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Title: FBI Seizes Four State Department Servers in Clinton Email Probe
Source: Washington Free Beacon
URL Source: http://freebeacon.com/politics/fbi- ... ervers-in-clinton-email-probe/
Published: Oct 8, 2015
Author: Bill Gertz
Post Date: 2015-10-08 12:45:55 by nolu chan
Keywords: None
Views: 3983
Comments: 50

FBI Seizes Four State Department Servers in Clinton Email Probe

Probe focusing on how classified information was sent to secretary of state

BY: Bill Gertz
Washington Free Beacon
October 7, 2015 5:00 am

The FBI has seized four State Department computer servers as part of its probe into how classified information was compromised on former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s private email system, according to people familiar with the investigation.

The four servers, which were located at the State Department’s headquarters building, were seized by the FBI several weeks ago. They are being checked by technical forensic analysts charged with determining how Top Secret material was sent to Clinton’s private email by State Department aides during her tenure as secretary from 2009 to 2013, said two people familiar with the probe. The people spoke on condition of anonymity because it is an ongoing investigation.

State Department spokesman John Kirby referred questions about the computer servers to the FBI. An FBI spokeswoman, Carol Cratty, declined to comment.

No other details about the servers, including whether they are part of the department’s classified system, or used for unclassified information networks, could be learned.

A spokesman for the Clinton campaign did not respond to an email request for comment.

Clinton has offered varying explanations for her use of a private email server, initially claiming she had done nothing wrong. Then, under pressure from critics, she said she was sorry people were confused by the practice, later admitting in early September that her use of a private email system had been a mistake.

The State Department uses two separate networks, one for classified information and one for unclassified information. The two networks are kept separate for security reasons. Most classified networks are equipped with audit systems that allow security managers to check who has accessed intelligence or foreign policy secrets.

The FBI is trying to determine the origin of the highly classified information that was found in Clinton emails.

However, the task is said to be complicated because those with authority to create classified information have broad authority to label information in one of three categories: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.

The FBI is primarily concerned with trying to determine how Top Secret information made its way on to the private server.

Chris Farrell, an investigator with the public interest legal group Judicial Watch, said the State Department has been reluctant to describe the nature of its computer networks as some of the 16 Freedom of Information Act lawsuits the group has filed make their way through the courts.

Farrell said in an interview that the department also has been unwilling to say whether the private email system, used by Clinton and close aides Huma Abedin and Cheryl Mills, should be considered an official State Department network covered by FOIA laws.

Farrell said the seizure of the four State Department servers is likely part of the forensic investigation underway by the FBI into hardware used by Clinton and her aides to send email to the private server.

“In the midst of what I believe to be a forensic examination of the hardware that [Clinton lawyer David] Kendall surrendered on behalf of Mrs. Clinton, any serious national security investigation would seek to track all emails inbound and outbound,” Farrell said. “If they are doing that tracking of email since she was secretary of state, then they would be looking at any email that could have crossed into a State server.”

The servers were part of the State Department bureau of information resource management.

The bureau helps the department “to successfully carry out its foreign policy mission by applying modern IT tools, approaches, systems, and information products.”

In addition to improving efforts of “transparent, interconnected diplomacy,” the bureau is “focused on enhancing security for the department’s computer and communications systems.”

The FBI probe of State Department servers is the latest disclosure on the criminal investigation into the private Clinton email server that has embroiled the leading Democratic presidential candidate for several months.

The FBI took possession of Clinton’s private email server last summer after classified information was found in some of the more than 30,000 emails Clinton turned over to the State Department.

The investigation began after I. Charles McCullough, the intelligence community inspector general, reported to Congress Aug. 11 that Clinton’s private emails included some highly classified information labeled “Top Secret//SI/TK//Noforn.” Information classified at that level is deemed by the government to be very sensitive, requiring strong security protections because its compromise would cause grave damage to U.S. national security.

The politics surrounding the probe prompted FBI Director James Comey to tell reporters last week that the bureau will not be influenced by politics.

“One of the main reasons I have a 10-year term is to make sure that this organization stays outside of politics, and if you know my folks, you know that they don’t give a whit about politics,” Comey said, adding that the FBI has devoted sufficient resources and personnel so that the Clinton email probe can be completed in a timely way.

Those remarks were the first official confirmation of the investigation.

The State Department contacted Clinton’s lawyer, David E. Kendall, seeking additional emails that were not part of the more than 30,000 emails provided to the department earlier, the Washington Times reported on Tuesday.

The private email server was discovered by the legal public interest group Judicial Watch in late 2014 after the State Department informed the group that it had discovered a new tranche of records. Judicial Watch currently has at least 16 lawsuits related to State Department and other government records.

The email server material then became the focus of House investigators looking into Clinton’s handling of the terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi in 2012.

The House investigation of the Benghazi attack was attacked by Clinton this week after Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.), the frontrunner to be the next House speaker, said the Benghazi probe was part of a political effort to diminish Clinton’s presidential prospects.

Clinton seized on the comments in a New Hampshire town hall meeting this week.

Asked if she would have investigated a member of a Republican administration amid charges of improperly using a personal email account and server, Clinton said, “I would never have done that.”

“Look at the situation they chose to exploit to go after me for political reasons, the death of four Americans in Benghazi,” she continued.

In a sign of increasing worries about the probe at the Clinton campaign, the New York Post reported that an unidentified legal aide to Clinton has advised her to hire a criminal defense lawyer.

The number of communications regarded as classified is about 400, according to the latest State Department release of emails. Three of the new emails released last month were marked secret, including emails relating to Iranian nuclear talks.

Security analysts have voiced concerns that foreign hackers may have breached the private email server.

One theory is that Clinton aides who were cleared for access to national security secrets first read classified reports on State Department information system and then “gisted” the material into private emails for Clinton.

Clinton spokesman Nick Merrill told the New York Times that none of the candidate’s aides had mishandled classified information.

“She and her team took the handling of classified information very seriously, and at home and abroad she communicated with others via secure phone, cable, and in meetings in secure settings,” Merrill said.

The State Department has confirmed to Sen. Chuck Grassley (R., Iowa) in a related development that Clinton currently holds a security clearance for Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information, the highest-level security clearance.

The department said Clinton’s clearance was “revalidated” after she left office in 2013 and was done so as part of a standard practice allowing former high-ranking officials to be granted access to secrets.

Critics in Congress have called for Clinton’s clearance to be revoked based on the compromises involved in her use of the private email system.

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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 49.

#3. To: nolu chan (#0)

Critics in Congress have called for Clinton’s clearance to be revoked based on the compromises involved in her use of the private email system.

Now THAT may work when she is cleared of any 'wrong doing.' They revoke her clearance and that becomes a campaign issue for her after the nomination.

Then again the 47% won't care or won't know what it means to have a security clearance revoked.

Then again Barry Oh received a clearance and half of life is 'missing.' If a CPT in the Army had Barry Oh's background they would not get a TS clearance. Maybe a secret.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-10-08   13:59:27 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#6. To: redleghunter (#3)

They revoke her clearance and that becomes a campaign issue for her after the nomination.

Because she is NOT actively on duty, she has no active clearance. Because she is running for President; the office has no requirement about having any clearance at all.

Your point is moot.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-08   22:12:46 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#7. To: buckeroo (#6)

The department said Clinton’s clearance was “revalidated” after she left office in 2013 and was done so as part of a standard practice allowing former high-ranking officials to be granted access to secrets.

Critics in Congress have called for Clinton’s clearance to be revoked based on the compromises involved in her use of the private email system.

Her TS clearance is still valid. Revalidated in 2013. Which means her next periodic review is 2018.

She may be read off certain programs but I doubt that. Former Sec of State keep their read on to "help" consult the sitting Secretary. Part of the government's grey beard program.

That was why Sandy Berger was allowed access to classified data during the 9/11 hearings. Which he stuffed some in his socks and underwear.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-10-09   1:02:24 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#8. To: redleghunter (#7)

NO, her clearance is not valid; it queued based on past access but suspended for any activity. Irrespective of clearance classification there is a "need to know" requirement. She can't have access to diddly squat.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-09   22:29:55 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#14. To: buckeroo (#8)

NO, her clearance is not valid; it queued based on past access but suspended for any activity. Irrespective of clearance classification there is a "need to know" requirement. She can't have access to diddly squat.

That's not how it works.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-10-09   23:39:31 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#16. To: redleghunter (#14)

That's not how it works.

Hoe quaint. Once a post is removed as in the Secretary of State (or any job requiring clearance) access is denied. One's security clearance is a moot point about NEED TO KNOW.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-09   23:42:15 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#22. To: buckeroo (#16)

Need to know applies in any job requiring a security clearance.

I had some of the most nifty access but at times did not have a need to know. I was also in a situation where it was deemed I had a need to know and my boss did not.

That was only because having the need to know meant being locked up in a planning vault for 6 days. Better me than him I guess.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-10-09   23:56:48 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#23. To: redleghunter (#22)

Need to know applies in any job requiring a security clearance.

That is NOT TRUE. You don't know diddly squat.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-10   0:02:06 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#25. To: buckeroo (#23)

That is NOT TRUE. You don't know diddly squat.

Again, whatever Buck. You must have been the J2 in a previous life.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-10-10   0:04:31 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#26. To: redleghunter (#25) (Edited)

You have not operated on or within a theater level. That is a phuckin' fact. You may have had privilege to data based on some "clearance" but that "clearance" did not grant "NEED TO KNOW."

The US government guards data like a hawk. Having a clearance, no matter the level of clearance(s) means nothing unless granted the NEED TO KNOW. The NEED TO KNOW means that you are listed with authoritative bodies and authorized through a chain of command whether government, military or private industry.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-10   0:10:23 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#29. To: buckeroo (#26)

You have not operated on or within a theater level. That is a phuckin' fact.

I have. Twice and during combat and COIN operations.

On two assignments I was on a 3 star HQs General staff.

On two other assignments I served on the Army and Joint Staff.

I had a TS SCI as early as the rank of 2LT due to tactical nukes back then.

So yes I know how it works.

redleghunter  posted on  2015-10-10   0:24:02 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#30. To: redleghunter (#29)

You still did not have a NEED TO KNOW on data requiring an SCI. A clearance is secondary to NEED TO KNOW. A clearance (any clearance) does not grant access to data.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-10   0:26:21 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#42. To: buckeroo, redleghunter (#30)

You still did not have a NEED TO KNOW on data requiring an SCI. A clearance is secondary to NEED TO KNOW. A clearance (any clearance) does not grant access to data.

A "need to know" does not grant access to anything either. If you have a "need to know" to do your job, and you do not have the requisite clearance, you can't get in the door. After you get the clearance, then you must get an official access authorization to work with the stuff you need to know.

If you are entering certain areas, you can have a security clearance, access authorization, and need to know, and if your name does not appear on the access list on the inside of the access door, you may still be uninvited to the party.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-10-10   1:49:10 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#43. To: nolu chan (#42)

A "need to know" does not grant access to anything either.

Yes it does.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-10   17:53:34 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#44. To: buckeroo, redleghunter (#43)

A "need to know" does not grant access to anything either.

Yes it does.

A "need to know" does not grant access to jack shit. Assess is granted by an access authorization letter and that must be issued by authority of the responsible official for the information to which access is granted. The access authorization letter cannot be granted until the requisite level security clearance is granted.

Example: you are assigned to a military command, and you have a SECRET clearance from your previous work, but your job at the new command requires a TOP SECRET clearance to access the space where you will do your new assigned job, which willi include TS information. You have a "need to know" the information attached to your assigned job, but you do not have the requisite clearance. You cannot be given an access authorization or be permitted to do your job. You will be found less classified or unclassified makework to do until your additional clearance is approved. You might walk around with a coffee cup looking stupid for a few months, or just hanging out.

A TOP SECRET clearance follows the "need to know" which is one of the factors which makes one eligible for such a clearance. Your existing NAC doesn't cut it. There needs to be a BI. That takes time. Until you get the clearance and the access authorization, your "need to know" does not get you in the door.

You really should stop making believe you know anything about the subject.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-10-13   16:27:55 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#45. To: nolu chan, redleghunter (#44)

In a word, "Bullshit." Your example of using TOP SECRET is significant to support my perspective, too. A cursory background check is provided for the applicant after review of the application for the security clearance. If that cursory background check yields no issues, an INTERIM TOP SECRET clearance is provided until the FULL background investigation is complete.

A TOP SECRET clearance may take months and sometimes over a year. For "need to know" requiresments such as a specialized skill set, provision is provided for those passing a cursory investigation and granting an interim clearance.

buckeroo  posted on  2015-10-14   20:31:06 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#49. To: buckeroo, redleghunter (#45)

In a word, "Bullshit." Your example of using TOP SECRET is significant to support my perspective, too. A cursory background check is provided for the applicant after review of the application for the security clearance. If that cursory background check yields no issues, an INTERIM TOP SECRET clearance is provided until the FULL background investigation is complete.

A TOP SECRET clearance may take months and sometimes over a year. For "need to know" requiresments such as a specialized skill set, provision is provided for those passing a cursory investigation and granting an interim clearance.

Googling some uncited website and giving your interpretation of their incomplete information does not get it. It only underscores, once again, that you have never gained a working knowledge of how the system works, and you certainly have not read the applicable personnel security manuals. In short, you do not know what the hell you are talking about.

Until you have a clearance and then an access authorization letter, your bullshit "need to know" still cannot get you in the door.

To be eligible for an Interim Top Secret clearance, the individual MUST first have a lower security clearance, or a current NAC that has been favorably adjudicated by the applicable agency.

The average SECRET clearance takes 34 days and the average TOP SECRET clearance takes 89 days, according to Ft. Meade.

Below are OFFICIAL instructions about granting FINAL and INTERIM clearances, first Navy (SECNAV M-5510.30) and then Army (AR 380-67), including those for civilian employees. Dod issues the vast majority of all clearances.

SECNAV M-5510.30
June 2006

CHAPTER 7

CLEARANCE AND SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENT ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS

[...]

7-3 SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SENSITIVE DUTY ASSIGNMENT

[...]

2. Security clearance eligibility is not de facto authorization for an individual to access classified information. Authorization to access classified information is a separate command level determination dependent on whether an individual who has the requisite eligibility also has a need for access to classified information in the performance of official duties, as explained in chapter 9.

CHAPTER 9

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

9-1 BASIC POLICY

1. Under U.S. Navy regulations, the commanding officer’s responsibility for his or her command is absolute. The authority of the commanding officer is commensurate with his or her responsibility. Commanding officers have ultimate responsibility and authority for all determinations regarding persons who may have access to classified information under their control.

2. Commanding officers will determine those position functions under their control that require access to classified information, and may authorize access to the incumbents of such positions who have officially been determined to be eligible by the appropriate adjudicative authority.

3. Commanding officers may grant access to classified information to any individual who has an official need-to-know, established security clearance eligibility, and about whom there is no known un-adjudicated disqualifying information.

4. No one has a right to have access to classified information solely because of rank, position, or security clearance eligibility.

5. Access to classified information will be granted only if allowing access will promote the furtherance of the DON mission while preserving the interests of national security.

6. Access to classified information will be limited to the extent possible, to the minimum number of persons necessary to accomplish the mission, and will be based on need-to-know. Additionally, the level of the classification and the amount of information authorized for access will be limited to the minimum level and amount required to perform assigned duties.

7. Access to classified information will be formally terminated when it is no longer required in the performance of assigned DON duties and/or when the individual's security clearance eligibility is denied or revoked.

[...]

9-2 NEED-TO-KNOW

1. Access to classified information is not authorized by the favorable conclusion of a clearance eligibility determination. Access is only permitted to eligible individuals after determining that the individual has a “need-to-know.”

2. Need-to-know is a determination that an individual requires access to specific classified information in the performance of (or assist in the performance of) lawful and authorized government functions and duties.

3. Need-to-know is one of two information points that must be determined by every authorized holder of classified information prior to relinquishing that classified information to a prospective recipient.

a. The authorized holder of classified information must determine that the intended recipient has security clearance eligibility established at (or above) the level of access required.

b. The authorized holder must determine that the prospective recipient needs-to-know that information in order to perform lawful and authorized government functions.

c. These determinations must be based on reliable information, obtained formally or informally, from chain of command supervisors, security managers, or other sources in a position to know the prospective recipients security clearance eligibility and/or duties and organizational functions in relation to the specified classified information intended for release.

4. Need-to-know is a preventative measure to identify and deter unauthorized access.

a. Knowledge, possession of, or access to classified information is not provided to any individual solely by virtue of the individual’s office, rank, or position.

b. Although access can only be authorized for individuals with established security clearance eligibility at or above the level of classified information required, having security clearance eligibility DOES NOT equate to need-to-know.

5. Classified discussions are prohibited in public areas; hallways, cafeterias, elevators, rest rooms or smoking areas because the discussion may be overheard by persons who do not have a need-to-know. (Individuals are obliged to report violations of the need-to-know principle to their security manager.)

6. Need-to-know requires a level of personal responsibility that is challenging, particularly since it conflicts with human nature and the desire to share information with co-workers and colleagues. It is therefore critical to frequently focus on need-to-know requirements during security education briefings and refresher training.

9-4 TEMPORARY ACCESS (INTERIM CLEARANCE)

1. In the absence of adverse information, commanding officers may grant temporary access (also referred to as interim clearance or interim access) to individuals pending completion of full investigative requirements and pending establishment of security clearance eligibility by the DON CAF. Adverse information is identified in appendix G, paragraph 4.

2. Temporary access is an exception to the requirement for a completed investigation and eligibility determination prior to access. Temporary access is a stopgap measure taken to minimize operational impact, but it requires compensatory security measures to only consider this option if no issue information is present as follows:

a. Temporary Top Secret access requires:

(1) Established secret or confidential security clearance eligibility or a current NAC favorably adjudicated by DON CAF; and

(2) A favorable review of the completed personnel security questionnaire (PSQ) revealing no eligibility issues as outlined in exhibit 10A; and

(3) The submission of the SSBI request to OPM; and

(4) A favorable review of local records, as defined in paragraph 6-12.

b. Temporary secret or confidential access requires:

(1) A favorable review of the PSQ revealing no eligibility issues as outlined in exhibit 10A; and

(2) The submission of an appropriate investigative request to OPM (paragraph 6-14 applies); and

(3) A favorable review of local records (paragraph 6-12 applies).

3. Commands will record temporary access in JPAS.

4. Temporary access may only be authorized by the commanding officer or designee, and has been the subject of a favorably completed SSBI. Temporary access for SCI may be only authorized by the DONCAF.

5. It is important to ensure that the request for investigation reaches its destination, especially when temporary access is at issue. Since temporary access is a stopgap measure that anticipates a timely and favorable result, commands must be vigilant in monitoring these requests and are strongly encouraged to use registered or certified mail to ensure receipt when mailing investigation request and other required/related documentation.

6. When the command receives a LOI (also known as Statement of Reasons) from the DON CAF to deny an individual's security clearance, the commanding officer will immediately withdraw temporary access (interim security clearance).

7. Temporary access or assignment to sensitive positions is not authorized for individuals who have received a final unfavorable eligibility determination. Requests for reinstatement may be submitted to DON CAF; however, temporary access is not authorized until eligibility is reestablished.

9-5 ONE-TIME ACCESS

1. An urgent operational or contractual emergency may arise for cleared personnel to have one-time or short duration access to classified information at a level higher than that for which they are eligible. Processing the individual to upgrade the security clearance would not be practical in these situations, therefore an individual may be granted access at one security classification level above that for which eligible, subject to the following terms and conditions:

a. Only a flag officer or general officer, a general courts-martial convening authority or equivalent senior executive service member, may grant one-time access, after coordination with command security officials.

b. The individual granted one-time access must be a U.S. citizen, have a DoD security clearance eligibility determination and have been continuously employed by DoD or a cleared DoD contractor for the preceding 24-month period. One-time access is not authorized for part-time or temporary employees.

c. A review of locally available records must reveal no disqualifying information.

d. Whenever possible, access will be limited to a single instance or, at most, a few occasions. If repeated access is required, the proper PSI will be initiated.

e. The access authorization will automatically expire no later than 90 calendar days from the date access commenced. If the need for access is expected to continue for a period in excess of 90 days, the command must initiate a request for the appropriate PSI. Access will not be extended, in any case, beyond 90 days from the date access commenced unless a supporting PSI is requested.

f. Access at the higher level will only be allowed under the supervision of a properly cleared individual.

g. Access will be limited to information under the control of the official who authorized the one-time access. One-time access will not be authorized for COMSEC, SCI, NATO or foreign government information.

2. This provision will be used sparingly and repeated use of one time access within any 12-month period on behalf of the same individual is prohibited.

3. A record must be maintained for each individual authorized one-time access.

a. Justification for the access will be recorded, to include an explanation of the compelling reason for granting the higher-level access and, specifically, how the DON mission is being furthered;

b. An unclassified description of the specific information to which access was afforded and the duration of the access, to include the dates access was afforded will also be recorded;

c. A description of the specific results of the local records review; and

d. The approving authority will be fully identified with name, rank, and position.

= = = = = = = = = =

Army Regulation 380-67

Security

Personnel Security Program

[...]

2-1

[...]

b. No person is entitled to knowledge of, possession of, or access to classified defense information solely by virtue of office, position, grade, rank, or security clearance. Such information will be entrusted only to persons whose official military or other governmental duties require it and who have been investigated and cleared for access under the standards prescribed by this regulation. Security clearances indicate that the persons concerned are eligible for access to classified information should their official duties require it.

[...]

2–6. National agency check/entrance national agency check

Essentially, a national agency check (NAC) is a records check of designated agencies of the Federal Government that maintain record systems containing information relevant to making a personnel security determination. An entrance national agency check (ENTNAC) is a NAC (scope as outlined in para B–1, app B) conducted on inductees and firstterm enlistees, but lacking a technical fingerprint search. A NAC is also an integral part of each background investigation (BI), special background investigation (SBI), and periodic reinvestigation (PR). Chapter 3 prescribes when a NAC is required.

2–7. National agency check and written inquiries.

The OPM conducts a NAC and written inquiries (NACI) on civilian employees for all departments and agencies of the Federal Government, pursuant to EO 10450. NACIs are considered to meet the investigative requirements of this regulation for a nonsensitive or noncritical-sensitive position and/or up to a SECRET clearance and, in addition to the NAC, include coverage of law enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools covering the last 5 years.

2–8. DOD national agency check and written inquiries.

The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) will conduct a Department of Defense National Agency check with written inquiries (DNACI), consisting of the scope contained in paragraph B–2, appendix B, for DOD military and contractor personnel for access to SECRET information. Chapter 3 prescribes when a DNACI is required.

2–9. Background investigation.

The BI is the principal type of investigation conducted when an individual requires TOP SECRET clearance or is to be assigned to a critical-sensitive position. The BI normally covers a 5-year period and consists of a subject interview, NAC, local agency check (LAC)s, credit checks, developed character references (3), employment records checks, employment references (3), and select scoping as required to resolve unfavorable or questionable information. (See paraB–3, app B.) Chapter 3 prescribes when a BI is required.

2–10. Special background investigation

a. An SBI is essentially a BI providing additional coverage both in period of time as well as sources of information, scoped in accordance with the provisions of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 but without the personal interview. While the kind of coverage provided for by the SBI determines eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI), DD has adopted this coverage for certain other special access programs. Chapter 3 prescribes when an SBI is required.

b. The OPM, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Secret Service, and the Department of State conduct specially scoped BIs under the provisions of DCID 1/14. Any investigation conducted by one of the above-cited agencies under DCID 1/14 standards is considered to meet the SBI investigative requirements of this regulation.

c. The detailed scope of an SBI is set forth in paragraph B–4, appendix B.

[...]

3–2. Criteria for security designation of positions

Each civilian position within DOD shall be categorized, with respect to security sensitivity, as either nonsensitive, noncritical-sensitive, or critical-sensitive.

a. The criteria to be applied in designating a position as sensitive are:

(1) Critical-sensitive.

(a) Access to TOP SECRET information.

(b) Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs that affect the overall operations of the DOD or of a DOD component.

(c) Development or approval of war plans, plans or particulars of future major or special operations of war, or critical and extremely important items of war.

(d) Investigative and certain investigative support duties, the issuance or adjudication of personnel security clearances or access authorizations, or the making of personnel security determinations.

(e) Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust.

(f) Duties falling under special access programs.

(g) Category I automated data processing (ADP) positions.

(h) Any other position so designated by the head of the component or designee.

(2) Noncritical-sensitive.

(a) Access to SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL information.

(b) Security police/provost marshal-type duties involving the enforcement of law and security duties involving the protection and safeguarding of DOD personnel and property.

(c) Category II automated data processing positions.

(d) Duties involving education and orientation of DOD personnel.

(e) Duties involving the design, operation, or maintenance of intrusion detection systems deployed to safeguard DOD personnel and property.

(f) Any other position so designated by the head of the component or designee.

b. All other positions shall be designated as nonsensitive.

[...]

Section II

Civilian Employment

3–6. General

The appointment of each civilian employee in any DOD component is subject to investigation, except for reappointment when the break in employment is less than 12 months. The type of investigation required is set forth in this section according to position sensitivity.

[...]

3–9. Noncritical-sensitive positions

a. An NACI shall be requested and the NAC portion favorably completed before a person is appointed to a noncritical-sensitive position (for exceptions see para 3–10). An ENTNAC, NAC or DNACI conducted during military or contractor employment may also be used for appointment provided a NACI has been requested from OPM and there is no more than 12 months break in service since completion of the investigation.

b. Seasonal employees (including summer hires) normally do not require access to classified information. For those requiring access to classified information, the appropriate investigation is required. The request for the NAC should be submitted to DIS by entering “SH” (summer hire) in red letters approximately 1 inch high on the DD Form 398–2, Personnel Security Questionnaire (National Agency Check). Additionally, to ensure expedited processing by DIS, summer hire requests should be assembled and forwarded to DIS in bundles, when appropriate. 3–10. Critical-sensitive positions A BI shall be favorably completed prior to appointment to critical-sensitive positions (for exceptions see para 3–10).

Certain critical-sensitive positions require a preappointment SBI in accordance with section V of this chapter. Preappointment BIs and SBIs will be conducted by DIS. Inasmuch as a BI or SBI is of greater scope, a NACI will not be requested from OPM if a BI or SBI for employment in a critical-sensitive position is requested from DIS or a valid BI or SBI exists.

3–11. Exceptions

a. Noncritical-sensitive. In an emergency, a noncritical-sensitive position may be occupied pending the completion of the NACI if the head of the requesting organization finds that the delay in appointment would be harmful to the national security and such finding is reduced to writing and made a part of the record in the official personnel folder (OPF). The emergency finding will include a statement of why a delay pending completion of the required investigation will be harmful to the national interest. In such instances, the position may be filled only after the NACI has been requested.

b. Critical-sensitive. In an emergency, a critical-sensitive position may be occupied pending completion of the BI (or SBI, as appropriate) if the head of the requesting organization or an authority listed in paragraph F–7a, appendix F finds that the delay in appointment would be harmful to the national security and such finding is reduced to writing and made a part of the record in the OPF. The emergency finding will include a statement of why a delay pending completion of the required investigation will be harmful to the national interest. In such instances, the position may be filled only when the NAC portion of the BI (or SBI) or a previous valid NACI, NAC, or ENTNAC has been completed and favorably adjudicated, and there has been no break in service in excess of 12 months.

c. Harmful delays. In exceptions a and b above, a delay in appointment may be considered harmful to national interests if the following apply:

(1) Regulatory requirements, mission-essential functions, or responsibilities cannot be met. A detailed explanation will be provided.

(2) No other personnel are available on a temporary basis to complete these requirements.

d. Applicability. This policy applies to new appointments and to current incumbents of positions when the sensitivity designation is changed.

[...]

Section IV

Security Clearance

3–19. General

a. The authorities designated in paragraph F–1, appendix F, are the only authorities authorized to grant, deny or revoke DOD personnel security clearances. The granting of such clearances shall be limited to only those persons who require access to classified information for mission accomplishment.

b. Military, DOD civilian, and contractor personnel who are employed by or serving in a consultant capacity to the DOD, may be considered for access to classified information only when such access is required in connection with official duties. Such individuals may be granted either a final or interim personnel security clearance provided the investigative requirements set forth below are complied with, and provided further that all available information has been adjudicated and a finding made that such clearance would be clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

c. Before issuing any security clearance, final or interim, the commander must verify the following:

(1) That the person has had no break in Federal service exceeding 12 months since the completion of the investigation.

(2) That the person can prove U.S. citizenship by presenting one of the documents listed in paragraph B.4d, appendix B (see para 3.20).

3.20. Investigative requirements for clearance

a. TOP SECRET.

(1) Final clearance:

(a) BI/SBI.

(b) Established billet per paragraph 3.4 (except contractors).

(c) Favorable review of local personnel, post military police, medical records, and other security records, as appropriate.

(2) Interim clearance:

(a) Favorable NAC, ENTNAC, DNACI, or NACI completed within past 5 years.

(b) Favorable review of DD Form 398/SF.86/OF 612/DD Form 49.

(c) BI or SBI has been initiated.

(d) Favorable review of local personnel, post or base military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.

(e) Established billet per paragraph 3.4 (except contractors).

(f) Provisions of paragraph 3.10 have been met regarding civilian personnel.

(g) If evidence exists of a BI, SBI, full field investigation, Criminal Investigation Command (CID) character investigation, or comparable investigation not over 4 1/2 years old, provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c), above, are waived and a requesting a final TOP SECRET clearance will be submitted to central clearance facility (CCF) noting that an interim clearance was granted. Such evidence will be attached to the DA Form 5247.R. CCF will check the defense central investigations index (DCII) to find whether or not a later investigation exists that would require withdrawal of a security clearance.

(h) Commanders may grant an interim TOP SECRET clearance for 180 days in the name of the Commander, CCF.

b. SECRET.

(1) Final clearance:

(a) DNACI: Military (except first-term enlistees) and contractor employees.

(b) NACI: Civilian employees.

1. The NACI is required even though the individual held a valid security clearance based on a NAC, ENTNAC, or DNACI while a member of the Armed Forces.

2. Exception: Summer hires, members of cooperative education programs, employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, Army and Air Force Exchange Service employees, Red Cross members, USO employees, and non-Federal employees of the ARNG may be granted a final clearance on the basis of a favorable completed NAC/ENTNAC conducted by the DIS. No interim clearance is authorized for these employees.

(c) Entrance: First-term enlistees.

(d) Favorable review of local personnel, post military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.

(2) Interim clearance:

(a) When a valid need to access SECRET information is established, an interim SECRET clearance may be issued for 180 days in the name of the CDR, CCF, in every case, provided that a DA Form 5247.R has been submitted to CCF, and the steps outlined in paragraphs (b) through (e), below, have been complied with.

(b) Favorable review of DD Form 398.2/SF 85/OF 612/DD Form 48.

(c) NACI, DNACI, or ENTNAC initiated.

(d) Favorable review of local personnel, post or base military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.

(e) NAC or ENTNAC completed or, in an emergency, provisions of paragraph 3.10 have been complied with regarding civilian personnel.

c. CONFIDENTIAL.

(1) Final clearance:

(a) NAC or ENTNAC: Military and contractor employees (except for Philippine national members of the United States Navy on whom a BI shall be favorably completed).

(b) NACI; Civilian employees (except for summer hires and others listed in paragraph 3–19b(l)(b)(l)2 who may be granted a final clearance on the basis of a NAC).

(c) Favorable review of local personnel, post military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.

(2) Interim clearance:

(a) Favorable review of DD Form 398–2/SF 86/OF 612/DD Form 48.

(b) NAC, ENTNAC, or NACI initiated.

(c) Favorable review of local personnel, post or base military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.

(d) Provisions of paragraph 3–10 have been complied with regarding civilian personnel.

d. Validity of, previously granted clearances. Clearances granted under less stringent investigative requirements retain their validity; however, if a higher degree of clearance is required, investigative requirements of this regulation will be followed.

nolu chan  posted on  2015-10-14   23:46:38 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


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