United States News
See other United States News Articles
Title: Florida Woman Found Not Guilty of Marijuana Cultivation (Jury Nullification)
Source:
Marijuana.com
URL Source: http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/ ... ilty-of-marijuana-cultivation/
Published: Sep 17, 2016
Author: Monterey Bud
Post Date: 2016-09-17 21:06:32 by Hondo68
Keywords: Not Guilty, legal, Maine to Florida
Views: 9840
Comments: 53
Bridget Kirouac, a medical marijuana patient who relocated from Maine to Florida, and who suffers from debilitating bone spurs, was found not guilty of cultivating medical marijuana in her Martin County home. BREAKING: Bridget Kirouac found NOT GUILTY of cultivation and possession of cannabis. More tonight on @WPTVpic.twitter.com/KTNuuRqXd7 — Jason Hackett (@JHackettWPTV) September 16, 2016 Informing the sympathetic jury, “I’m not a criminal, I’m a patient,” Kirouac told the attentive courtroom. “All I’m trying to do is survive.” Kirouac used marijuana Kirouac explained to the courtroom that she was an MMJ patient in the state of Maine with a valid recommendation for medical marijuana before relocating to the Sunshine State for its warmer climate. She held back tears while explaining her struggle with pain. “When you get to that point, and you tried as many of the options that are available to you as I have…dying becomes a very attractive prospect,” she said. The prosecution focused on the fact that medical marijuana was not legal at the time of her offense. They were ultimately handed a historical defeat with the jury’s not guilty verdict for Bridget Kirouac. Poster Comment: A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal. THE END 
Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
Comments (1-12) not displayed.
.
.
.
#13. To: nolu chan (#8)
Or they will prosecute because it will be another jury That would be irresponsible use of taxpayer resources absent any evidence that this jury was somehow skewed. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. I'm all for it. Sadly, that doesn't follow. But the trend is in that direction, and I pray it continues. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Really? I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. "Recently, several courts have indicated that judges also have the right, when it is brought to their attention by other jurors, to remove (prior to a verdict, of course) from juries any juror who makes clear his or her intention to vote to nullify the law. " - law2.umkc.edu/faculty/pro...zenger/nullification.html A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. --- arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited. Why is arguing nullification before a jury prohibited, -- if,-- " Jury nullification is just fine." ???
For one example, see: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) Argued June 10, 1969 William M. Kunstler, New York City, (Harold Buchman, Fred Weisgal, Baltimore, Md., Robert R. Drinan, William C. Cunningham, Harrop A. Freeman on brief), for appellants. Barnet D. Skolnik, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Stephen H. Sachs, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee. Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and WINTER, Circuit Judges. SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge: [...] II Appellants' second contention is that the trial judge should have informed the jury, as requested, that it had the power to acquit even if appellants were clearly guilty of the charged offenses. They maintain that the judge should have told the jury this or permitted their counsel to argue it to the jury in the face of the judge's instruction on the law. Appellants reason that since the jury has "the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts," [5] then the jury should be told that it has this power. Furthermore, the argument runs, the jury's power to acquit where the law may dictate otherwise is a fundamental necessity of a democratic system. Only in this way, it is said, can a man's actions be judged fairly by society speaking through the jury, or a law which is considered too harsh be mitigated. [...] We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Concededly, this power of the jury is not always contrary to the interests of justice. For example, freedom of the press was immeasurably strengthened by the jury's acquittal of John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, a violation of which, under the law as it then existed and the facts, he was clearly guilty. In that case Andrew Hamilton was allowed to urge the jury, in the face of the judge's charge, "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging of the lives, liberties, or estates of their fellow subjects."[11] No less an authority than Dean Pound has expressed the opinion that "Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration."[12] However, this is not to say that the jury should be encouraged in their "lawlessness," and by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to insure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century. Justice Harlan's scholarly opinion traced the history of the rights of juries in criminal cases. He distinguished Brailsford as a civil case and therefore not controlling in criminal trials. Justice Harlan further deprecated that decision, going to the extreme of questioning whether it was in fact reported properly, since he doubted that Chief Justice Jay could ever have held such an opinion even in a civil case. The Justice concluded finally that Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were applicable to the particular case being tried. * * * But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13] There was a powerful dissent by Justice Grey joined by Justice Shiras. As in the majority decision, Justice Grey historically traced the authorities and the classic arguments to support his conclusion that the jury should decide both the law and the facts.[14] The Harlan majority opinion, however, has carried the day. Since the Sparf case, the lower federal courts — even in the occasional cases in which they may have ventured to question its wisdom[15] — have adhered to the doctrine it affirmed.[16] Furthermore, among the states, only two still allow the jury to be told that they can disregard the law as given them by the court.[17] The recent case of United States v. Spock et al., 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), heavily stressed by the appellants in their supplemental memorandum, does not reach a different conclusion. That case was concerned with the question arising from submission of special interrogatories to the jury. The First Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Aldrich, concluded that By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him through the frame of the questions.[18] Nowhere does the court intimate that the judge should not instruct the jury on the law, and nowhere does it hold, as appellants here contend, that the jury should be instructed that it may disregard the law as declared by the judge.
The Court was quite clear in saying this does not mean that she can further use marijuana. It is UNLAWFUL. The jury verdict did not change that. If she tokes up tomorrow, that will be another prosecutable crime.
Why is arguing nullification before a jury prohibited, -- if,-- " Jury nullification is just fine." ??? You quote an OPINION by Justice Jay: --- So you return to the same old silly argument, -- that 'we must hold firmly to the doctrine', --- court opinions MUST be treated as 'law'. -- You're wrong..
Good! This is what jury is for - to protect people from legal unjustice.
I was removed from the jury for that. I told judge that I will put my judgment and conscience before his instructions.
Keeping jurors in ignorance is a nullification of the juries.
The Court was quite clear in saying this does not mean that she can further use marijuana. Completely beside the point ... color me unsurprised. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one? It certainly isn't this: A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. --- where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13] So you return to the same old silly argument, -- that 'we must hold firmly to the doctrine', --- court opinions MUST be treated as 'law'. -- You're wrong.. And you are an ingnorant asshole displaying your assholery. You post responds to yourself at #16. At #17 I quoted from one case, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969). Moylan gave the correct precedent, and you are full of shit, as usual. The quote from Moylan reads: Moylan has a footnote 13: "Sparf and Hansen v. United States, supra n. 6 at 101-102, 15 S. Ct. at 293." At the footnote 13 cited case, pp. 101-02, Sparf says: 156 U.S. 102 citizens against unjust and groundless prosecutions, would depend entirely upon juries uncontrolled by any settled, fixed, legal principles. And if it be true that jurors in a criminal case are under no legal obligation to take the law from the court, and may determine for themselves what the law is, it necessarily results that counsel for the accused may, of right, in the presence of both court and jury, contend that what the court declares to be the law applicable to the case in hand is not the law, and, in support of his contention, read to the jury the reports of adjudged cases and the views of elementary writers. Undoubtedly, in some jurisdictions, where juries in criminal cases have the right, in virtue of constitutional or statutory provisions, to decide both law and facts upon their own judgment as to what the law is, and as to what the facts are, it may be the privilege of counsel to read and discuss adjudged cases before the jury And in a few jurisdictions, in which it is held that the court alone responds as to the law, that practice is allowed in deference to long usage. But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. Under the contrary view - if it be held that the court may not authoritatively decide all questions of law arising in criminal cases -the result will be that when a new trial in a criminal case is ordered, even by this court, the jury, upon such trial, may of right return a verdict based upon the assumption that what this court has adjudged to be law is not law We cannot give our sanction to any rule that will lead to such a result. We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law, upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be. Sparf quotes Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U. S. 1 (1794) from an opinion by Chief Justice John Jay. The quote, as given by Sparf, is recited below, a bit more completely. That early 1794 jury civil case was annihilated as any sort of precedent to the effect of espousing jury nullification in criminal or general cases by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) which I have previously quoted to your dumb ass, and which is the case cited in the footnote to which you refer here. As noted below, Georgia v. Brailsford 3 U.S. 1 (1794) was examined by the U.S. Sureme Court in Sparf, and the whole case was considered an anomaly. It was a trial by jury in the U.S. Supreme Court. The jury, so-called, was a panel of experts chosen for their expertise on the subject. The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in one case about jury nullification in 1894 and decided in 1895. That case, Sparf and Hansen v. United States,, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), forever put your insane bullshit to bed. Deal with it. As Moylan noted in 1969, as I quoted: And since 1969, add about another half-century to that standing precedent. As you have been previously informed of this, I am sure you are merely being an asshole. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/156/51/case.html U.S. Supreme Court Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) Sparf and Hansen v. United States No. 613 Submitted March 5, 1894 Decided January 21, 1895 In the courts of the United States, it is the duty of the jury, in criminal cases, to receive the law from the court, and to apply it as given by the court, subject to the condition that, by a general verdict, a jury of necessity determines both law and fact as compounded in the issue submitted to them in the particular case. [156 U.S. 63] Opinion of the Court The court below assumed, and correctly, that section 1035 of the Revised Statutes did not authorize a jury in a criminal case to find the defendant guilty of a less offense than the one charged unless the evidence justified them in so doing. Congress did not intend to invest juries in criminal cases with power arbitrarily to disregard the evidence and the principles of law applicable to the case on trial. [156 U.S. 64] Opinion of the Court The general question as to the duty of the jury to receive the law from the court is not concluded by any direct decision of this Court. But it has been often considered by other courts and by judges of high authority, and, where its determination has not been controlled by specific constitutional or statutory provisions expressly empowering the jury to determine both law and facts, the principle by which courts and juries are to be guided in the exercise of their respective functions has become firmly established. [156 U. S. 64-65] Opinion of the Court In Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 3 U. S. 4, a case in this Court tried by a special jury upon an amicable issue, Chief Justice Jay is reported to have said: Of the correctness of this report, Mr. Justice Curtis in United States v. Morris, 1 Curtis 23, 58, expressed much doubt, for the reason that the Chief Justice is reported as saying that, in civil cases — and that was a civil case — the jury had the right to decide the law, and because also the different parts of the charge conflict with each other, the Chief Justice, according to the report, saying at the outset that it is the province of the jury to decide questions of fact, and of the court to decide questions of law, and in the succeeding sentence informing the jury that they had the right to take upon themselves the determination of both law and fact. If the Chief Justice said that it was the province of the court to decide questions of law, and the province of the jury to decide questions of fact, he could not have said that the jury had the right, in a civil case, to judge of and determine both law and fact. "The whole case," Mr. Justice Curtis said, [156 U. S. 82 - 86] Opinion of the Court 156 U. S. 83 In Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536, 554, it was held to be inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution that questions of law, and, still less, questions of constitutional law, should be decided by the verdict of the jury contrary to the instructions of the court. In Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y. 588, 591, Judge Selden, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York, said: See also People v. Finnegan, 1 Parker's Cr.Cas. 147, 152; Safford v. People, 1 Parker's Cr.Cas. 474, 480. So, in Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, 192, Mr. Justice Campbell, as the organ of the court, said: "We understand the uniform practice and the decided weight of opinion to require that the judge give his views of the law to the jury as authority, and not as a matter to be submitted to their review." And in People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65, 70: "In this state it is so well settled as no longer to be open to debate that it is the duty of a jury, in a criminal case, to take the law from the court." 156 U. S. 84 The principle was accurately stated by Chief Justice Ames, speaking for the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, when he said: State v. Smith, 6 R.I. 33, 34. In Pennsylvania, in the case of Commonwealth v. Sherry (reported in the appendix to Wharton's treatise on Homicide, pp. 481-482), Judge Rogers, a jurist of high reputation, thus charged the jury in a capital case: 156 U. S. 85 About the same time, Judge Sergeant charged a jury: Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, Brightly (Penn.) 73. To the same effect, substantially, was the language of Chief Justice Gibson, who, when closing a charge in a capital case, said, "If the evidence on these points fail the prisoner, the conclusion of his guilt will be irresistible, and it will be your duty to draw it." Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn.St. 269. In a more recent case, Kane v. Commonwealth, 89 Penn.St. 522, Sharswood, C.J., said that the power of the jury to judge of the law in a criminal case was one of the most valuable securities guarantied by the bill of rights of Pennsylvania. But in a later case, Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 96 Penn.St. 505, it was said: In Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Penn.St. 64, 85, it was adjudged that the statement by the court was the best evidence of the law within the reach of the jury, and that the jury should be guided by what the court said as to the law. And this view the court, speaking by Chief Justice Paxson, said was in harmony with Kane v. Commonwealth. The question has recently been examined by the Supreme Court of Vermont, and after an elaborate review of the 156 U. S. 86 authorities, English and American, that court, by a unanimous judgment, overruling State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, and all the previous cases which had followed that case, said: State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 34. These principles are supported by a very large number of adjudications, as will be seen by an examination of the cases cited in margin.{2} [156 U. S. 106 - 107] Opinion of the Court, conclusion 156 U. S. 107 argument was the other way. He wisely observed that, United States v. Morris, 1 Curtis 62, 63. The questions above referred to are the only ones that need be considered on this writ of error.
The U.S. Supreme Court set precedent to the contrary in 1895. It still stands. See #25. The standing precedent is Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. The standing precedent is Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Once you persuade the courts that over a century of standing settled precedent should be overturned, you will be making progress. Until then, you are just spewing doper bullshit.
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Your absurd interpretation of Sparf is pure bullshit pulled out of your ass. Here is a Federal court interpretation of that Opinion which covers 156 U.S. 51 through 107. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969)
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century. Your absurd interpretation of Sparf is pure bullshit pulled out of your ass. Scotus opinions are not law.
Which in no way implies your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited". As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) And your are a master weasel-word bullshitter, but have no substance to your bullshit. You just pull it out of yor ass. Thank you, sir! May I have another? Yes, you may. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) Courts have long recognized that defendants have no right to an instruction on jury nullification. See United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969). A court may "block defense attorneys' attempts to serenade a jury with the siren song of nullification ... and ... may instruct the jury on the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury nullification." United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir.1993). Just as defendants have no right to an instruction on nullification, jurors have no right to nullify. As a D.C. Circuit panel comprised of Chief Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Judge George E. MacKinnon, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained: United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). ii. If Taken Seriously, Jury Nullification Threatens to Undermine the Democratic Process and the Rule of Law If it were taken seriously by mainstream Americans, jury nullification would threaten to unravel the fabric of our democracy. The impropriety of nullification emanates from the notion that ours is "a government of laws and not of men." See Mass. Const. Part I, art. XXX.[8] This means simply that no citizen is above the law, and none is free to make his own law. As Thomas Paine stated in Common Sense, "For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." Thomas *121 Paine, Common Sense (1776), available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/paine.htm.
Of course. The judge should provide legal advice to the jury. Jurors are not lawyers and what are the alternatives - hiring an outside advisor? But how is it related to the main topic?
This is bad? Only in the world of nolu spam.. The 'democratic process', as applied by the progressive leftists, is leading the USA down the road to serfdom.
Nice job of proving what I already stipulated, dolt: that some judges - presumably including Judge Young (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts) - will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. Thanks for proving my point: As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Something that is good to avoid doing, if one wants to have a seat on a jury. If a jurist wants to nullify but knows most (or any) other jurors may blow a whistle on them, the best course may just be to refuse to vote to convict because you don't find key witnesses credible. Though adding expressions of sympathy for the accused should be quite safe to do as well.
... A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power. You and courts and anyone can say any thing they want to about how jury nullification is wrong, unlawful, a violation of this or that, or whatever else. But at the end of the day, the jury has the de facto power and therefore full fledged Right to nullify, and there ain't nothing you or any judge can do to undo that power. The moral standing juries have this power trumps all other considerations, including whatever "legal" or judicial opinion material you present to the contrary. If you want a legal precedent, look up the case of William Penn in 1670. Though perhaps you disagree with that verdict as well, and feel the imprisonment of the jury was appropriate for their refusing to convict.
William Penn did not exist under the Constitution and whatever he said would not overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Your disdain for the U.S. government and its laws is noted.
The US Supreme Court cannot overturn a jury nullification verdict. All they can do is whine about it, assuming they don't like it. Your religious absolutism about judicial law being the perfect order of life is noted.
Thanks for proving my point: As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. Thank you for proving my point that you are nothing but a bloviating asshole. NOT JUST SOME JUDGES, the BAR ASSOCIATIONS do it as well as the judges. Your attorney will not directly argue nullification as the judge will quickly admonish him to quit if he goes near it. If he continues, he will be stopped. If necessary, the judge can declare that the closing argument is finished. Then the judge can refer him for Rule 11 sanctions to include suspension or disbarment, plus a hefty fine. Your lawyer will not go there because it can be expensive and may cost his license. If you are representing yourself, the judge does not have to take your shit. He will warn you, and if necessary, tell you to sit down and be quiet. He may hold you in contempt. If needed, you may be taken to another room, restrained in a chair, and watch the rest of the proceeding on closed-circuit television. Directly arguing jury nullification is prohibited in Federal courts and in 48 states. The two exceptions are Maryland and Indiana, and even there, "the jury instructions typically admonish the jury not to arbitrarily and willfully disregard the law or substitute their own judgment for what they think the law should be in a particular case." See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Opinion 320, Jury Nullification Arguments by Criminal Defense Counsel [...] In these early periods of American history, the power of the jury to nullify the law was explicit and affirmatively approved. With the turn of the 20th century, however, the law has developed a more strict separation between the domain of the court (to say what the law is) and the domain of the jury (to determine the facts). Jurors today are routinely instructed that they must accept the law as given to them by the court in its instructions. E.g., Sparf & Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).[1] Thus, under contemporary substantive legal standards, a suggestion by a lawyer to a jury that it should ignore the law as stated by the judge may be tantamount to an explicit invitation to the jury to ignore the judge’s instructions. [...] Thus, at a minimum defense counsel must necessarily conform their conduct to the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is appearing. See D.C. Rule 8.5(a); see also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 105 (2000) (“a lawyer must comply with applicable law, including rules of procedure and evidence and specific tribunal rulings”). In this jurisdiction, such substantive law appears to preclude express advocacy of the jury nullification power. The District of Columbia has no rule or statute authorizing jury nullification. Both the local courts and the federal courts have rejected assertions that juries are entitled to an instruction apprising them of their “right” to nullify the law. See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (fact that juries can abuse their power and return verdicts contrary to the law does not mean that courts must give such instruction); Reale v. United States, 573 A.2d 13 (D.C. 1990) (trial court not required to instruct jurors about their power of jury nullification). [...] Moreover, the standard jury instruction given in District of Columbia courts contains this express admonition to the jury: “You may not ignore any instruction, or question the wisdom of any rule of law.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instr. 2.01 (Bar Assn. of D.C. 4th ed. 1993). Within this jurisdiction express exhortations to ignore the law are, therefore, likely to be deemed prohibited by law and may, therefore, result in violations of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct by lawyers who advocate such a course. See D.C. Rule 8.4. [...] 1. Two states, Indiana and Maryland, retain state constitutional provisions that enshrine a jury’s authority to determine the law as well as the facts. See Ind. Const. art. I, § 19; Md. Decl. of Rights, art. 23. But even in those states the jury instructions typically admonish the jury not to arbitrarily and willfully disregard the law or substitute their own judgment for what they think the law should be in a particular case. See. e.g.. Indiana Jury Instruction (quoted in Kourlis, “Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control,” 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1996)).
But how is it related to the main topic? The judge instructs the jury on what the law is. The jury determines the facts. The jury is supposed to apply the law, as given by the court, to the facts. The title of the thread contains the term "jury nullification." As you observe, jurors are not lawyers. They are not expected to be fluent at interpreting laws. The rule prohibiting defense counsel from arguing nullificationto a jury is Supreme Court (federal) precedent dating to 1895. Similar rules have been adopted in 48 states. If a juror argues nullification in the jury room, he may be reported to the judge and kicked off the jury. If he argues nullification in voir dire, he will not make it to the jury. He will be dismissed for cause. The poster comment to the article was, "A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal." By that logic, assuming arguendo the defendant did the deed, the O.J. jury determined that murdering one's wife (plus 1) is legal.
"If a juror feels that the statute involved in any criminal offence is unfair, or that it infringes upon the defendant's natural god-given unalienable or constitutional rights, then it is his duty to affirm that the offending statute is really no law at all and that the violation of it is no crime at all, for no one is bound to obey an unjust law." -- Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone "For more than six hundred years-- that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215--there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such law." --Lysander Spooner, The Right of Juries If the jury feels the law is unjust, we recognize the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by a judge, and contrary to the evidence. -- 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, US v Moylan, 1969 Every jury in the land is tampered with and falsely instructed by the judge when it is told that it must accept as the law that which has been given to them, or that they can decide only the facts of the case. -- Lord Denham, O'Connell v Rex (1884) The jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both the law and the facts. -- Justice Holmes, Homing v District of Columbia, 138 (1920) When a jury acquits a defendant even though he or she clearly appears to be guilty, the acquittal conveys significant information about community attitudes and provides a guideline for future prosecutorial discretion...Because of the high acquittal rate in prohibition cases in the 1920s and early 1930s, prohibition laws could not be enforced. The repeal of these laws is traceable to the refusal of juries to convict those accused of alcohol traffic. -- Sheflin and Van Dyke, Law and Contemporary Problems, 43, No. 4, 1980 It is not only the juror's right, but his duty, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct opposition to the directions of the court.-- John Adams You argue: -- SCOTUS opinions and precedents are NOT LAW. -- Nor are state rules to the same effect. -- They are, in this instance, anti- constitutional..
The jury is supposed to apply the law, as given by the court, to the facts. That's my clarification in parenthesis, not part of the title. It seems like jury nullification, but I don't pretend to know for certain what each jurors reasoning was. The jurors endeavor to reach a verdict, and they did. For whatever reasons, the jurors decided that the defendant was not guilty of a crime. NOT guilty. NOT guilty. He said the truth: “I’m not a criminal, I’m a patient,” Kirouac told the attentive courtroom. “All I’m trying to do is survive.”
Fine, make that "some judges and some bar associations" - still doesn't add up to a universal prohibition, particularly since a defendant has the option of representing himself and if doing so could give a shit what any bar association says. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. This is a good point. If a law is badly written, and a person is obviously innocent by the moral standards, why to pay lawyers? Present your cause to the jury directly and if jurors are not heartless morons you will be vindicated. BTW, if represent yourself, can you participate in jury selection?
It does not make much sense. 12 random and average people are better judges of the facts than experts and court officials? No, juries are to inject HUMAN factor to be ABOVE soulless machine of the law.
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law. tpaine opinions are bullshit. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 2004 ________________ GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. RAICH CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR No. 03-1454. Argued November 29, 2004—Decided June 6, 2005 California’s Compassionate Use Act authorizes limited marijuana use for medicinal purposes. Respondents Raich and Monson are California residents who both use doctor-recommended marijuana for serious medical conditions. After federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents seized and destroyed all six of Monson’s cannabis plants, respondents brought this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the extent it prevents them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical use. Respondents claim that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that they had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the claim that the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority as applied to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law. The court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, to hold that this separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of federal power. Page 2 Syllabus Held: Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. Pp. 10-33. (a) For the purposes of consolidating various drug laws into a comprehensive statute, providing meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and strengthening law enforcement tools against international and interstate drug trafficking, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Title II of which is the CSA. To effectuate the statutory goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by the CSA. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a). All controlled substances are classified into five schedules, § 812, based on their accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body, §§ 811, 812. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance, § 812©, based on its high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment, § 812(b)(1). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana a criminal offense. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a). Pp. 10-15. (b) Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce is firmly established. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 151. If Congress decides that the “ ‘total incidence’ “ of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See, e.g., id., at 154-155. Of particular relevance here is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128, where, in rejecting the appellee farmer’s contention that Congress’ admitted power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for the appellee’s own consumption, the Court established that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” i.e., not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. In assessing the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the Court need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. E.g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557. Given the en- Syllabus forcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, the Court has no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Pp. 15-22. (c) Respondents’ heavy reliance on Lopez and Morrison overlooks the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases, while also reading those cases far too broadly. The statutory challenges at issue there were markedly different from the challenge here. Respondents ask the Court to excise individual applications of a concededly valid comprehensive statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for the Court has often reiterated that “[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.” Perez, 402 U. S., at 154. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the laws at issue in Lopez and Morrison had nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise. See Lopez, 514 U. S., at 561; Morrison, 529 U. S., at 610. In contrast, the CSA regulates quintessentially economic activities: the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational means of regulating commerce in that product. The Ninth Circuit cast doubt on the CSA’s constitutionality by isolating a distinct class of activities that it held to be beyond the reach of federal power: the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accord-ance with state law. However, Congress clearly acted rationally in de-termining that this subdivided class of activities is an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme. The case comes down to the claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically rather than sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation. Given the CSA’s findings and the undisputed magnitude of the commercial market for marijuana, Wickard and its progeny foreclose that claim. Pp. 23-33. 352 F. 3d 1222, vacated and remanded. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 33. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting Page 4 Syllabus opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part III, post, p. 42. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 57. Acting Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Lisa S. Blatt, Mark B. Stern, Alisa B. Klein, and Mark T. Quinlivan. Randy E. Barnett argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert A. Long, Jr., Heidi C. Doerhoff, Robert A. Raich, and David M. Michael.* __________ *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Community Rights Counsel by Timothy J. Dowling; for the Drug Free America Foundation, Inc., et al. by David G. Evans; for Robert L. DuPont, M. D., et al. by John R. Bartels, Jr.; and for U.S. Representative Mark E. Souder et al. by Nicholas P. Coleman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Jim Hood, Attorney General of Mississippi; for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor, Taylor S. Carey, Special Assistant Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, and Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington; for the California Nurses Association et al. by Julia M. Carpenter; for the Cato Institute by Douglas W. Kmiec, Timothy Lynch, and Robert A. Levy; for Constitutional Law Scholars by Ernest A. Young, Matthew D. Schnall, Charles Fried, and David L. Shapiro; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor, Dana Berliner, and Richard A. Epstein; for the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society et al. by David T. Goldberg, Sean H. Donahue, and Daniel N. Abrahamson; for the Lymphoma Foundation of America et al. by Stephen C. Willey; for the Marijuana Policy Project et al. by Cheryl Flax-Davidson; and for the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws et al. by John Wesley Hall, Jr., Joshua L. Dratel, and Sheryl Gordon McCloud. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper, Sharon L. Browne, and Deborah J. La Fetra; and for the Reason Foundation by Manuel S. Klausner. Opinion of the Court JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. California is one of at least nine States that authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.[1] The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States” includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. I California has been a pioneer in the regulation of marijuana. In 1913, California was one of the first States to pro-hibit the sale and possession of marijuana,[2] and at the end of the century, California became the first State to authorize limited use of the drug for medicinal purposes. In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, now codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.[3] The proposition was de- __________ [1] See Alaska Stat. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010–17.37.080 (Lexis 2004); Colo. Const., Art. XVIII, § 14, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–18–406.3 (Lexis 2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 329–121 to 329–128 (2004 Cum. Supp.); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, § 2383–B(5) (West 2004); Nev. Const., Art. 4, § 38, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§453A.010–453A.810 (2003); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§475.300–475.346 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4472–4474d (Supp. 2004); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 69.51.010–69.51.080 (2004); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–3412.01 (West Supp. 2004) (voter initiative permitting physicians to prescribe Schedule I substances for medical purposes that was purportedly repealed in 1997, but the repeal was rejected by voters in 1998). In November 2004, Montana voters approved Initiative 148, adding to the number of States authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes. [2] 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 342, § 8a; see also Gieringer, The Origins of Cannabis Prohibition in California 21–23 (rev. Mar. 2005), available at http:// www.canorml.org/background/caloriginsmjproh.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 2, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). [3] Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005). The California Legislature recently enacted additional legislation supplementing the Compassionate Use Act. §§ 11362.7–11362.9. Page 6 Opinion of the Court signed to ensure that “seriously ill” residents of the State have access to marijuana for medical purposes, and to encourage Federal and State Governments to take steps to-ward ensuring the safe and affordable distribution of the drug to patients in need.[4] The Act creates an exemption from criminal prosecution for physicians,[5] as well as for pa-tients and primary caregivers who possess or cultivate mari-juana for medicinal purposes with the recommendation or approval of a physician.[6] A “primary caregiver” is a person who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of the patient.[7] Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson are California residents who suffer from a variety of serious medical conditions and have sought to avail themselves of medical marijuana pursuant to the terms of the Compassionate Use __________ [4] “The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows: “(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction. “(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.” § 11362.5(b)(1). [5] “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.” § 11362.5(c). [6] “Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient’s primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.” §11362.5(d). [7] § 11362.5(e). Opinion of the Court Act. They are being treated by licensed, board-certified family practitioners, who have concluded, after prescribing a host of conventional medicines to treat respondents’ conditions and to alleviate their associated symptoms, that marijuana is the only drug available that provides effective treatment. Both women have been using marijuana as a medication for several years pursuant to their doctors’ recommendation, and both rely heavily on cannabis to function on a daily basis. Indeed, Raich’s physician believes that forgoing cannabis treatments would certainly cause Raich excruciating pain and could very well prove fatal. Respondent Monson cultivates her own marijuana, and ingests the drug in a variety of ways including smoking and using a vaporizer. Respondent Raich, by contrast, is unable to cultivate her own, and thus relies on two caregivers, litigating as “John Does,” to provide her with locally grown marijuana at no charge. These caregivers also process the cannabis into hashish or keif, and Raich herself processes some of the marijuana into oils, balms, and foods for consumption. On August 15, 2002, county deputy sheriffs and agents from the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came to Monson’s home. After a thorough investigation, the county officials concluded that her use of marijuana was entirely lawful as a matter of California law. Nevertheless, after a 3-hour standoff, the federal agents seized and destroyed all six of her cannabis plants. Respondents thereafter brought this action against the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the DEA seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., to the extent it prevents them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical use. In their complaint and supporting afidavits, Raich and Monson described the severity of their afflictions, their repeatedly futile attempts Page 8 Opinion of the Court to obtain relief with conventional medications, and the opinions of their doctors concerning their need to use marijuana. Respondents claimed that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the doctrine of medical necessity. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for a pre-liminary injunction. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (ND Cal. 2003). Although the court found that the federal enforcement interests “wane[d]” when compared to the harm that California residents would suffer if denied access to medically necessary marijuana, it concluded that respondents could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their legal claims. Id., at 931. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction.[8] Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F. 3d 1222 (2003). The court found that respondents had “demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.” Id., at 1227. The Court of Appeals distinguished prior Circuit cases upholding the CSA in the face of Commerce Clause challenges by focusing on what it deemed to be the ”separate and distinct class of activities” at issue in this case: “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law.” Id., at 1228. The __________ [8] On remand, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners “‘from arresting or prosecuting Plaintiffs Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, seizing their medical cannabis, forfeiting their property, or seeking civil or administrative sanctions against them with respect to the intrastate, non-commercial cultivation, possession, use, and obtaining without charge of cannabis for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law, and which is not used for distribution, sale, or exchange.’” Brief for Petitioners 9. Opinion of the Court court found the latter class of activities “different in kind from drug trafficking” because interposing a physician’s recommendation raises different health and safety concerns, and because “this limited use is clearly distinct from the broader illicit drug market—as well as any broader commercial market for medicinal marijuana—insofar as the medicinal marijuana at issue in this case is not intended for, nor does it enter, the stream of commerce.” Ibid. The majority placed heavy reliance on our decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000), as interpreted by recent Circuit precedent, to hold that this separate class of purely local activities was beyond the reach of federal power. In contrast, the dissenting judge concluded that the CSA, as applied to respondents, was clearly valid under Lopezand Morrison; moreover, he thought it “simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct surrounding the cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this case from the cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn,” 352 F. 3d, at 1235 (opinion of Beam, J.). The obvious importance of the case prompted our grant of certiorari. 542 U.S. 936 (2004). The case is made difficult by respondents’ strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic purposes. The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally. Well-settled law controls our answer. The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Page 10 " align="center" court="Court" gonzales="GONZALES" ii="II" of="of" opinion="Opinion" raich="RAICH" the="the" v="v"> Shortly after taking office in 1969, President Nixon declare a national “war on drugs.”[9] As the first campaign of that war, Congress set out to enact legislation that would consolidate various drug laws on the books into a comprehensive statute, provide meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools against the traffic in illicit drugs.[10] That effort culminated in the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236. This was not, however, Congress’ first attempt to regulate the national market in drugs. Rather, as early as 1906 Congress enacted federal legislation imposing labeling regulations on medications and prohibiting the manufacture or shipment of any adulterated or misbranded drug traveling in interstate commerce.[11] Aside from these labeling restrictions, most domestic drug regulations prior to 1970 generally came in the guise of revenue laws, with the Department of the Treasury serving as the Federal Government’s primary enforcer.[12] For example, the primary drug control law, before being repealed by the passage of the CSA, was the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970). The Harrison Act sought to exert control over the possession and sale of narcotics, specifically cocaine and opiates, by requiring producers, distributors, and purchasers to register with the Federal Government, by assessing taxes against __________ [9] See D. Musto & P. Korsmeyer, The Quest for Drug Control 60 (2002) (hereinafter Musto & Korsmeyer). [10] H. R. Rep. No. 91–1444, pt. 2, p. 22 (1970) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.); 26 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 531 (1970) (hereinafter Almanac); Musto & Korsmeyer 56–57. [11] Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059. [12] See United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 14–16 (1969). Opinion of the Court parties so registered, and by regulating the issuance of prescriptions.[13] Marijuana itself was not significantly regulated by the Federal Government until 1937 when accounts of marijuana’s addictive qualities and physiological effects, paired with dissatisfaction with enforcement efforts at state and local levels, prompted Congress to pass the Marihuana Tax Act, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970).[14] Like the Harrison Act, the Marihuana Tax Act did not outlaw the possession or sale of marijuana outright. Rather, it imposed registration and reporting requirements for all individuals importing, producing, selling, or dealing in marijuana, and required the payment of annual taxes in addition to transfer taxes whenever the drug changed hands.[15] Moreover, doctors wishing to prescribe marijuana for medical purposes were required to comply with rather burdensome administrative requirements.[16] Noncompliance exposed trafficker to severe federal penalties, whereas compliance would often subject them to prosecution under state law.[17] Thus, while the Marihuana Tax Act did not declare the drug illegal per se, the onerous administrative requirements, the prohibitively expensive taxes, and the risks attendant on compliance practically curtailed the marijuana trade. Then in 1970, after declaration of the national “war on drugs,” federal drug policy underwent a significant transformation. A number of noteworthy events precipitated __________ [13] See Doremus, 249 U. S., at 90–93. [14] R. Bonnie & C. Whitebread, The Marijuana Conviction 154–174 (1999); L. Grinspoon & J. Bakalar, Marihuana, the Forbidden Medicine 7–8 (rev. ed. 1997) (hereinafter Grinspoon & Bakalar). Although this was the Federal Government’s first attempt to regulate the marijuana trade, by this time all States had in place some form of legislation regulating the sale, use, or possession of marijuana. R. Isralowitz, Drug Use, Policy, and Management 134 (2d ed. 2002). [15] Leary, 395 U. S., at 14–16. [16] Grinspoon & Bakalar 8. [17] Leary, 395 U. S., at 16–18. Page 12 Opinion of the Court this policy shift. First, in Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 (1969), this Court held certain provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act and other narcotics legislation unconstitutional. Second, at the end of his term, President Johnson fundamentally reorganized the federal drug control agencies. The Bureau of Narcotics, then housed in the Department of the Treasury, merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, then housed in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), to create the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, currently housed in the Department of Justice.[18] Finally, prompted by a perceived need to consolidate the growing number of piecemeal drug laws and to enhance federal drug enforcement powers, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.[19] Title II of that Act, the CSA, repealed most of the earlier antidrug laws in favor of a comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit drugs. The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.[20] Congress was particularly concerned with the __________ [18] Musto & Korsmeyer 32–35; 26 Almanac 533. In 1973, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs became the DEA. See Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1973, § 1, 28 CFR § 0.100 (1973). [19] The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 consists of three titles. Title I relates to the prevention and treatment of narcotic addicts through HEW (now the Department of Health and Human Services). 84 Stat. 1238. Title II, as discussed in more detail above, addresses drug control and enforcement as administered by the Attorney General and the DEA. Id., at 1242. Title III concerns the import and export of controlled substances. Id., at 1285. [20] In particular, Congress made the following findings: Opinion of the Court need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels.[21] To effectuate these goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a). The CSA categorizes all controlled substances into five schedules. § 812. The drugs are grouped together based on their accepted medical uses, the potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body. __________ “(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because— “(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce, “(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution, and “(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession. “(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. “(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. “(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.” 21 U. S. C. §§ 801(1)–(6). [21] See United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122, 135 (1975); see also H. R. Rep., at 22. Page 14 Opinion of the Court §§ 811, 812. Each schedule is associated with a distinct set of controls regarding the manufacture, distribution, and use of the substances listed therein. §§ 821-830. The CSA and its implementing regulations set forth strict requirements regarding registration, labeling and packaging, production quotas, drug security, and recordkeeping. Ibid.; 21 CFR § 1301 et seq. (2004). In enacting the CSA, Congress classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug. 21 U. S. C. § 812(c). This preliminary classification was based, in part, on the recommendation of the Assistant Secretary of HEW “that marihuana be retained within schedule I at least until the completion of certain studies now underway.”[22] Schedule I drugs are categorized as such because of their high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment. § 812(b)(1). These three factors, in varying gradations, are also used to categorize drugs in the other four schedules. For example, Schedule II substances also have a high potential for abuse which may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence, but unlike Schedule I drugs, they have a currently accepted medical use. § 812(b)(2). By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as opposed to listing it on a lesser schedule, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research study. §§ 823(f), 841(a)(1), 844(a); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 490 (2001). The CSA provides for the periodic updating of schedules and delegates authority to the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to add, remove, or transfer substances to, from, or between __________ [22] Id., at 61 (quoting letter from Roger O. Egeberg, M. D., to Hon. Harley O. Staggers (Aug. 14, 1970)). Opinion of the Court schedules. § 811. Despite considerable efforts to reschedule marijuana, it remains a Schedule I drug.[23] III Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress’ commerce power. Brief for Respondents 22, 38. Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority. Rather, respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. In assessing the validity of congressional regulation, none of our Commerce Clause cases can be viewed in isolation. As charted in considerable detail in United States v. Lopez, our understanding of the reach of the Commerce Clause, as well as Congress’ assertion of authority thereunder, has __________ [23] Starting in 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws began its campaign to reclassify marijuana. Grinspoon & Bakalar 13–17. After some fleeting success in 1988 when an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) declared that the DEA would be acting in an “unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious” manner if it continued to deny marijuana access to seriously ill patients, and concluded that it should be reclassified as a Schedule III substance, Grinspoon v. DEA, 828 F. 2d 881, 883–884 (CA1 1987), the campaign has proved unsuccessful. The DEA Administrator did not endorse the ALJ’s findings, 54 Fed. Reg. 53767 (1989), and since that time has routinely denied petitions to reschedule the drug, most recently in 2001. 66 Fed. Reg. 20038 (2001). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has reviewed the petition to reschedule marijuana on five separate occasions over the course of 30 years, ultimately upholding the Administrator’s final order. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F. 3d 1131, 1133 (1994). Page 16 Opinion of the Court evolved over time.[24] The Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation.[25] For the first century of our history, the primary use of the Clause was to preclude the kind of discriminatory state legislation that had once been permissible.[26] Then, in response to rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy, Congress “ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power,” beginning with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, 24 Stat. 379, and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2 et seq.[27] Cases decided during that “new era,” which now spans more than a century, have identified three general categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce power. First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150 (1971). Second, Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate __________ [24] United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 552–558 (1995); id., at 568–574 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id., at 604–607 (Souter, J., dissenting). [25] See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 224 (1824) (opinion of Johnson, J.); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1337, 1340–1341 (1934); G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 127 (9th ed. 1975). [26] See Lopez, 514 U. S., at 553–554; id., at 568–569 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460, 472–473 (2005). [27] Lopez, 514 U. S., at 554; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 121 (1942) (“It was not until 1887, with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, that the interstate commerce power began to exert positive influence in American law and life. This first important federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others. These statutes ushered in new phases of adjudication, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder” (footnotes omitted)). Opinion of the Court commerce. Ibid. Third, Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Ibid.; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). Only the third category is implicated in the case at hand. Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Perez, 402 U. S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 128-129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 125. We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the “‘total incidence’” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U. S., at 154-155 (“‘[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may do so’” (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259 (1927))). In this vein, we have reiterated that when “‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” E.g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968); emphasis deleted). Our decision in Wickard, 317 U. S. 111, is of particular relevance. In Wickard, we upheld the application of regulations promulgated under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31, which were designed to control the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and consequent abnormally low prices. The regulations established an allotment of 11.1 acres for Filburn’s 1941 wheat crop, but he sowed 23 acres, intending to use the excess by consuming it on his own farm. Filburn Page 18 Opinion of the Court argued that even though we had sustained Congress’ power to regulate the production of goods for commerce, that power did not authorize “federal regulation [of] production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Wickard, 317 U. S., at 118. Justice Jackson’s opinion for a unanimous Court rejected this submission. He wrote: Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking. Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.[28] Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed “to __________ [28] Even respondents acknowledge the existence of an illicit market in marijuana; indeed, Raich has personally participated in that market, and Monson expresses a willingness to do so in the future. App. 59, 74, 87. See also Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 770, 774, n. 12, and 780, n. 17 (1994) (discussing the “market value” of marijuana); id., at 790 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 792 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 591 (1977) (addressing prescription drugs “for which there is both a lawful and an unlawful market”); Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 417, n. 33 (1970) (referring to the purchase of drugs on the “retail market”). Opinion of the Court control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses . . . “ and consequently control the market price, id., at 115, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets. See nn. 20-21, supra. In Wickard, we had no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat outside the regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions. More concretely, one concern prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home consumption in the 1938 Act was that rising market prices could draw such wheat into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices. Wickard, 317 U. S., at 128. The parallel concern making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market. While the diversion of homegrown wheat tended to frustrate the federal interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial transactions in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.[29] __________ [29] To be sure, the wheat market is a lawful market that Congress sought to protect and stabilize, whereas the marijuana market is an unlawful market that Congress sought to eradicate. This difference, however, is of no constitutional import. It has long been settled that Congress’ power to regulate commerce includes the power to prohibit commerce in a particu- Page 20 Opinion of the Court Nonetheless, respondents suggest that Wickard differs from this case in three respects: (1) the Agricultural Adjustment Act, unlike the CSA, exempted small farming operations; (2) Wickard involved a “quintessential economic activity”—a commercial farm—whereas respondents do not sell marijuana; and (3) the Wickard record made it clear that the aggregate production of wheat for use on farms had a significant impact on market prices. Those differences, though factually accurate, do not diminish the precedential force of this Court’s reasoning. The fact that Filburn’s own impact on the market was “trivial by itself” was not a sufficient reason for removing him from the scope of federal regulation. 317 U. S., at 127. That the Secretary of Agriculture elected to exempt even smaller farms from regulation does not speak to his power to regulate all those whose aggregated production was significant, nor did that fact play any role in the Court’s analysis. Moreover, even though Filburn was indeed a commercial farmer, the activity he was engaged in—the cultivation of wheat for home consumption—was not treated by the Court as part of his commercial farming operation.[30] And while it is true that the record in the Wickard case itself established the causal connection between the production for local use and the national market, we have before us findings by Congress to the same effect. Findings in the introductory sections of the CSA explain why Congress deemed it appropriate to encompass local activities within the scope of the CSA. See n. 20, supra. The __________ lar commodity. Lopez, 514 U.S., at 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In the Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903), the Court rejected the argument that Congress lacked [the] power to prohibit the interstate movement of lottery tickets because it had power only to regulate, not to prohibit”); see also Wickard, 317 U. S., at 128 (“The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon”). 30 See id., at 125 (recognizing that Filburn’s activity “may not be regarded as commerce”). Opinion of the Court submissions of the parties and the numerous amici all seem to agree that the national, and international, market for marijuana has dimensions that are fully comparable to those defining the class of activities regulated by the Secretary pursuant to the 1938 statute.[31] Respondents nonetheless insist that the CSA cannot be constitutionally applied to their activities because Congress did not make a specific finding that the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical purposes based on the recommendation of a physician would substantially affect the larger interstate marijuana market. Be that as it may, we have never required Congress to make particularized findings in order to legislate, see Lopez, 514 U. S., at 562; Perez, 402 U. S., at 156, absent a special concern such as the protection of free speech, see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 664-668 (1994) (plurality opinion). While congressional findings are certainly helpful in reviewing the substance of a congressional statutory scheme, particularly when the connection to commerce is not self-evident, and while we will consider congressional findings in our analysis when they are available, the absence of particularized findings does not call into question Congress’ authority to legislate.[32] __________ [31] The Executive Office of the President has estimated that in 2000 American users spent $10.5 billion on the purchase of marijuana. Office of Nat. Drug Control Policy, Marijuana Fact Sheet 5 (Feb. 2004), http:// www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/marijuana/index.html. [32] Moreover, as discussed in more detail above, Congress did make findings regarding the effects of intrastate drug activity on interstate commerce. See n. 20, supra. Indeed, even the Court of Appeals found that those findings “weigh[ed] in favor” of upholding the constitutionality of the CSA. 352 F. 3d 1222, 1232 (CA9 2003) (case below). The dissenters, however, would impose a new and heightened burden on Congress (unless the litigants can garner evidence sufficient to cure Congress’ perceived “inadequa[cies]”)—that legislation must contain detailed findings proving that each activity regulated within a comprehensive statute is essential to the statutory scheme. Post, at 53–55 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); post, at 64 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Such an exacting requirement is not only un- Page 22 Opinion of the Court In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276-280 (1981); Perez, 402 U. S., at 155-156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252-253 (1964). Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. § 801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intra-state activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme. __________ precedented, it is also impractical. Indeed, the principal dissent’s critique of Congress for “not even” including “declarations” specific to marijuana is particularly unpersuasive given that the CSA initially identified 80 other substances subject to regulation as Schedule I drugs, not to mention those categorized in Schedules II–V. Post, at 55 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Surely, Congress cannot be expected (and certainly should not be required) to include specific findings on each and every substance contained therein in order to satisfy the dissenters’ unfounded skepticism. 33 See n. 21, supra (citing sources that evince Congress’ particular concern with the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels). Opinion of the Court IV To support their contrary submission, respondents rely heavily on two of our more recent Commerce Clause cases. In their myopic focus, they overlook the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases. Moreover, even in the narrow prism of respondents’ creation, they read those cases far too broadly. Those two cases, of course, are Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, and Morrison, 529 U. S. 598. As an initial matter, the statutory challenges at issue in those cases were markedly different from the challenge respondents pursue in the case at hand. Here, respondents ask us to excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for we have often reiterated that “[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.” Perez, 402 U. S., at 154 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 193 (emphasis deleted)); see also Hodel, 452 U. S., at 308. At issue in Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, was the validity of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which was a brief, single-subject statute making it a crime for an individual to possess a gun in a school zone. 104 Stat. 4844-4845, 18 U. S. C. § 922(q)(1)(A). The Act did not regulate any economic activity and did not contain any requirement that the possession of a gun have any connection to past interstate activity or a predictable impact on future commercial activity. Distinguishing our earlier cases holding that comprehensive regulatory statutes may be validly applied to local conduct that does not, when viewed in isolation, have a significant impact on interstate commerce, we held the statute invalid. We explained: Page 24 Opinion of the Court The statutory scheme that the Government is defending in this litigation is at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum. As explained above, the CSA, enacted in 1970 as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 84 Stat. 1242-1284, was a lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution, and possession of five classes of “controlled substances.” Most of those substances—those listed in Schedules II through V—“have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.” 21 U. S. C. § 801(1). The regulatory scheme is designed to foster the beneficial use of those medications, to prevent their misuse, and to prohibit entirely the possession or use of substances listed in Schedule I, except as a part of a strictly controlled research project. While the statute provided for the periodic updating of the five schedules, Congress itself made the initial classifications. It identified 42 opiates, 22 opium derivatives, and 17 hallucinogenic substances as Schedule I drugs. 84 Stat. 1248. Marijuana was listed as the 10th item in the 3d subcategory. That classification, unlike the discrete prohibition established by the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, was merely one of many “essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut Opinion of the Court unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Lopez, 514 U. S., at 561.[34] Our opinion in Lopez casts no doubt on the validity of such a program. Nor does this Court’s holding in Morrison, 529 U. S. 598. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1902, created a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. 42 U. S. C. § 13981. The remedy was enforceable in both state and federal courts, and generally depended on proof of the violation of a state law. Despite congressional findings that such crimes had an adverse impact on interstate commerce, we held the statute unconstitutional because, like the statute in Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity. We concluded that “the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision” in Lopez, and that our prior cases had identified a clear pattern of analysis: “‘Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.’”[35] Morrison, 529 U. S., at 610. Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. “Economics” refers to “the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.” Webster’s Third New International __________ [34] The principal dissent asserts that by “[s]eizing upon our language in Lopez,” post, at 46 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), i. e., giving effect to our well-established case law, Congress will now have an incentive to legislate broadly. Even putting aside the political checks that would generally curb Congress’ power to enact a broad and comprehensive scheme for the purpose of targeting purely local activity, there is no suggestion that the CSA constitutes the type of “evasive” legislation the dissent fears, nor could such an argument plausibly be made. Post, at 47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). [35] Lopez, 514 U. S., at 560; see also id., at 573–574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Lopez did not alter our “practical conception of commercial regulation” and that Congress may “regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy”). Page 26 Opinion of the Court Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.[36] Such prohibitions include specific decisions requiring that a drug be withdrawn from the market as a result of the failure to comply with regulatory requirements as well as decisions excluding Schedule I drugs entirely from the market. Because the CSA is a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutionality. The Court of Appeals was able to conclude otherwise only by isolating a “separate and distinct” class of activities that it held to be beyond the reach of federal power, defined as “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law.” 352 F. 3d, at 1229. The court characterized this class as “different in kind from drug trafficking.” Id., at 1228. The differences between the members of a class so defined and the principal trafficker in Schedule I substances might be sufficient to justify a policy decision exempting the narrower class from the coverage of the CSA. The question, however, is whether Congress’ contrary policy judgment, i.e., its decision to include this narrower “class of activities” within the larger regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient. We have no difficulty concluding that Congress acted rationally in determining that none of the characteristics making up the purported class, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA; rather, the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court ___________ [36] See 16 U. S. C. § 668(a) (bald and golden eagles); 18 U. S. C. § 175(a) (biological weapons); § 831(a) (nuclear material); § 842(n)(1) (certain plastic explosives); § 2342(a) (contraband cigarettes). Opinion of the Court of Appeals was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme. First, the fact that marijuana is used “for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician” cannot itself serve as a distinguishing factor. Id., at 1229. The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses. Moreover, the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes, and in what manner. Indeed, most of the substances classified in the CSA “have a useful and legitimate medical purpose.” 21 U. S. C. § 801(1). Thus, even if respondents are correct that marijuana does have accepted medical uses and thus should be redesignated as a lesser schedule drug,[37] the CSA would still impose controls beyond what is required by California law. The CSA requires manufacturers, physicians, pharmacies, and other handlers of controlled substances to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions mandating registration with the DEA, compliance with specific production quotas, security controls to guard against diversion, recordkeeping and reporting obligations, and prescription requirements. See __________ [37] We acknowledge that evidence proffered by respondents in this case regarding the effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I. See, e. g., Institute of Medicine, Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base 179 (J. Joy, S. Watson, & J. Benson eds. 1999) (recognizing that “[s]cientific data indicate the potential therapeutic value of cannabinoid drugs, primarily THC [Tetrahydrocannabinol] for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and appetite stimulation”); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F. 3d 629, 640–643 (CA9 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (chronicling medical studies recognizing valid medical uses for marijuana and its derivatives). But the possibility that the drug may be reclassified in the future has no relevance to the question whether Congress now has the power to regulate its production and distribution. Respondents’ submission, if accepted, would place all homegrown medical substances beyond the reach of Congress’ regulatory jurisdiction. Page 28 Opinion of the Court §§ 821-830; 21 CFR § 1301 et seq. (2004). Furthermore, the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544 (1979). Accordingly, the mere fact that marijuana—like virtually every other controlled substance regulated by the CSA—is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the CSA. Nor can it serve as an “objective marke[r]” or “objective facto[r]” to arbitrarily narrow the relevant class as the dissenters suggest, post, at 47 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); post, at 68 (opinion of Thomas, J.). More fundamentally, if, as the principal dissent contends, the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is beyond the “‘outer limits’ of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority,” post, at 42 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), it must also be true that such personal use of marijuana (or any other homegrown drug) for recreational purposes is also beyond those “‘outer limits,’” whether or not a State elects to authorize or even regulate such use. JUSTICE THOMAS’ separate dissent suffers from the same sweeping implications. That is, the dissenters’ rationale logically extends to place any federal regulation (including quality, prescription, or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for any purpose beyond the “‘outer limits’” of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance. The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, that judgment is not only rational, but “visible to the Opinion of the Court naked eye,” Lopez, 514 U. S., at 563, under any commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an open-ended exemption. Second, limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation “in accordance with state law” cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is “‘superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’” however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 196 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 426 (1925)). See also 392 U. S., at 195-196; Wickard, 317 U. S., at 124 (“‘[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress’”). Just as state acquiescence to federal regulation cannot expand the bounds of the Commerce Clause, see, e.g., Morrison, 529 U. S., at 661-662 (breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 38 States requested federal intervention), so too state action cannot circumscribe Congress’ plenary commerce power. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 114 (1941) (“That power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power”).[38] __________ [38] That is so even if California’s current controls (enacted eight years after the Compassionate Use Act was passed) are “effective,” as the dissenters would have us blindly presume, post, at 53–54 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); post, at 63, 68 (opinion of Thomas, J.). California’s decision (made 34 years after the CSA was enacted) to impose “stric[t] controls” on the “cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical purposes,” post, at 62 (Thomas, J., dissenting), cannot retroactively divest Congress of its authority under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, Justice Thomas’ urgings to the contrary would turn the Supremacy Clause on its head, and would resurrect limits on congressional power that have long since been rejected. See post, at 41 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 424 (1819)) (“‘To impose on [Congress] Page 30 Opinion of the Court Respondents acknowledge this proposition, but nonetheless contend that their activities were not “an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme” because they had been “isolated by the State of California, and [are] policed by the State of California,” and thus remain “entirely separated from the market.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. The dissenters fall prey to similar reasoning. See n. 38, supra, at 26 and this page. The notion that California law has surgically excised a discrete activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate marijuana market is a dubious proposition, and, more importantly, one that Congress could have rationally rejected. Indeed, that the California exemptions will have a significant impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana is not just “plausible” as the principal dissent concedes, post, at 56 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.), it is readily apparent. The exemption for physicians provides them with an economic incentive to grant their patients permission to use the drug. In contrast to most prescriptions for legal drugs, which limit the dosage and duration of the usage, under California law the doctor’s permission to __________ the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of the constitution’ ”). Moreover, in addition to casting aside more than a century of this Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is noteworthy that Justice Thomas’ suggestion that States possess the power to dictate the extent of Congress’ commerce power would have far-reaching implications beyond the facts of this case. For example, under his reasoning, Congress would be equally powerless to regulate, let alone prohibit, the intrastate possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana for recreational purposes, an activity which all States “strictly contro[l].” Indeed, his rationale seemingly would require Congress to cede its constitutional power to regulate commerce whenever a State opts to exercise its “traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.” Post, at 66 (dissenting opinion). Opinion of the Court recommend marijuana use is open-ended. The authority to grant permission whenever the doctor determines that a patient is afflicted with “any other illness for which marijuana provides relief,” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2005), is broad enough to allow even the most scrupulous doctor to conclude that some recreational uses would be therapeutic.[39] And our cases have taught us that there are some unscrupulous physicians who overprescribe when it is sufficiently profitable to do so.[40] The exemption for cultivation by patients and caregivers can only increase the supply of marijuana in the California market.[41] The likelihood that all such production will __________ [39] California’s Compassionate Use Act has since been amended, limiting the catchall category to “[a]ny other chronic or persistent medical symptom that either: ...[s]ubstantially limits the ability of the person to conduct one or more major life activities as defined” in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or “[i]f not alleviated, may cause serious harm to the patient’s safety or physical or mental health.” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 11362.7(h)(12)(A)–(B) (West Supp. 2005). [40] See, e. g., United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122 (1975); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919). [41] The state policy allows patients to possess up to eight ounces of dried marijuana, and to cultivate up to 6 mature or 12 immature plants. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.77(a) (West Supp. 2005). However, the quantity limitations serve only as a floor. Based on a doctor’s recommendation, a patient can possess whatever quantity is necessary to satisfy his medical needs, and cities and counties are given carte blanche to establish more generous limits. Indeed, several cities and counties have done just that. For example, patients residing in the cities of Oakland and Santa Cruz and in the counties of Sonoma and Tehama are permitted to possess up to 3 pounds of processed marijuana. Reply Brief for Petitioners 18–19 (citing Proposition 215 Enforcement Guidelines). Putting that quantity in perspective, 3 pounds of marijuana yields roughly 3,000 joints or cigarettes. Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs 24 (Dec. 2001), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/american_ users_spend_2002.pdf. And the street price for that amount can range anywhere from $900 to $24,000. DEA, Illegal Drug Price and Purity Report (Apr. 2003) (DEA–02058). Page 32 Opinion of the Court promptly terminate when patients recover or will precisely match the patients’ medical needs during their convalescence seems remote; whereas the danger that excesses will satisfy some of the admittedly enormous demand for recreational use seems obvious.[42] Moreover, that the national and international narcotics trade has thrived in the face of vigorous criminal enforcement efforts suggests that no small number of unscrupulous people will make use of the California exemptions to serve their commercial ends whenever it is feasible to do so.[43] Taking into account the fact that California is only one of at least nine States to have authorized the medical use of marijuana, a fact Justice O’CONNOR’s dissent conveniently disregards in arguing that the demonstrated effect on commerce while admittedly “plausible” is ultimately “unsubstantiated,” post, at 56, 55, Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggregate impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial. So, from the “separate and distinct” class of activities identified by the Court of Appeals (and adopted by the dissenters), we are left with “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana.” 352 F. 3d, at 1229. Thus the case for the exemption comes down to the claim that a locally cultivated product that is used domestically __________ [42] For example, respondent Raich attests that she uses 2.5 ounces of cannabis a week. App. 82. Yet as a resident of Oakland, she is entitled to possess up to 3 pounds of processed marijuana at any given time, nearly 20 times more than she uses on a weekly basis. [43] See, e. g., People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1386– 1387, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 23 (1997) (recounting how a Cannabis Buyers’ Club engaged in an “indiscriminate and uncontrolled pattern of sale to thousands of persons among the general public, including persons who had not demonstrated any recommendation or approval of a physician and, in fact, some of whom were not under the care of a physician, such as undercover officers,” and noting that “some persons who had purchased marijuana on respondents’ premises were reselling it unlawfully on the street”). SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment rather than sold on the open market is not subject to federal regulation. Given the findings in the CSA and the undisputed magnitude of the commercial market for marijuana, our decisions in Wickard v. Filburn and the later cases endorsing its reasoning foreclose that claim. V Respondents also raise a substantive due process claim and seek to avail themselves of the medical necessity defense. These theories of relief were set forth in their complaint but were not reached by the Court of Appeals. We therefore do not address the question whether judicial relief is available to respondents on these alternative bases. We do note, however, the presence of another avenue of relief. As the Solicitor General confirmed during oral argument, the statute authorizes procedures for the reclassification of Schedule I drugs. But perhaps even more important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the halls of Congress. Under the present state of the law, however, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [Page 33 continues with concurring opinion of Justice SCALIA.]
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are NOT LAW. -- Nor are state rules to the same effect. -- They are, in this instance, anti- constitutional..
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. Unless and until these warnings or a waiver of these rights are demonstrated at the trial, no evidence obtained in the interrogation may be used against the accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 478, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. See also In custody; Interrogation. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. It's the law. Everybody knows it but tpaine. If one is subjected to custodial interrogation without being given the Miranda warnings, no evidence obtained in the interrogation may be used against the accused. It is the law because the U.S. Supreme Court said so in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In tpaine's delusional world, there is no enforceable Miranda Rule as there is no such thing as case law. Nowhere in the Constitution does it say one must be informed of his rights prior to questioning, nor does it say answers to questions asked before the court-required warning may not be used against the accused.
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham The nullification principle involves the power to say no to the excesses of government, --- to onerous scotus opinions and unconstitutional precedences, --- and thus serves as a final defense against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson put it to Tom Paine in a 1789 letter, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550
To really get in touch, tell the judge, during voir dire, that you espouse jury nullification. Or get reported to the judge during deliberations. "Fully Informed Juror, which "is essentially a study of juror nullification." Nullification gets a juror kicked off the jury. "Fully informed juror," if espoused to the Court is grounds for dismissal. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) [Excerpt] Jury deliberations, however, presented the Court with two issues. First, after only an hour of deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating that one juror refused to accept the legitimacy of the drug laws at issue. After it became clear that deliberations could not move forward, the Court conducted individual juror voir dire. The Court dismissed Juror No. 2[1] because he was unwilling to set aside his belief that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the authority to proscribe mere possession of narcotics. The second issue arose when Juror No. 3, a man in his midfifties, informed the Court of teenage drug use and a resulting arrest. Juror No. 3's revelations, however, did not provide grounds for removal because any resulting legal consequences had completely resolved more than seven years before his service. I. BACKGROUND Luisi's case went to the jury just before noon on March 11. At approximately 1:00, the Court received the following note: Trial Tr. vol. 9, 2 (March 12, 2008). The Court instructed the jury that they were not free "to determine any constitutional questions about [the] law." Id. at 3. At 3:00, the jury sent two more questions. The first inquired, "If a juror denies on constitutional grounds the validity of the trial, charges, and jurisdiction thus preempting consideration of the facts in question, is he an ineligible juror?" Id. at 7. The second asked, "Are we, given these objections, a legally constituted jury?" Id. After speaking with counsel, the Court convened and again instructed the jurors that the laws at issue were constitutional and that they were not free to substitute their own views. Id. The Court then told the jury they were to take the rest of the day off and to reflect on the Court's instructions. Id. at 11-12. The next day, after researching the issue and consulting the attorneys, the Court determined that if the problem persisted each juror should be brought into the lobby in the presence of counsel and the Court should inquire 1) whether he or she believed he or she could *109 faithfully apply the law as instructed to the facts of the case; and 2) whether he or she could begin their deliberations afresh if a juror had to be removed and replaced by an alternate. See Trial Tr. vol. 10, 6 (March 13, 2008); see also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 302 (3d Cir.2007) (recognizing that individual questioning of jurors may be "the optimal way to root out misconduct"). When the jury arrived, the Court instructed them to continue deliberations, but told them that they should send another note if the problem persisted. Id. at 5. Within ten minutes, the foreperson passed a note indicating that one juror still refused to engage in deliberations. The Court instructed the jurors to suspend deliberations and began questioning each juror in the lobby. The Court first spoke with the foreperson, who answered both of the aforementioned questions in the affirmative. Juror No. 2 was the second juror questioned. He immediately informed the Court that he was the juror who had asked the first juror question and who was the subject of the second and third questions. Id. at 10. He then explained: * * * Congress is empowered by Article I, in a list of about 17 specific empowerments, I'm unaware, and it was never made clear to me, where [banning mere possession of drugs] is authorized in the Constitution. Id. at 12-13. The Court then informed Juror No. 2 that the Supreme Court had interpreted the Commerce Clause "to extend to enacting laws with respect to contraband, including contraband drugs." Id. at 14. When asked if he could accept that interpretation and apply the law passed by Congress to Luisi's case, Juror No. 2 stated that he could "only accept the words that have been given to [him], and [he could] only accept the fact that [the Commerce Clause] is written as it is written." Id. Juror No. 2 also took exception to the Court's reference to the Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution. In his words, "[I]nterpret is a word I associate with reading a foreign language. The [C]onstitution as ... you know, is written in English." Id. at 16. He pontificated: Id. At one point during the exchange, the Court asked Juror No. 2 whether he believed he had the authority to "decide whether the law is valid." Id. at 14. He responded: Id. The Court spent several minutes attempting to explain how Congress had the authority to ban drug possession but continued to receive evasive responses. The Court then asked Juror No. 2 to step out in the hallway in order to confer with counsel. The Court informed counsel of its opinion that Juror No. 2 was "engaged in juror nullification and [the Court believed] it was within [its] power to dismiss him." But before dismissing Juror No. 2, the Court wanted to hear argument. The government did not object to the dismissal. Id. at 21. Luisi's counsel objected on the ground that Juror No. 2 had stated he did not agree with the Fully Informed Juror, which "is essentially a study of juror nullification." Id. Notwithstanding Juror No. 2's professed disagreement with the "philosophy known as a fully informed juror," it was clear he believed the Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to pass laws related to drugs that did not cross "more than two" state lines and that he did not accept the power of the judiciary to interpret the Clause to embrace any additional power. It was equally clear that he was unable to set aside his personal beliefs and apply the law as instructed. Notwithstanding defense counsel's argument, the Court was convinced that this was a form of juror misconduct that could be classified as nullification. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir.1997) ("'[N]ullification' can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors may nullify, for example, because of ... [a] general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws."). At bottom, Juror No. 2's insistence on applying his own law was grounds for dismissal. The Court therefore dismissed Juror No. 2 and replaced him with the first alternate, who up until that point had been isolated from the deliberating jury. After questioning each of the remaining jurors, the Court brought the newly constituted jury into the courtroom and explained that they were to begin their deliberations afresh. Trial Tr. vol. 10, 33.
The nullification principle involves the power to say no to the excesses of government, --- to onerous scotus opinions and unconstitutional precedences, --- and thus serves as a final defense against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson put it to Tom Paine in a 1789 letter, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550 We can hope juries are NOT stupid enough to follow your nasty little recommendations, nolu. Only in the anti-constitutional world of nolu sham, and his socialistic progressives, -- do we see this idiocy advocated. It's time to end their world. VOTE TRUMP...
'Continued use will not be without risk of arrest, but after this no responsible prosecutor will waste taxpayer resources trying her for the "crime" of using medicine.'
#14. To: misterwhite (#10)
Why not simply repeal the law? For everyone?
That should be easy given that it's an immoral one.
#15. To: nolu chan (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
#16. To: nolu chan (#9)
Jury nullification is just fine. It does not change any law. It does not say marijuana is legal. It says the jury, based on the fasts of the case, found rendering a guilty verdict in the case before them would be an injustice. They are empowered and free to render a not guilty verdict. They do not change the law.
#17. To: ConservingFreedom, TPAINE (#15)
I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided October 15, 1969
#18. To: ConservingFreedom (#13)
That would be irresponsible use of taxpayer resources absent any evidence that this jury was somehow skewed.
#19. To: All, nolu spam, wrong again (#16)
--- where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13]
#20. To: hondo68 (#0)
#21. To: ConservingFreedom (#15)
"Recently, several courts have indicated that judges also have the right, when it is brought to their attention by other jurors, to remove (prior to a verdict, of course) from juries any juror who makes clear his or her intention to vote to nullify the law.
#22. To: nolu chan (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
#23. To: nolu chan (#18)
"That would be irresponsible use of taxpayer resources absent any evidence that this jury was somehow skewed."
#24. To: nolu chan (#17)
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision.
#25. To: tpaine (#19)
(Edited)
You quote an OPINION by Justice Jay: ---
But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13]
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as in their judgment were applicable to the particular case being tried. If because, generally speaking, it is the function of the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused according to the evidence, of the truth or weight of which they are to judge, the court should be held bound to instruct them upon a point in respect to which there was no evidence whatever, or to forbear stating what the law is upon a given state of facts, the result would be that the enforcement of the law against criminals and the protection of
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century.
[156 U.S. 51] Syllabus
"It may not be amiss here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law it is the province of the court, to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to take [65] upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt you will pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court, for as on the one hand it is presumed that juries are best judges of facts, it is, on the other hand, presumable that the courts are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully within your power of decision."
"was an anomaly. It purports to be a trial by jury in the Supreme Court of the United States of certain issues out of chancery, and the Chief Justice begins by telling the jury that the facts are all agreed, and the only question is a matter of law, and upon that the whole court were agreed. If it be correctly reported, I can only say it is not in accordance with the views of any other court, so far as I know, in this country or in England, and is certainly not in accordance with the course of the Supreme Court for many years."
This question was also fully considered in Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 132, 149, 151, in which case Chief Justice Robertson said:
"The circuit judge would be a cipher, and a criminal trial before him a farce, if he had no right to decide all questions of law which might arise in the progress of the case. The jury are the exclusive judges of the facts. In this particular they cannot be controlled, and ought not to be instructed, by the court. They are also,
necessitate, the ultimate judges, in one respect, of the law. If they acquit, the judge cannot grant a new trial, how much soever they have misconceived or disregarded the law. . . . If the court had no right to decide on the law, error, confusion, uncertainty, and licentiousness would characterize the criminal trials, and the safety of the accused might be as much endangered as the stability of public justice would certainly be."
"The unquestionable power of juries to find general verdicts, involving both law and fact, furnishes the foundation for the opinion that they are judges of the law as well as of the fact, and gives some plausibility to that opinion. They are not, however, compelled to decide legal questions, having the right to find special verdicts, giving the facts, and leaving the legal conclusions which result from such facts to the court. When they find general verdicts, I think it is their duty to be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal questions involved in such verdicts. They have the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded as rightful, although the law has provided no means, in criminal cases, of reviewing their decisions, whether of law of fact, or of ascertaining the grounds upon which their verdicts are based."
"The line between the duties of a court and jury in the trial of causes at law, both civil and criminal, is perfectly well defined, and the rigid observance of it is of the last importance to the administration of systematic justice. Whilst, on the one hand, the jury are the sole, ultimate judges of the facts, they are, on the other, to receive the law applicable to the case before them solely from the publicly given instructions of the court. In this way, court and jury are made responsible, each in its appropriate department, for the part taken by each in the trial and decision of causes, and in this way alone can errors of fact and errors of law be traced, for the purpose of correction, to their proper sources. If the jury can receive the law of a case on trial in any other mode than from the instructions of the court, given in the presence of parties and counsel, how are their errors of law with any certainty to be detected, and how, with any certainty therefore to be corrected? It is a statute right of parties here -- following, too, the ancient course of the common law -- to have the law given by the court, in their presence, to the jury, to guide their decision, in order that every error in matter of law may be known and corrected."
"You are, it is true, judges in a criminal case, in one sense, of both law and fact, for your verdict, as in civil cases, must pass on law and fact together. If you acquit, you interpose a final bar to a second prosecution, no matter how entirely your verdict may have been in opposition to the views expressed by the court. . . . It is important for you to keep this distinction in mind, remembering that while you have the physical power, by an acquittal, to discharge a defendant from further prosecution, you have no moral power to do so against the law laid down by the court. . . . For your part, your duty is to receive the law, for the purposes of this trial, from the court. If an error injurious to
the prisoner occurs, it will be rectified by the revision of the court en banc. But an error resulting from either a conviction or acquittal against the law can never be rectified. In the first case, an unnecessary stigma is affixed to the character of a man who was not guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the second case, a serious injury is effected by the arbitrary and irremediable discharge of a guilty man. You will see from these considerations the great importance of the preservation, in criminal as well as in civil cases, of the maxim that the law belongs to the court, and the facts to the jury."
"The point, if you believe the evidence on both sides, is one of law, on which it is your duty to receive the instructions of the court. If you believe the evidence in the whole case, you must find the defendant guilty."
"The court had an undoubted right to instruct the jury as to the law, and to warn them as they did against finding contrary to it. This is very different from telling them that they must find the defendant guilty, which is what is meant by a binding instruction in criminal cases."
"We are thus led to the conclusion that the doctrine that jurors are the judges of the law in criminal cases is untenable; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the common law from which it is claimed to take its origin; contrary to the uniform practice and decisions of the courts of Great Britain, where our jury system had its beginning and where it matured; contrary to the great weight of authority in this country; contrary to the spirit and meaning of the Constitution of the United States; repugnant to the Constitution of this state; repugnant to our statute relative to the reservation of questions of law in criminal cases, and passing the same to the supreme court for final decision."
The main reason ordinarily assigned for a recognition of the right of the jury in a criminal case to take the law into their own hands, and to disregard the directions of the court in matters of law, is that the safety and liberty of the citizen will be thereby more certainly secured. That view was urged upon Mr. Justice Curtis. After stating that, if he conceived the reason assigned to be well founded, he would pause long before denying the existence of the power claimed, he said that a good deal of reflection had convinced him that the
"[a]s long as the judges of the United States are obliged to express their opinions publicly, to give their reasons for them when called upon in the usual mode, and to stand responsible for them not only to public opinion, but to a court of impeachment, I can apprehend very little danger of the laws' being wrested to purposes of injustice. But on the other hand, I do consider that this power and corresponding duty of the court authoritatively to declare the law is one of the highest safeguards of the citizen. The sole end of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially, without respect of persons or times or the opinions of men. To enforce popular laws is easy. But when an unpopular cause is a just cause; when a law, unpopular in some locality, is to be enforced — there then comes the strain upon the administration of justice, and few unprejudiced men would hesitate as to where that strain would be most firmly borne."
#26. To: A Pole (#22)
Keeping jurors in ignorance is a nullification of the juries.
#27. To: ConservingFreedom (#24)
Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?
#28. To: nolu chan (#27)
'Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?'
#29. To: ConservingFreedom (#28)
Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court.
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century.
#30. To: nolu chan (#29)
Here is a Federal court interpretation of that Opinion which covers 156 U.S. 51 through 107.
#31. To: nolu chan (#29)
the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law
#32. To: ConservingFreedom (#31)
Which in no way implies your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited". As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster.
i. Juries Do Not Have a Right to Disregard the Judge's Instructions on the Law
A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.
#33. To: nolu chan (#29)
The Supreme Court, ... affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law
#34. To: nolu chan claims - Jury Nullification Threatens to Undermine the Democratic Process (#32)
#35. To: nolu chan (#32)
United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008)
#36. To: A Pole (#21)
I was removed from the jury for that. I told judge that I will put my judgment and conscience before his instructions.
#37. To: nolu chan (#32)
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.
#38. To: Pinguinite (#37)
If you want a legal precedent, look up the case of William Penn in 1670.
#39. To: nolu chan (#38)
and whatever he said would not overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
#40. To: ConservingFreedom (#35)
Nice job of proving what I already stipulated, dolt: that some judges - presumably including Judge Young (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts) - will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
A lawyer defending a criminal case may zealously advocate for the acquittal of his client using any evidentiary argument for which he has a reasonable good faith basis. Current legal standards strongly disfavor jury nullification and prohibit express exhortations that a jury nullify the law. Accordingly, a lawyer may not, consistent with the rules of professional conduct, expressly urge a jury to disregard the law. Nor may a lawyer disregard a ruling of the tribunal limiting the scope of permissible argument.
#41. To: A Pole (#33)
The judge should provide legal advice to the jury. Jurors are not lawyers and what are the alternatives - hiring an outside advisor?
#42. To: nolu chan (#41)
The nullification principle involves the power to say no to the excesses of government, and thus serves as a final defense against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson put it to Tom Paine in a 1789 letter, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550
The rule prohibiting defense counsel from arguing nullificationto a jury is Supreme Court (federal) precedent dating to 1895. Similar rules have been adopted in 48 states.
#43. To: nolu chan, A Pole (#41)
The title of the thread contains the term "jury nullification."
Castle(C), Stein(G), Johnson(L)
#44. To: hondo68 (#43)
For whatever reasons, the jurors decided that the defendant was not guilty of a crime.
#45. To: nolu chan (#40)
NOT JUST SOME JUDGES, the BAR ASSOCIATIONS do it
#46. To: ConservingFreedom, Willie Green, sneakypete, Vicomte13, TooConservative (#45)
Fine, make that "some judges and some bar associations" - still doesn't add up to a universal prohibition, particularly since a defendant has the option of representing himself and if doing so could give a shit what any bar association says.
#47. To: nolu chan (#41)
The judge instructs the jury on what the law is.The jury determines the facts.The jury is supposed to apply the law, as given by the court, to the facts.
#48. To: tpaine (#42)
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are NOT LAW.
et al.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
“(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
“(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.
“(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.
“The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” Id., at 127-128.
“Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intra-state activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.” 514 U.S., at 561.
#49. To: All, ---- SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham opines (#42)
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham
#50. To: tpaine (#49)
SCOTUS opinions and precedents are NOT LAW. -- Nor are state rules to the same effect. -- They are, in this instance, anti- constitutional..
Case law. The aggregate of reported cases as forming a body of jurisprudence, or the law of a particular subject as evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases, in distinction to statutes and other sources of law. It includes the aggregate of reported cases tat interpret statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions.
Miranda Rule. Prior to any custodial interrogation (that is, questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way) the person must be warned: 1. That he has a right to remain silent; 2. That any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him; 3. That he has a right to the presence of an attorney; 4. That if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
#51. To: All, --- anti- constitutional SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham (#49)
#52. To: tpaine (#51)
To get in touch with the fully informed jury movement write: Fully Informed Jury Association, Box 59, Helmville MT 5984, 406-793-5550
The First Circuit vacated Luisi's conviction because the district court refused to give an entrapment instruction. Id. On remand, the case was assigned to this session of the Court. On March 12, 2008, a second jury convicted Luisi on the same three drug-related counts. Jury Verdict [Doc. No. 257]. Although Luisi's entrapment defense at times lent the proceedings the air of The Godfather, the trial was otherwise unremarkable.
One juror is asking: Where — if two-thirds of both houses of congress voted in 1919 that it was necessary to amend the constitution to give congress the power to ban mere possession of a substance (prohibition of alcohol in that case) — is the constitutional grant of authority to ban mere possession of cocaine today?
My question was where, if, ... as every schoolboy knows, the highest law in the land is the United States Constitution, and if [C]ongress had to go to amend the [C]onstitution in, actually it was ratified in 1919, the 18th Amendment, in order to have the power to ban not interstate commerce but mere possession, where is [Congress' authority to ban mere possession of drugs] in the [C]onsitution[?]
As an educator, I know that [the Constitution is] written to the eleventh grade vocabulary level. And "among the several states" is a reference to, is basically the plural between. It's more than two. And I know that if a plane crashes between North America and Europe it did not crash in Denver. I know that there's a specific meaning to those words.
No, I don't decide.... I am familiar with the philosophy known as a fully informed juror,[2] but I disagree with it. *110 What I'm saying is that the interstate commerce clause ... those words have a specific meaning; that words have meaning.
#53. To: nolu sham, anti-constitutionalist, anti- trump (#52)
All, --- anti- constitutional SCOTUS opinions and precedents are law, ---- nolu sham (#49)
To really get in touch, tell the judge, during voir dire, that you espouse jury nullification. Or get reported to the judge during deliberations.
Nullification gets a juror kicked off the jury. "Fully informed juror," if espoused to the Court is grounds for dismissal.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
[Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register]