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Iceland Volcano Erupts For Third Time In 2 Months, State Of Emergency Declared Tucker Carlson Interview with Vladamir Putin Status: Not Logged In; Sign In U.S. Constitution See other U.S. Constitution Articles Title: Peruta v San Diego Cty, no 2nd Amdt right to concealed Carry Source: 9th Circuit Court URL Source: [None] Published: Jun 9, 2016 Author: Circuit Judge W. Fletcher Post Date: 2016-06-09 16:48:27 by nolu chan Keywords: None Views: 27270 Comments: 127 Peruta v San Diego Cty, no 2nd Amdt right to concealed Carry Peruta et al v County of San Diego et al, 10-56971 (9th Cir, 9 Jul 2016) OPINION W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: Under California law, a member of the general public may not carry a concealed weapon in public unless he or she has been issued a license. An applicant for a license must satisfy a number of conditions. Among other things, the applicant must show “good cause” to carry a concealed firearm. California law authorizes county sheriffs to establish and publish policies defining good cause. The sheriffs of San Diego and Yolo Counties published policies defining good cause as requiring a particularized reason why an applicant needs a concealed firearm for self-defense. Appellants, who live in San Diego and Yolo Counties, allege that they wish to carry concealed firearms in public for self-defense, but that they do not satisfy the good cause requirements in their counties. They contend that their counties’ definitions of good cause violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. They particularly rely on the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). We hold that the Second Amendment does not preserve or protect a right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public. Post Comment   Private Reply   Ignore Thread   Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 4. #1. To: nolu chan (#0) "We hold that the Second Amendment does not preserve or protect a right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public." The U.S. Supreme Court in Heller said nothing about concealed carry. Meaning the lower courts are free to interpret "bear arms" as they see fit. Their decisions, of course, only apply to their jurisdiction. misterwhite  posted on  2016-06-09   17:18:52 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #2. To: misterwhite (#1) The U.S. Supreme Court in Heller said nothing about concealed carry. Meaning the lower courts are free to interpret "bear arms" as they see fit. Their decisions, of course, only apply to their jurisdiction. Heller incorporated the 2nd Amendment against the Federal District of Columbia in 2008, but left the status of incorporation against the States undeclared. Opinion of the Court by Scalia. McDonald incorporated the 2nd Amendment against the States in 2010. Opinion of the Court by Alito. While the right to keep and bear arms in protected by the 2nd Amendment, the amendment does not state, claim, or imply that it either created or defined the right to keep and bear arms. The Framers felt no need to define what were, to them, the well known terms of English common law which had prevailed in the colonies and which were carried forth in the States after the revolution. The 2nd Amendment makes no allusion of the right to carry concealed weapons. I know of no law specifically for or against concealed carry from that era. The earliest concealed carry laws appear to have cropped up in 1813 in Kentucky and Louisiana. At the time, the 2nd Amendment did not apply to the States. Concealed carry may just not have been an issue back before the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Heller and McDonald make clear that the right to keep and bear arms is rooted in the English common law and that "the right to keep and bear arms is not 'a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.'" Under Heller and McDonald it appears that there is nothing prohibiting a State from regulating or prohibiting the concealed carry of handguns. Prohibiting the carrying of handguns was held unconstitutional, but allowing open carry satisfies that. Of course, if Hillary appoints three or four justices to the Supreme Court, it may find that "common sense" regulations disarming United States civilians are lawfully justified by some emanation from some penumbra. McDonald at 20-21: Heller makes it clear that this right is “deeply rooted inthis Nation’s history and tradition.” Glucksberg, supra, at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted). Heller explored the right’s origins, noting that the 1689 English Bill of Rights explicitly protected a right to keep arms for self defense, 554 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20), and that by 1765, Blackstone was able to assert that the right to keep and bear arms was “one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 20). Blackstone’s assessment was shared by the American colonists. As we noted in Heller, King George III’s attempt to disarm the colonists in the 1760’s and 1770’s “provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms.” [16] Id., at ___ (slip op., at 21); see also L. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 137–143(1999) (hereinafter Levy). The right to keep and bear arms was considered no less fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights. “During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or selectmilitia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.” __________ [16] For example, an article in the Boston Evening Post stated: “For it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry, to prove the British subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recognized by the Bill of Rights, and, who live in a province where the law requires them to be equip’d with arms, &c. are guilty of an illegal act, in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law directs.” Boston Evening Post, Feb. 6, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 1768–1769, p. 61 (1936) (emphasis deleted). McDonald at 39-40: It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 54). We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatorymeasures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 54–55). We repeat those assurances here.Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms. McDonald at 40: Municipal respondents suggest that the Second Amendment right differs from the rights heretofore incorporated because the latter were “valued for[their] own sake.” Id., at 33. But we have never previously suggested that incorporation of a right turns on whether it has intrinsic as opposed to instrumental value, and quite a few of the rights previously held to be incorporated—for example the right to counsel and the right to confront and subpoena witnesses—are clearly instrumental by any measure. Moreover, this contention repackages one of the chief arguments that we rejected in Heller, i.e., that the scope of the Second Amendment right is defined by the immediate threat that led to the inclusion of that right in the Bill of Rights. In Heller, we recognized that the codification of this right was prompted by fear that the Federal Government would disarm and thus disable the militias, but we rejected the suggestion that the right was valued only as a means of preserving the militias. 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26). On the contrary, we stressed that the right was also valued because the possession of firearms was thought to be essential for self-defense. As we put it, self-defense was “the central component of the right itself.” Ibid. nolu chan  posted on  2016-06-10   1:29:05 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #4. To: nolu chan (#2) "The earliest concealed carry laws appear to have cropped up in 1813 in Kentucky and Louisiana" And I believe those laws were against concealed carry, since the only reason to conceal a weapon was evil intent (or some such reasoning). misterwhite  posted on  2016-06-10   9:06:41 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   Replies to Comment # 4. #6. To: misterwhite (#4) And I believe those laws were against concealed carry, since the only reason to conceal a weapon was evil intent (or some such reasoning). The Kentucky constitution of 1799 provided "that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned." The Kentucky law of 1813 stated, "that any person in this commonwealth, who shall hereafter wear a pocket pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon, unless when travelling on a journey, shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred dollars...." The Kentucky Court of Appeals struck the law down as repugnant to the Kentucky Constitution. The Federal Constitution was not at issue. Bliss v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 12 Littell 90 (Ky. 1822) This was an indictment founded on the act of the legislature of this state, "to prevent persons in this commonwealth from wearing concealed arms." The act provides, that any person in this commonwealth, who shall hereafter wear a pocket pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon, unless when travelling on a journey, shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred dollars; which may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction of like sums, by action of debt, or on presentment of a grand jury. The indictment, in the words of the act, charges Bliss with having worn concealed as a weapon, a sword in a cane. Bliss was found guilty of the charge, and a fine of one hundred dollars assessed by the jury, and judgment was thereon rendered by the court. To reverse that judgment, Bliss appealed to this court. 2. In argument the judgment was assailed by the counsel of Bliss, exclusively on the ground of the act, on which the indictment is founded, being in conflict with the twenty third section of the tenth article of the constitution of this state. That section provides, "that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned." The provision contained in this section, perhaps, is as well calculated to secure to the citizens the right to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state, as any that could have been adopted by the makers of the constitution. If the right be assailed, immaterial through what medium, whether by an act of the legislature or in any other form, it is equally opposed to the comprehensive import of the section. The legislature is no where expressly mentioned in the section; but the language employed is general, without containing any expression restricting its import to any particular department of government; and in the twenty eighth section of the same article of the constitution, it is expressly declared, "that every thing in that article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to the constitution, shall be void." It was not, however, contended by the attorney for the commonwealth, that it would be competent for the legislature, by the enactment of any law, to prevent the citizens from bearing arms either in defence of themselves or the state; but a distinction was taken between a law prohibiting the exercise of the right, and a law merely regulating the manner of exercising that right; and whilst the former was admitted to be incompatible with the constitution, it was insisted, that the latter is not so, and under that distinction, and by assigning the act in question a place in the latter description of laws, its consistency with the constitution was attempted to be maintained. 3. That the provisions of the act in question do not import an entire destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state, will not be controverted by the court; for though the citizens are forbid wearing weapons concealed in the manner described in the act, they may, nevertheless, bear arms in any other admissible form. But to be in conflict with the constitution, it is not essential that the act should contain a prohibition against bearing arms in every possible form--it is the right to bear arms in defence of the citizens and the state, that is secured by the constitution, and whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the constitution. If, therefore, the act in question imposes any restraint on the right, immaterial what appellation may be given to the act, whether it be an act regulating the manner of bearing arms or any other, the consequence, in reference to the constitution, is precisely the same, and its collision with that instrument equally obvious. And can there be entertained a reasonable doubt but the provisions of the act import a restraint on the right of the citizens to bear arms? The court apprehends not. The right existed at the adoption of the constitution; it had then no limits short of the moral power of the citizens to exercise it, and it in fact consisted in nothing else but in the liberty of the citizens to bear arms. Diminish that liberty, therefore, and you necessarily restrain the right; and [Volume 5, Page 213] such is the diminution and restraint, which the act in question most indisputably imports, by prohibiting the citizens wearing weapons in a manner which was lawful to wear them when the constitution was adopted. In truth, the right of the citizens to bear arms, has been as directly assailed by the provisions of the act, as though they were forbid carrying guns on their shoulders, swords in scabbards, or when in conflict with an enemy, were not allowed the use of bayonets; and if the act be consistent with the constitution, it cannot be incompatible with that instrument for the legislature, by successive enactments, to entirely cut off the exercise of the right of the citizens to bear arms. For, in principle, there is no difference between a law prohibiting the wearing concealed arms, and a law forbidding the wearing such as are exposed; and if the former be unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise. We may possibly be told, that though a law of either description, may be enacted consistently with the constitution, it would be incompatible with that instrument to enact laws of both descriptions. But if either, when alone, be consistent with the constitution, which, it may be asked, would be incompatible with that instrument, if both were enacted? The law first enacted would not be; for, as the argument supposes either may be enacted consistent with the constitution, that which is first enacted must, at the time of enactment, be consistent with the constitution; and if then consistent, it cannot become otherwise, by any subsequent act of the legislature. It must, therefore, be the latter act, which the argument infers would be incompatible with the constitution. But suppose the order of enactment were reversed, and instead of being the first, that which was first, had been the last; the argument, to be consistent, should, nevertheless, insist on the last enactment being in conflict with the constitution. So, that the absurd consequence would thence follow, of making the same act of the legislature, either consistent with the constitution, or not so, according as it may precede or follow some other enactment of a different import. Besides, by insisting on the previous act producing any effect on the latter, the argument implies that the previous one operates as a partial restraint on the right of the citizens to bear arms, and proceeds on the notion, that by prohibiting the exercise of the residue of right, not affected by the first act, the latter act comes in collision with the constitution. But it should not be forgotten, that it is not only a part of the right that is secured by the constitution; it is the right entire and complete, as it existed at the adoption of the constitution; and if any portion of that right be impaired, immaterial how small the part may be, and immaterial the order of time at which it be done, it is equally forbidden by the constitution. 4. Hence, we infer, that the act upon which the indictment against Bliss is founded, is in conflict with the constitution; and if so, the result is obvious--the result is what the constitution has declared it shall be, that the act is void. And if to be incompatible with the constitution makes void the act, we must have been correct, throughout the examination of this case, in treating the question of compatibility, as one proper to be decided by the court. For it is emphatically the duty of the court to decide what the law is; and how is the law to be decided, unless it be known? and how can it be known without ascertaining, from a comparison with the constitution, whether there exist such an incompatibility between the acts of the legislature and the constitution, as to make void the acts? A blind enforcement of every act of the legislature, might relieve the court from the trouble and responsibility of deciding on the consistency of the legislative acts with the constitution; but the court would not be thereby released from its obligations to obey the mandates of the constitution, and maintain the paramount authority of that instrument; and those obligations must cease to be acknowledged, or the court become insensible to the impressions of moral sentiment, before the provisions of any act of the legislature, which in the opinion of the court, conflict with the constitution, can be enforced. Whether or not an act of the legislature conflicts with the constitution, is, at all times, a question of great delicacy, and deserves the most mature and deliberate consideration of the court. But though a question of delicacy, yet as it is a judicial one, the court would be unworthy its station, were it to shrink from deciding it, whenever in the course of judicial examination, a decision becomes material to the right in contest. The court should never, on slight implication or vague conjecture, pronounce the legislature to have transcended its authority in the enactment of law; but when a clear and strong conviction is entertained, that an act of the legislature is incompatible with the constitution, there is no alternative for the court to pursue, but to declare that conviction, and pronounce the act inoperative and void. And such is the conviction entertained by a majority of the court, (Judge Mills dissenting,) in relation to the act in question. nolu chan  posted on  2016-06-10 16:04:53 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   #7. To: misterwhite (#4) Georgia had a statute of 1837 overturned by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1846. Here the court found banning concealed carry was acceptable, but banning open carry was not. The Georgia case involved both the Federal and State constitutions. A law which merely inhibits the wearing of certain weapons in a concealed manner is valid. But so far as it cuts off the exercise of the right of the citizen altogether to bear arms, or, under the color of prescribing the mode, renders the right itself useless, it is in conflict with the Constitution, and void. nolu chan  posted on  2016-06-10 16:50:25 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply   End Trace Mode for Comment # 4. Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest

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