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United States News Title: Why my grandsons will NOT be joining the USMC or any branch Current U.S. Rules Of Engagement In Afghanistan Problematic By WILLIAM MAYER December 17, 2009 - San Francisco, CA - PipeLineNews.org - The response to president Obama's much delayed announcement regarding increased troop levels in Afghanistan has been predictable, with opinion divided predominantly along ideological lines and less concern devoted to matters of military necessity. Generally, the left hates the idea of committing as many as 30,000 additional troops to the Afghan theater by next summer with many on the political right, though basically supportive of the mission, in large part demanding the full complement of 40,000 troops that Gen. McChrystal had originally requested [that number did not represent the upward limit of the General's most ambitious plan which took form in a much larger surge, comprised of possibly 85,000 troops]. But warfare is more than a game of numbers, depending on many less quantifiable and sometimes more important factors. Among those which are deservedly receiving much greater prominence now is the matter of the critical guidance issued to U.S. forces that serves to define what constitutes the appropriate use of force when engaging the enemy - the Rules of Engagement [ROE]. The issue comes under scrutiny now that the decision has been made to substantially increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, but with the daunting caveat that they will only be allotted about a year to prove their effectiveness before the withdrawal process is set in motion, in July of 2011, not surprisingly in consideration of the 2012 presidential election. The exact content of U.S. Rules of Engagement are necessarily classified, but can be stitched together and approximated with a reasonable degree of accuracy from various sources, media and otherwise. The most trustworthy of these come from statements - seldom for attribution - made by active U.S. combat forces and returning vets. The military itself will comment, with a certain sense of vagueness, about the general outlines of the ROE, but will not address specific elements of the directive. To those who believe that the West is embroiled in an epic conflict between civilization and Islamic jihad, the ROE loom large. If the rules are overly restrictive, U.S. combat efficiency will be negatively affected and American casualties will quickly rise. On the other hand if the ROE are too wide open then they might well serve to quash popular support for the mission among the Afghani people, a matter of prime concern in counterinsurgency warfare. There are two official military documents which provide relevant guidance on the use of lethal force. 1. ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance 2. Unclassified July 2, 2009 guidance regarding the Tactical Directive [ROE] At the beginning of December, PipeLineNews.org opened a line of communication with a senior ISAF spokesman in Afghanistan in order to more fully understand the ROE. What follows in this section is a verbatim transcript, our questions appear in bold. The response begins with a general statement of policy; we made the decision not to attribute the comments to a particular individual, though that was not part of the ground rules going into this process. The tactical directive requires troops, to the best of their ability, to ask a few fundamental questions in that situation. Even if someone might be shooting in my general direction, am I still in danger? Will I make more enemies than I'll kill by destroying property or, if I've missed something, innocent civilians? What are my other options to resolve this without escalating the violence? As unfortunate as they were, the incidents that have become emblems of perceived problems with the tactical directive were not situations in which the decisions discussed in the tactical directive ever came into play." What is the current directive regarding ROE in Afghanistan? Would you please describe the process under which this policy was determined, by whom the final policy was set and how long it has been in effect? US ROE is also under constant review by commanders at all levels of command. The Secretary of Defense, with input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chain of command, determines the ROE applicable to all US units. General McChrystal has recently issued a tactical directive designed to reduce civilian casualties while maintaining the inherent right of self defense for all units. While the tactical directive, like all orders is always subject to review, there are currently no plans to alter it." To what degree, if any, was the civilian government in Afghanistan a party to ROE being set? Are there plans to modify the current ROE to possibly be more consistent with the Afghan surge? Under what circumstances are battlefield captures/detainees 'Mirandized'? Under current policy, at what point does custodial interrogation begin for battlefield captures/detainees? "The questioning of individuals detained by ISAF forces is undertaken in accordance with ISAF and national rules and policy and complies with obligations under international law. As stated above detention by US service-members is conducted under the Law of Armed Conflict and not under criminal law and thus Miranda is not applicable. US law enforcement personnel would determine if Miranda warnings are required prior to any interview they conduct." It's difficult to read through the above guidance and not get the sense that an extraordinary degree of judgment and hence restraint is being required of the U.S. military in the Afghan theater, to a degree seldom if ever seen in warfare. A few enterprising U.S. media sources [in this case, an article published November 16, 2009 in the Washington Times] have expended much effort to piece together specific components of the ROE [source, U.S. troops battle both Taliban and their own rules] In a recent interview carried on NPR [seldom characterized as a pro-war media source] Rules Of Engagement Are A Dilemma For U.S. Troops one of the interviewees, Tom Bowman, relates his first-hand experience during a trip to Afghanistan, where he observed a detachment of Marines which was forced by the ROE to break off engaging a group of insurgents who were caught dead to rights placing a roadside IED. The anecdote ends with the gunship showing up and the insurgents responding by simply walking away unscathed, because the Marines no longer had the authority to engage the now "harmless" enemy. We have noted similar occurrences in our previous coverage, for example this September 29 piece Obama's Afghan Rules Of Engagement Prove He Has No Interest In Winning Such incidents are unfortunately not isolated. In a statement made during a national security briefing, sponsored by Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, by Lt. Col. Allen West [Retired, having served 2 1/2 years in Afghanistan at Kandahar Air Base as Sr. Advisor to the Afghan Army] he said, "The Rules of Engagement have been so terribly drawn up now that we are allowing the enemy to pin down our forces...before we will engage with all available weapon systems. The Taliban knows what we will and will not do. I'll give you a great example. You go outside the gate of Kandahar Air Base and you will have people that are sitting right outside the gate, that are watching convoys, that are counting, but you can't engage them because they don't have weapons and therefore they're not conveying any hostile intent..." [Col West's statement begins about 7:50 into the video] Other examples abound. One involves American units coming under attack, taking small arms fire from enemy forces which are operating near a village. In previous wars one of the main options would be to call in close air support and resolve the matter with finality, however in this conflict special legal clearance [which sometimes fail to materialize, despite the justifiability of the proposed action] must often be obtained before acting. As noted early in this piece, one of the key notions in U.S. counterinsurgency theory is that though the enemy can be militarily defeated, the conflict can nonetheless still be lost through inappropriate application of force which results in enough collateral [civilian] casualties to turn the populace against the effort, rendering liberators into occupiers in their minds. This concern was made clear by our military source in a follow up note: It seems clear that in Afghanistan some primary elements of the ROE must be viewed as being largely discordant with traditional war-fighting doctrine, making guidance subservient to political considerations which may or may not be wise, yielding a military strategy of yet undetermined effectiveness. One effect the current ROE has is to make all concerned overly cautious, cognizant of potential legal complications. When everyone from the commander on the ground to the command center on up to the Sec. of Defense and CIC becomes risk averse to an extreme degree, the real possibility of insufficient application of force becomes compounded exponentially, the higher the decision making process goes, if only because of increasing estrangement from the battlefield. The enemy undoubtedly has a very good understanding of our rules of engagement, after all they are the ones being targeted, and they routinely take advantage of them. The ease with which they game the system gives pause for concern that the ROE place questionable constraints on the use of lethal force by our troops. It's not breaking news that the Afghanis have now been at war continuously for 30 years and no one in that unfortunate country has any misconceptions regarding the brutality of warfare. Those in political authority, at least those at the local level who are not particularly allied with the enemy ideologically [questions of Islamic brotherhood and political hedging aside] want this conflict to end, resolved with a defeated Taliban. The goal of these players, many of them local chieftains and tribal leaders then intersects with the United States' major foreign policy objective which is to establish a mechanism in Afghanistan whereby the country can best avoid backsliding into its previous role as a base for Islamic jihad directed against the U.S. interests and the West in general. The only way to do this is to defeat the Taliban, something unquestionably within our military power. Failing to do so in the most effective manner invokes an event horizon fraught with unacceptable risk: One, if the Afghans get the sense that we are not serious about this matter, that we are so concerned with world opinion and its media drivers that we are not fully committed to defeating the jihadis, then they will necessarily hold back and not burn bridges with the Taliban and their sponsors. Who could blame them? Two, if the American public [increasingly restive about the Afghan operation, though in our opinion that is by no means a hardened position] is once again bombarded with daily body counts appearing above the fold on the front page of the New York Times et al., as U.S. troops suffer unneeded casualties while the war turns increasingly hot next spring and summer, then there will be considerable pressure, perhaps irresistible, given president Obama's apparent lack of genuine commitment to U.S. force projection anywhere, to end the conflict and leave the Afghans to the tender mercies of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the terrorist network. Three, though American troops have already proven themselves, beyond measure, as unfailingly courageous and effective, we can't expect them to maintain the requisite level of morale forever in the face of overly restrictive ROE and waning political support. For these reasons an urgent, immediate and thorough review of the ROE in Afghanistan is called for. This assessment should be done outside the extant "constant review" process referred to in the ISAF spokesman's statement. Attention must be directed to deemphasizing concern over what really amounts to public relations, crafted to assuage players who will never support the mission and don't like us in the first place, and instead move with all deliberate haste to assure maximization of American force effectiveness by optimizing the ROE. The key here must be to decisively defeat the Taliban and whatever remnants of al-Qaeda which might still be present and minimizing [while accepting the inevitability of] U.S. military and civilian Afghan casualties. As part of this process we must not ignore the opinions of those in positions of natural influence at the most elemental level in Afghan society, the tribal elders and imams [mirroring what was done in the successful Iraq surge] who eventually and understandably want us out, but on terms which can still be largely consistent with our legitimate foreign policy goals in the region. We realize that our military leaders have been presented with a supreme challenge in this matter, fighting a barbaric, totally committed and clever enemy in such a way as to navigate around the numerous obstacles, many of our own construction, placed along the way. We remain confident that if reasonableness prevails, something not entirely in evidence at this point, then we will achieve our goals and avoid fighting a pretend war which does disservice to this country our troops and the Afghan people. ©1999-2009 PipeLineNews.org LLC, William Mayer. All rights reserved.
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#1. To: All (#0)
These ROE's are so unglody, so stupid that they could easily be considered treason by any rational man or woman who cares anything about those we send to fight to make the powers of the oligarchy rich.
What are my other options to resolve this without escalating the violence? As unfortunate as they were, the incidents that have become emblems of perceived problems with the tactical directive were not situations in which the decisions discussed in the tactical directive ever came into play." What is the current directive regarding ROE in Afghanistan? "All forces operating under the authority of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan are subject to Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued by Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum. The ROE are consistent with NATO publication MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement. Non-ISAF US forces operate under similar ROE promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. US ROE are based on CJCSI 3121.01A. All US units, ISAF and non-ISAF, retain the inherent right of self defense. The ROE are classified and their content cannot be released to or discussed with members of the public." Just sent you some items. The above are generally not really ROE considerations but LOAC (Geneva convention) considerations. The spokesmen was correct...Every servicemember has an inherent right to self defense. Any hostile act (someone shooting at you) or hostile intent (somone setting up a mortar to shoot at you) clearly allows any and all use of force by the Soldier or Marine on the ground or aviator in the air. Once this is determined in under a second or seconds the response must be proportional. Meaning you do not bomb an entire market place full of civilian non-combatants to get at one RPG gunner running away. That's not Obola's rules or the ROE but the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). We signed and ratified treaties after and since WWII to join these warfare conventions. The EU nations have signed on to more restrictive agreements we declined to sign on to. If we remove ourselves from the tags of Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria and switch to an example of a high intensity conflict army on army, airforce on airforce. If we are in the middle of the desert beating an Arab army, then they retreat to a city location and start shooting artillery and rockets at our formations. Let's say there is no ROE and we are just fighting conventionally according to the LOAC. So we have this indirect fire coming in, we are taking casualties. Our radars give us precise grid coordinates and we have precision weapons to shoot back accurately. By the LOAC we have a right of self defense, we can shoot back. By LOAC we are to take into serious consideration also proportionality. Do we, even with precise weapons, shoot back at artillery firing from a crowed marketplace? A school in session? Apartment buildings? By the LOAC the commander on scene must make this determination that even though those above sites and buildings are protected by LOAC, they also lose that protection by LOAC when the enemy uses those sites. So the on scene commander down to the lowest level, by LOAC, can make that decision. If they fire back and kill civilians he or she must live with the consequences of those actions; if he or she decides not to fire back and we lose more troops to enemy fire, again they must live with the consequences of those actions. So, hostile act/intent and proportionality. That is LOAC. An example of ROE in the above situation, would be the restriction of making the decision to fire back or not at a higher level than the on scene commander and reserve it for a higher level commander. Perhaps at the company grade, field grade or flag officer levels. That seems to be the rub of many vets in my generation. The "big however" I observed were that company grade and field grade commanders were more restrictive in ADDING to the ROE than flag officers (generals). So after much investigation (at least in Iraq), the lower you went down the food chain, the more restrictive the ROE. I saw few cases of the flip side, the 'cowboy' unit commanders who ignored the ROE/LOAC.
And then there is this from the RT's. Tighter rules of engagement contributed to US casualty rate in Afghanistan – report US military directives enacted in Afghanistan after President Obama took office in 2009 could be to blame for an increase in casualties according to a critical new report, and may have laid the seeds for the current impasse in negotiations. Months after his presidential inauguration in 2009 Obama announced that the US would commit over 30,000 additional troops to the Afghan conflict. The order came at the request of military leaders on the ground in the Middle East, who advised the president that it would be beneficial to send troops in sooner and pull them out sooner than initially planned. Obama tapped General Stanley McChrystal and then Army General David Petraeus to carry out the directive. Yet a new report from the Washington Times, a conservative paper often critical of the administration’s policies, notes that the shift from the policies of the Bush administration to Obama’s may have cost more American lives. The rules of engagement (ROE) put into place in 2009 and the early part of 2010 limited air and artillery strikes in the name of preventing civilian casualties, and at times called upon soldiers to restrain from firing their weapons. The report in the Washington Times indicates that, upon approaching Taliban fighters, a ground unit would often have to convince a remote commander that the threat was armed before engaging. “In Afghanistan, the [rules of engagement] that were put in place in 2009 and 2010 have created a hesitation and confusion for our war fighters,” Wayne Simmons, a retired US intelligence officer who worked at NATO headquarters in Kabul under McChrystal and Petraeus, told the Times. “It is no accident nor a coincidence that from January 2009 to August of 2010, coinciding with the Obama/McChrystal radical change of the ROE, casualties more than doubled,” Simmons went on. “The carnage will certainly continue as the already fragile and ineffective [rules] have been further weakened by the Obama administration as if they were playground rules.” US troop strength more than doubled from 40,000 to 85,000 military personnel between 2008 and 2010, the first full year of the surge. Despite that influx 499 Americans were killed in 2010, three times the 2008 total and roughly five times the 2007 death toll. The American military presence peaked in 2011 at 100,000 troops, with 419 deaths that year. Numbers began to subside the following year, when the death toll fell to 319. Perhaps the most striking example of a bureaucracy putting lives at risk came in September 2009 at the battle of Ganjgal. Two soldiers were award the Medal of Honor for their actions in the in 10-hour fight in Afghanistan’s Kunar province, yet one of them – former Army Captain William Swenson – has said that the military’s reluctance to provide an air strike nearly killed him. “It’s not JAG (military attorney) responsibility to interject to say, ‘Hey, we are concerned that you’re going to hit a building,’” he told the Washington Times last month. “I can tell you that I am concerned with saving as many lives as I can, not necessarily one. Unfortunately, this is combat. I can’t be perfect, but I can do what I feel what’s right at the time.” Former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said in 2012, when the surge ended, that the Obama administration’s initiative had been a success, deeming it “a very important milestone” in the war. The “surge did accomplish its objectives of reversing the Taliban momentum on the battlefield and dramatically increase the size and capability of the Afghan national security forces,” Panetta told USA Today. An internal report card from the International Security assistance Force obtained by Wired magazine in 2012 indicates the contrary. The ISAF itself determined that many of the strategic gains from the surge turned out to be negligible and that other aspects of the conflict actually worsened. For instance, insurgents launched 475 homemade bomb attacks in July 2009, and approximately 625 in July 2012. Yet Swenson, the Medal of Honor recipient, said the issue was about much more than numbers for those who are fighting to save their own lives: “I am not a politician. I am just the guy on the ground asking for that ammunition to be dropped because it’s going to save lives.”
The excerpt you posted hopscotched a bit between info on the OEF surge and an anecdote of one denied bomb drop. Is there more? Difficult to assess without the reasoning for not dropping the payload.
#10. To: redleghunter (#8)
I don't I know, I posted the entire article.
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