Title: GOP’s new idea to stop Trump: Make candidates pledge to support the nominee in order to qualify for the ballot Source:
Hot Air URL Source:http://hotair.com/archives/2015/08/ ... der-to-qualify-for-the-ballot/ Published:Aug 25, 2015 Author:Allahpundit Post Date:2015-08-25 19:10:49 by cranky Keywords:None Views:2449 Comments:14
Dumb. You think Trump gives a crap about a pledge? He’d take the pledge, renounce it later, then laugh at what losers these Republican leaders are for ever believing that he’d keep his promise.
And his fans would cheer him on. “He outwitted the RINOs by making them think he’s a man of his word!”
The Virginia and North Carolina parties are in discussions about implementing a new requirement for candidates to qualify for their primary ballots: that they pledge to support the Republican presidential nominee — and not run as a third-party candidate — in the general election…
Any moves to tie Trump’s hands, though, could infuriate the mercurial billionaire, who has warned that he could bolt the party if GOP leaders treat him unfairly. On Tuesday morning, Roger Stone, a longtime former Trump strategist, wrote on Twitter that the state party effort would backfire. “The kind of thing that could make @realDonaldTrump bolt the GOP and run 3rd party or Indy,” he said…
“Ballot access usually is regarded as party function,” said Tom Josefiak, a former RNC chief counsel. “It definitely would be left up to the state party to decide how it’s going to operate.”
The South Carolina GOP requires a loyalty pledge to make the ballot. Trump has until September 30th to decide.
I understand why GOPers are jittery about Trump going third-party but that seems less likely to happen every day. In fact, if you’re a Trump-hater who’s groaning over his polling, there’s your silver lining — the better he does now, the more likely he is to commit himself to the Republican race and try to win the party’s nomination. And his odds of doing that are still much, much lower than the odds are that he’d successfully wreck the GOP’s chances in the general election as an indie. If your endgame here is Republican victory next fall, you’re better off trying to stop Trump in the primaries than having him as a loose cannon firing at the party from the outside. Building a formidable independent campaign that qualifies for the ballot in all 50 states will take lots of money, organization, and time. Trump has the first of those three but the second is questionable, and the longer he spends atop the GOP field, the less he’ll have of the third this winter to try to put together an indie bid if his lead among Republicans starts to collapse.
Besides, as Ken Cuccinelli noted to Politico, there are “sore loser laws” in some states that block candidates from running in the general election as an independent if they compete in a party primary and lose. Other states require candidates to register for the primary and general elections on the same day, effectively blocking a third-party switch later. There may be ways around those laws depending upon how much you want to spend on lawyers and how lucky you feel in court, but the safe play would be for Trump to decide whether to stick it out in the GOP race or abandon the party before the voting has even started. If his polling has collapsed before Iowa, he’ll be looking at blowing tens of millions of bucks on a third-party bid where all he can do is play spoiler, and if his polling hasn’t collapsed, he’ll have every reason to remain a Republican and take his chances with GOP voters. What would a ballot pledge do to stop him that those electoral laws don’t? Besides, if Trump wants to wreck the GOP nominee in the general, he doesn’t have to go to any bother involving registering as a candidate, spending money, stumping around the country, etc. He could simply quit the Republican race in due time and then spend next summer doing media hits urging his fans not to vote in the fall. “The best thing you can do now to make America great again,” he could say, “is to send a message to Republicans by staying home this year.” Same basic effect as a third-party candidacy without any of the hassle. Imagine how grateful President Hillary will be.
Here’s Glenn Beck being asked last night on CNN whether he’d vote for Trump as the Republican nominee. Hot Air alum Noah Rothman, a sharp Trump critic, makes a sharp point on a related note here: If you disdain Trump so much that you’d force him to take a loyalty oath, shouldn’t you, as a Republican, pledge to vote for him next fall if he’s the party’s nominee? If you want to reserve your right to boycott a Trump/Clinton election, maybe you shouldn’t demand vows of fealty from anyone else.
So you don't think the sore loser laws will be a deterrent?
No, and they shouldn't be since they're illegal. They're both Natural Born US Citizens, and old enough. Republicans and Democrats have become used to voting for Kenyans, Panamanians, Mexicans, etc. but they might to willing to give a legitimate candidate a try. These guest worker presidential candidates aren't working out.
So you don't think the sore loser laws will be a deterrent?
No, and they shouldn't be since they're illegal.
It's an interesting question.
The State interest in Presidential elections is different from State elections.
An Ohio early filing deadline, applicable to a presidential election, was struck down in 1983 in Anderson, but the opinion stated "the deadline is neither a 'sore loser' provision nor a disaffiliation statute."
In several other cases, "sore loser" provisions were upheld.
Anderson et al v. Celebrezze, Secretary of State of Ohio, 460 U.S. 780, 802-806 (1983)
[802]
[...]
Thus in Williams v. Rhodes we concluded that First Amendment values outweighed the State's interest in protecting the two major political parties.
On the other hand, in Storer v. Brown we upheld two California statutory provisions that restricted access by inde-
[803]
pendent candidates to the general election ballot. Under California law, a person could not run as an independent in November if he had been defeated in a party primary that year or if he had been registered with a political party within one year prior to that year's primary election. We stated that "California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government," and that destruction of "the political stability of the system of the State" could have "profound consequences for the entire citizenry." 415 U. S., at 736. Further, we approved the State's goals of discouraging "independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel." Id., at 735.
Thus in Storer we recognized the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventing "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism." But we did not suggest that a political party could invoke the powers of the State to assure monolithic control over its own members and supporters.' Political competition that draws resources away from the major parties cannot, for that reason alone, be condemned as "unrestrained factionalism." Instead, in Storer we examined the two challenged provisions in the context of California's electoral system. By requiring a candidate to remain in the intraparty competition once the disaffiliation deadline had passed, and by giving conclusive effect to the winnowing process performed by party members in the primary election, the challenged provisions were an essential part of "a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot." Moreover, we pointed out that the
[804]
policy "involves no discrimination against independents." Storer, supra, at 733.
Ohio's challenged restriction is substantially different from the California provisions upheld in Storer. As we have noted, the early filing deadline does discriminate against independents. And the deadline is neither a "sore loser" provision nor a disaffiliation statute." Furthermore, it is important to recognize that Storer upheld the State's interest in avoiding political fragmentation in the context of elections wholly within the boundaries of California.' The State's interest in regulating a nationwide Presidential election is not nearly as strong; no State could singlehandedly assure "political stability" in the Presidential context. The Ohio deadline does not serve any state interest in "maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" for the Presidency, because Ohio's Presidential preference primary does not serve to narrow the field for the general election. A major party candidate who loses the Ohio primary, or who does not even run in Ohio, may nonetheless appear on the November general election ballot as the party's nominee. In addition, the national scope of the competition for delegates at the Presidential nominating conventions assures that "intraparty feuding" will continue until August.
[805]
More generally, the early filing deadline is not precisely drawn to protect the parties from "intraparty feuding," whatever legitimacy that state goal may have in a Presidential election. If the deadline is designed to keep intraparty competition within the party structure, its coverage is both too broad and too narrow. It is true that in this case § 3513.25.7 was applied to a candidate who had previously competed in party primaries and then sought to run as an independent. But the early deadline applies broadly to independent candidates who have not been affiliated in the recent past with any political party. On the other hand, as long as the decision to run is made before the March deadline, Ohio does not prohibit independent candidacies by persons formerly affiliated with a political party, or currently participating in intraparty competition in other States-regardless of the effect on the political party structure.
Moreover, the early deadline for filing as an independent may actually impair the State's interest in preserving party harmony. As Professor Bickel perceptively observed:
"The characteristic American third party, then, consists of a group of people who have tried to exert influence within one of the major parties, have failed, and later decide to work on the outside. States in which there is an early qualifying date tend to force such groups to create minor parties without first attempting to influence the course taken by a major one. For a dissident group is put to the choice of foregoing major-party primary and other prenomination activity by organizing separately early on in an election year, or losing all opportunity for action as a third party later." Bickel, supra n. 11, at 87-88.
The same analysis, of course, is applicable to a "dissident group" that coalesces around an independent candidate rather than attempting to form a new political party. We conclude that Ohio's March filing deadline for independent candidates for the office of President of the United
[806]
States cannot be justified by the State's asserted interest in protecting political stability.
"For even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 343. 'Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. [415], 438 [(1963)]. If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties." Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 58-59 (1973).
IV
We began our inquiry by noting that our primary concern is not the interest of candidate Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associate together to express their support for Anderson's candidacy and the views he espoused. Under any realistic appraisal, the "extent and nature" of the burdens Ohio has placed on the voters' freedom of choice and freedom of association, in an election of nationwide importance, unquestionably outweigh the State's minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.
A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status. Nor do we have reason for concluding that the device California chose, § 6830-(d) (Supp. 1974), was not an essential part of its overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals. As we indicated in Rosario, the Constitution does rot require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot.
We conclude that § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is not unconstitutional, and Storer and Frommhagen were properly barred from the ballot as a result of its application.7 Cf. Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U. S. 1032 (1972).
Reaching the merits, we conclude that Backus' constitutional claim is frivolous. Under Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S. Ct. 1274, 39 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1974), South Carolina certainly has the power, as a permissible adjunct to promoting orderly primary elections, to forbid petition candidacies by persons who have been defeated in party primaries.
US Taxpayers Party v. Garza, 924 F. Supp. 71, 74-75 (W.D. Tex. 1996)
Defendants argue that Section 162.015(a) (2) ensures an orderly electoral process and protects the integrity of the system. They assert that the election process is divided between the primary and the general election, with the primaries screening out candidates within a party and the general election allowing the party candidates, independent candidates, and write-in candidates to face each other on the ballot. The Texas Election Code envisions the November general election as the proper forum for both major struggles and focused policy disputes between the political parties. The November general election is not an arena for continuing intraparty feuds, nor is it a proper arena for a failed party candidate to run yet again in the same election cycle as a candidate of another separate and distinct political party. The "sore loser" statute prohibits, and thus avoids, divisive and internecine intraparty fights after a political party had decided its nominee. Defendants argue that this section and the Texas Election Code as a whole seek to minimize unrestrained political factionalism and bickering that can only serve to confuse the electorate.
In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a California disaffiliation statute that denied ballot access to an independent candidate if that candidate had been affiliated with any political party within one year prior to the immediate preceding primary election. The Supreme Court found that the restriction protected the compelling state interest of furthering the stability of the political system by guarding against splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism. The Court stated:
the general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot.
Storer, 415 U.S. at 735, 94 S.Ct. at 1281.
The State may impose restrictions which settle intraparty competition before the general election. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1306, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974). In striking down an Ohio filing deadline in Anderson, the Supreme Court noted that the restriction was neither a "sore loser" nor a disaffiliation statute, indicating that those sorts of ballot access restrictions were constitutional. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 804, 103 S.Ct. at 1578. Courts have routinely upheld provisions similar to the Texas statute at issue. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1991); Backus v. Spears, 677 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982).
The Court finds that the Defendants' stated reasons for the "sore loser" statute are *75 valid, legitimate justifications for the restriction. There is no question that the present situation presents an example of intraparty feuding. Pat Buchanan is now, and at all relevant times has been, a Republican. It is well known that he would like to be in the place of the likely Republican nominee for President, Bob Dole, and that he has sought, in a spirited contest, the Republican Party's Presidential nomination in 1996. The "sore loser" statute is designed to address this very type of intra-party conflict.
Although the State's interest in protecting political stability is not as strong when a national election is at issue, the Defendants' justifications for the restriction are valid. The State's interest in preventing factionalism, intra-party feuding, and voter confusion outweighs the minimal burden the statute places on the Plaintiffs' rights. The Court finds that the Texas "sore loser" statute is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction that protects the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself and does not overly burden Plaintiffs' fundamental rights as voters.
