you make about medical marijuana users. Not taking delight, just not taking your blathering bullshit. Marijuana is illegal. Marijuana is not medicine. That is the law, like it or not. Jury nullification is just fine. It does not change any law. It does not say marijuana is legal. It says the jury, based on the fasts of the case, found rendering a guilty verdict in the case before them would be an injustice. They are empowered and free to render a not guilty verdict. They do not change the law. Each future defendant will have to roll the dice on a verdict, knowing that they have violated the law. And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
Really? I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. "Recently, several courts have indicated that judges also have the right, when it is brought to their attention by other jurors, to remove (prior to a verdict, of course) from juries any juror who makes clear his or her intention to vote to nullify the law. " - law2.umkc.edu/faculty/pro...zenger/nullification.html
For one example, see: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) Argued June 10, 1969 William M. Kunstler, New York City, (Harold Buchman, Fred Weisgal, Baltimore, Md., Robert R. Drinan, William C. Cunningham, Harrop A. Freeman on brief), for appellants. Barnet D. Skolnik, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Stephen H. Sachs, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee. Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and WINTER, Circuit Judges. SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge: [...] II Appellants' second contention is that the trial judge should have informed the jury, as requested, that it had the power to acquit even if appellants were clearly guilty of the charged offenses. They maintain that the judge should have told the jury this or permitted their counsel to argue it to the jury in the face of the judge's instruction on the law. Appellants reason that since the jury has "the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts," [5] then the jury should be told that it has this power. Furthermore, the argument runs, the jury's power to acquit where the law may dictate otherwise is a fundamental necessity of a democratic system. Only in this way, it is said, can a man's actions be judged fairly by society speaking through the jury, or a law which is considered too harsh be mitigated. [...] We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Concededly, this power of the jury is not always contrary to the interests of justice. For example, freedom of the press was immeasurably strengthened by the jury's acquittal of John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, a violation of which, under the law as it then existed and the facts, he was clearly guilty. In that case Andrew Hamilton was allowed to urge the jury, in the face of the judge's charge, "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging of the lives, liberties, or estates of their fellow subjects."[11] No less an authority than Dean Pound has expressed the opinion that "Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration."[12] However, this is not to say that the jury should be encouraged in their "lawlessness," and by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to insure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century. Justice Harlan's scholarly opinion traced the history of the rights of juries in criminal cases. He distinguished Brailsford as a civil case and therefore not controlling in criminal trials. Justice Harlan further deprecated that decision, going to the extreme of questioning whether it was in fact reported properly, since he doubted that Chief Justice Jay could ever have held such an opinion even in a civil case. The Justice concluded finally that Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were applicable to the particular case being tried. * * * But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13] There was a powerful dissent by Justice Grey joined by Justice Shiras. As in the majority decision, Justice Grey historically traced the authorities and the classic arguments to support his conclusion that the jury should decide both the law and the facts.[14] The Harlan majority opinion, however, has carried the day. Since the Sparf case, the lower federal courts — even in the occasional cases in which they may have ventured to question its wisdom[15] — have adhered to the doctrine it affirmed.[16] Furthermore, among the states, only two still allow the jury to be told that they can disregard the law as given them by the court.[17] The recent case of United States v. Spock et al., 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), heavily stressed by the appellants in their supplemental memorandum, does not reach a different conclusion. That case was concerned with the question arising from submission of special interrogatories to the jury. The First Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Aldrich, concluded that By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him through the frame of the questions.[18] Nowhere does the court intimate that the judge should not instruct the jury on the law, and nowhere does it hold, as appellants here contend, that the jury should be instructed that it may disregard the law as declared by the judge.
Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one? It certainly isn't this:
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. The standing precedent is Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Once you persuade the courts that over a century of standing settled precedent should be overturned, you will be making progress. Until then, you are just spewing doper bullshit.
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court.
Your absurd interpretation of Sparf is pure bullshit pulled out of your ass. Here is a Federal court interpretation of that Opinion which covers 156 U.S. 51 through 107. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969)
Of course. The judge should provide legal advice to the jury. Jurors are not lawyers and what are the alternatives - hiring an outside advisor? But how is it related to the main topic?
But how is it related to the main topic? The judge instructs the jury on what the law is. The jury determines the facts. The jury is supposed to apply the law, as given by the court, to the facts. The title of the thread contains the term "jury nullification." As you observe, jurors are not lawyers. They are not expected to be fluent at interpreting laws. The rule prohibiting defense counsel from arguing nullificationto a jury is Supreme Court (federal) precedent dating to 1895. Similar rules have been adopted in 48 states. If a juror argues nullification in the jury room, he may be reported to the judge and kicked off the jury. If he argues nullification in voir dire, he will not make it to the jury. He will be dismissed for cause. The poster comment to the article was, "A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal." By that logic, assuming arguendo the defendant did the deed, the O.J. jury determined that murdering one's wife (plus 1) is legal.
"If a juror feels that the statute involved in any criminal offence is unfair, or that it infringes upon the defendant's natural god-given unalienable or constitutional rights, then it is his duty to affirm that the offending statute is really no law at all and that the violation of it is no crime at all, for no one is bound to obey an unjust law." -- Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone "For more than six hundred years-- that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215--there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such law." --Lysander Spooner, The Right of Juries If the jury feels the law is unjust, we recognize the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by a judge, and contrary to the evidence. -- 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, US v Moylan, 1969 Every jury in the land is tampered with and falsely instructed by the judge when it is told that it must accept as the law that which has been given to them, or that they can decide only the facts of the case. -- Lord Denham, O'Connell v Rex (1884) The jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both the law and the facts. -- Justice Holmes, Homing v District of Columbia, 138 (1920) When a jury acquits a defendant even though he or she clearly appears to be guilty, the acquittal conveys significant information about community attitudes and provides a guideline for future prosecutorial discretion...Because of the high acquittal rate in prohibition cases in the 1920s and early 1930s, prohibition laws could not be enforced. The repeal of these laws is traceable to the refusal of juries to convict those accused of alcohol traffic. -- Sheflin and Van Dyke, Law and Contemporary Problems, 43, No. 4, 1980 It is not only the juror's right, but his duty, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct opposition to the directions of the court.-- John Adams You argue: -- SCOTUS opinions and precedents are NOT LAW. -- Nor are state rules to the same effect. -- They are, in this instance, anti- constitutional..
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are NOT LAW. -- Nor are state rules to the same effect. -- They are, in this instance, anti- constitutional..
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham The nullification principle involves the power to say no to the excesses of government, --- to onerous scotus opinions and unconstitutional precedences, --- and thus serves as a final defense against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson put it to Tom Paine in a 1789 letter, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550
To really get in touch, tell the judge, during voir dire, that you espouse jury nullification. Or get reported to the judge during deliberations. "Fully Informed Juror, which "is essentially a study of juror nullification." Nullification gets a juror kicked off the jury. "Fully informed juror," if espoused to the Court is grounds for dismissal. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) [Excerpt] Jury deliberations, however, presented the Court with two issues. First, after only an hour of deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating that one juror refused to accept the legitimacy of the drug laws at issue. After it became clear that deliberations could not move forward, the Court conducted individual juror voir dire. The Court dismissed Juror No. 2[1] because he was unwilling to set aside his belief that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the authority to proscribe mere possession of narcotics. The second issue arose when Juror No. 3, a man in his midfifties, informed the Court of teenage drug use and a resulting arrest. Juror No. 3's revelations, however, did not provide grounds for removal because any resulting legal consequences had completely resolved more than seven years before his service. I. BACKGROUND Luisi's case went to the jury just before noon on March 11. At approximately 1:00, the Court received the following note: Trial Tr. vol. 9, 2 (March 12, 2008). The Court instructed the jury that they were not free "to determine any constitutional questions about [the] law." Id. at 3. At 3:00, the jury sent two more questions. The first inquired, "If a juror denies on constitutional grounds the validity of the trial, charges, and jurisdiction thus preempting consideration of the facts in question, is he an ineligible juror?" Id. at 7. The second asked, "Are we, given these objections, a legally constituted jury?" Id. After speaking with counsel, the Court convened and again instructed the jurors that the laws at issue were constitutional and that they were not free to substitute their own views. Id. The Court then told the jury they were to take the rest of the day off and to reflect on the Court's instructions. Id. at 11-12. The next day, after researching the issue and consulting the attorneys, the Court determined that if the problem persisted each juror should be brought into the lobby in the presence of counsel and the Court should inquire 1) whether he or she believed he or she could *109 faithfully apply the law as instructed to the facts of the case; and 2) whether he or she could begin their deliberations afresh if a juror had to be removed and replaced by an alternate. See Trial Tr. vol. 10, 6 (March 13, 2008); see also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 302 (3d Cir.2007) (recognizing that individual questioning of jurors may be "the optimal way to root out misconduct"). When the jury arrived, the Court instructed them to continue deliberations, but told them that they should send another note if the problem persisted. Id. at 5. Within ten minutes, the foreperson passed a note indicating that one juror still refused to engage in deliberations. The Court instructed the jurors to suspend deliberations and began questioning each juror in the lobby. The Court first spoke with the foreperson, who answered both of the aforementioned questions in the affirmative. Juror No. 2 was the second juror questioned. He immediately informed the Court that he was the juror who had asked the first juror question and who was the subject of the second and third questions. Id. at 10. He then explained: * * * Congress is empowered by Article I, in a list of about 17 specific empowerments, I'm unaware, and it was never made clear to me, where [banning mere possession of drugs] is authorized in the Constitution. Id. at 12-13. The Court then informed Juror No. 2 that the Supreme Court had interpreted the Commerce Clause "to extend to enacting laws with respect to contraband, including contraband drugs." Id. at 14. When asked if he could accept that interpretation and apply the law passed by Congress to Luisi's case, Juror No. 2 stated that he could "only accept the words that have been given to [him], and [he could] only accept the fact that [the Commerce Clause] is written as it is written." Id. Juror No. 2 also took exception to the Court's reference to the Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution. In his words, "[I]nterpret is a word I associate with reading a foreign language. The [C]onstitution as ... you know, is written in English." Id. at 16. He pontificated: Id. At one point during the exchange, the Court asked Juror No. 2 whether he believed he had the authority to "decide whether the law is valid." Id. at 14. He responded: Id. The Court spent several minutes attempting to explain how Congress had the authority to ban drug possession but continued to receive evasive responses. The Court then asked Juror No. 2 to step out in the hallway in order to confer with counsel. The Court informed counsel of its opinion that Juror No. 2 was "engaged in juror nullification and [the Court believed] it was within [its] power to dismiss him." But before dismissing Juror No. 2, the Court wanted to hear argument. The government did not object to the dismissal. Id. at 21. Luisi's counsel objected on the ground that Juror No. 2 had stated he did not agree with the Fully Informed Juror, which "is essentially a study of juror nullification." Id. Notwithstanding Juror No. 2's professed disagreement with the "philosophy known as a fully informed juror," it was clear he believed the Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to pass laws related to drugs that did not cross "more than two" state lines and that he did not accept the power of the judiciary to interpret the Clause to embrace any additional power. It was equally clear that he was unable to set aside his personal beliefs and apply the law as instructed. Notwithstanding defense counsel's argument, the Court was convinced that this was a form of juror misconduct that could be classified as nullification. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir.1997) ("'[N]ullification' can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors may nullify, for example, because of ... [a] general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws."). At bottom, Juror No. 2's insistence on applying his own law was grounds for dismissal. The Court therefore dismissed Juror No. 2 and replaced him with the first alternate, who up until that point had been isolated from the deliberating jury. After questioning each of the remaining jurors, the Court brought the newly constituted jury into the courtroom and explained that they were to begin their deliberations afresh. Trial Tr. vol. 10, 33.
The nullification principle involves the power to say no to the excesses of government, --- to onerous scotus opinions and unconstitutional precedences, --- and thus serves as a final defense against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson put it to Tom Paine in a 1789 letter, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550 We can hope juries are NOT stupid enough to follow your nasty little recommendations, nolu. Only in the anti-constitutional world of nolu sham, and his socialistic progressives, -- do we see this idiocy advocated. It's time to end their world. VOTE TRUMP...
There are no replies to Comment # 53. End Trace Mode for Comment # 53.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal.
“It’s been extraordinarily stressful…emotionally draining” Kirouac says but the judge says her acquittal doesn’t mean she is free to use medical marijuana.
#4. To: nolu chan (#3)
(Edited)
#9. To: Deckard (#4)
You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others.
#15. To: nolu chan (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
#17. To: ConservingFreedom, TPAINE (#15)
I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided October 15, 1969
#24. To: nolu chan (#17)
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision.
#27. To: ConservingFreedom (#24)
Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?
#28. To: nolu chan (#27)
'Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?'
#29. To: ConservingFreedom (#28)
Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court.
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century.
#33. To: nolu chan (#29)
The Supreme Court, ... affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law
#41. To: A Pole (#33)
The judge should provide legal advice to the jury. Jurors are not lawyers and what are the alternatives - hiring an outside advisor?
#42. To: nolu chan (#41)
The nullification principle involves the power to say no to the excesses of government, and thus serves as a final defense against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson put it to Tom Paine in a 1789 letter, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550
The rule prohibiting defense counsel from arguing nullificationto a jury is Supreme Court (federal) precedent dating to 1895. Similar rules have been adopted in 48 states.
#49. To: All, ---- SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham opines (#42)
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham
#51. To: All, --- anti- constitutional SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham (#49)
#52. To: tpaine (#51)
To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550
The First Circuit vacated Luisi's conviction because the district court refused to give an entrapment instruction. Id. On remand, the case was assigned to this session of the Court. On March 12, 2008, a second jury convicted Luisi on the same three drug-related counts. Jury Verdict [Doc. No. 257]. Although Luisi's entrapment defense at times lent the proceedings the air of The Godfather, the trial was otherwise unremarkable.
One juror is asking: Where — if two-thirds of both houses of congress voted in 1919 that it was necessary to amend the constitution to give congress the power to ban mere possession of a substance (prohibition of alcohol in that case) — is the constitutional grant of authority to ban mere possession of cocaine today?
My question was where, if, ... as every schoolboy knows, the highest law in the land is the United States Constitution, and if [C]ongress had to go to amend the [C]onstitution in, actually it was ratified in 1919, the 18th Amendment, in order to have the power to ban not interstate commerce but mere possession, where is [Congress' authority to ban mere possession of drugs] in the [C]onsitution[?]
As an educator, I know that [the Constitution is] written to the eleventh grade vocabulary level. And "among the several states" is a reference to, is basically the plural between. It's more than two. And I know that if a plane crashes between North America and Europe it did not crash in Denver. I know that there's a specific meaning to those words.
No, I don't decide.... I am familiar with the philosophy known as a fully informed juror,[2] but I disagree with it. *110 What I'm saying is that the interstate commerce clause ... those words have a specific meaning; that words have meaning.
#53. To: nolu sham, anti-constitutionalist, anti- trump (#52)
All, --- anti- constitutional SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham (#49)
To really get in touch, tell the judge, during voir dire, that you espouse jury nullification. Or get reported to the judge during deliberations.
Nullification gets a juror kicked off the jury. "Fully informed juror," if espoused to the Court is grounds for dismissal.
Replies to Comment # 53.
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