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Title: Florida Woman Found Not Guilty of Marijuana Cultivation (Jury Nullification)
Source:
Marijuana.com
URL Source: http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/ ... ilty-of-marijuana-cultivation/
Published: Sep 17, 2016
Author: Monterey Bud
Post Date: 2016-09-17 21:06:32 by Hondo68
Keywords: Not Guilty, legal, Maine to Florida
Views: 9868
Comments: 53
Bridget Kirouac, a medical marijuana patient who relocated from Maine to Florida, and who suffers from debilitating bone spurs, was found not guilty of cultivating medical marijuana in her Martin County home. BREAKING: Bridget Kirouac found NOT GUILTY of cultivation and possession of cannabis. More tonight on @WPTVpic.twitter.com/KTNuuRqXd7 — Jason Hackett (@JHackettWPTV) September 16, 2016 Informing the sympathetic jury, “I’m not a criminal, I’m a patient,” Kirouac told the attentive courtroom. “All I’m trying to do is survive.” Kirouac used marijuana Kirouac explained to the courtroom that she was an MMJ patient in the state of Maine with a valid recommendation for medical marijuana before relocating to the Sunshine State for its warmer climate. She held back tears while explaining her struggle with pain. “When you get to that point, and you tried as many of the options that are available to you as I have…dying becomes a very attractive prospect,” she said. The prosecution focused on the fact that medical marijuana was not legal at the time of her offense. They were ultimately handed a historical defeat with the jury’s not guilty verdict for Bridget Kirouac. Poster Comment: A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal. THE END 
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#1. To: hondo68 (#0)
The War on Pot doesn't work without the cooperation of juries.
A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. I expect to see more cases like this one. The shrill, shrieking authoritarians here ain't gonna like this one bit. Hallelujah!! This was the second medical marijuana case that Michael Minardi has won in Florida. The first was the case of Jesse Teplicki. If you are ever charged with marijuana possession in Florida, be sure to cite the binding precedent of Florida v. Bridget Kirouac, opinion of the jury. That judge is a spoilsport.
You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others. Not just this thread either - it's pretty much the same on any post you make about medical marijuana users. Let's get one thing straight - the government does not own our bodies and as such has no business telling anyone what they may or may not use to medicate themselves. Pot, meet kettle. You're the asshole who takes delight in the flouting of the law. To you, laws are merely a recommendation and they only apply to others, not you.
Continued use will not be without risk of arrest, but after this no responsible prosecutor will waste taxpayer resources trying her for the "crime" of using medicine. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Geeze, who pissed in your Cheerios this morning? I'm completely confident that Deckard takes no delight in the flouting of just laws such as those against murder, rape, and theft ... but is pleased to see punishment not inflicted on those breaking immoral laws such as those against using governmentally-disapproved medicines. So "Deckard" is really Bridget Kirouac? Who knew? A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Or they will prosecute because it will be another jury, and this case will not be citable for innocence. Absolutely nothing can be cited as marijuana being medicine.
Not just this thread either - it's pretty much the same on any post you make about medical marijuana users. Not taking delight, just not taking your blathering bullshit. Marijuana is illegal. Marijuana is not medicine. That is the law, like it or not. Jury nullification is just fine. It does not change any law. It does not say marijuana is legal. It says the jury, based on the fasts of the case, found rendering a guilty verdict in the case before them would be an injustice. They are empowered and free to render a not guilty verdict. They do not change the law. Each future defendant will have to roll the dice on a verdict, knowing that they have violated the law. And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
Why not simply repeal the law? For everyone? That should be easy given that it's an immoral one.
Bullshit! The jury decided that the DA's and your presentation to the court is SPAM, that you're CT freaks, kooks, and weirdos. It's settled law that weed is legal. The precedent is carved into stone, deal with it! It's settled law that weed is legal. The precedent is carved into stone, deal with it! Neither a trial court, nor its jury, is capable of setting a binding precedent. How much ignorance can you display? A precedent is binding upon all lower courts within the jurisdiction of an appellate court. A trial court has no lower court to bind. A jury is not the court and cannot create precedent, even upon the trial court. You are completely cluless. You do not know what a binding precedent is. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precedent Precedent that must be applied or followed is known as binding precedent (alternately metaphorically precedent, mandatory or binding authority, etc.). Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a lower court must honor findings of law made by a higher court that is within the appeals path of cases the court hears. In state and federal courts in the United States of America, jurisdiction is often divided geographically among local trial courts, several of which fall under the territory of a regional appeals court. All appellate courts fall under a highest court (sometimes but not always called a "supreme court"). By definition, decisions of lower courts are not binding on courts higher in the system, nor are appeals court decisions binding on local courts that fall under a different appeals court. Further, courts must follow their own proclamations of law made earlier on other cases, and honor rulings made by other courts in disputes among the parties before them pertaining to the same pattern of facts or events, unless they have a strong reason to change these rulings. There is a binding precedent, but it is from the U.S. Supreme Court. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27-29 (2005) Second, limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation “in accordance with state law” cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is “‘superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’” however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 196 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 426 (1925)). See also 392 U. S., at 195–196; Wickard, 317 U. S., at 124 (“‘[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress’”). - - - - - - - - - - [37] We acknowledge that evidence proffered by respondents in this case regarding the effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I. See, e. g., Institute of Medicine, Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base 179 (J. Joy, S. Watson, & J. Benson eds. 1999) (recognizing that “[s]cientific data indicate the potential therapeutic value of cannabinoid drugs, primarily THC [Tetrahydrocannabinol] for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and appetite stimulation”); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F. 3d 629, 640–643 (CA9 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (chronicling medical studies recognizing valid medical uses for marijuana and its derivatives). But the possibility that the drug may be reclassified in the future has no relevance to the question whether Congress now has the power to regulate its production and distribution. Respondents’ submission, if accepted, would place all homegrown medical substances beyond the reach of Congress’ regulatory jurisdiction.
Or they will prosecute because it will be another jury That would be irresponsible use of taxpayer resources absent any evidence that this jury was somehow skewed. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. I'm all for it. Sadly, that doesn't follow. But the trend is in that direction, and I pray it continues. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Really? I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. "Recently, several courts have indicated that judges also have the right, when it is brought to their attention by other jurors, to remove (prior to a verdict, of course) from juries any juror who makes clear his or her intention to vote to nullify the law. " - law2.umkc.edu/faculty/pro...zenger/nullification.html A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. --- arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited. Why is arguing nullification before a jury prohibited, -- if,-- " Jury nullification is just fine." ???
For one example, see: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) Argued June 10, 1969 William M. Kunstler, New York City, (Harold Buchman, Fred Weisgal, Baltimore, Md., Robert R. Drinan, William C. Cunningham, Harrop A. Freeman on brief), for appellants. Barnet D. Skolnik, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Stephen H. Sachs, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee. Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and WINTER, Circuit Judges. SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge: [...] II Appellants' second contention is that the trial judge should have informed the jury, as requested, that it had the power to acquit even if appellants were clearly guilty of the charged offenses. They maintain that the judge should have told the jury this or permitted their counsel to argue it to the jury in the face of the judge's instruction on the law. Appellants reason that since the jury has "the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts," [5] then the jury should be told that it has this power. Furthermore, the argument runs, the jury's power to acquit where the law may dictate otherwise is a fundamental necessity of a democratic system. Only in this way, it is said, can a man's actions be judged fairly by society speaking through the jury, or a law which is considered too harsh be mitigated. [...] We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Concededly, this power of the jury is not always contrary to the interests of justice. For example, freedom of the press was immeasurably strengthened by the jury's acquittal of John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, a violation of which, under the law as it then existed and the facts, he was clearly guilty. In that case Andrew Hamilton was allowed to urge the jury, in the face of the judge's charge, "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging of the lives, liberties, or estates of their fellow subjects."[11] No less an authority than Dean Pound has expressed the opinion that "Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration."[12] However, this is not to say that the jury should be encouraged in their "lawlessness," and by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to insure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century. Justice Harlan's scholarly opinion traced the history of the rights of juries in criminal cases. He distinguished Brailsford as a civil case and therefore not controlling in criminal trials. Justice Harlan further deprecated that decision, going to the extreme of questioning whether it was in fact reported properly, since he doubted that Chief Justice Jay could ever have held such an opinion even in a civil case. The Justice concluded finally that Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were applicable to the particular case being tried. * * * But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13] There was a powerful dissent by Justice Grey joined by Justice Shiras. As in the majority decision, Justice Grey historically traced the authorities and the classic arguments to support his conclusion that the jury should decide both the law and the facts.[14] The Harlan majority opinion, however, has carried the day. Since the Sparf case, the lower federal courts — even in the occasional cases in which they may have ventured to question its wisdom[15] — have adhered to the doctrine it affirmed.[16] Furthermore, among the states, only two still allow the jury to be told that they can disregard the law as given them by the court.[17] The recent case of United States v. Spock et al., 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), heavily stressed by the appellants in their supplemental memorandum, does not reach a different conclusion. That case was concerned with the question arising from submission of special interrogatories to the jury. The First Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Aldrich, concluded that By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him through the frame of the questions.[18] Nowhere does the court intimate that the judge should not instruct the jury on the law, and nowhere does it hold, as appellants here contend, that the jury should be instructed that it may disregard the law as declared by the judge.
The Court was quite clear in saying this does not mean that she can further use marijuana. It is UNLAWFUL. The jury verdict did not change that. If she tokes up tomorrow, that will be another prosecutable crime.
Why is arguing nullification before a jury prohibited, -- if,-- " Jury nullification is just fine." ??? You quote an OPINION by Justice Jay: --- So you return to the same old silly argument, -- that 'we must hold firmly to the doctrine', --- court opinions MUST be treated as 'law'. -- You're wrong..
Good! This is what jury is for - to protect people from legal unjustice.
I was removed from the jury for that. I told judge that I will put my judgment and conscience before his instructions.
Keeping jurors in ignorance is a nullification of the juries.
The Court was quite clear in saying this does not mean that she can further use marijuana. Completely beside the point ... color me unsurprised. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one? It certainly isn't this: A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. --- where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13] So you return to the same old silly argument, -- that 'we must hold firmly to the doctrine', --- court opinions MUST be treated as 'law'. -- You're wrong.. And you are an ingnorant asshole displaying your assholery. You post responds to yourself at #16. At #17 I quoted from one case, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969). Moylan gave the correct precedent, and you are full of shit, as usual. The quote from Moylan reads: Moylan has a footnote 13: "Sparf and Hansen v. United States, supra n. 6 at 101-102, 15 S. Ct. at 293." At the footnote 13 cited case, pp. 101-02, Sparf says: 156 U.S. 102 citizens against unjust and groundless prosecutions, would depend entirely upon juries uncontrolled by any settled, fixed, legal principles. And if it be true that jurors in a criminal case are under no legal obligation to take the law from the court, and may determine for themselves what the law is, it necessarily results that counsel for the accused may, of right, in the presence of both court and jury, contend that what the court declares to be the law applicable to the case in hand is not the law, and, in support of his contention, read to the jury the reports of adjudged cases and the views of elementary writers. Undoubtedly, in some jurisdictions, where juries in criminal cases have the right, in virtue of constitutional or statutory provisions, to decide both law and facts upon their own judgment as to what the law is, and as to what the facts are, it may be the privilege of counsel to read and discuss adjudged cases before the jury And in a few jurisdictions, in which it is held that the court alone responds as to the law, that practice is allowed in deference to long usage. But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. Under the contrary view - if it be held that the court may not authoritatively decide all questions of law arising in criminal cases -the result will be that when a new trial in a criminal case is ordered, even by this court, the jury, upon such trial, may of right return a verdict based upon the assumption that what this court has adjudged to be law is not law We cannot give our sanction to any rule that will lead to such a result. We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law, upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be. Sparf quotes Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U. S. 1 (1794) from an opinion by Chief Justice John Jay. The quote, as given by Sparf, is recited below, a bit more completely. That early 1794 jury civil case was annihilated as any sort of precedent to the effect of espousing jury nullification in criminal or general cases by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sparf and Hansen v. United States,, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) which I have previously quoted to your dumb ass, and which is the case cited in the footnote to which you refer here. As noted below, Georgia v. Brailsford 3 U.S. 1 (1794) was examined by the U.S. Sureme Court in Sparf, and the whole case was considered an anomaly. It was a trial by jury in the U.S. Supreme Court. The jury, so-called, was a panel of experts chosen for their expertise on the subject. The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in one case about jury nullification in 1894 and decided in 1895. That case, Sparf and Hansen v. United States,, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), forever put your insane bullshit to bed. Deal with it. As Moylan noted in 1969, as I quoted: And since 1969, add about another half-century to that standing precedent. As you have been previously informed of this, I am sure you are merely being an asshole. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/156/51/case.html U.S. Supreme Court Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) Sparf and Hansen v. United States No. 613 Submitted March 5, 1894 Decided January 21, 1895 In the courts of the United States, it is the duty of the jury, in criminal cases, to receive the law from the court, and to apply it as given by the court, subject to the condition that, by a general verdict, a jury of necessity determines both law and fact as compounded in the issue submitted to them in the particular case. [156 U.S. 63] Opinion of the Court The court below assumed, and correctly, that section 1035 of the Revised Statutes did not authorize a jury in a criminal case to find the defendant guilty of a less offense than the one charged unless the evidence justified them in so doing. Congress did not intend to invest juries in criminal cases with power arbitrarily to disregard the evidence and the principles of law applicable to the case on trial. [156 U.S. 64] Opinion of the Court The general question as to the duty of the jury to receive the law from the court is not concluded by any direct decision of this Court. But it has been often considered by other courts and by judges of high authority, and, where its determination has not been controlled by specific constitutional or statutory provisions expressly empowering the jury to determine both law and facts, the principle by which courts and juries are to be guided in the exercise of their respective functions has become firmly established. [156 U. S. 64-65] Opinion of the Court In Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 3 U. S. 4, a case in this Court tried by a special jury upon an amicable issue, Chief Justice Jay is reported to have said: Of the correctness of this report, Mr. Justice Curtis in United States v. Morris, 1 Curtis 23, 58, expressed much doubt, for the reason that the Chief Justice is reported as saying that, in civil cases — and that was a civil case — the jury had the right to decide the law, and because also the different parts of the charge conflict with each other, the Chief Justice, according to the report, saying at the outset that it is the province of the jury to decide questions of fact, and of the court to decide questions of law, and in the succeeding sentence informing the jury that they had the right to take upon themselves the determination of both law and fact. If the Chief Justice said that it was the province of the court to decide questions of law, and the province of the jury to decide questions of fact, he could not have said that the jury had the right, in a civil case, to judge of and determine both law and fact. "The whole case," Mr. Justice Curtis said, [156 U. S. 82 - 86] Opinion of the Court 156 U. S. 83 In Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536, 554, it was held to be inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution that questions of law, and, still less, questions of constitutional law, should be decided by the verdict of the jury contrary to the instructions of the court. In Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y. 588, 591, Judge Selden, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York, said: See also People v. Finnegan, 1 Parker's Cr.Cas. 147, 152; Safford v. People, 1 Parker's Cr.Cas. 474, 480. So, in Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, 192, Mr. Justice Campbell, as the organ of the court, said: "We understand the uniform practice and the decided weight of opinion to require that the judge give his views of the law to the jury as authority, and not as a matter to be submitted to their review." And in People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65, 70: "In this state it is so well settled as no longer to be open to debate that it is the duty of a jury, in a criminal case, to take the law from the court." 156 U. S. 84 The principle was accurately stated by Chief Justice Ames, speaking for the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, when he said: State v. Smith, 6 R.I. 33, 34. In Pennsylvania, in the case of Commonwealth v. Sherry (reported in the appendix to Wharton's treatise on Homicide, pp. 481-482), Judge Rogers, a jurist of high reputation, thus charged the jury in a capital case: 156 U. S. 85 About the same time, Judge Sergeant charged a jury: Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, Brightly (Penn.) 73. To the same effect, substantially, was the language of Chief Justice Gibson, who, when closing a charge in a capital case, said, "If the evidence on these points fail the prisoner, the conclusion of his guilt will be irresistible, and it will be your duty to draw it." Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn.St. 269. In a more recent case, Kane v. Commonwealth, 89 Penn.St. 522, Sharswood, C.J., said that the power of the jury to judge of the law in a criminal case was one of the most valuable securities guarantied by the bill of rights of Pennsylvania. But in a later case, Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 96 Penn.St. 505, it was said: In Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Penn.St. 64, 85, it was adjudged that the statement by the court was the best evidence of the law within the reach of the jury, and that the jury should be guided by what the court said as to the law. And this view the court, speaking by Chief Justice Paxson, said was in harmony with Kane v. Commonwealth. The question has recently been examined by the Supreme Court of Vermont, and after an elaborate review of the 156 U. S. 86 authorities, English and American, that court, by a unanimous judgment, overruling State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, and all the previous cases which had followed that case, said: State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 34. These principles are supported by a very large number of adjudications, as will be seen by an examination of the cases cited in margin.{2} [156 U. S. 106 - 107] Opinion of the Court, conclusion 156 U. S. 107 argument was the other way. He wisely observed that, United States v. Morris, 1 Curtis 62, 63. The questions above referred to are the only ones that need be considered on this writ of error.
The U.S. Supreme Court set precedent to the contrary in 1895. It still stands. See #25. The standing precedent is Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. The standing precedent is Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Once you persuade the courts that over a century of standing settled precedent should be overturned, you will be making progress. Until then, you are just spewing doper bullshit.
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Your absurd interpretation of Sparf is pure bullshit pulled out of your ass. Here is a Federal court interpretation of that Opinion which covers 156 U.S. 51 through 107. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969)
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century. Your absurd interpretation of Sparf is pure bullshit pulled out of your ass. Scotus opinions are not law.
Which in no way implies your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited". As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) And your are a master weasel-word bullshitter, but have no substance to your bullshit. You just pull it out of yor ass. Thank you, sir! May I have another? Yes, you may. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) Courts have long recognized that defendants have no right to an instruction on jury nullification. See United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969). A court may "block defense attorneys' attempts to serenade a jury with the siren song of nullification ... and ... may instruct the jury on the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury nullification." United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir.1993). Just as defendants have no right to an instruction on nullification, jurors have no right to nullify. As a D.C. Circuit panel comprised of Chief Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Judge George E. MacKinnon, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained: United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). ii. If Taken Seriously, Jury Nullification Threatens to Undermine the Democratic Process and the Rule of Law If it were taken seriously by mainstream Americans, jury nullification would threaten to unravel the fabric of our democracy. The impropriety of nullification emanates from the notion that ours is "a government of laws and not of men." See Mass. Const. Part I, art. XXX.[8] This means simply that no citizen is above the law, and none is free to make his own law. As Thomas Paine stated in Common Sense, "For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." Thomas *121 Paine, Common Sense (1776), available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/paine.htm.
Of course. The judge should provide legal advice to the jury. Jurors are not lawyers and what are the alternatives - hiring an outside advisor? But how is it related to the main topic?
This is bad? Only in the world of nolu spam.. The 'democratic process', as applied by the progressive leftists, is leading the USA down the road to serfdom.
Nice job of proving what I already stipulated, dolt: that some judges - presumably including Judge Young (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts) - will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. Thanks for proving my point: As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Something that is good to avoid doing, if one wants to have a seat on a jury. If a jurist wants to nullify but knows most (or any) other jurors may blow a whistle on them, the best course may just be to refuse to vote to convict because you don't find key witnesses credible. Though adding expressions of sympathy for the accused should be quite safe to do as well.
... A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power. You and courts and anyone can say any thing they want to about how jury nullification is wrong, unlawful, a violation of this or that, or whatever else. But at the end of the day, the jury has the de facto power and therefore full fledged Right to nullify, and there ain't nothing you or any judge can do to undo that power. The moral standing juries have this power trumps all other considerations, including whatever "legal" or judicial opinion material you present to the contrary. If you want a legal precedent, look up the case of William Penn in 1670. Though perhaps you disagree with that verdict as well, and feel the imprisonment of the jury was appropriate for their refusing to convict.
William Penn did not exist under the Constitution and whatever he said would not overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Your disdain for the U.S. government and its laws is noted.
The US Supreme Court cannot overturn a jury nullification verdict. All they can do is whine about it, assuming they don't like it. Your religious absolutism about judicial law being the perfect order of life is noted.
Thanks for proving my point: As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. Thank you for proving my point that you are nothing but a bloviating asshole. NOT JUST SOME JUDGES, the BAR ASSOCIATIONS do it as well as the judges. Your attorney will not directly argue nullification as the judge will quickly admonish him to quit if he goes near it. If he continues, he will be stopped. If necessary, the judge can declare that the closing argument is finished. Then the judge can refer him for Rule 11 sanctions to include suspension or disbarment, plus a hefty fine. Your lawyer will not go there because it can be expensive and may cost his license. If you are representing yourself, the judge does not have to take your shit. He will warn you, and if necessary, tell you to sit down and be quiet. He may hold you in contempt. If needed, you may be taken to another room, restrained in a chair, and watch the rest of the proceeding on closed-circuit television. Directly arguing jury nullification is prohibited in Federal courts and in 48 states. The two exceptions are Maryland and Indiana, and even there, "the jury instructions typically admonish the jury not to arbitrarily and willfully disregard the law or substitute their own judgment for what they think the law should be in a particular case." See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Opinion 320, Jury Nullification Arguments by Criminal Defense Counsel [...] In these early periods of American history, the power of the jury to nullify the law was explicit and affirmatively approved. With the turn of the 20th century, however, the law has developed a more strict separation between the domain of the court (to say what the law is) and the domain of the jury (to determine the facts). Jurors today are routinely instructed that they must accept the law as given to them by the court in its instructions. E.g., Sparf & Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).[1] Thus, under contemporary substantive legal standards, a suggestion by a lawyer to a jury that it should ignore the law as stated by the judge may be tantamount to an explicit invitation to the jury to ignore the judge’s instructions. [...] Thus, at a minimum defense counsel must necessarily conform their conduct to the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is appearing. See D.C. Rule 8.5(a); see also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 105 (2000) (“a lawyer must comply with applicable law, including rules of procedure and evidence and specific tribunal rulings”). In this jurisdiction, such substantive law appears to preclude express advocacy of the jury nullification power. The District of Columbia has no rule or statute authorizing jury nullification. Both the local courts and the federal courts have rejected assertions that juries are entitled to an instruction apprising them of their “right” to nullify the law. See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (fact that juries can abuse their power and return verdicts contrary to the law does not mean that courts must give such instruction); Reale v. United States, 573 A.2d 13 (D.C. 1990) (trial court not required to instruct jurors about their power of jury nullification). [...] Moreover, the standard jury instruction given in District of Columbia courts contains this express admonition to the jury: “You may not ignore any instruction, or question the wisdom of any rule of law.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instr. 2.01 (Bar Assn. of D.C. 4th ed. 1993). Within this jurisdiction express exhortations to ignore the law are, therefore, likely to be deemed prohibited by law and may, therefore, result in violations of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct by lawyers who advocate such a course. See D.C. Rule 8.4. [...] 1. Two states, Indiana and Maryland, retain state constitutional provisions that enshrine a jury’s authority to determine the law as well as the facts. See Ind. Const. art. I, § 19; Md. Decl. of Rights, art. 23. But even in those states the jury instructions typically admonish the jury not to arbitrarily and willfully disregard the law or substitute their own judgment for what they think the law should be in a particular case. See. e.g.. Indiana Jury Instruction (quoted in Kourlis, “Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control,” 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1996)).
But how is it related to the main topic? The judge instructs the jury on what the law is. The jury determines the facts. The jury is supposed to apply the law, as given by the court, to the facts. The title of the thread contains the term "jury nullification." As you observe, jurors are not lawyers. They are not expected to be fluent at interpreting laws. The rule prohibiting defense counsel from arguing nullificationto a jury is Supreme Court (federal) precedent dating to 1895. Similar rules have been adopted in 48 states. If a juror argues nullification in the jury room, he may be reported to the judge and kicked off the jury. If he argues nullification in voir dire, he will not make it to the jury. He will be dismissed for cause. The poster comment to the article was, "A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal." By that logic, assuming arguendo the defendant did the deed, the O.J. jury determined that murdering one's wife (plus 1) is legal.
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#2. To: ConservingFreedom, hondo68 (#1)
The War on Pot doesn't work without the cooperation of juries.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
"America is at that awkward stage. It's too late to work within the system, but too early to shoot the bastards."
#3. To: hondo68 (#0)
A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal.
“It’s been extraordinarily stressful…emotionally draining” Kirouac says but the judge says her acquittal doesn’t mean she is free to use medical marijuana.
#4. To: nolu chan (#3)
(Edited)
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
"America is at that awkward stage. It's too late to work within the system, but too early to shoot the bastards."
#5. To: Deckard (#4)
"You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others."
#6. To: nolu chan (#3)
the judge says her acquittal doesn’t mean she is free to use medical marijuana.
#7. To: misterwhite, Deckard (#5)
You're the asshole who takes delight in the flouting of the law.
To you, laws are merely a recommendation and they only apply to others, not you.
#8. To: ConservingFreedom (#6)
Continued use will not be without risk of arrest, but after this no responsible prosecutor will waste taxpayer resources trying her for the "crime" of using medicine.
#9. To: Deckard (#4)
You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others.
#10. To: ConservingFreedom (#7)
"but is pleased to see punishment not inflicted on those breaking immoral laws such as those against using governmentally-disapproved medicines."
#11. To: nolu chan, settled law (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited
Castle(C), Stein(G), Johnson(L)
#12. To: hondo68 (#11)
Bullshit! The jury decided that the DA's and your presentation to the court is SPAM, that you're CT freaks, kooks, and weirdos.
Binding precedent
First, the fact that marijuana is used “for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician” cannot itself serve as a distinguishing factor. Id., at 1229. The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses. Moreover, the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes, and in what manner. Indeed, most of the substances classified in the CSA “have a useful and legitimate medical purpose.” 21 U. S. C. § 801(1). Thus, even if respondents are correct that marijuana does have accepted medical uses and thus should be redesignated as a lesser schedule drug, [37] the CSA would still impose controls beyond what is required by California law. The CSA requires manufacturers, physicians, pharmacies, and other handlers of controlled substances to comply with statutory and regulatory provisions mandating registration with the DEA, compliance with specific production quotas, security controls to guard against diversion, recordkeeping and reporting obligations, and prescription requirements. See §§ 821–830; 21 CFR § 1301 et seq. (2004). Furthermore, the dispensing of new drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544 (1979). Accordingly, the mere fact that marijuana—like virtually every other controlled substance regulated by the CSA—is used for medicinal purposes cannot possibly serve to distinguish it from the core activities regulated by the CSA. Nor can it serve as an “objective marke[r]” or “objective facto[r]” to arbitrarily narrow the relevant class as the dissenters suggest, post, at 47 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); post, at 68 (opinion of Thomas, J.). More fundamentally, if, as the principal dissent contends, the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes is beyond the “‘outer limits’ of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority,” post, at 42 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), it must also be true that such personal use of marijuana (or any other homegrown drug) for recreational purposes is also beyond those “‘outer limits,’” whether or not a State elects to authorize or even regulate such use. Justice Thomas’ separate dissent suffers from the same sweeping implications. That is, the dissenters’ rationale logically extends to place any federal regulation (including quality, prescription, or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for any purpose beyond the “‘outer limits’” of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance. The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, that judgment is not only rational, but “visible to the naked eye,” Lopez, 514 U. S., at 563, under any commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an openended exemption.
#13. To: nolu chan (#8)
'Continued use will not be without risk of arrest, but after this no responsible prosecutor will waste taxpayer resources trying her for the "crime" of using medicine.'
#14. To: misterwhite (#10)
Why not simply repeal the law? For everyone?
That should be easy given that it's an immoral one.
#15. To: nolu chan (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
#16. To: nolu chan (#9)
Jury nullification is just fine. It does not change any law. It does not say marijuana is legal. It says the jury, based on the fasts of the case, found rendering a guilty verdict in the case before them would be an injustice. They are empowered and free to render a not guilty verdict. They do not change the law.
#17. To: ConservingFreedom, TPAINE (#15)
I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided October 15, 1969
#18. To: ConservingFreedom (#13)
That would be irresponsible use of taxpayer resources absent any evidence that this jury was somehow skewed.
#19. To: All, nolu spam, wrong again (#16)
--- where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13]
#20. To: hondo68 (#0)
#21. To: ConservingFreedom (#15)
"Recently, several courts have indicated that judges also have the right, when it is brought to their attention by other jurors, to remove (prior to a verdict, of course) from juries any juror who makes clear his or her intention to vote to nullify the law.
#22. To: nolu chan (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
#23. To: nolu chan (#18)
"That would be irresponsible use of taxpayer resources absent any evidence that this jury was somehow skewed."
#24. To: nolu chan (#17)
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision.
#25. To: tpaine (#19)
(Edited)
You quote an OPINION by Justice Jay: ---
But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13]
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as in their judgment were applicable to the particular case being tried. If because, generally speaking, it is the function of the jury to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused according to the evidence, of the truth or weight of which they are to judge, the court should be held bound to instruct them upon a point in respect to which there was no evidence whatever, or to forbear stating what the law is upon a given state of facts, the result would be that the enforcement of the law against criminals and the protection of
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century.
[156 U.S. 51] Syllabus
"It may not be amiss here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law it is the province of the court, to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to take [65] upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt you will pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court, for as on the one hand it is presumed that juries are best judges of facts, it is, on the other hand, presumable that the courts are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully within your power of decision."
"was an anomaly. It purports to be a trial by jury in the Supreme Court of the United States of certain issues out of chancery, and the Chief Justice begins by telling the jury that the facts are all agreed, and the only question is a matter of law, and upon that the whole court were agreed. If it be correctly reported, I can only say it is not in accordance with the views of any other court, so far as I know, in this country or in England, and is certainly not in accordance with the course of the Supreme Court for many years."
This question was also fully considered in Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 132, 149, 151, in which case Chief Justice Robertson said:
"The circuit judge would be a cipher, and a criminal trial before him a farce, if he had no right to decide all questions of law which might arise in the progress of the case. The jury are the exclusive judges of the facts. In this particular they cannot be controlled, and ought not to be instructed, by the court. They are also,
necessitate, the ultimate judges, in one respect, of the law. If they acquit, the judge cannot grant a new trial, how much soever they have misconceived or disregarded the law. . . . If the court had no right to decide on the law, error, confusion, uncertainty, and licentiousness would characterize the criminal trials, and the safety of the accused might be as much endangered as the stability of public justice would certainly be."
"The unquestionable power of juries to find general verdicts, involving both law and fact, furnishes the foundation for the opinion that they are judges of the law as well as of the fact, and gives some plausibility to that opinion. They are not, however, compelled to decide legal questions, having the right to find special verdicts, giving the facts, and leaving the legal conclusions which result from such facts to the court. When they find general verdicts, I think it is their duty to be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal questions involved in such verdicts. They have the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded as rightful, although the law has provided no means, in criminal cases, of reviewing their decisions, whether of law of fact, or of ascertaining the grounds upon which their verdicts are based."
"The line between the duties of a court and jury in the trial of causes at law, both civil and criminal, is perfectly well defined, and the rigid observance of it is of the last importance to the administration of systematic justice. Whilst, on the one hand, the jury are the sole, ultimate judges of the facts, they are, on the other, to receive the law applicable to the case before them solely from the publicly given instructions of the court. In this way, court and jury are made responsible, each in its appropriate department, for the part taken by each in the trial and decision of causes, and in this way alone can errors of fact and errors of law be traced, for the purpose of correction, to their proper sources. If the jury can receive the law of a case on trial in any other mode than from the instructions of the court, given in the presence of parties and counsel, how are their errors of law with any certainty to be detected, and how, with any certainty therefore to be corrected? It is a statute right of parties here -- following, too, the ancient course of the common law -- to have the law given by the court, in their presence, to the jury, to guide their decision, in order that every error in matter of law may be known and corrected."
"You are, it is true, judges in a criminal case, in one sense, of both law and fact, for your verdict, as in civil cases, must pass on law and fact together. If you acquit, you interpose a final bar to a second prosecution, no matter how entirely your verdict may have been in opposition to the views expressed by the court. . . . It is important for you to keep this distinction in mind, remembering that while you have the physical power, by an acquittal, to discharge a defendant from further prosecution, you have no moral power to do so against the law laid down by the court. . . . For your part, your duty is to receive the law, for the purposes of this trial, from the court. If an error injurious to
the prisoner occurs, it will be rectified by the revision of the court en banc. But an error resulting from either a conviction or acquittal against the law can never be rectified. In the first case, an unnecessary stigma is affixed to the character of a man who was not guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the second case, a serious injury is effected by the arbitrary and irremediable discharge of a guilty man. You will see from these considerations the great importance of the preservation, in criminal as well as in civil cases, of the maxim that the law belongs to the court, and the facts to the jury."
"The point, if you believe the evidence on both sides, is one of law, on which it is your duty to receive the instructions of the court. If you believe the evidence in the whole case, you must find the defendant guilty."
"The court had an undoubted right to instruct the jury as to the law, and to warn them as they did against finding contrary to it. This is very different from telling them that they must find the defendant guilty, which is what is meant by a binding instruction in criminal cases."
"We are thus led to the conclusion that the doctrine that jurors are the judges of the law in criminal cases is untenable; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the common law from which it is claimed to take its origin; contrary to the uniform practice and decisions of the courts of Great Britain, where our jury system had its beginning and where it matured; contrary to the great weight of authority in this country; contrary to the spirit and meaning of the Constitution of the United States; repugnant to the Constitution of this state; repugnant to our statute relative to the reservation of questions of law in criminal cases, and passing the same to the supreme court for final decision."
The main reason ordinarily assigned for a recognition of the right of the jury in a criminal case to take the law into their own hands, and to disregard the directions of the court in matters of law, is that the safety and liberty of the citizen will be thereby more certainly secured. That view was urged upon Mr. Justice Curtis. After stating that, if he conceived the reason assigned to be well founded, he would pause long before denying the existence of the power claimed, he said that a good deal of reflection had convinced him that the
"[a]s long as the judges of the United States are obliged to express their opinions publicly, to give their reasons for them when called upon in the usual mode, and to stand responsible for them not only to public opinion, but to a court of impeachment, I can apprehend very little danger of the laws' being wrested to purposes of injustice. But on the other hand, I do consider that this power and corresponding duty of the court authoritatively to declare the law is one of the highest safeguards of the citizen. The sole end of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially, without respect of persons or times or the opinions of men. To enforce popular laws is easy. But when an unpopular cause is a just cause; when a law, unpopular in some locality, is to be enforced — there then comes the strain upon the administration of justice, and few unprejudiced men would hesitate as to where that strain would be most firmly borne."
#26. To: A Pole (#22)
Keeping jurors in ignorance is a nullification of the juries.
#27. To: ConservingFreedom (#24)
Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?
#28. To: nolu chan (#27)
'Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?'
#29. To: ConservingFreedom (#28)
Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court.
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century.
#30. To: nolu chan (#29)
Here is a Federal court interpretation of that Opinion which covers 156 U.S. 51 through 107.
#31. To: nolu chan (#29)
the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law
#32. To: ConservingFreedom (#31)
Which in no way implies your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited". As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster.
i. Juries Do Not Have a Right to Disregard the Judge's Instructions on the Law
A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.
#33. To: nolu chan (#29)
The Supreme Court, ... affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law
#34. To: nolu chan claims - Jury Nullification Threatens to Undermine the Democratic Process (#32)
#35. To: nolu chan (#32)
United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008)
#36. To: A Pole (#21)
I was removed from the jury for that. I told judge that I will put my judgment and conscience before his instructions.
#37. To: nolu chan (#32)
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.
#38. To: Pinguinite (#37)
If you want a legal precedent, look up the case of William Penn in 1670.
#39. To: nolu chan (#38)
and whatever he said would not overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
#40. To: ConservingFreedom (#35)
Nice job of proving what I already stipulated, dolt: that some judges - presumably including Judge Young (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts) - will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
A lawyer defending a criminal case may zealously advocate for the acquittal of his client using any evidentiary argument for which he has a reasonable good faith basis. Current legal standards strongly disfavor jury nullification and prohibit express exhortations that a jury nullify the law. Accordingly, a lawyer may not, consistent with the rules of professional conduct, expressly urge a jury to disregard the law. Nor may a lawyer disregard a ruling of the tribunal limiting the scope of permissible argument.
#41. To: A Pole (#33)
The judge should provide legal advice to the jury. Jurors are not lawyers and what are the alternatives - hiring an outside advisor?
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