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Title: NYPD Steals $18,000 from Man Because He Was Carrying a Banned Pocket Knife
Source:
The Anti-Media
URL Source: http://theantimedia.org/nypd-steals-18000-knife-law/
Published: Sep 16, 2016
Author: Alice Salles
Post Date: 2016-09-17 14:59:03 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 12064
Comments: 50
In the past five years, the New York Police Department has spent $347,000 on false arrest lawsuit settlements. According to the Village Voice, these costs stem from the city’s “gravity knife statute.” Passed in 1958, the law banned New York residents from carrying knives fitted with blades that fall out of the handle as the user points them toward the ground while pushing the lever. This antiquated law is responsible for thousands of yearly arrests, despite the fact that current knife designs bear no resemblance to the blades of yesteryear. But estimates suggest that over the past ten years, this particular ban has been the reason for the prosecution of “60,000 New Yorkers … many of them working people who use folding knives as part of their jobs.” A recent incident shows another unintended consequence of upholding the gravity knife statute — one that cost a South Bronx resident $18,000. In a very public tweet, the NYPD announced Sunday that officers from Police Service Area 7 had “arrested a male for a gravity knife and vouchered $18,000 dollars cash for forfeiture.” The triumphant tweet, The Village Voice pointed out, even “[publicized the prisoner’s] name and address, down to the apartment number.” By coupling an outdated law with civil asset forfeiture rules — which in New York state, happen to be draconian — officers managed to take advantage of yet another property owner in order to “prop up” the local police budget. While few details about the arrest were made public, the Village Voice added, many on Twitter commented that the model of knife the arrestee was carrying “appear[ed] to be a style often carried by first responders, with a feature designed for safely cutting clothes and tangled seat belts after, say, a car accident.” The news outlet reached out to the NYPD for more information, but officers failed to respond with more details. The gravity knife ban was tweaked in June when Democrats added an amendment to the state law clarifying “the definition of a gravity knife by excluding any folding knife with a ‘bias toward closure.’” The change has yet to be signed by Governor Andrew Cuomo. But even if it’s signed, this change to the state law does little to protect the New Yorkers’ constitutional right to own and carry any means of self-defense. Nevertheless, it could help to limit the number of individuals framed by the NYPD over folding knives and pocket knives, which are often “used for work or passed down in a family.” Even if the tweak to the state’s knife ban is finally signed into law, this measure, alone, will not be enough because the state’s civil asset forfeiture laws remain intact. Until serious criminal justice reforms are passed in the Empire State, New Yorkers will continue to be bullied in the name of policing for profit.
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#1. To: Deckard (#0)
This falsely claims forfeiture due to carrying banned pocket knife. Cash and other property is seized upon belief that is was involved in an illegal enterprise, such as drug dealing. If the owner can show that he lawfully possessed the money, he may get it back.
What exactly was the man charged with? Illegal possession of a banned pocket knife or carry excess amount of cash? We still have Due Process in this country where one is innocent until proven guilty. The burden rests solely on the officers to prove this guy broke the law. Not the other way around.
I agree with you. You know innocent until priven guilty.
An action in rem determines lawful ownership of property, not guilt or innocence of a person.
An action in rem determines lawful ownership of property, not guilt or innocence of a person.[Emphasis added here] Not so especially where the court has no personal jurisdiction over the person. If they have no personal jurisdiction over the person then they also have no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Google is your friend. I am not your secretary. The sentence begins, "With contraband or the fruits of criminal activity...." This is ridiculous. Read my #31 again. IN RE FORFEITURE $180,975, 478 Mich. 444 (Mich. 2007) A civil asset forfeiture proceeding is a CIVIL proceeding, not a criminal proceeding. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine has no application whatsoever to civil proceedings. Seizure is not pursuant to a subpoena which is used to require one to appear at a judicial proceeding. A subpoena duces tecum requires one to bring specified relevant documents when one appears. A warrant may be issued for a search. There are exceptions to the requirement for a warrant. If, in the course of an illegal search law enforcement finds your 100 pounds of marijuana, they will lawfully seize it, and the government will never return it to you. If you go through customs at the airport, the customs may examine, as distinguished from inspect, your bags. It can be done on a predetermined random selection basis for the day, perhaps a digit of your social security number to hit every tenth passenger. You and your bags would be taken to a private room and your bags would be opened and the inspector can look inside everything. If an item is found that is unlawful to possess, it is seized. You are taken into custody. No warrant is required. The evidence is admissible. If the item is your marijuana, you do not see it again, except as evidence. You are misinformed as to criminal cases as well. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) 1. "The exigencies of the situation," in which the officers were in pursuit of a suspected armed felon in the house which he had entered only minutes before they arrived, permitted their warrantless entry and search. McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 335 U. S. 456. Pp. 387 U. S. 298-300. 2. The distinction prohibiting seizure of items of only evidential value and allowing seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband is no longer accepted as being required by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 387 U. S. 300-310. (a) There is no rational distinction between a search for "mere evidence" and one for an "instrumentality" in terms of the privacy which is safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment; nor does the language of the Amendment itself make such a distinction. Pp. 387 U. S. 301-302. (b) The clothing items involved here are not "testimonial" or "communicative," and their introduction did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757. Pp. 387 U. S. 302-303. Page 387 U. S. 295 (c) The premise that property interests control government's search and seizure rights, on which Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, partly rested, is no longer controlling as the Fourth Amendment's principal object is the protection of privacy, not property. Pp. 387 U. S. 303-306. (d) The related premise of Gouled that government may not seize evidence for the purpose of proving crime has also been discredited. The Fourth Amendment does not bar a search for that purpose provided that there is probable cause, as there was here, for the belief that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. Pp. 387 U. S. 306-307. (e) The remedy of suppression, with its limited functional consequence, has made possible the rejection of both the related Gouled premises. P. 387 U. S. 307. (f) Just as the suppression of evidence does not require the return of such items as contraband, the introduction of "mere evidence" does not entitle the State to its retention if it is being wrongfully withheld. Pp. 387 U. S. 307-308. (g) The numerous and confusing exceptions to the "mere evidence" limitation make it questionable whether it affords any meaningful protection. P. 387 U. S. 309. 363 F.2d 647, reversed.
Google is to case law as statutory positive law is to my friend. Again, I ask of you to define what is contraband according to the actual statutory law the judge used. Not case law.
Again, I ask of you to define what is contraband according to the actual statutory law the judge used. Not case law. Do it yourself. Buy a dictionary.
Just below is a link to a statute concerning contraband. Copy and paste unto the URL and when you get there look below the Yellow highlighted Part 8. I do not recall any statute ever referenced in that citation you mentioned in this thread. You don't just throw out the words "contraband" at somebody without realizing the negative connotation it has. Furthermore, it is a criminal offense. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?collectionCode=CFR&searchPath=Title+28%2FChapter+I%2FPart+8&granuleId=CFR-2005-title28-vol1-part6&packageId=CFR-2005-title28-vol1&oldPath=Title+28%2FChapter+I%2FPart+8&fromPageDetails=true&collapse=true&ycord=1846
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?collectionCode=CFR&searchPath=Title+28%2FChapter+I%2FPart+8&granuleId=CFR-2005-title28-vol1-part6&packageId=CFR-2005-title28-vol1&oldPath=Title+28%2FChapter+I%2FPart+8&fromPageDetails=true&collapse=true&ycord=1846 Your link goes to a CFR which, by definition, is not a statute. Go to whatever you are blathering about and post it with a link. Or use a dictionary. The concept of contraband is not difficult. It isn't that hard. Trafficking in contraband cigarettes is a federal crime. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2341 et seq. "Contraband per se" is property the mere possession of which is unlawful, while "derivative contraband" is property innocent by itself but used in perpetration of unlawful act. Com v. Fassnacht, 246 Pa.Super. 42, 369 A.2d 800, 802. See also Bootlegging; Counterfeit; Derivative contraband; Gray market goods; Smuggling. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. For example, marijuana is contraband in all 50 states.
I am familiar with Black's Law 6th Edition law dictionary as I own one. The point I was making was that in that case you cited, there is no mentioned statute concerning what the Defendant was ever charged with specifically. While at it, you might want to browse through this site on the CFR as it complements the Federal Registers. https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text https://www.doi.gov/library/collections/law/statutes And yes, the CFR and FR are considering statutes in reference to "contraband" issues https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/08/03/2015-18982/contraband-and-inmate-personal-property-technical-amendment
The CFR and FR are not statutes. Newspaper articles and blog entries may consider statutes in reference to anything. Only formal written enactments of legislative bodies are considered statutes. A statute is a legislative act. The "Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is the annual cumulation of executive agency regulations publised in the daily Federal Register, combined with regulations issued previously that are still in effect. Divided into 50 titles, each representing a broad subject area, individual volumes of the Code a broad subject area, individual volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations are revised at least once each calendar year and issued on a staggered quarterly basis. The CFR contains the general body of regulatory laws governing practice and procedure before federal administrative agencies." (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.) The Federal Register, "published daily, is the medium for making available to the public Federal agency regulations and and other legal documents of the Executive Branch." (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.) Executive Branch regulations are never considered statutes. This word is used to designate the legislatively created laws in contradistinction to court decided or unwritten laws. See Common law. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - While at it, you might want to browse through this site on the CFR as it complements the Federal Registers. You seem unable to comprehend the fact that no criminal charges are required against anyone in a CIVIL Asset Forfeiture case and are lost looking for criminal charges that need not exist. As the instant case was a New York case, and not a Federal case, the applicable law would be New York law. It is not found in the mountain of Executive Branch Federal Regulations either in the Federal Register, or as collected in the Code of Federal Regulations. It is found in New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. New York C.P.L.R. § 1311 on Forfeiture Actions provides: And, (i) in an action relating to a pre-conviction forfeiture crime, the burden shall be upon the claiming authority to prove by clear and convincing evidence the commission of the crime by a person, provided, however, that it shall not be necessary to prove the identity of such person. (ii) if the action relates to the proceeds of a crime, except as provided in subparagraph (i) hereof, the burden shall be upon the claiming authority to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to establish a claim for forfeiture and that the non-criminal defendant either (A) knew or should have known that the proceeds were obtained through the commission of a crime, or (B) fraudulently obtained his or her interest in the proceeds to avoid forfeiture. (iii) if the action relates to the substituted proceeds of a crime, except as provided in subparagraph (i) hereof, the burden shall be upon the claiming authority to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to establish a claim for forfeiture and that the non-criminal defendant either (A) knew that the property sold or exchanged to obtain an interest in the substituted proceeds was obtained through the commission of a crime, or (B) fraudulently obtained his or her interest in the substituted proceeds to avoid forfeiture. (iv) if the action relates to an instrumentality of a crime, except as provided for in subparagraph (i) hereof, the burden shall be upon the claiming authority to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to establish a claim for forfeiture and that the non-criminal defendant either (A) knew that the instrumentality was or would be used in the commission of a crime or (B) knowingly obtained his or her interest in the instrumentality to avoid forfeiture. (v) if the action relates to a real property instrumentality of a crime, the burden shall be upon the claiming authority to prove those facts referred to in subdivision four-b of section thirteen hundred ten of this article by clear and convincing evidence. The claiming authority shall also prove by a clear and convincing evidence that the non-criminal defendant knew that such property was or would be used for the commission of specified felony offenses, and either (A) knowingly and unlawfully benefitted from such conduct or (B) voluntarily agreed to the use of such property for the commission of such offenses by consent freely given. For purposes of this subparagraph, a non-criminal defendant knowingly and unlawfully benefits from the commission of a specified felony offense when he derives in exchange for permitting the use or occupancy of such real property by a person or persons committing such specified offense a substantial benefit that would otherwise not accrue as a result of the lawful use or occupancy of such real property. "Benefit" means benefit as defined in subdivision seventeen of section 10.00 of the penal law. And, (i) a non-criminal defendant who did not pay fair consideration for the proceeds of a crime, the substituted proceeds of a crime or the instrumentality of a crime shall be presumed to know that such property was the proceeds of a crime, the substituted proceeds of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime. (ii) a non-criminal defendant who obtains an interest in the proceeds of a crime, substituted proceeds of a crime or an instrumentality of a crime with knowledge of an order of provisional remedy relating to said property issued pursuant to this article, shall be presumed to know that such property was the proceeds of a crime, substituted proceeds of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime. (iii) in an action relating to a post-conviction forfeiture crime, a noncriminal defendant who the claiming authority proves by clear and convincing evidence has criminal liability under section 20.00 of the penal law for the crime of conviction or for criminal activity arising from a common scheme or plan of which such crime is a part and who possesses an interest in the proceeds, the substituted proceeds, or an instrumentality of such criminal activity is presumed to know that such property was the proceeds of a crime, the substituted proceeds of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime. (iv) a non-criminal defendant who participated in or was aware of a scheme to conceal or disguise the manner in which said non-criminal obtained his or her interest in the proceeds of a crime, substituted proceeds of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime is presumed to know that such property was the proceeds of a crime, the substituted proceeds of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime. Contraband is something which is unlawful to possess. If discovered, the government may seize it. Nobody can successfully such a forfeiture action as it would be impossible for them to establish that they lawfully possess that which is unlawful to possess. Persons who have their contraband seized generally disavow ownership. Any claimant would be providing evidence of his guilt and justify his own prosecution. Your Federal Register entry is applicable to the Federal Bureau of Prisons and their regulations on what is considered contraband for inmates. The definition of contraband therein applies only to such inmates. "Contraband any property the possession or transportation of which is ilegal. For instance, narcotic drugs, firearms, counterfeit money, or cigarettes which an individual intends to illegally distribute or use are contraband. 49 U.S.C. § 781." Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Steven H. Gifis, 1984. The cited section has been moved to: http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2014/title-49/subtitle-x/chapter-803/ 2014 US Code http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2014/title-49/subtitle-x/chapter-803/ http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2014/title-49/subtitle-x/chapter-803/sec.-80302/ §80302. Prohibitions (a) Definition.—In this section, "contraband" means— (1) a narcotic drug (as defined in section 102 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 802)), including marihuana (as defined in section 102 of that Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), that— (A) is possessed with intent to sell or offer for sale in violation of the laws and regulations of the United States; (B) is acquired, possessed, sold, transferred, or offered for sale in violation of those laws; (C) is acquired by theft, robbery, or burglary and transported— (i) in the District of Columbia or a territory or possession of the United States; or (ii) from a place in a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States, to a place in another State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession; or (D) does not bear tax-paid internal revenue stamps required by those laws or regulations; (2) a firearm involved in a violation of chapter 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.); (3) a forged, altered, or counterfeit— (A) coin or an obligation or other security of the United States Government (as defined in section 8 of title 18); or (B) coin, obligation, or other security of the government of a foreign country; (4) material or equipment used, or intended to be used, in making a coin, obligation, or other security referred to in clause (3) of this subsection; (5) a cigarette involved in a violation of chapter 114 of title 18 or a regulation prescribed under chapter 114; or (6)(A) a counterfeit label for a phonorecord, copy of a computer program or computer program documentation or packaging, or copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work (as defined in section 2318 of title 18); (B) a phonorecord or copy in violation of section 2319 of title 18; (C) a fixation of a sound recording or music video of a live musical performance in violation of section 2319A of title 18; or (D) any good bearing a counterfeit mark (as defined in section 2320 of title 18). (b) Prohibitions.—A person may not— (1) transport contraband in an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel; (2) conceal or possess contraband on an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel; or (3) use an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel to facilitate the transportation, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, exchange, or giving away of contraband. (Pub. L. 103–272, §1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1353; Pub. L. 104–153, §13, July 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1389.) http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2014/title-49/subtitle-x/chapter-803/sec.-80303/ 49 U.S.C. § 80303 (2014) §80303. Seizure and forfeiture The Secretary of the Treasury or the Governor of Guam or of the Northern Mariana Islands as provided in section 80304 of this title, or, when the violation of this chapter involves contraband described in paragraph (2) or (5) of section 80302(a), the Attorney General or a person authorized by another law to enforce section 80302 of this title, shall seize an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel involved in a violation of section 80302 and place it in the custody of a person designated by the Secretary, the Attorney General, or appropriate Governor, as the case may be. The seized aircraft, vehicle, or vessel shall be forfeited, except when the owner establishes that a person except the owner committed the violation when the aircraft, vehicle, or vessel was in the possession of a person who got possession by violating a criminal law of the United States or a State. However, an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel used by a common carrier to provide transportation for compensation may be forfeited only when— (1) the owner, conductor, driver, pilot, or other individual in charge of the aircraft or vehicle (except a rail car or engine) consents to, or knows of, the alleged violation when the violation occurs; (2) the owner of the rail car or engine consents to, or knows of, the alleged violation when the violation occurs; or (3) the master or owner of the vessel consents to, or knows of, the alleged violation when the violation occurs. (Pub. L. 103–272, §1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1354; Pub. L. 107–296, title XI, §1112(q), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2278.) http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2014/title-21/chapter-13/subchapter-i/part-e/sec.-881/ See also 21 U.S.C. 881 2014 US Code §881. Forfeitures (a) Subject property The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter. (2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter. (3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9). (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9). (5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter. (6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter. (7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. (8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this subchapter. (9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines, all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which have been imported, exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, dispensed, acquired, or intended to be distributed, dispensed, acquired, imported, or exported, in violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. (10) Any drug paraphernalia (as defined in section 863 of this title). (11) Any firearm (as defined in section 921 of title 18) used or intended to be used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2) and any proceeds traceable to such property. (b) Seizure procedures Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under this section may be seized by the Attorney General in the manner set forth in section 981(b) of title 18. (c) Custody of Attorney General Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the Attorney General, subject only to the orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction thereof. Whenever property is seized under any of the provisions of this subchapter, the Attorney General may— (1) place the property under seal; (2) remove the property to a place designated by him; or (3) require that the General Services Administration take custody of the property and remove it, if practicable, to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law. (d) Other laws and proceedings applicable The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such property or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and the compromise of claims shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under any of the provisions of this subchapter, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof; except that such duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property under this subchapter by such officers, agents, or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney General, except to the extent that such duties arise from seizures and forfeitures effected by any customs officer. (e) Disposition of forfeited property (1) Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may— (A) retain the property for official use or, in the manner provided with respect to transfers under section 1616a of title 19, transfer the property to any Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property; (B) except as provided in paragraph (4), sell, by public sale or any other commercially feasible means, any forfeited property which is not required to be destroyed by law and which is not harmful to the public; (C) require that the General Services Administration take custody of the property and dispose of it in accordance with law; (D) forward it to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for disposition (including delivery for medical or scientific use to any Federal or State agency under regulations of the Attorney General); or (E) transfer the forfeited personal property or the proceeds of the sale of any forfeited personal or real property to any foreign country which participated directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property, if such a transfer— (i) has been agreed to by the Secretary of State; (ii) is authorized in an international agreement between the United States and the foreign country; and (iii) is made to a country which, if applicable, has been certified under section 2291j(b) of title 22. (2)(A) The proceeds from any sale under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) and any moneys forfeited under this subchapter shall be used to pay— (i) all property expenses of the proceedings for forfeiture and sale including expenses of seizure, maintenance of custody, advertising, and court costs; and (ii) awards of up to $100,000 to any individual who provides original information which leads to the arrest and conviction of a person who kills or kidnaps a Federal drug law enforcement agent. Any award paid for information concerning the killing or kidnapping of a Federal drug law enforcement agent, as provided in clause (ii), shall be paid at the discretion of the Attorney General. (B) The Attorney General shall forward to the Treasurer of the United States for deposit in accordance with section 524(c) of title 28, any amounts of such moneys and proceeds remaining after payment of the expenses provided in subparagraph (A), except that, with respect to forfeitures conducted by the Postal Service, the Postal Service shall deposit in the Postal Service Fund, under section 2003(b)(7) of title 39, such moneys and proceeds. (3) The Attorney General shall assure that any property transferred to a State or local law enforcement agency under paragraph (1)(A)— (A) has a value that bears a reasonable relationship to the degree of direct participation of the State or local agency in the law enforcement effort resulting in the forfeiture, taking into account the total value of all property forfeited and the total law enforcement effort with respect to the violation of law on which the forfeiture is based; and (B) will serve to encourage further cooperation between the recipient State or local agency and Federal law enforcement agencies. (4)(A) With respect to real property described in subparagraph (B), if the chief executive officer of the State involved submits to the Attorney General a request for purposes of such subparagraph, the authority established in such subparagraph is in lieu of the authority established in paragraph (1)(B). (B) In the case of property described in paragraph (1)(B) that is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter, if the property is real property that is appropriate for use as a public area reserved for recreational or historic purposes or for the preservation of natural conditions, the Attorney General, upon the request of the chief executive officer of the State in which the property is located, may transfer title to the property to the State, either without charge or for a nominal charge, through a legal instrument providing that— (i) such use will be the principal use of the property; and (ii) title to the property reverts to the United States in the event that the property is used otherwise. (f) Forfeiture and destruction of schedule I and II substances (1) All controlled substances in schedule I or II that are possessed, transferred, sold, or offered for sale in violation of the provisions of this subchapter; all dangerous, toxic, or hazardous raw materials or products subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(2) of this section; and any equipment or container subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(2) or (3) of this section which cannot be separated safely from such raw materials or products shall be deemed contraband and seized and summarily forfeited to the United States. Similarly, all substances in schedule I or II, which are seized or come into the possession of the United States, the owners of which are unknown, shall be deemed contraband and summarily forfeited to the United States. (2) The Attorney General may direct the destruction of all controlled substances in schedule I or II seized for violation of this subchapter; all dangerous, toxic, or hazardous raw materials or products subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(2) of this section; and any equipment or container subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(2) or (3) of this section which cannot be separated safely from such raw materials or products under such circumstances as the Attorney General may deem necessary. (g) Plants (1) All species of plants from which controlled substances in schedules I and II may be derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this subchapter, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or which are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the United States. (2) The failure, upon demand by the Attorney General or his duly authorized agent, of the person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which such species of plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate registration, or proof that he is the holder thereof, shall constitute authority for the seizure and forfeiture. (3) The Attorney General, or his duly authorized agent, shall have authority to enter upon any lands, or into any dwelling pursuant to a search warrant, to cut, harvest, carry off, or destroy such plants. (h) Vesting of title in United States All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. (i) Stay of civil forfeiture proceedings The provisions of section 981(g) of title 18 regarding the stay of a civil forfeiture proceeding shall apply to forfeitures under this section. (j) Venue In addition to the venue provided for in section 1395 of title 28 or any other provision of law, in the case of property of a defendant charged with a violation that is the basis for forfeiture of the property under this section, a proceeding for forfeiture under this section may be brought in the judicial district in which the defendant owning such property is found or in the judicial district in which the criminal prosecution is brought. (l) 1 Agreement between Attorney General and Postal Service for performance of functions The functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be carried out by the Postal Service pursuant to such agreement as may be entered into between the Attorney General and the Postal Service. (Pub. L. 91–513, title II, §511, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1276; Pub. L. 95–633, title III, §301(a), Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3777; Pub. L. 96–132, §14, Nov. 30, 1979, 93 Stat. 1048; Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §§306, 309, 518, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2050, 2051, 2075; Pub. L. 99–570, title I, §§1006(c), 1865, 1992, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207–7, 3207–54, 3207–59; Pub. L. 99–646, §74, Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3618; Pub. L. 100–690, title V, §5105, title VI, §§6059, 6074, 6075, 6077(a), (b), 6253, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4301, 4319, 4323–4325, 4363; Pub. L. 101–189, div. A, title XII, §1215(a), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1569; Pub. L. 101–647, title XX, §§2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4855, 4856; Pub. L. 102–239, §2, Dec. 17, 1991, 105 Stat. 1912; Pub. L. 103–447, title I, §102(d), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4693; Pub. L. 104–237, title II, §201(b), Oct. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 3101; Pub. L. 106–185, §§2(c)(2), 5(b), 8(b), Apr. 25, 2000, 114 Stat. 210, 214, 216; Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, §4002(e)(3), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1810.) https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=17324 Wisconsin Supreme Court Leonard L. Jones v. State, 226 Wis.2d 565, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999) ¶47 We also note that a rule of statutory construction, such as ejudem generis, is employed only to determine the legislative intent behind an ambiguous statute. State v. Tollefson, 85 Wis. 2d 162, 167, 270 N.W.2d 201 (1978). “It is impermissible to apply rules of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent when the legislation is clear on its face.” Engler, 80 Wis. 2d at 406. We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) is ¶48 This court in State v. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d 419, 159 N.W.2d 1 (1968), recognized the difference between items which are per se illegal, and those items which are put to an illegal use. One of the issues before the Voshart court was whether concededly obscene materials which were improperly seized had to be returned to the defendant or could be destroyed as contraband. Id. at 434. The court determined that it would frustrate the public policy of the state based on the nature of obscenity to return admittedly obscene materials. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished obscenity from “an article put to an illegal use,” instead equating the former with those materials that should be destroyed because they are illegal to possess, such as counterfeit money, diseased cattle and gambling devices. Id. at 435. In contrast, the money in this case is akin to items which may constitute contraband, under Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), if put to an illegal use, such as the “tools, dies, machines or materials” used to make forged money or written instruments. ¶49 While public policy may not dictate destruction of the money, it certainly does not require its return to the owner. The legislature has declared the abuse of controlled substances to be a serious problem for society, Wis. Stat. § 961.001, and that those who illicitly traffic in controlled substances constitute a menace to the public health and safety, § 961.001(1r). Accordingly, the public interest in the control, suppression and regulation of controlled substances and those who traffic in them dictates that money which is used to purchase or is acquired in the sale of controlled substances be designated as contraband. ¶50 Contrary to Jones’ assertion, our interpretation does not render Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(b) superfluous. He argues that under subsec. (b) anything which is the fruit of or has been used in the commission of any crime may be seized under a search warrant. Id. If an item is neither contraband nor needed as evidence, a person may seek return of the property, and the court shall order its return under Wis. Stat. § 968.20(1). Benhoff, 185 Wis. 2d at 603. Thus, while § 968.20(1)(b) authorizes the seizure of items which have been used in the commission of a crime, these items must be returned to the rightful owner when they are no longer needed as evidence or when the proceedings have been completed. § 968.20(1)(a) and (b). Contraband, on the other hand, need never be returned. Judicial Council Committee Note, 1969, § 968.20, Stats. ¶51 Jones also contends that a broad interpretation of contraband would lead to absurd results because the potentially innocent owner of the money which is seized and later found to be contraband is out of luck. However, Wis. Stat. § 968.20(4) directs cities, towns, villages, and counties to adopt procedures for disposal of seized property. These procedures are to include a presumption that if the substance appears to be or is reported stolen, an attempt will be made to return the substance to the rightful owner. § 968.20(4). Thus, a truly innocent property owner would have some recourse under the statute. ¶52 We also reject Jones’ argument that if an item is the “fruit of a crime,” or used to commit a crime, then the criminal charges are critical. According to Jones, items which are per se illegal need never be returned, but those items which are legal to possess but have been used in an illicit manner must be proven to be contraband in a forfeiture action or be returned to its rightful owner. This contention is untenable. ¶53 As this court stated in Voshart, when determining whether seized property constitutes contraband, the underlying criminal charges are not before us for review. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d at 436. “Where the items were in fact contraband, properly found so to be by judicial determination in adversary proceedings, timely conducted, offending no constitutional safeguards, they would be subject to confiscation rather than return.” Id. Because contraband threatens the public health, safety and morals, the legislature has allowed for its seizure. Id. at 435. Similarly, controlled substances and those who traffic them are considered a substantial menace to the public health and safety. Wis. Stat. § 961.001(1r). Certainly money which is either the proceeds from or used for the purchase of controlled substances which has been found to be contraband in a judicial proceeding need not be returned simply because the charges have been dismissed. ¶54 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) is clear on its face, and that under this statute contraband is not limited to materials which are per se illegal. Rather, it is clear that contraband encompasses those items that are not only per se illegal, such as controlled substances or forged money, but also those items which are put to an illegal use or acquired illicitly, such as the purchase or sale of controlled substances. IV. ¶55 Having determined that money may constitute contraband under Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), if it is established to have been acquired through the sale of or used to purchase controlled substances, the next question we are presented with is who has the burden of establishing this connection. In order to remove any incentive a prosecutor may have to never use Wis. Stat. § 961.55, the forfeiture statute, the State suggests, without opposition from Jones, that this court place the same burden of proof on the state which exists under Wis. Stat. § 961.555(3) on the issue of whether the property in question is contraband. ¶56 This court, in Welter v. Sauk County Clerk of Court, 53 Wis. 2d 178, 182 n.6, 184, 191 N.W.2d 852 (1971), addressed the burden of proof under Wis. Stat. § 963.04, which was superseded by Wis. Stat. § 968.20. The petitioner in Welter sought return of some 200 items involved in the killing of a law enforcement officer, and the wounding of another. Welter, 53 Wis. 2d at 180. The trial court denied the motion based on petitioner’s failure to particularize the evidentiary usefulness of the requested items in case a new trial were to be ordered. Id. at 183-84. This court affirmed, concluding that the burden of proof rests with the moving party to support the motion by proof. Id. at 184. We stated, “The burden of proof upon petitioner was, at the least, the responsibility to identify items which he claimed to be without evidentiary value, and his reason or basis for so claiming.” Id. at 185. ¶57 In his motion for return of the monies seized, Jones identified his claim to the money, and he indicated the basis of his claim, in accordance with Welter. It was the State, however, who argued that the money was contraband and need not be returned to Jones. Wis. Stat. § 968.20. Because the burden rests with the moving party to support the motion by proof, Welter, 53 Wis. 2d at 184, it follows that the State should have the burden of establishing that the property, in this case money, constitutes contraband as defined by Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), and need not be returned, § 968.20. ¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.20 is silent on this question. However, actions in rem are civil and fall under the civil procedures of Wis. Stat. ch. 801. See Wis. Stat. § 801.01; State v. One 1973 Cadillac, 95 Wis. 2d 641, 644, 291 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1980). In addition, Wisconsin cases have applied the middle burden in civil actions involving criminal acts. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980). While the return of property statute does not involve criminal acts, the state’s contention that the property is contraband implies criminal or illicit activity. See Judicial Council Committee Note, 1969, § 968.20, Stats. (Contraband need never be returned). Thus, the appropriate burden of proof in this civil matter, as with other civil actions, is proof by the greater weight of the credible evidence. See Wis. JI-Civil 200 (1996); Kruse v. Horlamus Indus., Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 357, 362-63, 387 N.W.2d 64 (1986). We conclude that when the state contends that property need not be returned under § 968.20(1) because it constitutes contraband, the state must establish this by the greater weight of the credible evidence. V. ¶59 In addressing whether money may constitute contraband under Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), we have concluded that property, in this case money, which has been found to have a significant connection to items which are illegal to possess, such as controlled substances, or have been acquired illicitly, may constitute contraband. We also have reaffirmed that an item found to be contraband need never be returned regardless of whether the underlying criminal charges are dismissed or not. Further, when the state has alleged property to be contraband, and therefore not subject to return, we have concluded that the state must establish that the property is contraband by the greater weight of the credible evidence. ¶60 We have yet to determine the effect of our holdings on the outcome of this case. At the hearing on Jones’ motion for return of the property, the circuit court placed the burden of establishing that the money was not contraband on Jones. This was in error. The proper question and the question before us now is whether the State established by the greater weight of the credible evidence that the money was drug-related and therefore contraband. ¶61 Whether a party has met its burden of proof is a question of law which we examine without deference to the circuit court’s conclusion. Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 330 N.W.2d 192 (1983). However, in doing so, we must accept the circuit court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See id. at 12-13; In re Estate of Glass, 85 Wis. 2d 126, 135, 270 N.W.2d 386 (1978). Because the State established, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that the money was contraband, we conclude that the circuit court committed harmless error by placing the burden on the defendant. ¶62 The harmless error test appears in Wis. Stat. § 805.18, which requires this court to “disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.” § 805.18(1). When a court has committed a procedural error, § 805.18 precludes the court from reversing unless an examination of the entire proceeding reveals that the alleged error has “affected the substantial rights” of the party seeking reversal. § 805.18(2); State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999). ¶63 When determining whether the circuit court error is harmless, this court must determine if there is a reasonable possibility that but for the error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 369. The State, as the beneficiary of the error, has the burden of showing that the error was harmless. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). ¶64 The State has met its burden in this case. Jones was arrested for OWI, and a search incident to that arrest was conducted of Jones and the vehicle in which he was found. Jones moved to suppress the evidence and sought return of the money and property seized during the search. At the motion hearing, Officer Linsmeier testified to the evidence he found: a small scale, six cigarette lighters, three pieces of charred “Chore-boy” scouring pads and $1,783 in cash. Linsmeier explained that “Chore-boy” pads are regularly used in a crack pipe for ingesting crack cocaine and that a scale is a common tool that drug dealers use to measure drugs for sale. The wads of cash were also significant: the number of twenties in set totals, the separation of the money on Jones’ body, and the lack of any alternative explanation for the large amount of cash all indicated to Linsmeier that the money was drug-related. Jones presented no evidence to the contrary. ¶65 The circuit court found Linsmeier’s testimony to be credible in reaching its conclusion that the money was contraband. We accept the circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of the testimony unless they are clearly erroneous. Burg, 111 Wis. 2d at 12; Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, we conclude that the State established, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, a logical nexus between the money and the drug paraphernalia in Jones’ possession such that the money falls under the purview of Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a) and need not be returned.[16] ¶66 We are unpersuaded that the cases cited by Jones dictate a different result. Jones concedes that the four cases he cites all stem from a different procedural posture, but insists these cases provide persuasive authority for this court to rule in his favor. ¶67 We do not agree. The result in each case turned on whether there was credible evidence to support the circuit court’s factual findings, and in three cases, the reviewing court determined that there was credible evidence to support the court’s findings. See State v. Roberts, 657 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); State v. $7,000, 642 A.2d 967, 975 (N.J. 1994); and People v. United States Currency, $3,108, 579 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ill. 1991). Similarly, in this case, we have concluded that there is credible evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the cash was contraband. ¶68 In the fourth cited case, United States v. $506,231 in United States Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1997), the court of appeals reversed the district court finding no evidence tying the money to narcotics pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), which allows for forfeiture of proceeds traceable to drug trafficking. The court concluded that without the statutorily required nexus connecting the money to drugs, the money was not subject to forfeiture. $506,231 in United States Currency, 125 F.3d at 452. The court did not determine whether cash could be contraband. We do not view the cited cases as controlling. ¶69 In summary, we hold that property, in this case money, which has been found in a judicial proceeding to have a logical nexus to items which are illegal to possess, such as controlled substances, or have been acquired through illicit means, may constitute contraband as defined in Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a). If property is found to be contraband under § 968.13(1)(a), the property need not be returned to the owner whether criminal charges are filed or not. Wis. Stat. § 968.20. We also hold that the state is required to establish, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that the property constitutes contraband. Even though the circuit court in this case mistakenly placed the burden on the defendant to show whether the cash was or was not contraband, we conclude that based on the evidence presented at the hearing, this error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Insanity. An inanimate object is not capable of committing a crime.
#50. To: Deckard (#49)
But it is capable of being the subject of an in rem legal action. Damn, you are dumb. Uncle Sam says you have no property right to contraband. He can and does take your illegal shit, including your money made from selling your shit, or intended to be used to buy more shit. What's really insane is registering and getting a card certifying that you buy and use shit. Then Uncle Sam knows you can't be trusted with a firearm and takes that away. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2014) (a) Subject property The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter. (2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter. (3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9). (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9). (5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter. (6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter. [...]
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest NYPD Steals $18,000 from Man Because He Was Carrying a Banned Pocket Knife
#17. To: nolu chan (#1)
"...If the owner can show that he lawfully possessed the money, he may get it back."
#22. To: goldilucky (#17)
#29. To: A K A Stone, goldilucky (#22)
I agree with you. You know innocent until priven guilty.
#32. To: nolu chan (#29)
(Edited)
#37. To: goldilucky (#32)
With contraband or the fruits of criminal activity, the government can seize the property and the court can hold an in rem proceeding to determine ownership.
Nonsense here! Define "contraband".
They can unlawfully search and still seize the property.
Anything seized without a court order subpoena, is treated as unlawful seizure under the fruit of the poisoned tree doctrine.
In deciding these questions, we first hold that under Immigration Naturalization Service v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032; 104 S Ct 3479; 82 L Ed 2d 778 (1984), illegally seized property is not immune from forfeiture. We also agree with the holding in United States v $639,558, 293 US App DC 384, 387; 955 F2d 712 (1992), that property subject to forfeiture that was illegally seized "is not 'excluded' from the proceeding entirely." Instead, the illegally seized property "may be offered into evidence for the limited purpose of establishing its existence, and the court's in rem jurisdiction over it." Id.
Held:
#39. To: nolu chan (#37)
Google is your friend. I am not your secretary. The sentence begins, "With contraband or the fruits of criminal activity...."
#40. To: goldilucky (#39)
Google is to case law as statutory positive law is to my friend.
#44. To: nolu chan (#40)
(Edited)
#46. To: goldilucky (#44)
Just below is a link to a statute concerning contraband. Copy and paste unto the URL and when you get there look below the Yellow highlighted Part 8. I do not recall any statute ever referenced in that citation you mentioned in this thread. You don't just throw out the words "contraband" at somebody without realizing the negative connotation it has. Furthermore, it is a criminal offense.
Contraband. In general, any property which is unlawful to produce or possess. Things and objects outlawed and subject to forfeiture and destruction upon seizure. Com. v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427, 429. Goods exported from or imported into a country against it.s laws. Smuggled goods. Articles, the importation or exportation of which, is prohibited by law. See e.g. 49 U.S.C.A. § 781.
#47. To: nolu chan (#46)
(Edited)
#48. To: goldilucky (#47)
[goldilucky #44] Just below is a link to a statute concerning contraband.
[goldilucky #47] And yes, the CFR and FR are considering statutes in reference to "contraband" issues
Statute, n. A formal written enactment of a legislative body, whether federal, state, city, or county. An act of the legislature declaring, commanding, or prohibiting something; a particular law enacted and established by the will of the legislative department of government; the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state. Such may be public or private, declaratory, mandatory, directory, or enabling, in nature. For mandatory and directory statutes, see Directory; Mandatory statutes. Depending upon its context in usage, a statute may mean a single act of a legislature or a body of acts which are collected and arranged according to a scheme or for a session of a legislature or parliament.
Regulations. Such are issued by various governmental departments to carry out the intent of the law. Agencies issue regulations to guide the activity of those regulated by the agency and of their own employees and to ensure uniform application of the law. Regulations are not the work of the legislature and do not have the effect of law in theory. In practice, however, because of the intricacies of judicial review of administrative action, regulations can have an important effect in determining the outcome of cases involving regulatory activity. United States Government regulations appear first in the Federal Register, published five days a week, and are subsequently arranged by subject in the Code of Federal Regulations.
[goldilucky #47] The point I was making was that in that case you cited, there is no mentioned statute concerning what the Defendant was ever charged with specifically.
A civil action may be commenced against a non-criminal defendant to recover the property which constitutes the proceeds of a crime, the substituted proceeds of a crime, an instrumentality of a crime, or the real property instrumentality of a crime provided, however, that a judgment of forfeiture predicated upon clause (A) of subparagraph (iv) of paragraph (b) of subdivision three hereof shall be limited to the amount of the proceeds of the crime. Any action under this article must be commenced within five years of the commission of the crime and shall be civil, remedial, and in personam in nature and shall not be deemed to be a penalty or criminal forfeiture for any purpose. Except as otherwise specially provided by statute, the proceedings under this article shall be governed by this chapter. An action under this article is not a criminal proceeding and may not be deemed to be a previous prosecution under article forty of the criminal procedure law.
(b) In a forfeiture action commenced by a claiming authority against a non-criminal defendant:
(c) In a forfeiture action commenced by a claiming authority against a noncriminal defendant the following rebuttable presumptions shall apply:
Title 49 - Transportation (Sections 101 - 80504)
Subtitle X - Miscellaneous (Sections 80101 - 80504)
Chapter 803 - Contraband (Sections 80301 - 80306) Table of Contents
Sec. 80301 - Definitions
Sec. 80302 - Prohibitions
Sec. 80303 - Seizure and forfeiture
Sec. 80304 - Administrative
Sec. 80305 - Availability of certain appropriations
Sec. 80306 - Relationship to other laws 49 U.S.C. § 80302 (2014)
2014 US Code
Title 49 - Transportation (Sections 101 - 80504)
Subtitle X - Miscellaneous (Sections 80101 - 80504)
Chapter 803 - Contraband (Sections 80301 - 80306)
Sec. 80303 - Seizure and forfeiture
Title 21 - Food and Drugs (Sections 1 - 2252)
Chapter 13 - Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (Sections 801 - 971)
Subchapter I - Control and Enforcement (Sections 801 - 904)
Part E - Administrative and Enforcement Provisions (Sections 871 - 890)
Sec. 881 - Forfeitures 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2014)
¶46 Based on the enumerated items provided in Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(a), we conclude that contraband is not limited to materials which are per se illegal. Rather, it is clear that contraband encompasses those items that are not only per se illegal, such as controlled substances or forged money, but also those items which are used, acquired or transferred illicitly. Money which is established to have been acquired through the sale of or used to purchase controlled substances certainly constitutes contraband under§ 968.13(1)(a).
#49. To: nolu chan, goldilucky (#48)
United States v. $506,231 in United States Currency
Replies to Comment # 49. Insanity. An inanimate object is not capable of committing a crime.
§881. Forfeitures
End Trace Mode for Comment # 49.
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