United States News
See other United States News Articles
Title: Polygamist who appeared on Sister Wives applies for a license to marry his second wife in wake of Supreme Court ruling on gay marriage
Source:
Daily Mail UK
URL Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art ... o-applies-wedding-license.html
Published: Jul 6, 2015
Author: AP and Daily Mail reporters
Post Date: 2015-07-06 15:48:02 by redleghunter
Keywords: None
Views: 3767
Comments: 59
A Montana man said Wednesday that he was inspired by last week's U.S. Supreme Court decision legalizing gay marriage to apply for a marriage license so that he can legally wed his second wife. Nathan Collier and his wives Victoria and Christine applied at the Yellowstone County Courthouse in Billings on Tuesday in an attempt to legitimize their polygamous marriage. Montana, like all 50 states, outlaws bigamy - holding multiple marriage licenses - but Collier said he plans to sue if the application is denied. 'It's about marriage equality,' Collier said Wednesday. 'You can't have this without polygamy.' Collier and his second wife were met with confusion when they went to the Yellowstone County court house on Tuesday to fill out the application. 'So, are you legally married, you didn't get divorced?' one clerk asked, when he saw that Collier marked 'not applicable' on a question asking the dissolution date of his previous marriage. Collier responded that he was indeed still married and trying to marry for a second time. 'We'll have to deny that, let me go grab the other supervisor real quick so I can get confirmation but as far as I'm aware you can't be married to two people at the same time,' another clerk said. County clerk officials initially denied Collier's application, then said they would consult with the county attorney's office before giving him a final answer, Collier said. Yellowstone County chief civil litigator Kevin Gillen said he is reviewing Montana's bigamy laws and expected to send a formal response to Collier by next week. 'I think he deserves an answer,' Gillen said, but added his review is finding that 'the law simply doesn't provide for that yet.' 'All we want is legal legitimacy. We aren't asking anybody for anything else. We just want to give our marriage and our family the legitimacy that it deserves,' Nathan Collier said. In a Facebook post on Wednesday, Nathan Collier said he had yet to hear an answer from the county attorney on their decision to grant or deny the marriage license. However, he says that he has told through 'other sources' that the attorney general's office is considering charging him for bigamy. 'I knew the risks I faced when I asked the State to grant legal legitimacy to my family, and I accepted those risks. 'I only ask that if their intent is to lock me in a cage (and we wonder why they keep asking for more money to expand the jails?!?!?) over my family dynamic, contact me privately and I will walk in your front door. 'I have no reason to run or hide. Please, don't kick my door in and shoot my dogs,' Collier wrote. Collier goes on to say that he is 'saddened' that his family faces such challenges in the 'land of the free'. 'You can believe that the entire nation is and will be watching your choices and actions. There is no honor in destroying functional families,' Collier added. The Supreme Court's ruling on Friday made gay marriages legal nationwide. Chief Justice John Roberts said in his dissent that people in polygamous relationships could make the same legal argument that not having the opportunity to marry disrespects and subordinates them. Poster Comment: Seems to look like a "happy, loving, healthy" family...I mean who are we to judge if they all really love each other....The wise Latina wants to know...
Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 14.
#3. To: redleghunter, Nolu Chan (#0)
(Edited)
The supreme court case centered around equal treatment under the law. The logic is that since a hetero couple can get married a homo couple should also because they are denied rights a married hetero couple would get. This does not apply to polygamists because that is not allowed for anyone. Whoever brings up this polygamy should now be legal argument just shows they are ignorant over the judicial arguments involved. I don't agree with gay marriage at all as a Christian but the arguments for it are based on the equal protection clause. If I am wrong, I will let our resident lawyer tell us otherwise.
No, it centered on the due process clause. The recent decision in Obergefell is based upon the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause is cited only for ancillary support to the main argument that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right. Equal protection of a right does not arise until the right is established as existing. The claim of a fundamental right is not just the use of a surplus adjective. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. Challenged legislation that significantly burdens a "fundamental right" (examples include First Amendment rights, (privacy, and the right to travel interstate)) will be reviewed under a stricter standard of review. A law will be held violative of the due process clause if it is not closely tailored to promote a compelling or overriding interest of government. A similar principle applies under Equal Protection law. Is the right to same-sex marriage either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution? As you may observe, finding a fundamental right at argument, whether explicit or emanating from a penumbra, affects the applicable standard of review under the due process clause. The underpinning of the majority opinion defining marriage is due process, not equal protection. See also, Roberts in dissent at 23-24: "Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right." Ante, at 19. The majority goes on to assert in conclusory fashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternative basis for its holding. Ante, at 22. Yet the majority fails to provide even a single sentence explaining how the Equal [24] Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitutional questions. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 197 (2009). In any event, the marriage laws at issue here do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States' "legitimate state interest" in "preserving the traditional institution of marriage." Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). It is important to note with precision which laws petitioners have challenged. Although they discuss some of the ancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such as hospital visitation rights and recognition of spousal status on official documents, petitioners' lawsuits target the laws defining marriage generally rather than those allocating benefits specifically. The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. Of course, those more selective claims will not arise now that the Court has taken the drastic step of requiring every State to license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples.
The recent decision in Obergefell is based upon the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause is cited only for ancillary support to the main argument that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right. Thanks for the clarification of the legalese. I don't think the due process clause can apply to polygamists but what do you think Nolu? Again, taking into account on what the ruling actually said rather than what anti-gay marriage activists like myself wish it said.
#20. To: Pericles, SOSO, misterwhite (#14)
I can understand why you wouldn't think so, but I do not see why the logic of the court does not extent to trios or quartets. I provide an extensive quote of the reasoning of the majority and a few snippet quotes at the end to illustrate the problem. Note the majority opinion at 11 relates, "The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry." Now picture cellmates/lifers exercising their fundamental right to marry. Good luck to the wardens. From the majority opinion Syllabus at 2: (synopsis of holding) (1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. From the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy at 10-15: (all emphasis as in original) Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The fundamental liberties protected by this Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147-149 (1968). In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484-486 (1965). The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, "has not been reduced to any formula." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. See ibid. That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements. History and tradi- 11 tion guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. See Lawrence, supra, at 572. That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present. The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invalidated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978), which held the right to marry was burdened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J. , 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). It cannot be denied that this Court's cases describing the right to marry presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners. The Court, like many institutions, 12 has made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is a part. This was evident in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question. Still, there are other, more instructive precedents. This Court's cases have expressed constitutional principles of broader reach. In defining the right to marry these cases have identified essential attributes of that right based in history, tradition, and other constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 574; Turner, supra, at 95; Zablocki, supra, at 384; Loving, supra, at 12; Griswold, supra, at 486. And in assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453-454; Poe, supra, at 542-553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. A first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki, supra, at 384 (observing Loving held "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals"). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. Indeed, the Court has noted it would 13 be contradictory "to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society." Zablocki, supra, at 386. Choices about marriage shape an individual's destiny. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has explained, because "it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition." Goodridge, 440 Mass., at 322, 798 N. E. 2d, at 955. The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at_-_(slip op., at 22-23). There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices. Cf. Loving, supra, at 12 ("[T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State"). A second principle in this Court's jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. This point was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception. 381 U. S., at 485. Suggesting that marriage is a right "older than the Bill of Rights," Griswold described marriage this way: "Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 14 projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. " Id., at 486. And in Turner, the Court again acknowledged the intimate association protected by this right, holding prisoners could not be denied the right to marry because their committed relationships satisfied the basic reasons why marriage is a fundamental right. See 482 U. S., at 95-96. The right to marry thus dignifies couples who "wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other." Windsor, supra, at_(slip op., at 14). Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other. As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association. Lawrence invalidated laws that made same-sex intimacy a criminal act. And it acknowledged that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring." 539 U. S., at 567. But while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty. A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer, 262 U. S., at 399. The Court has recognized these connections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole: "[T]he right to 'marry, establish a home and bring up children' is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 384 15 (quoting Meyer, supra, at 399). Under the laws of the several States, some of marriage's protections for children and families are material. But marriage also confers more profound benefits. By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents' relationship, marriage allows children "to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives." Windsor, supra, at_(slip op., at 23). Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children's best interests. See Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae 22-27. As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised by such couples. See Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae 4. Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents, see id., at 5. This provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at_(slip op., at 23). At 13: "The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation." Isn't this equally true for trios as couples? At 14: "As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association. Lawrence invalidated laws that made same-sex intimacy a criminal act. And it acknowledged that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring." Does a trio not have sexuality that finds overt expression in intimate conduct with one another? At 14: "A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education." Is this something exclusive to couples?
I believe that this will ultimately be looked upon as an exercise of due process of contractual law. Since the marriage license is generally viewed as a consensual contract between mutual parties to join together, the number if parties involved may cease to not matter. Yes, the quoted paragraph was talking about trade, but that is what all contracts are, a trade of something each party finds value in. Since marriage is a trade of value, the courts will continue to find that anything truly goes, as long as everything is "mutually consensual". As far as gay marriage being a fundamental right, I saw many times that being the question, but not the clear answer. Those justices dance around the term like dancers on hot coal, never once lingering long enough for the words to really burn them.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
#12. To: Pericles (#3)
The supreme court case centered around equal treatment under the law.
Fundamental rights. Those rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution, Price v. Cohen, C.A.Pa., 715 F.2d 87, 93, and state constitutions, Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763. See e.g., Bill of rights.
In addition to their due process argument, petitioners contend that the Equal Protection Clause requires their States to license and recognize same-sex marriages. The majority does not seriously engage with this claim. Its discussion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow. The central point seems to be that there is a "synergy between" the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and that some precedents relying on one Clause have also relied on the other. Ante, at 20. Absent from this portion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual framework for deciding equal protection cases. It is casebook doctrine that the "modern Supreme Court's treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing." G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein, M. Tushnet, & P. Karlan, Constitutional Law 453 (7th ed. 2013). The majority's approach today is different:
#14. To: nolu chan, SOSO, misterwhite (#12)
The supreme court case centered around equal treatment under the law. No, it centered on the due process clause.
Replies to Comment # 14. I don't think the due process clause can apply to polygamists but what do you think Nolu? Again, taking into account on what the ruling actually said rather than what anti-gay marriage activists like myself wish it said.
(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. Pp. 10–27.
III
#28. To: Pericles, nolo chan (#14)
I don't think the due process clause can apply to polygamists but what do you think Nolu?
Justice Rufus Peckham (1809–1873), writing for the Court in Allgeyer , favorably cited Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-house. He also quoted Justice John Marshall Harlan’s majority opinion in Powell . Though Powell upheld restrictions on the sale of margarine, Harlan recognized a Fourteenth Amendment right to “enjoyment upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances of the privilege of pursuing [an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding and selling property], as an essential part of [the] rights of liberty and property.” Neither of these previous opinions had suggested that the Constitution protects a general right to liberty of contract, but Peckham’s opinion in Allgeyer firmly established liberty of contract as a right protected by the F ourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.
(Emphasis mine) www.law.gmu.edu/assets/fi...eedom%20of%20Contract.pdf
End Trace Mode for Comment # 14.
[Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register]